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ABSTRACT
Four long poems have been selected for study which
in one way or another have epic pretensions and yet are
distinctively modern. They share a concern for language
and an awareness of poetry as a linguistic medium which
is involuted and self-conscious, a pre-occupation with
myth and history which is reflected in their treatment
of time, and an interest in such techniques as fragmen¬
tation, collage and open or serial forms.
I seek to place these poems in the wider context of
developments in poetic theory since Imagism and the under¬
lying influences of metaphysical systems such as Whitehead's
philosophy of process and organism and Heidegger's existen¬
tial phenomenology.
The first chapter introduces Bergson, T.E. Hulme and
discusses the beginnings of Imagism. The second chapter
considers Ezra Pound and the development of Vorticism.
The third chapter is a study of The Anathemata. The fourth
chapter is a study of In Memoriam James Joyce. The fifth
chapter traces movements in American poetics from Imagism
and Vorticism through Objectivism and W.C. Williams to
Charles Olson and Projective Verse. The sixth chapter
discusses the relevance of Whitehead and Heidegger. The
seventh chapter is a study of Passages. The eighth chapter
is a study of Gunslinger.
In conclusion, I find that these attempts to write
the long poem, to create epic forms consonant with our
times must be founded on a monistic and dynamic view of
the universe where art and poetry, while they are intensi¬
fications of consciousness, articulations of energy, are
nevertheless part of life, historical, not detached nor
separable from life. Such a view is opposed to the classical
dualism where art and life, form and content, eternity and
time are radically separate to the extent that confidence
in the possibility of communication and therefore of
community is either shattered or dependent on faith in
an arbitrary and unknowable God. The deity in these long
poems is discovered in the Logos, in the recurrent moment
of creation when the union of matter and spirit is realised
in language.
TOWARDS OPEN FORM :
A STUDY OF PROCESS POETICS IN RELATION TO FOUR LONG POEMS
Introduction
I do go in circles, in fact believe that only if one
does, does one finally suck up the vertu in anything.
Charles Olson
The Special View of History.
This thesis originates from a previous study of the
poetry and poetics of Charles Olson and their place in the
history of modern and post-modern poetry. The study led
to the discovery of the wealth of American poetry produced
in the fifties, sixties and early seventies, poetry which
reaches back from Olson, Duncan and perhaps Ginsberg to
Zukofsky, Williams and finally to Pound. One feature of
this "New American Poetry" as Don Allen called it in his
anthology, The New American Poetry (New York, Evergreen:
1960) was the willingness to entertain the possibility
of the long poem, the public poem, the poem including
history which might be termed epic.
Poets attempting these ambitious extended works had
as their chief examples The Cantos, Pqfcerson, and more
recently, itself in process throughout the sixties,
Charles Olson's The Maximus Poems. Zukofsky's "A" is also
important but not, I am inclined to think, as well known
or accessible and therefore less influential.
These poems and the theory of poetics which lie
behind them seem to stem historically from the movement
in Anglo-American poetry which had its chief outlet in
Imagism. I was led back, therefore, to Imagism, behind
Pound to T.E. Hulme and the philosopher, Henri Bergson,
to the inception of modernism, in an attempt to explain
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the wealth of the American inheritance and to discover,
if possible, parallel developments in British poetry.
This attempt was largely unsuccessful and the two poems,
Anathemata by David Jones and In Memoriam James Joyce by
Hugh MacDiarmid, considered in the first part of this
thesis, must be regarded as atypical. In my view, which
I hope to substantiate in the arguments which follow, the
poetic theories and debate initiated by the Imagists
allowed for two possible lines of development: on the one
hand, the reversion to dualism with its unbridgeable gulf
between subject and object, man and world, spirit and
matter, a position which leads ultimately to blind faith
or through irony to silence; and on the other hand, a
dialectical monism, a view which sees history or reality
as the continuing interaction of man and world, spirit
and matter, thought and action, with language and literature
as an integral and contributing part of that process.
The British poets have by and large inclined to the first
view; the Americans, at least those under discussion, have
been more sympathetic to the second.
Of course, the moment of Imagism is necessarily an
arbitrary starting point. Theories of organism and
process reach back before the twentieth century. Organic
philosophy and its implications for art, as Frank Kermode
has pointed out in his discussion of the evolutions of
the image, may be traced back to the earliest Romantics.1
In Britain, Coleridge continues to be regarded as the
most important source of such ideas. But recognition of
the antecedents of process philosophy should not disguise
the very considerable and revitalising effect the ideas
of writers such as Bergson, then Whitehead and, later,
Heidegger had on poetic theory. I hope to demonstrate
how different versions of process philosophy have perco¬
lated through into poetry and at the same time to show how
the poems under discussion may best be interpreted in
terms of process. In this study I shall pay particular
attention to the above-named philosophers: to Bergson as
the first to answer the positivists and because of his
crucial relationship to T.E. Hulme and the origins of
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Imagism; to Whitehead as the metaphysician who accommo¬
dated Einsteinian physics and because of his influence on
Charles Olson and hence on Robert Duncan and Edward Dorn;
and to Heidegger because of his fundamental importance in
shaping the contemporary intellectual climate, because of
his acknowledged significance for Dorn and because of the
many remarkable parallels between his writing and the work
of Olson and Duncan. These philosophers afford different
aspects of dynamic and processual ontologies and epistemo-
logies which are of use in interpreting the poetic theory
and practice of the poets under discussion. In no way is
their influence exclusive; in each case, the philosophical
elements are mediated and their contributions, more or
less indirect, make up only a part of the many sources
which have shaped the poem.
The development of poetic theory in the twentieth
century has centered very largely round the notion of the
image, a notion espoused by conflicting schools of poetry
and criticism under many different guises. In his book,
Romantic Image, Frank Kermode has recognised the centrality
of the concept, its derivation from the "symbol" and its
successive reincarnation, for instance as "ideogram",
"vortex", "epiphany", "concrete universal", and so on.
Kermode has indicated the difficulties which symbolism,
imagism and all their successors have posed for the long
poem:
For the ideograms of that poem (Pound's Cantos) are symbols
(or Images, or Vortices) which seemed, because of their
developed function in Chinese thought, to have some hope
of holding together in a structure owing nothing to logic
and connective discourse. In this way, and with the aid
of music (a fugue has structure but no discursive meaning)
a long poem might be possible, whereas if it has to resort
to continuous narrative or doctrine it becomes at best
a series of short poems tediously bound together by prose,
But the difficulties are enormous, in terms of precision
and complexity of the symbolic relationships; and the
finished product, eschewing all devices which we habitually
recognise as establishing connexions, may be nothing but
a confused heap of words, with only the isolated perfect
detail to show how dreadfully the artist has squandered
his power.2
Yet despite the formidable difficulties, poets have
followed Pound in attempting the long poem on a methodology
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derived from imagist theory. I shall argue that imagism
and the various movements which have succeeded it, with
all their ramifications and implications, are indeed central
in the development of contemporary poetics, and moreover
that those artists who have sought to create a contemporary
long poem have inevitably been constrained by the context
of these ideas, which though at first apparently inimical
have proved to offer new possibilities for extended work
in verse.
Although I shall refer extensively to the poetry and
criticism of Pound, Williams, Olson and others, I have
considered it more useful to take as my texts four lesser
known long poems, very different from each other, but in
those differences revelatory of the impact of imagism and
its successors, with all the problems, reverbations and
interpretations they have given rise to. The two earlier
British poems, Anathemata by David Jones and In Memoriam
James Joyce by Hugh MacDiarmid might be described as
products of the first wave of modernism, while the two
later, American poems, Robert Duncan's Passages and
Edward Dorn's Gunslinger, are second generation, or what
has come to be called "post-modern".3
These poems have more in common than simply their
length. Each of them, in its own way, may be considered
as poems in "open form", All of them, in different respects,
have epic pretensions. Considering the latter question
first, we must recognise that "epic" is a much abused and
ill-defined term. We must also recognise that modern epic
will not be in the pattern of Gilgamesh, nor The Iliad,
The Aeneid, nor even Paradise Lost. Each of these versions
of epic differs from the others though there may be common
factors which allow for the continuing use of the name.
These differences arise out of historical change and alter¬
ing historical circumstances: to name only the most obvious,
the difference in function between oral and written poetry,
between the poem of the tribe or polis, and the poem of
empire, or between the secular and religious epic. Thus,
the epic of the twentieth century will have its nature
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determined by the circumstances of the twentieth century
although the history of the epic may impose certain constraints
and provide for certain expectations. The term is loose
and all we can offer is an attempt to identify those limits
and expectations in relation to the poetry which interests
us here.
"An epic is a poem including history"^ said Ezra Pound,
and went on to define history in terms of economics.
William Carlos Williams, in an incidental comment in his
introduction to a book by David Ruth, says this:
The truth is that news offers the precise incentive to epic
poetry, the poetry of events; and now is precisely the time
for it since never by any chance is the character of a
single fact ever truthfully represented todays tver we ore.
to have any understanding of what is going on about us we
we shall need some other means to discover it.
The epic poem would be our "newspaper"., Pound's cantos
are the algebraic equivalent but too perversely individual
to achieve the universal understanding required. The epic,
if you please, is what we're after, but not the lyric-epic
sing-song. It must be a concise sharp-shooting epic style.
Machine-gun style. Facts, facts, facts, tearing into us
to blast away our stinking flesh of news. Bullets.5
It seems, therefore, that epic is expected to have
a public, indeed political aspect, to be engaged with
history and with contemporary events. But epic has also
traditionally included myth and the modern epic can be no
exception for it is by the very process of selecting facts
and historical events, by relating them and structuring
them that myth is created. This conscious pursuit of
pattern which we may describe as mythopoeic is perhaps
what Williams disparagingly called "algebraic" in the
Cantos. Traditionally, epic preserves and perpetuates the
culture of the tribe through gathering its history and
ruling myths, presenting each in terms of the other, so
that the society and members of the society will know
themselves more fully, and through that self-awareness be
rendered more free to choose and determine their own future
course. Traditional oral epic has a strongly didactic and
socially cohesive influence, which literary imitations
from Virgil's Aeneid to Milton's Paradise Lost have sought
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to emulate. Wo matter how successful or otherwise they
have been, it must be recognised how strongly such aims
have continued to influence the poets. MacDiarmid, in
the long sections of his vast incomplete masterwork, and
Olson, in The Maximus Poems, however different they may
be in other ways, share this overwhelming urge to teach
and prophecy to their people, to alter society. But all
four of the poems we shall discuss incorporate and indeed
struggle with themes of history and myth in order to weave
from them some sort of coherence for their own time. This
is true at the simplest level of content where we may take
history as referring to all individual facts, whether these
are chronological, geological or physical, and where myth
will cover all references to mythology, religion, legend
or folli-belief. Thus, for example, in Anathemata,
David Jones's reference to ship-building in the Pool of
London or geology in Wales is historical, while his evocation
of Arthur or of Catholic ritual can be deemed myth.
Similarly, MacDiarmid's discussion of the diversity of
languages or of methods of catching fish can be considered
historical while the appearance of the "Gile na Gile"
(brightest of the bright") is mythical. Robert Duncan's
description of bombing in Vietnam or of the interior of
his own home is, in the first instance, historical, while
his invocation of Ahriman, the Persian principle of evil,
or of Pegasus and Chrysaor, is mythical. In Edward Dorn's
Gunslinger, Howard Hughes, Heidegger and the geography of
the American West are historical, but the coach of
Parmenides is mythical. The last example, however, neatly
illustrates the arbitrariness of his distinction between
history and myth, since Howard Hughes and Heidegger both
appear as mythical rather than historical figures, though
their historicity creates a surrealistic edge in the poem.
The importance of history and myth at the level of
content implies an element of representational art, and
indeed as far as representation goes these poets would
follow the demands of the imagists for exactitude and
precision. But the modern movement has sought very largely
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to get away from the more straightforward kinds of represen¬
tation, away from the idea of art as mimesis, in the sense
of holding a mirror up to nature or producing simulacra
of achieved forms. Instead, the attempt was to capture
the process of becoming, a breakaway which in literature
resulted in the use of surreal techniques, fractured
continuity, apparent dislocations in time and space and
the break-up of narrative. This is mimesis in a profounder
sense, in that the poem attempts to imitate the process
which inform the world and mind and in so doing recognises
its own participation in and contribution to those processes.
The life-form of the poem is generated through its continu¬
ing translation of history into myth, a process which is
conditioned as much by its own existing shape as by the
events which impinge upon it.
Attention to the image is as important in the long
poem as in the shortest of imagist apercus. However, it
is the ordering or arrangement of the imagery which is of
paramount significance for the long poem. Donald Davie,
in his study of Pound,6 points out that prolonged appli¬
cation of imagist techniques resulted in static, dis¬
continuous poetry. However, it can be argued that the
possibilities for the long poem have developed with the
increasing recognition that it is the relationships between
elements in a poem which create its dynamism, that images
generate images in a process which has the coherence of
the living organism. This process of ordering is meta-
phoric in that it consists in placing images in relation
to each other according to perceived similarities or points
of identity. It is also mythic, for according to the
Aristotelian definition quoted approvingly by Olson and
Duncan, myth is "the arrangement of the incidents".7 In
its metaphoric aspect, the process is innovative, creative,
devouring fresh images which keep the poem alive and open.
In its mythic aspect, the process reinforces its own form
so that the selection of fresh material is not free, but
determined by the existing shape of the poem. Each of
these aspects implies the other; neither can be disregarded.
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To give some crude examples: a leveret may grow to become
a hare, but never a bull; and, on the literary level, the
first book of Paradise Lost makes possible the twelfth
book, but never the final Cantos. Metaphor may be the
extension or discovery of meaning, but in the sense that
discovery can only be the discovery of that which is already
there, the discovered meaning is the myth.
When we recognise that the poem may have organic life
we admit the possibility of the long poem, but we must also
recognise that the poem is a form in language, itself a
specialised form of life. History and myth, we have
suggested, are the primary materials of the long poem, but
the life of the poem is the conversion of history into
myth through language. Therefore, though we must take account
of external conditioning factors such as authorial intention,
theoretical context and historical circumstances our first
attention must be to the poem as a development in language,
as it is written, as it is read or heard, and as it remains
capable of growth.
Every rereading, revision and addition is a specific
occasion and adds to the life of the poem. At the same
time, and here the life of the poem differs from the
physical life of the animal or human, each repetition or
re-enactment of the poem lifts it out of historical time.
This is the basis of ritual and myth and indeed the basis
of the only human claim to immortality for which we have
evidence. It is because the poem exists and works in
historical time that it can achieve immortality and confer
that immortality on men in the shape of social and cultural
continuity.
The poetics of process demand a much more flexible
concept of the boundaries of the poem. Of the four poems
considered here, only one, Duncan's Passages, remains
theoretically "unfinished". Yet Passages may die a "natural
death" in that while its author need not officially put an
end to it, no more may be written. Similarly, The Cantos,
The Maximus Poems and Hugh MacDiarmid's vast and variously
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named poemshave ended in the sense that their originators,
having died, v/ill add no more to them. They are less
"finished", but only to a degree, than David Jones'
Anathemata or Gunslinger while In Memoriam James Joyce is
itself a component of the larger work mentioned above.
Moreover, each of these poems contains within itself
sections or passages which may well be regarded as complete
poems in their own right. The problems of the boundaries
of the poem and of individual authorship will be discussed
further in the examination of the individual poems. Suffice
it to say here that the boundaries in physical life are
equally problematic. Should we consider the cell, the
individual, the group or the society as the primary unit
of life? Any single answer brings with it a doctrinaire
philosophy which excludes other possibilities. This is
also true of the poem and the realm of literature. Can
we not recognise the form of each poem, of each section
of each poem, and of each poetic opus, while at the same
time seeing each unit as constituent of a larger form and
eventually of the largest form of total human culture?
We need also to be aware that the poem stays open, that
its terminus comes from within itself as much as from the
determination of the author. However, we may not delude
ourselves by thinking that because the extent of a poem's
life is indefinite it is infinite. Even at the widest
level, the continuation of culture is inseparable from
the continuation of human history.
In this thesis I consider four poems which I believe
may most fruitfully be interpreted in terms of a poetics
of process. In attempting such an interpretation I have
sought to trace the historical developments of poetics
which is their context, and, at the same time, to show,
by an analysis of the texts, how a theory of process and
of open form is precipitated from the poems themselves.
In examining each poem I have tried to uncover the poetic
theory and philosophy of the poet by considering his sources,
his critical writings and his place in literary history.
However, since my aim has been to discover from these
poems a consistent line of development and a theory of
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open form which might provide a metapoetic ground or justi¬
fication for the writing of long poems, ray critical response
has been strongly coloured by the poems themselves. This
influence is, of course, as fruitful as it is inevitable
and is part of the continuing life of the poems, but it is
an influence of which I, as critic, must be conscious and
wary.
In addition to the ideas gathered from the poems
themselves and the reading which they have imposed upon me,
I have drawn on a variety of critical writing. Much of
this material has been too thoroughly absorbed or adapted
to be explicitly acknowledged in the text and I have tried
to remedy these omissions in the general section of the
bibliography.
It may be helpful to give here a brief outline of
the sequence and contents of chapters. Chapter One is a
discussion of Bergson and Hulme in relation to the beginn¬
ings of Imagism, while Chapter Two investigates more closely
the social and literary context of Imagism as it developed
with Hulme and later Pound. This chapter includes an
analysis of the various Imagist manifestoes and their
implications.
Chapter Three considers David Jones and the Anathemata,
the first part being a general introduction of Jones's
work and ideas, while the second part is devoted to the
analysis of the poem itself. Chapter Four, in the same
pattern, is concerned with Hugh MacDiarmid and In Memoriam
James Joyce.
Chapter Five which opens the second part of the thesis
may be regarded as an updating of poetic theory since
Imagism, tracing developments from the Thirties, the
Objectivists, Oppen, Zukofsky and Williams to Projective
Verse (1950) and beyond. Chapter Six attempts, briefly,
to relate the philosophies of Whitehead and Heidegger as
significant influences on post-modern aesthetics and, in
particular, on process poetics. Chapter Seven is devoted
to Robert Duncan and Passages, Chapter Eight to Gunslinger
by Edward Dorn. A final chapter recapitulates and reiterates
the main tenets and conclusions of the thesis.
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Bergson's philosophy was characterised by Bertrand
Russell as neither verifiable nor falsifiable, but of its
nature more attractive to poets and artists than to modern
mathematicians or scientists. "His imaginative picture of
the world, regarded as a poetic effort, is in the main not
capable of either proof or disproof".1 Russell, (as the)
epitome of the rational humanist, was unlikely to be
sympathetic to Bergson's views, his anti-intellectualism,
his insistence on intuition. Nevertheless, Henri Bergson
was for a time one of the most popular philosophers the
world has known. People queued to hear him when he
lectured in the College de France. His doings were followed
by the Press. When he came to London he lectured to
capacity audiences at University College, and anyone who,
like Hulme, could boast a personal acquaintanceship found
himself much cultivated. No doubt many of those who
attended his lectures or quoted his philosophy were merely
following fashion; on the other hand, a number of writers
and thinkers found in his works a sort of salvation, a
system which rescued them from the despair into which
scientific determinism had plunged them. One example was
the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, later to become
distinguished as a Catholic neo-Thomist aesthetician. As
students, he and his wife, desolate in an "unhappy and
cruel universe, wherein the sole light was the philosophy
of scepticism and relativism",2 resolved to die by their
own hands if within a fixed period they had not discovered
some way of living according to some spiritual truth,
some way of reasserting an absolute. We shall come back
to Maritain, with his initial enthusiasm for Bergson and
eventual rejection of him, when considering the ideas
behind David Jones's poetry.
Meanwhile, we can turn to T.E. Hulme who had explained
in some detail why he was attracted to Bergsonian philosophy,
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for it was very largely through his lectures and propaganda
that the French thinker's ideas were taken up in England.
In a series of 'Notes on Bergson' published in The New Age
during 1911 and 1912, Hulme described how he came to
appreciate the philosopher:
The growth of (the) mechanistic theory during the last two
centuries has put a weapon of such a new and powerful nature
into the hands of the materialist, that in spite of oneself
one is compelled to submit. It is as if one side in the
faction fight had suddenly armed themselves in steel breast¬
plates while the other went unprotected... A candid examina¬
tion of one's own mind shows one that the mechanistic
theory has an irresistible hold over one (that is, if one
has been educated in a certain way) ... It is from this
frank recognition of forces that comes my excitement about
Bergson. I find, for the first time, this force which
carries me on willy-nilly to the materialist side, balanced
by a force, which is, as a matter of actual fact, apart
from the question of what I want, able to meet on equal
terms, the first force. As the materialist side becomes
for a time triumphant, because it became, to a certain
extent, artificial by putting on heavy armour (this is how
the effect of the mechanistic theory appears to me), so in
Bergson, in the conception of time, I find that the other
side, the scattered opposition to materialism, has taken
on for its part, a, to a certain extent, artificial form
which is able to meet the other side on equal terms.3
We recognise that Bergson's philosophy attracted the
disciples of the arts because it defended art while acknow¬
ledging the discoveries of science. Whitehead's ideas were
also to appeal to poets because they offered an accommo¬
dation of science which was not inimical to art. However,
Whitehead's philosophy is more radical for it transcends
the two sides of materialism and anti-materialism, "the
scattered opposition", whereas Bergson merely strengthened
the latter against the former. It would be beyond the
scope of this thesis to trace the historical course of the
conflict between art and science or the correlated notion
of the "dissociation of sensibility" which is effectively
criticised in Kermode's Romantic Image. It is a conflict
based on a deep-seated metaphysical dualism, on the premise
of an ineradicable division between spirit and matter,
Bergson himself did not attempt to overcome this division
but rather elaborated and confused it. Claiming that the
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division occurs far back in evolution, before the emergence
of man, he asserted that the original vital impulse (elan
vital) split into three forms of activity, vegetal,
instinctual and intellectual.11 We remark an affinity with
Catholic Thomism, for Aquinas posited three kinds of soul,
vegetative, sensitive and rational.5 Man is possessed of
all three but the last is peculiar to him. By virtue of
his rational soul he is placed between Creator and creation,
an uneasy combination of spirit and matter. The acceptance
of dualism which has characterised modern thought has been
a common base for most scientists, artists and religious
believers. Anti-positivists have rejected, for the most
part, not dualism, but rationalism. Rationalism, based on
materialism, leads to scientific determinism which was held
to be irreconcileable with a belief in the value or signi¬
ficance of art or literature. As examples of the inhibiting
force of determinism, Bergson and Hulme cited the famous
declarations of Laplace and Huxley.
An intellect which at a given instant knew all the forces
with which nature is animated and the respective situations
of the beings that comprise Nature - supposing that some
intellect were vast enough to subject these data to analysis -
would embrace in the same formulae the notions of the
greatest bodies in the universe and those of the slightest
atom; nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future
like the past, would be present to its eyes. -Laplace-
If the fundamental proposition of evolution is true, that
the entire world, living and not living, is the result of
the mutual interaction according to definite laws of the
forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive
nebulosity of the universe was composed - it is no less
certain that the existing world lay potentially in the
cosmic vapour, and that a sufficient intellect, could from
the knowledge of the properties of that vapour, have
predicted, say the state of the fauna in Great Britain in
1869 with as much certainty as one can say what will
happen to the vapour of the breath on a cold winter's day.
-Huxley- 6
The possibility of such complete knowledge of past
and future, the assertion that every event is predetermined
seems to deny that there can be either free will or creativity.
If every event is already determined by inevitable chains,
then no action can be chosen or free. Furthermore, if
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every act depends on what has preceded it and can at least
in theory be predicted, there is no possibility of novelty.
All works of art exist already potentially, and the artist
must consider himself part of the cosmic machine, a mere
instrument devoid of will, for their realisation. Few
artists could work with such an understanding of their
role. The conception is particularly uncongenial to those
reared in the cultural traditions of the West, in the
heritage of the Renaissance and the Romantics, for they
hold dear the notions of man's free will, of the human
spirit as either itself divine or with access to the divine
and hence outside natural or mechanical laws. T.E. Hulme
described this "nightmare":
In the picture of the world as it existed before the arrival
of the mechanistic theory you had a good deal of freedom in
matter itself, and consciousness had this certificate, at
least, to it - its independence and reality - that it was
able to act directly on andfeproduce changes in this, the
physical world. You might suspect its existence to be a
precarious one; but, at any rate, it did exist temporarily,
and could prove this existence by real action. But if you
accept the mechanistic view of the world, not only does all
freedom disappear from the material world, but also from
the organic. The world is pictured as a mass of atoms and
molecules, which are supposed to carry out unceasingly
movements of every kind. The matter of which our bodies
is composed is subject to the same laws as the matter out¬
side. The motion of every atom of your brain is, then,
subject to the same laws of motion as those which govern
all matter. It is, then, completely mechanical and calcul¬
able. If, then, at any moment you know the position of
all the atoms of a human body, you could calculate with
unfailing certainty the past, present and future actions
of the person to whom that body belonged. Consciousness,
then, does nothing; it makes no difference; everything
would go on just the same without it.7
The ultimate consequences, therefore, of rational
empiricist activity is to verify its own utter expenda-
bility. It was in answer to the despairing niju-lism
which such a position entailed that Bergson had recourse
to a second mode of knowledge, "intuition". It must be
emphasised that he still accepted the fundamental dualist
metaphysic, indeed reasserted it against the radical
materialism of the extreme positivists. According to
Bergson, the function of the practical intellect or
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scientific method is to organise experience so as to enable
us to act, but this process necessitates abstraction and
generalisation which distort the truth of reality. Against
this, he championed intuition which alone gives access to
the real but is removed from action and therefore impotent.
Intellect, writes Bergson in Creative Evolution
has the advantage of enabling us to foresee the future and
of making us in some measure masters of events; in return,
it retains of the moving reality only eventual immobilities,
that is to say, views taken of it by our mind. It symbolises
the real and transposes it into the human rather than
expresses it. The other knowledge (intuition) if it is
possible is practically useless, it will not extend our
empire over our nature, it will even go against certain
natural aspirations of the intellect; but, if it succeeds,
it is reality itself that it will hold in a firm and final
embrace.8
This conception of the activity of the practical
intellect may seem akin to Heidegger's account of "inauthentic"
or "everyday" behaviour. However, Heidegger moved beyond
dualism with his concept of "Being in the World" and recog¬
nised that it is this inauthentic understanding which is
leading us to destruction. Similarly, Charles Olson,
disciple of Whitehead's philosophy of process which also
transcends dualism, decried the tradition of rational
empiricism. "With Aristotle the two great means appear -
logic and classification. And it is they that have so
fastened themselves on habits of thought that action is
interfered with, absolutely interfered with, I should say".9
But Olson, unhampered by dualism, believed in the possibility
of knowledge as direct access to, indeed possession of the
real, so that knowledge and action become one. His position
and the influence of Whitehead and Heidegger will be dis¬
cussed at length in Chapter Six. In this chapter our first
concern must be the impact of Bergson on contemporary
literature.
Let us then consider Hulme's presentation of Bergson's
conception of the intellect. This is expressed most
succinctly in his paper "Bergson's Theory of Art" which is
an abstract of, and at times quotes directly from, Bergson's
writings, particularly as found in the three major works,
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Time and Free Will, Creative Evolution and Matter and
Memory.
Man's primary need is not knowledge but action ... The
function of the intellect is so to present things not
thatW* muy most thoroughly understand them, but that we may
successfully act on them.10
... What I see and hear is simply a selection made by my
senses to serve as a light for my conduct. My senses and
my consciousness give me no more than a practical simpli¬
fication of reality. In the usual perception I have of
reality all the differences useless to man have been
suppressed. My perception runs in certain moulds. Things
have been classified with a view to the use I can make of
them. It is this classification I perceive rather than
the real shape of things. I hardly see an object, but
merely notice what class it belongs to - what ticket I
ought to apply to it.11
The method of the intellect is to analyse everything in
terms of atomic explanations:
We find atoms everywhere. We reduce everything to exten¬
sive manifolds. We always pursue the method of analysis
simply because that is the only way in which the intellect
can deal with things.12
Hence the "intellect distorts reality because it persists
in unfolding things out in space". Against the "extensive
manifolds", Hulme, following Bergson, sets up the notion
of the "intensive manifold" which is unanalysable and can
be known only through intuition. Hulme's theories of
imagism and his prescriptions for art and poetry are to a
great extent derived from this notion of intensive manifolds.
To understand this concept, we must return to Bergson's
assertion of two ways of knowing, through intuition and
through intellect, and to his distinctions between abstract
and real time, or duration.
Bergson argues, in Time and Free Will, that men have
a special faculty of perceiving or conceiving empty, homo¬
geneous space, and that this faculty enables us to "use
clean-cut distinctions, to count, to abstract, and perhaps
also to speak".13 This homogeneous medium is devoid of
every quality, but in it the mind can set or represent to
itself material objects which are mutually exclusive. In
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other words, extensive manifolds are apprehended in space
by the intellect. It is customary to think of time as
similar to space, as being also a homogeneous, unbounded
medium. However, argues Bergson, this is a mistaken view,
for "when we make time a homogeneous medium in which
conscious states unfold themselves, we take it to be
given all at once, which amounts to saying that we abstract
it from duration". When we try to recollect our psychic
status we represent them in abstract time, or in what
Bergson calls space, "We may therefore surmise that time,
conceived under the form of a homogeneous medium, is some
spurious concept, due to the trespassing of the idea of
space upon the field of pure consciousness".u Time, as
a homogeneous medium, can be reduced to space, "Real time"
or "pure duration", on the other hand, is "the form which
the succession of our conscious states assumes when our
ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating
its present states from its former states". Real time can
only be lived, it cannot be analysed or represented, for
analysis and representation are symbolic and atomic
processes which are executed in the medium of space. Pure
duration is not homogeneous since it is always changing,
always becoming.
In a word, pure duration might well be nothing but a
succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and
permeate one another, without precise outlines, without
any tendency to externalise themselves in relation to one
another, without any affiliation with number; it would be
pure heterogeneity.
This notion of heterogeneity is somewhat akin to Hulme1s
rather picturesque philosophy of "Cinders":16
The cosmos is only organised in parts; the rest is cinders ...
Many necessary conditions must be fulfilled before the
counters and the chessboard can be posed elegantly on
the cinders ... The absolute is to be described not as
perfect, but if existent as essentially imperfect, chaotic
and cinderlike ...
Only in the fact of consciousness is there unity in the
world ...
Unity is made in the world by drawing squares over it.
Hulme1s notes express an extreme of scepticism but they
draw attention to the same disparity between the reality
which is flux and the order imposed by the human mind.
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However, continuous change is the reality and is
necessary for creative evolution. The mathematician can
conceive of abstract time when he divides intervals for
the purpose of calculation, but he is always speaking of
given moments, which are as abstract as the concept of
the pure point in space. They have nothing to do with
real time, which is flow. "The world the mathematician
deals with is a world that dies and is reborn at every
instant". But evolution demands continuity, real time,
"the persistence of the past into the present". "Continuity
of change, preservation of the past in the present - the
living being seems, then, to share these attributes with
consciousness. Can we go further and say that life, like
conscious activity, is invention, is unceasing creation".17
Hulme's explanation of "real time" may help to clarify
the notion:
In the mechanical world, then, time might flow with
infinite rapidity and the entire past, present and future
be spread out all at once. But inside us it is very different.
In us time is an undeniable fact. If I want to mix a glass
of sugar and water I have to wait willy-nilly until the
sugar melts. This is real time; it coincides with my
impatience, that is with a certain portion of my duration
which I cannot contract as I like ... Real duration, real
time is an absolute thing which cannot be contracted or
hastened because in it real work is being done, really new
things are appearing.
In the world of mechanism ... there is no real creation of
new things, there is merely a rearrangement of fixed elements
in various positions. They can't be said to exist in time,
because nothing new happens, there is no real time because
there is no real change. At a certain depth of mental
life you experience real time because there is a real
change; new things are produced and not a mere rearranging
of old parts. Time then is creation. In real time you get
real creation and so real freedom.18
We may ask how we are to apprehend this reality which
is duration, if every attempt to do so through the intellect
is doomed to be a distortion since it inevitably introduces
three dimensions. Here the artist comes into his own and
the field is left clear for imagism. We return to Hulme's
interpretation of Bergson's theory of art.
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7. The creative activity of the artist is only necessary
because of the limitations placed on internal and external
perception by the necessities of action. If we could break
through the veil which action interposes, if we could come
into direct contact with sense and consciousness, art
would be useless and unnecessary. Our eyes, aided by
memory, would carve out in space and fix in time the most
inimitable of pictures. In the centre of one's own mind,
we should hear constantly a certain music. But as this is
impossible, the function of the artist is to pierce through
here and there, accidently as it were, the veil placed
between us and reality by the limitations of our perception
engendered by action. 19
A difficulty with this apologia for the artist in both
Bergson and Hulme is that no explicit reason is given as to
why we should need to pierce through to "reality", parti¬
cularly since, as Bergson tells us, the intellect is so
admirably geared to enable us to act. We can, of course,
move further for ourselves, to deduce implied values for
art; for instance, that by introducing us to new perceptions,
fresher more vivid representations of reality, it enables
us to modify our own concepts and categories so that we are
better equipped to survive in the reality which changes.
Yet the step from intuition which can engage with the
dynamism of flux to the work of art which is static, out¬
side "real time" and the world of the practical intellect,
remains an unsatisfactory one. Hulme, the arch-enemy of
romanticism, seems to take over without question from
Bergson the highly romantic idea that artists are peculiar
individuals with a peculiar talent (or weakness) for
intuitions:
13. From time to time in a fit of absent-mindedness nature
raises up minds which are more detached from life - a
natural detachment, one innate in the structure of sense
or consciousness, which at once reveals itself by a virginal
manner of seeing, hearing or thinking.
27. ... It is not sufficient to say that an artist is a
person who is able to convey over the actual things he sees
the emotions he feels. It is necessary before that that
he should be a person who is able to emancipate himself
from the moulds which a language and ordinary perception
force on him and be able to see things freshly as they
really are. 20
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It seems then that the qualification for being an
artist is a well-developed faculty of intuition, which
necessarily involves a certain detachment from life, or
at least from the life of action. But both Hulme and
Bergson tend to emphasize the subjective aspect of artistic
creation, to identify with the artist rather than discuss
the work of art. Bergson, for instance, explains the
notion of intuition by referring to the creative process:
In conclusion, we may remark that there is nothing myster¬
ious in this faculty. Everyone ^ hqsWbccasion to
exercise it to a certain extent. Any one of us, for
instance, who has attempted literary composition, knows
that when the subject has been studied at length, the
materials all collected, and the notes all made, something
more is needed in order to set about the work of composit¬
ion itself, and that is an often very painful effort to
place ourselves directly at the heart of the subject, and
to seek as deeply as possible an impulse, after which we
need only let ourselves go. 21
Intuition is the subjective and internal experience
of continuous reality permeated by recollections of the
past, but by its very nature neither analyzable, nor, one
would have thought, capable of expression. After all, the
media of poetry, painting and even of music make use of
recognisable and pre-existing concepts and forms which are
discrete, more or less spatial and necessarily different
from the experience of duration they seek to express.
Music can be experience in time and therefore may be
intuited as pure duration, as long as we do not attempt to
analyze or intellectualise it (for Bergson on music, see
Time and Free Will, p.14-15). Music, however, cannot
represent any other intuition without distortion any more
than poetry or painting. It is only a duration as it is
known for itself. Bergson frequently uses music as an
analogy for the intuition of duration. However, perhaps
through an accident of psychology, perhaps for more
intrinsic reasons, Bergpn, like his follower, Hulme, was,
as Russell and other critics have noticed, very much a
visualiser. Many of his ideas, like Hulme's, are conveyed
through vivid images and metaphors rather than by logically
developed argument. For the reader who has not succeeded
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in empathising with Bergson this mannerism can be more
irritating than enlightening, for a difficult argument is
as likely to be resolved by a striking analogy as by a
rational conclusion. Of course, since Bergson wanted
metaphysics to be based on intuition rather than intellect,
perhaps his practice must be acknowledged as, at least,
consistent. In T.E. Hulme this trick of using metaphor
as the central mode of argument jars strangely with his
affectation of a plain, no-nonsense, almost hectoring prose.
Bergson's own reference to the nature and value of
aesthetic experience are for the most part incidental and
his explanations are less than adequate. In Time and Free
Will he declares "the object of art is to put to sleep the
active or rather resistant powers of our personality, and
thus to bring us into a state of perfect responsiveness,
in which we realise the idea that is suggested to us and
sympathise with the feeling that is expressed". He
describes this process in poetry:
The poet is he with whom feelings develop into images, and
the images themselves into words which translate them while
obeying the laws of rhythm. In seeing these images pass
before our eyes we in our turn experience the feeling which
was, so to speak, their emotional equivalent, but we should
never realise those images to strongly without the regular
movements of the rhythm by which our soul is lulled into
self-forgetfulness, and, as in a dream, thinks and sees
with the poet. 22
This passage leaves many questions unanswered: Why
should the feelings or even the images of the poet be
relevant to anyone else? In what way do feelings, images
and words correspond? How do we know that the feeling we
experience on hearing the poet's words is equivalent to his
original feelings? However, the dissociation of rhythm
from image, here described, radically separates form from
content, and when on the next page Bergson somewhat curiously
states that nature does not command the forces of rhythm,
he further dissociates the human from the natural. These
divisions proceed from Bergson's fundamental dualism,
which we have already recognised.
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We continue Bergson's account of the process of
artistic creation:
... the artist aims at giving us a share in (his) emotion,
so rich, so personal, so novel, and at enabling us to
experience what he cannot make us understand. This he will
bring about by choosing, among the outward signs of his
emotions, those which our body is likely to imitate
mechanically, though slightly, as soon as it perceives
them, so as to transport us all at once into the indefinable
psychological state which called them forth. Thus will be
broken down the barrier interposed by time and space between
his consciousness and ours, and the richer in ideas and the
more pregnant with sensations and emotions in the feeling
within whose limits the artist has brought us, the deeper
and higher shall we find the beauty thus expressed. The
successive intensities of the aesthetic feelings thus
correspond to changes of state occurring in us, and the
degrees of depth to the larger or smaller number of elemen¬
tary psychic phenomena which we dimly discern in the funda¬
mental emotion. 23
It is not clear whether this is intended as a psycho¬
logical or a metaphorical description. Again we notice that
the artist is a special person, with richer, deeper emotions
than others, which are, however, to be communicated through
whatever is his particular medium. The physiological ideas
here are curious, reminding us as much of sympathetic magic
as of modern biology or psychology. Bergson appears to be
suggesting here that our emotions or psychic states derive
from physical states, a view which would seem to be more
appropriate to the crudest behaviourism and at odds with
the general tenor of his philosophy.
In "Bergson's Theory of Art", to which we have already
referred, Hulme attempted to systematise a Bergsonian
aesthetic, and in so doing framed many of the original
tenets of Imagism. Hulme asserts that the aesthetic emotion
is the artist's intuition of the vital force or impetus
which organises the assembled features of life, and that
while this aesthetic emotion may be a very small part of
any particular work of art it is nevertheless a defining
characteristic. At this stage, like Bergson, he does not
explain how the subjective emotion is objectified in the
work of art. Art is, however, necessary since it allows
us to pierce through the veil of action to reality.
Apparently the artist is able to escape the conventional
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ways of perception and so can discover new aspects of
experience, common to all of us, which he can fix in art:
It is as if the surface of our mind was a sea in a continual
state of motion, that there were so many waves on it, their
existence was so transient, and they interfered so much
with each other, that one was unable to perceive them.
The artist by making a fixed model of one of these transient
waves enables you to isolate it out and to perceive it in
yourself. In that sense art merely reveals, it never
creates. 2k
The poet conveys his "vividly felt actual sensations"
through new metaphor since conventional language has lost
its sensual or visual impact and is therefore ineffective.
Hulme argues that all language is originally metaphorical.
"Every word in the language originates as a live metaphor,
but gradually of course all visual meaning goes out of
them and they become a kind of counters". 25 With this
view of language, Hulme places himself among the Romantics
as he does also in another essay when he declares "Poetry
is always the advance guard of language". ("footes on
Language and Style in Further Speculations edited by
Sam Hynes (Minneapolis, 1955) p.81). We need only think
of Shelley:
Their language is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks
the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates
their apprehension, until words, which represent them,
become, through time, signs for portions or classes of
thought, instead of pictures of integral thoughts and then,
if no new poets should arise and create afresh the associa¬
tions which have been thus disorganised, language will be
dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse. 26
The idea that language develops through metaphor and
that in its archaic origins is poetic stems from Vico and
Herder, may be found in the English Romantics, in Emerson
and Whitman, and has been put forward in recent times by
Ernst Cassirer, Susanne Langer and the "symbolist" critics. 27
In Hulme's argument originality of metaphor or imagery
is not considered as valuable in itself, but is only
necessary because of the defects of language, All words
are by definition already "ccunter-words" since language
as "a communal apparatus ... only carries over that part
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o£ the emotion which is common to all of us". To conyey
a vividly felt individual emotion, the artist is compelled
"to invent new metaphors and new epithets ... compelled,
simply, in order to be accurate, to invent original ways
of stating things". 28
Hulme sees the image or metaphor as working on a non-
intellectual level, as perhaps acting on our instincts to
"convey over bodily" the sensation or emotion the artist
wishes to communicate. Again and again, he uses the some¬
what clumsy phrase "convey over" as if by this emphasis
he could effect the leap from the mind of the poet to
that of his reader:
The element in (poetry) which will be found in the rest
of art is not the accidental fact that imagery conveys
over actually felt visual sensation, but the actual
character of that communication, the fact that it hands
you over the sensation as directly as possible, attempts
to get it over bodily with all the qualities it possessed
for you when you experienced it.
The feeling conveyed over to one is almost a kind of
instinctive feeling. You get continuously from good
imagery this conviction that the poet is constantly in
the presence of a vividly felt visual and physical scene. 29
This passage is typical of Hulme's prose style. If
we read him at length we notice that his writing is exceed¬
ingly repetitive, proceeding by a series of short sentences
which recur with slight alterations in wording or meaning
at later stages in the text. He hammers again and again
on a point to drive it home, and intensifies his effect
by numerous metaphors and a striking use of often redundant
adverbs and prepositions: "convey over", "fix it down",
"diving down", "crystallised out" (all from "Bergson's
Theory of Art"). Though some of the repetition, abrupt¬
ness and downright awkwardness of Hulme1s style may be
accounted for by the fact that many of his pieces were
first written as public lectures, nevertheless we feel
that he himself is motivated by the desire to make language
work at the sub- or pre-conceptual level.
Nevertheless, the forcefulness of the passage quoted
above disguises a number of problems. Hulme instructs
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that the artist must invent new imagery, metaphors, epithets,
that he cannot use language "straight-forwardly". This is
an elevation of the conscious faculty of fancy and might
seem a direction to contrivance or conceit. On the other
hand, he advocates the "passionate desire for accuracy",
citing in illustration the example of the "architect's
curve". This is expressed more concisely in another essay,
"Romanticism and Classicism",
You know what I call architect's curves - flat pieces of
wood with all different kinds of curvature. By a suitable
selection from these you can draw approximately any curve
you like. The artist I take to be the man who simply can't
bear the idea of that 'approximately'. He will get the
exact curve of what he sees whether it be an object or an
idea in the mind. I shall here have to change my metaphor
a little to get the process in his mind. Suppose that
instead of your carved pieces of wood you have a springy
piece of steel of the same types of curvatures as the wood.
Now the state of tension or concentration of mind, if he
is doing anything really good in this struggle against the
ingrained habit of technique, may be represented by a man
employing all his fingers to bend the steel out of its own
curve and into the exact curve which you want. Something
different to what it would assume naturally. 30
We are told that contrivance or distortion must be
exerted on language; but still we are not told how there
can be a correlation between language and sensations or
emotions, nor how new metaphor can be expressed through
old "counter" words. Clearly the answer must lie in how
words are disposed and relationships established between
juxtaposed words and images. By arranging conventional
elements of discourse in new ways the artist hopes somehow
to stimulate the original experience which produced his
individual emotion, or at least to incite a similar emotion
in his audience. Can this be compared to the activity of
one psychologist who might try to induce fear in a subject
by showing him film of a charging bull, or is it more like
that of another, perhaps a neurologist who might try for
the same effect by applying electric shocks to appropriate
areas of the brain? Does the artist try to reproduce both
cause and effect of his intuition or subjective experience,
or simply effect, and in either case, does the work of art
retain any autonomy or objective value? Hulme himself
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seems to look on art as a means to an end rather than an
end in itself. "If we could break through the veil which
action interposes, if we could come into direct contact
with sense and consciousness, art would be useless and
unnecessary". 31
We may sum up: clear, hard, dry poems are to be
produced, not as objective works of art, ends in themselves,
but as communications of the artist's intuitions to the
reader in the attempt to arouse that reader to similar
intuitions. However, this is to be effected, not imagina¬
tively nor intuitively, but rather to be engineered by the
intellectual faculty of "fancy". We should note Hulme's
inconsistency in his attitude to Coleridge and Coleridgean
terminology. "Vital" or organic art is commended in
"Romanticism and Classicism", but condemned in "Humanism"
(p.8). "Fancy" is exalted at the expense of the imaginat¬
ion in "Romanticism and Classicism" (p.113) yet this is
qualified on p.137:
When the analogy has not enough connection with the thing
described and there is a certain excess, then you have the
play of the fancy - that I grant is inferior to imaginat¬
ion .
Then on p.139 the artist is described as having a
"powerfully imaginative mind". This uncertainty may best
be explained by Hulme's vagueness about the difference
between the artist's conception, imaginative or intuitive,
and its execution or objectification as a work of art which
is an operation of fancy. Hulme champions "fancy"
against "imagination" in his battle against the Romantics.
His use of the term is, in part, bravado, but the distinct¬
ion is nevertheless vitally related to his central philo¬
sophy of discontinuity, and will be discussed below. Mean¬
while we must return to some of the problems inherent in
Hulme's theory of imagism which were to cause difficulties
for the later Imagists but so stimulate new developments
under the aegis of Pound, Wyndham Lewis and the Vorticists.
Hulme repeatedly speaks of the image or the work of
art as something "fixed", something taken out of the flux
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of reality. "The big artist, the innovator, leaves the
level where things are crystallised out into the different
shapes, and, diving down into the inner flux, comes back
with a new shape which he endeavours to fix".32 In another
essay he describes how he himself came to verse "from the
inside rather than the outside. There were certain impress¬
ions which I wanted to fix".33
If the image is fixed it becomes static, "dead", and
thus belies the central truth of reality. Yet Hulme follows
Coleridge in asserting his image or analogy to be vital,
or organic, a complexity "in which the parts cannot be said
to be elements as each one is modified by the other's
presence, and each one to a certain extent is the whole".31'
These complexities he described as "intensive" in the
Bergsonian sense, and claims "to deal with the intensive
you must use intuition":
A powerfully imaginative mind seizes and combines at the
same instant all the important ideas of its poem or picture,
and while it works with one of them, it is at the same instant
working with and modifying all in their relation to it and
never losing sight of their bearings on each other as the
motion of a snake's body goes through all parts at once and
its volition acts at the same instant in coils which go
contrary ways.35
There is a confusion here, caused again by the failure
to distinguish psychological events and the creative process
of the artist from the completed art object. Working through
the implications of the papers on "Romanticism and Classi¬
cism" and "Bergson's Theory of Art", one could suggest the
following argument. The artist has a specially developed
faculty of intuition enabling him to apprehend pure duration.
The possession of such a talent involves at the same time a
necessary detachment from action or practical life. He
creates a work of art through images in order to communicate
his intuition. We cannot properly say he works to "fix"
the intuition since the essence of intuition is its appre¬
hension of real motion. However, to communicate his intui¬
tion, sometimes confusingly called "image", he seeks, if
he is a poet, for fresh images or metaphors, new arrange¬
ments of words which will startle his reader into experiencing
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an equivalent emotion, or a sort of second-hand intuition.
Paradoxically, the fixed image or work of art which conveys
the intuition becomes, as soon as it is objectified or placed
in the public domain, itself "extensive", dead, conventional.
But these characteristics are those we draw on for practical
purposes. Hence the objectified image of the intuition
experienced by the artist in isolation from action, may
open up possibilities for new action by the rest of us.
The function and value of art would be, therefore, that it
trues us, brings us closer to reality.
Even if we accept this admittedly tortuous argument,
we confront many further difficulties. Hulme, in his attack
on Romanticism, followed not only Bergson, but the German
acsthctician, William Worringer, from whose work, indeed,
he derived his distinction between Romanticism and Classicism.
According to Worringer, whom Hulme paraphrases in "Modern
Art",36 there were two main kinds of art which satisfy two
distinct aesthetic needs and spring from two completely
different ways of looking at the world. On the one hand,
we have abstract, formalistic art like that of the Egyptians
or Byzantines; on the other, representational or naturalistic
art like that of the Greeks or the Renaissance. Abstract
art goes with the religious or classical attitude, Hulme
argues, and signifies a fear of or alienation from nature,
a consciousness of human limits and of original sin.
Naturalistic art, on the other hand, entails a "happy
pantheistic relation between men and the outside world",37
an optimistic rationalism and a belief that man is good and
possessed of unlimited potential. Again, in "Humanism"
Hulme argues that the world-view or dominating categories
which have determined our values since the Renaissance are
mistaken. Contrasting the present period with the Middle
Ages he says:
Turn now to the second period. This does not seem to form
a coherent period like the first. But it is possible to
show, I think, that all thought since the Renaissance, in
spite of its apparent variety, in reality forms one coherent
whole. It all rests on the same presuppositions which were
denied by the previous period. It all rests on the same
conception of the nature of man, and all exhibits the same
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conjplete inability to realise the meaning of the dogma of
Original Sin. In this period not only has its philosophy,
its literature, and ethics been based on this new conception
of man as fundamentally good, as sufficient, as the measure
of things, but a good case can even be made out for regarding
many of its characteristic economic features as springing
entirely from this central abstract conception.38
Within this period, Hulme distinguishes humanism proper,
with which he has some sympathy, from Romanticism, which
he regards as thoroughly reprehensible.
Judged in this light, William Carlos Williams,
Hugh MacDiarmid and later Charles Olson and Robert Duncan
must certainly be termed Romantics. Pound, with his faith
in enlightenment and human reason, also qualifies as a Romantic,
or at least as a humanist under Hulme's definition. Once
more we recognise that the two world-views spring from the
basic metaphysical distinction between dualism and monism.
While the religious or classical writer accepts dualism,
the fundamental division between spirit and matter, the
Romantic or Humanist in declaring the unity of the Universe
must be a monist. Traditionally this monism would force
him to one or other of the extremes of materialism or
idealism, theoretical positions which in practice have
generally proved untenable. The poet, as MacDiarmid has
said "would aye be where extremes meet". It should not
surprise us therefore to find these poets turning to philo¬
sophical systems such as those of Whitehead and Heidegger
which in their different ways go beyond materialism and
idealism.
Hulme, an obdurate dualist, believing all such views
to be mistaken, predicted and demanded a new classicism
with a new "geometrical art":
this change from a vital to a geometrical art is the product
of and will be accompanied by a certain change of sensib¬
ility, a certain change of general attitude, and ... this
new attitude will differ in kind from the humanism which
has prevailed from the Renaissance to now, and will have
certain analogies to the attitude of which geometrical
art was the expression in the past. 39
Hulme was neither nostalgic nor a medievalist, recog¬
nising that the new art could not ignore the tradition of
-31-
"vital" or naturalistic art, but must emerge from and be
enriched by it. However, although he argues that parti¬
cular periods are ruled by particular "Weltanschauung<cn'
dominating categories, or what we might today call arch-
myths or paradigms, Hulme does not conclude that truth or
the good are relative: "the way in which I have explained
the action of the central abstract attitudes and ways of
thinking, and the use of the word pseudo-categories, might
suggest that I hold relativist ideas about their validity,
but I don't. I hold the religious conception of ultimate
value to be right, the humanist wrong".40 In order to
escape subjection to false categories, he demands a long
historical view:
Just as a knowledge of the colours extended and separated
in the spectrum enables us to distinguish the feebler
colours confused together in shadows, so a knowledge of
these ideas, as it were objectified and extended in history
enablesus to perceive them hidden in our own minds. Once
they have been brought to the surface of the mind, they
lose their inevitable character. They are no longer
categories. We have lost our naivete. Provided that we
have a great enough length of history at our disposal, we
then always vaccinate ourselves against the possibility of
having false categories. For in a couple of thousand years
the confused human mind works itself out clearly into all
the separate attitudes it is possible for it to assume.
Humanity ought therefore always to carry with it a library
of a thousand years as a balancing pole.41
But, even as Hulme recognises, awareness of the cate¬
gories which dominate us does not entail the correctness
of any specific world-view. The Romantic or Humanist might
still argue that his ideas were the right ones. Moreover,
Hulme's philosophy of history seems to carry within itself
seeds of self-contradiction. The passage quoted here
recognises a cyclical process in human affairs and thought,
but he rejects the notion that this could be a spiral or
"progress" in any favourable sense:
In November 1829 , a tragic date for those who see with
regret the establishment of a lasting and devastating
stupidity, Goethe - in answer to Eckermann's remark that
human thought and action seemed to repeat itself, going
round in a circle - said: 'No, it is not a circle, it is
a spiral'. You disguise the wheel by making it run up an
inclined plane; it them becomes "Progress" which is the
modern substitute for religion.42
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Not only does this argument seem to be at variance
with his acknowledgement that each period of art is influenced
and enriched by what precedes it, it also renders somewhat
futile his assertion of absolute values, since, even if
they do take hold for the period in which we happen to
live, they will, in the course of time, again be ousted.
The dualist classicism advocated by Hulme entails in
art and literature a dichotomy between form and content,
or rather an emphasis on form at the expense of content.
The content of the work of art is determined by the artist's
original experience or intuition, the intuition which he
seeks to repeat, recreate or simulate. However, as we have
seen, Hulme argues that this intuition is an experience in
real time and as such unique and incommunicable. The work
of art can never be more than an analogy or representation,
a work of fancy, a construct in space which inevitably
schematizes the content it tries to convey. Therefore the
artist may abandon the attempt to imitate or simulate
content, the "messiness" of nature and of flux, and instead
attempt to discover abiding forms, the recurrent patterns
or laws which underlie the particulars of experience or
intuition. In his own time, Hulme saw this need as "a
desire for austerity and bareness, a striving towards
structure and away from the messiness and confusion of
nature and natural things".4 3
There are difficulties in elucidating Hulme's ideas
which arise from the fragmentary nature of his writings.
At the time of his death, none of his work had been
published in book form. Speculations (1924) edited by
Herbert Retd and Further Speculations (1955) edited by
Sam Hynes were both assembled from his unpublished papers,
magazine articles and public lectures. Hulme's revision
of his early work was only partial so that the Lecture on
Modern Poetry which he first delivered in 1908 was given
again in 1914 in substantially the same form although in
1913 he had come under the influence of Worringer and the
attraction of geometric abstract art. In the "Lecture on
Modern Art", he cites the ancient search for permanence
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in flux, for poetry which would be perfect and immortal,
"Living in a dynamic world they wished to create a static
fixity where their souls might rest", but only to repudiate
it:
Now the whole*. ' trend of the modern spirit is away from
that; philosophers no longer believe in absolute truth.
We no longer believe in perfection, either in verse or in
thought, we frankly acknowledge the relative. We shall no
longer strive to attain the absolutely perfect form in
poetry. Instead of these minute perfections of phrase
and words, the tendency will be rather towards the product¬
ion of a general effect; this of course takes away the
predominance of metre and a regular number of syllables
as the element of perfection in words. We are no longer
concerned that stanzas shall be shaped and polished like
gems, but rather that some vague mood shall be communicated.
In all the arts, we seek for the maximum of individual and
personal expression, rather than for the attainment of any
absolute beauty. (Emphasis mine). h
It seems impossible to reconcile this passage with
demands for "the exact curve", for "dry, hard, classical
verse", let alone with "abstract geometrical art". Perhaps
all they do share is Hulme's belief that the intuition
which inspires the work of art and the effects which a
work of art communicates operate at a non-logical or pre-
conceptual level. This is not the case with the actual
production of the work which for Hulme is very much a matter
of the conscious intellect united with practical craft.
In this same lecture Hulme predicted a new poetry
which would be primarily visual or sculptural. This
insistence on the visual image, perhaps a consequence of
his interest in painting, led to the assertion that the
new poetry would be read, not recited, and to the dismissal
of rhythmic or musical effects in poetry which he seemed
to confuse with fixed or regular metre. Thus, he dis¬
misses the older bardic art with an argument which, as it
happens, is in direct contradiction of Bergson: (see p.10
above).
The effect of rhythm, like that of music, is to produce a
kind of hypnotic state, during which suggestions of grief
or ecstasy are easily and powerfully effective, just as
when we are drunk all jokes seem funny. This is the art
of chanting, but the procedure of the new visual art is
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just the contrary. It depends for its effect, not on the
kind of half sleep produced, but on arresting the attention,
so much so that the succession of yisual images should
exhaust one, h5
Hulme declares that the "big things", actions, the
matter of history, science and philosophy are no longer fit
subjects for verse; instead there is to be a concentration
on momentary personal experience. But this rejection of
such large areas of human experience is arbitrary since
science and history hear on the individual and since any
poem he or she may produce will become part of the general
history and cultural heritage. Hulme argues:
But the modern is the exact opposite of this, it no longer
deals with heroic action, it has become definitely and
finally introspective and deals with expression and communi¬
cation of momentary phases in the poet's mind. It was
well put by Mr. G.K. Chesterton in this way - that where
the old dealt with the siege of Troy, the new attempts to
express the emotions of a boy fishing. The opinion you
often hear expressed, that perhaps a new poet will arrive
who will synthesize the whole modern movement into a great
epic, shows an entire misconception of the tendency of
modern verse. 1,6
Yet we may feel that the Siege of Troy is as likely
to affect the emotions of any educated adult as the thoughts
of a boy fishing, an image of pastoral innocence which is
surely itself specious. The poet whose introspection does
not discover some consciousness of his history or culture
would probably not be one we should care to read very
extensively. Even Hulme1s own minimal oeuvre does not
succeed in avoiding the "big things" or the influence of
history.
Mana Aboda.
Beauty is the marking-time, the stationary vibration,
the feigned ecstasy of an arrested impulse unable to
reach its natural end.
Mana Aboda, who^e bent form
The sky in arched circle is,
Seems ever for an unknown grief to mourn.
Yet on a day I heard her cry:
"I weary of the roses and the singing poets -
Josephs all, not tail enough to try".
or from "Conversion":
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Now pass I to the final river
Ignominiously, in a sack, without sound,
As any peeping Turk to the Bosphorus,
Even Hulme's best-known poem surely wins some of its
effect from the perhaps unintended implication of social
comment;
And round about were the wistful stars
With white faces like town children. 47
It would seem that the individual's experience cannot
be divorced from his cultural inheritance, so that this
argument against the long poem must fall. Certainly,
Pound rejected it in his attempt to amalgamate the techniques
of imagism with the genre of epic.
The inconsistencies in Hulme's thinking are illustrated
in these poems. The first quoted certainly seems to have
as its subject a vague impression, though whether or not
it is successfully conveyed may be disputed. But this
and the other poems are contaminated by an imprecision of
vocabulary, a tendency to abstract rather than concrete
language, even to cliche, which runs counter to much of
Hulme's own writing, especially those arguments which Pound
and the later Imagists took up and developed.
A confusion which persists throughout Hulme's work is
his failure to make (it) clear whether the artist is attempt¬
ing to represent something (he has) seen or an emotion felt.
The basic problem is whether emotions can be distinguished
from sensations, or whether in fact all emotions, intuit¬
ions, feelings, can be reduced to sensations. If a pure
sensationalism is adopted then we have a view of the mind
like Locke's tabula rasa and the artist will endeavour to
reproduce the external and physical causes of his own
sensation in order to impress it on other minds. Hulme
insists forcefully on the physical or visual image, arguing
that poetry is "not a counter language but a visual concrete
one ... It always endeavours to arrest you, and to make
you see continuously a physical thing, to prevent you
gliding through an abstract process".^8 Though in one
respect this passage reflects the distrust of positivism,
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and at the same time it shows the influence of positivist
scientific method with its demands for observables and for
objective knowledge. The insistence on the visual image
and on accurate observation may overwhelm the original
notion that the image itself is merely the best corres¬
pondence to an intuition or subjective emotion of the
artist, so that we arrive at a sort of neo-realism which
aspires to the same objectivity as did the scientists.
However, the poets cannot beat the scientists at this parti¬
cular game and the attempt arises from a distrust and
rejection of emotional or spiritual life, a materialist
philosophy which is inert and, (quite simply), inadequate
as an account of our experience.
Nevertheless, demands for the accurate recording of
external particulars as exemplified in Pound's parable of
Agassiz and the fish, did have a stringently beneficial
effect on poetry.
A post-graduate student equipped with honours and diplomas
went to Agassiz to receive the final and finishing touches.
The great man offered him a small fish and told him to
describe it.
Post-Graduate Student: 'That's only a sunfish'.
Agassiz: 'I know that. Write a description of it'.
After a few minutes the student returned with the descript¬
ion of the Ichthus Heliodiplodokus, or whatever term is
used to conceal the common sunfish from vulgar knowledge,
family of Heliichtherinkus, etc., as found in text-books
of the subject.
Agassiz again told the student to describe the fish.
The student produced a four-page essay. Agassiz then
told him to look at the fish. At the end of three weeks
the fish was in an advanced state of decomposition, but
the student knew something about it.^ \
"Pound had sought a cure of tongues by the discipline
of the eye, some restraint that would keep words grounded
in meaning",50 said Robert Duncan. However, he argues
that while for Amy Lowell and the cruder, literalist
Imagists the "image was imitative of sensory appearances,
for Pound and H.D.— as, too, for Lawrence and Williams —
the image was a vision of reality".51 This statement entails
a belief in the reality of the world as well as of the
vision and of the image. In process poetics, energy is
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the fundamental reality of which vision, image and physical
phenomena are different forms, none of which is less real
than the others. Process and energy are the ultimate unity
underlying the division between matter and spirit. For
Williams and the Objectivists this meant a new dignity for
the physical object as a form of energy, an idea made
concrete as well as a new concept of the work of art as
itself an object among other objects of the world, charged
with and communicating energy. For the poets of process
the relationship of inner to outer, of sensation and emotion
is no longer a problem of inexplicable equivalencies but
an intersection of forces in a creative event. Pound, in
an oft-quoted phrase, speaks of the moment when "a thing
outward and objective transforms itself, or darts into a
thing inward and subjective".52 This moment, itself an
event will transfer its energy through process to the
latter event of the poem. In Olson's words "A poem is
energy transferred from where the poet got it (he will
have some several causations), by way of the poem itself
to, all the way over to, the reader. Okay. Then the
poem itself must, at all points, be a high-energy construct
and, at all points, an energy-discharge".53 Art is not
detached from life or action, it is part of the action,
and as such a force for articulation and intensity of
organisation.
This process theory of poetry overcomes the difficulties
inherent in Eliot's notion of the "objective correlative"
which is in essence a formulation of the dualistic,
Bergsonian view.
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is
by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a
set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall
be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when
the external facts, which must terminate in sensory
experience are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.54
This interpretation of art relies upon a correspondence
between emotion and image and between the image and the
words which formulate it. Yet, as Kermode reminds us,
we must now admit "that words are not pictures, that words
-38-
behave differently from things" and therefore we are obliged
to accept as an act of faith that other minds are like our
own and that our words will be the same for them as for us
and stimulate in them the same emotions. Such a view
implies a spiritual or religious faith in an underlying
essential reality behind the multiple and fleeting phenomena
of the world of appearance, a reality which poetry can reach
by manipulating perceptions of appearances through the
operation of fancy. This theory which accords more or less
with Hulme's version of Imagism differs from the later develop¬
ment initiated by Pound where appearances are real and where
the emphasis is placed on the poet's duty to record that
reality with a full recognition that it is an intersection
of inner and outer, of subjective and objective forces.
T.E. Hulme's writings are unsystematic and often
contradictory. His harsher critics have said that he was
an intellectual journalist whose sole distinction lay in
his knowledge of French and German. But it is the very
ability of the journalist to reflect and popularise topical
concerns and movements which makes Hulme's work so central
to the modernist movement in English and American poetry.
He undoubtedly influenced Ezra Pound as well as the lesser-
known Imagists, and held for a short time a sort of salon
at 67 Frith Street which was frequented by most of the
leading artists and writers of the day, including Gaudier-
Brzeska, Epstein, Wyndham Lewis, Pound, Orage, Richard
Aldington, F.S. Flint, J;G. Fletcher and others. He was
one of the first to propagate the ideas not only of Bergson,
but also of Worringer, Husserl and other European writers.
By his lectures and his articles in The New Age he contri¬
buted to the intellectual climate of the day, which nourished,
among other fellow-contributors, High MacDiarmid. The
posthumous publication of Speculations had a considerable
influence on T.S. Eliot, which he acknowledged.
Hulme and others turned to Bergson because he seemed
to offer a metaphysics capable of including art and science,
of dealing with evolution and scientific relativism without
discarding human freedom or absolute values. But while
Bergson acknowledged flux or process, he established a
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radical dualism based on a dichotomy between space and time
which was bound to prove unacceptable, except perhaps from
the religious viewpoint. Moreover, many of the empirical
theories on which much of his philosophy is based now seem
curiously outdated. The space-time dichotomy has been
superceded by the four-dimensional space-time continuum.
His arguments about memory and perception are based on a
discredited theory about the nature of the correlation
between psychic states and physical states of the brain.
His speculations on the course of evolution are based on
very shaky empirical evidence.55
Nevertheless, while Bergson's system has not survived
either as a satisfactory philosophy of science or of art,
his ideas have undoubtedly been fruitful for poetry.
Curiously, given his own comments about art, it is probably
his description of durations and evolution which have meant
most to poets, as they attempt to create the dynamic image
and the poem which lives and continues to evolve. The notion
of flux would be replaced by that of process, the elan vital
by the concept of energy, but Bergson must be recognised as
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IMAGISTS, VORTICISTS AND EZRA POUND
Many accounts, scholarly, historical and critical,
have been written of Imagism, and each disagrees with the
last. This reflects the extraordinary vigour and richness
of intellectual debate between 1908 and 1916, which while
it may have involved comparatively few in numbers, compen¬
sated in the intensity and diversity of its philosophical
and artistic ideas. It is almost impossible to pick one's
way through the various schools and factions of the period.
Often these overlapped, both in time and membership.
Bloomsbury co-operated with the Vorticists until Wyndham
Lewis and Roger Fry quarrelled. The Imagists sprang from
the Poets' Club and both had links with survivors from
Yeats's Rhymers' Club. The same man, Harold Munro1, pub¬
lished Rupert Brooke and "Des Imagistes". T.E.Hulme's
Frith Street salon was open to Walter Sickert and to
Gaudier-Brzeska. Ford Madox Ford sat at the feet of Henry
James and Joseph Conrad, but rolled at the feet of Ezra
Pound.2 The same faces were to be seen eating buns with
A.R. Orage in an . A.B.C. restaurant as he discussed the
final shape of the week's issue of The New Age as might be
discovered later in the sophisticated drawing-room of Brigit
Patmore, or in Violet Hunt's salon at South Lodge.3 The
theoretical differences between the groupings are equally
difficult to distinguish, for, again, the developments of
individual members resulted in overlapping positions and
modified beliefs. The imagists and futurists distinguished
themselves from symbolists and impressionists and even more
fiercely, they differentiated between each other. Yet as
early as 1930, Ford Madox Ford lumps together futurism,
cubism, vorticism and expressionism and in the long term
most of their differences will warrant only a footnote in
the history of art.1'
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The aim of this chapter will be to show that the
notion of the image held by the Imagists and enshrined by
their various manifestoes tended to emphasize the realistic
or representational side of art, insisting on accurate ren¬
dering of the concrete at the expense of underlying patterns
or forms and of the interaction of subject and object.
This emphasis was technically salutary, but in the end the
theory proved too crude to account even for the best Imagist
poems. The force of the Imagist claims were dissipated in
the recapitulations of later anthologies,5 while the real
advances came from Pound and his fusion of Imagism with
the Vorticism of Wyndham Lewis and Gaudier-Brzeska. After
a brief outline of the history of Imagism I shall examine
the movement's main tenets and discuss a number of Imagist
poems in an effort to analyze just how the image can operate.
From there I shall move to a consideration of Vorticism in
an attempt to discover how Hulme's claim that:
The opinion you often hear expressed, that perhaps a new
poet will arrive who will synthesize the whole modern
movement into a great epic, shows an entire misconception
of modern verse.6
could be superseded by Pound's note:
I am often asked whether there can be a long Imagiste
or vorticist poem. The Japanese, who evolved the haiku,
evolved the Noh plays. In the best 'Noh' the whole play
may consist of one image, enforced by movement and music.
I see nothing against a long vorticist poem.7
Imagism, in the first instance, developed from the
Poets' Club founded by T.E.Hulme in 1908. F.S.Flint wrote
a piece in The New Age condemning the tameness and excessive
formality of the Club, and this, curiously, led to a friend¬
ship between Flint and Hulme, with the latter's secession
from his own club and the formation of a breakaway group
which met in the Eiffel Tower restaurant. The members of
this group included Hulme, F.S. Flint, F.W. Tancred,
Florence Farr, Joseph Campbell, Edward Storer and, after
the third or fourth meeting, Ezra Pound.
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Flint, Hulme and Storer were probably the most important
influences on this early band of Imagists. Hulme's role has
already been discussed. Flint played a major part in intro¬
ducing contemporary French poetry into England. Indeed,
he and later John Gould Fletcher, became the foremost autho¬
rities on the post-symbolist schools, and it was largely
through them that Ezra Pound became aware of the French
movements.
Flint is an attractive character. Reared in abject
poverty, he educated himself sufficiently to become a career
civil servant, and in his spare time, one of the most inform¬
ed critics of avant-garde poetry in the early twentieth
century. He was also a minor poet, basically a romantic,
though his best or his best-known verse was stiffened by
Imagist doctrines. As poetry critic for The New Age from
1908 to 1910 Flint reviewed a wide range of poetry includ¬
ing Japanese haiku which were to be of considerable impor¬
tance to the Imagists. His chief interest remained French
poetry, which he reviewed systematically and inclusively
in The New Age, Poetry Review and Poetry and Drama. Like
Hulme, he was influenced by Tancr^de de Visan's L'Attitude
du Lyrisme Contemporain, a Bergsonian account of symbolism.
For de Visan, the poem of juxtaposed images could exterio¬
rize a lyric intuition. This differed from the symbolism
of Mallarme", for instance, whose poems attempted to render
a non-empirical and ineffable "idea". Cyrena Pondrom sees
this as representing "the tendency to accommodate the con¬
flicting demands of positivism and idealistic symbolism",8
an effort which was important to the post-symbolist poets
and the Imagists as they attempted to adapt to a world-view
in which the philosophy of positivist science seemed to
loom so large.
According to Flint, Edward Storer also played a con¬
siderable part in the debates of the "forgotten school of
1909".9
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There was also a lot of talk and practice among us,
Storer leading it chiefly, of what we call the Image.
We were very much influenced by modern French symbo¬
list poetry.10
Storer in particular was more of a post-symbolist than an
Imagist proper, as is shown by his verse and an essay,
highly thought of at the time, in Mirrors of Illusion.
In this essay, "Poetry, Narrative and Drama", Storer advo¬
cated a pure poetry free from the coarser, prosaic elements
of drama or narrative. Good poetry was made up of images
and fragments:
On close analysis, it seems to be made up of scattered
lines, which are pictures, descriptions or suggestions
of something at present incapable of accurate identi¬
fication, yet nevertheless convincing enough to some
one portion of the brain; to be accepted as true by
all the rest. Mirages, as it were, for whose essential
verity, outside the illusion and circumstances of ordi¬
nary, everyday life, we have only the insistent and
unexplainable protest of some kind of sixth sense. In
a word, symbolism and symbols but an unconscious non-
arbitrary symbolism for which we have no key.11
Storer, unlike Flint, was never an Imagiste, but the
two poets have much in common, both harkening back to the
less brutally concrete poetry of the Nineties and the
Decadents. We may notice in the last sentence quoted here,
the suggestion that symbols are not arbitrary, though whether
their necessity derives from human psychology or is an
external law of nature is not made clear. Storer was also
an early propagandist for free verse drawing his ideas from
Romantic concepts of organic form. His essay argues that
verse form should be dictated by "vital, inherent necessi¬
ties" rather than a "rigid mould" and concludes with an
interesting recommendation that blank verse be "cut up"
typographically according to phrasing in order to assist
both ear and eye.
Ford Madox Hueffer (Ford) played an important and often
underestimated role as a sort of godfather of letters to
young writers throughout this period, including Lawrence,
Pound and Wyndham Lewis, all of whom he published in The
English Review. In his introduction to the 1930 Imagist
Anthology, he claims some credit for Imagism:
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I like to think that my ceaseless hammerings on
the note that the word, written or spoken, has
energies that transgress the limits of the letters
that cage or the sounds that cabine it ... I like
to think that my hammering on that note and also
on the other notes - that emotions have their own
peculiar cadences and that poetic ideas are best
expressed by the renderings of concrete objects -
had their effects on the promoters of this slender
and lovely little Movement, (p.xiii)
Ford picks out what he considers to be the main features
of Imagism. Apart from the emphasis on the power of the
word which has a vorticist ring, we notice the leaning
towards accuracy in language, "I desired to see English
become at once more colloquial and more exact"; towards
free verse, "verse more fluid and exacting of its practi¬
tioners", and towards treatment of concrete, external pheno¬
mena, "and above all, as I have said, that it should be
realised that poetry, as it were, dynamically is a matter of
rendering, not comment".12
Ezra Pound claimed that Imagism was founded to launch
the poetry of H.D. Nevertheless, by the time Pes Imagistes
was published in 1914, the doctrine for the Manifestoes had
already been well established. The famous propagandist
piece "Imagisme" which appeared in Poetry (Chicago) March
1913 over the signature of F.S. Flint was in fact largely
the work of Ezra Pound. It published for the first time
the notorious rules of Imagism:
1. Direct treatment of the "thing", whether subjective
or objective.
2. To use absolutely no word that did not contribute
to presentation.
3. As regarding rhythm to compose in sequence of the
musical phrase, not in sequence of a metronome.
In addition to these tenets, there was also a certain
"Doctrine of the Image which they had not committed to writ¬
ing; they said that it did not concern the public, and would
provoke useless discussion". This should perhaps be regard¬
ed as a piece of bravado symptomatic of an age-old taste for
secret societies and Orphic doctrines which at the same time
served to mask basic uncertainties among the Imagist them-
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selves as to what the Image actually was. Certainly,
it has been provoking discussion ever since. It will
be worthwhile to examine each of these rules briefly,
in order to establish more firmly the general character
of Imagism(e) and to discover the limitations which led
to its decline and to Pound's development of his own
vortex-image.
The first rule stresses again, in spirit if not
actually in the letter, that the Imagists preferred to
treat of the concrete, to present external objects which
would be adequate symbols for "lyric intuitions", subjec¬
tive experiences, "moments of real time" or whatever.
Even at this stage, however, they realised that the simple
representation of objects in an accurate and naturalistic
way was a less than satisfactory prescription. Hence,
they posit a "thing" which may be "subjective or objec¬
tive", thereby robbing these terms of effective meaning.
If the "thing" which is to be directly treated is objec¬
tive, it is presumably some aspect of the external world
which is to be rendered as accurately and with as little
interference from the personality as possible. This is
comprehensible, though it minimizes the uncomfortable
fact that all perceptions are selections, mediated by indi¬
vidual circumstance and personality. But what, we ask,
is a subjective thing? is it an emotion, like love or
hate, or is it perhaps a thought? If so, how can it be
rendered except indirectly through objective correlatives,
or through the despised descriptive abstractions? Perhaps
a thought might be represented in the language or symbols
of logic, though again these are conventions. The con¬
clusion to be drawn, and which Pound drew, is that the
"thing" to be treated is neither subjective, but a fusion
of the two.
In a poem of this sort one is trying to record the
precise instant when a thing outward and objective
transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and
subjective.13
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The confusion inherent in this first rule does spring
from the desire of the poets for a positivist approach,
a wish that they too, like the scientists could work with
the real "facts" of the material world, rather than the
ideas and emotions which had been so devalued by mechan¬
istic empiricism.
The second rule also has affinities with scientific
method, advocating precision and economy of means in pre¬
sentation. Interpretations of this rule may be found in
Pound's writings and in the Imagist prefaces. The essence
of this rule is the search for the "exact" word, the word
which presents rather than decorates. The preface to the
second volume of Some Imagist Poets attempted to expand
on this and thereby raised a number of difficulties which
it could not resolve, again concerning the nature of the
"image":
The 'fexact" word does not mean the word which exactly
describes the object in itself, it means the "exact"
word which brings the effect of that object before
the reader as it presented itself to the poet's mind
at the time of writing the poem. Imagists deal but
little with similes, although much of their poetry is
metaphorical. The reason for this is that while acknow¬
ledging the figure to be an integral part of all poetry,
they feel that the constant imposing of one figure upon
another in the same poem blurs the central effect.14
It is consistent for Imagist doctrine to eschew simile,
felt to be more descriptive or decorative than metaphor,
but the rejected device of imposing one figure on another
seems, on the other hand, to be the essence of metaphor
and central to Imagist practice, as in "Oread" or "The
Garden" by H.D., Pound's "In a Station of the Metro",
or Aldington's "Sunset". Moreover, Pound, Aldington and
even H.D. wrote many imagist poems which turn on a simile:
Like a skein of loose silk blown against a wall
She walks by the railing of a path
-Pound, "The Garden"
As cool as the pale wet leaves
of lily-of-the-valley
She lay beside me in the dawn.
-Pound, "Alba"
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Her fingers were like the tissue
Of a Japanese paper napkin
-Pound, "The Encounter"
You quiver like a sea-fish
-H.D., "The Pond"
0 rose, cut in rock
hard as the descent of hail
-H.D. "The Garden" (metaphor and simile)
She has new leaves
After her dead flowers,
Like the little almond tree
Which the frost hurt-
-Aldington, "New Love"
The blue smoke leaps
Like swirling clouds of birds vanishing.
So my love leaps towards you
Vanishes and is renewed.
-Aldington, "Images (2)"
In this last poem we have direct treatment of an emotional
state through the indirect figures of simile and analogy.
Insouciance
In and out of the dreary trenches
Trudging cheerily under the stars
1 make for myself little poems
Delicate as a flock of doves
They fly away like white-winged doves.
-Aldington15
This poem moves almost incongruously from its opening
Browningesque to the Japanese delicacy of its conclusion.
Again it employs an explicit simile, stated and then ela¬
borated.
It might be argued that these similes are not deco¬
rative, but essential and therefore closer to what we
normally think of as metaphor. This returns us to the
difficulty of distinguishing between description and pre¬
sentation. This may be a matter of intensity;16 "presen¬
ting the object" or "rendering the image" meant achieving
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sufficient vividness in language to arouse in the reader
the same emotion or sensation as that experienced by the
poet. Once more, this is easier to understand if we
conceive the poet's task to be the presentation of the
"external" object; for then if he succeeds in presenting
an object, recreating it as it appeared to him, he will
induce in the reader an experience or sensation which is
pre-conceptual and non-abstract. If, on the other hand,
he succeeds only in describing the object, the reader's
apprehension will be conceptual and the knowledge he
acquires will conform with his received ideas and cate¬
gories. The "exact" word, or the words which contribute
to the presentation must therefore be fresh, figures vivid
or unexpected, as Hulme suggested; otherwise the poem
collapses into the mere description of "symbolic" or
"counter" language.
However, if the subjective experience of the author
is itself held to be the "thing" for presentation, we
return to the problem of symbolism. The reader is dis¬
tanced from the experience not only by the inherent sym¬
bolism of language but by the introduction of external
or material equivalents to the subjective experience of
the author. Only if notions of exactness and economy
are applied to the presentation of the form, "idea" or
structure of the experience which can be transmitted
through different media, paint, sculpture, music words,
may the valves of directness be preserved. Superficially,
an emphasis on form would seem to run counter to the
primary thrust of Imagism until it is realised that the
accurate perception of form is that which determines
the selection of the concrete and specific images to be
presented. (This emphasis on what is transmitted through
art should not obscure the autonomy and specificity of
the work of art in itself.) In any case, the second rule
of Imagism, like the others was not intended to be ex¬
plored for its metaphysical implications; it too was a
stylistic directive, intended to bring about a pruning
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of poetic diction and verbose generalities. This is
clear from Pound's "A Few Don'ts by an Imagiste":
Use no superfluous word, no adjective, which does
not reveal something.
Don't use such an expression as "dim lands of peace".
It dulls the image. It mixes an abstraction with
the concrete. It comes from the writer not realizing
that the natural object is always the adequate symbol.16
Several critics have commented on how much of the
various Imagist proclamations and articles are taken up
by arguments over vers libre, rhythm, metric, etc. By
the time of the 1915 anthology Imagism under Amy Lowell
had allied itself firmly with vers libre, the theory of
which was inspired by contemporary French experiment.
Pound never sanctioned the looser notions of free verse,
though his theory of the "musical phrase" may have been
regarded as licence for some of the century's more form¬
less productions. In his article "Re Vers Libre" (1917)
he attributed the interest in free verse to a desire to
return to quantitative measure:
I think one should write vers libre only when one 'must'.,
that is to say, only when the 'thing' builds up a rhythm
more beautiful than that of set metres, or more real,
more a part of the emotion of the 'thing', more germane,
intimate, interpretative than the measure of regular
accentual verse; a rhythm which discontents one with
set iambic or set anapaestic. ...
I mean I do not think one can use to any advantage
rhythms much more tenuous and imperceptible than
some I have used. I think progress lies rather
in an attempt to approximate classical quantitative
metres (NOT to copy them) than in a carelessness
regarding such things.17
Yet in 1918 he asserted again his belief in "an absolute
rhythm, a rhythm, that is, in poetry which corresponds
exactly to the emotion or shade of emotion to be expressed
A man's rhythm must be interpretative, it will be, there¬
fore, in the end, his own, uncounterfeiting, uncounter-
feitable".18 It is to be noted that this statement by
no means renounces the use of measure, not even the
traditional measures of the past, for it has always been
possible for the poet to impose his own rhythm on tradi-
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tional forms. On the other hand, it does permit wide
experiment in the search for the rhythm which will best
correspond to or embody that which is to be expressed.
Two further points emerge from this statement: the
first is that rhythm and measure are part of the orga¬
nism of the poem, and the second is the impossibility
of separating subject from object. The rhythm of the
poem will be conditioned by the individuality, even by
the physiological individuality of the perceiver as well
as by the particular identity of what is perceived.
These two points were to be important for later American
poets like Williams, Olson and Creeley.
Pound, in common with other poets of the time, was
of course affected by the experiments of the French vers
librists and commented on them in his Approach to Paris
series published in The New Age during 1913, where he
showed an open mind to a wide range of styles. In his
concluding article, he praised the achievement of the
French poets, particularly in regard to rhythm which he
defined thus:
Dante defined poetry as a composition of words set
to music. With the passage of the centuries poetry
has been gradually removed from the art of music, as
the term 'music' is generally used, i.e. from melody
of pitch variation. The art of music which still re¬
mains to the poet is that of rhythm, and of a sort of
melody dependent on the order and arrangement of varied
vowel and consonantal sounds. The rhythm is a matter
of duration of individual sounds and of stress, and
the matter of the 'word melody' depends largely on
the fitness of this duration and stress to the sounds
where with it is connected.19
This statement is important because it carries in it
Pound's conviction that rhythm and measure were as in¬
trinsic to a poem as images or the elements of discourse,
the three aspects which he was later to analyse as melo-
poeia, phanopoeia and logopoeia. Furthermore, the stress
on quantity and duration reveals Pound's emphasis on the
poem itself as an event, moving through time. The poem
cannot be still as a painting or sculpture is still; it
does not "fix" the intuition or thing, object or experience,
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but rather recreates it in a form which is appropriate.
This insight was to be of value in the formulation of
Vorticism and the writing of The Cantos. The post-1914
Imagists, represented chiefly by Aldington and Amy
Lowell, repeated and adulterated some of Pound's stric¬
tures on rhythm and metre, while at the same time em¬
bracing the gamut of vers libre practice. The discus¬
sion of rhythm and form, point 2 in the 1915 anthology,
which may be traced back to Hulme and Storer in 1909,
Says nothing new:
(2) To create new rhythms - as the expression of
new moods - and not to copy old rhythms, which merely
echo old moods. We do not insist upon 'free-verse'
as the only method of writing poetry. We believe
that the individuality of a poet may often be better
expressed in free-verse than in conventional forms.
In poetry, a new cadence means a new idea.
Free verse is further defined as "all that increasing
amount of writing whose cadence is more marked, more
definite, and closer knit than that of prose, but which
is not so violently nor so obviously accented as the so-
called 'regular verse'. We refer those interested in
the question to the Greek Melic poets, and to the many
excellent French studies on the subject by such distin¬
guished and well-equipped authors as Remy de Gourmont,
Gustave Kahn, Georges Duhamel, Charles Vildrac, Henri
Gheon, Robert de Souza, Andre Spire". Perhaps the very
inclusiveness of this list reveals the dissipation of the
original force of Imagism. The 1916 Preface further ex¬
pands the notion of "cadenced" verse with a profusion of
images and analogies which is another indication of the
impoverishment of the movement and its debts to stronger
theoreticians both in Britain and France.
The main force of Imagism was, as we have said, corre¬
ctive and those principles which were most agreed on were
those concerned with poetic craftsmanship, technique and
style. On the other matters, particularly those relating
to the concept of the "Image" which gave the movement its
name, the manifestoes and proclamations remained, deli-
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berately or perforce, vague and indefinite. Though thib
central uncertainty may have provided sufficient latitude
for the publication of three anthologies, it meant that
the stated Imagist doctrines were in the end inadequate
to account for the best work of their own practitioners.
By looking more closely at a few poems generally regard¬
ed as Imagist, we shall discover these inadequacies and
the many discrepancies between various approaches to the
Image.
According to F.S. Flint, Edward Storer was one of
the first to write in the Imagist manner,20 and certainly
the first poem in his Mirrors of Illusion was called
simply, "Image":
Forsaken lovers
Burning to a chaste white moon
Upon strange pyres of loneliness and drought.
It was with reference to Storer's poetry, which he called
"porridge",21 that Pound distinguished between "Impress¬
ionism", the proto-Imagism of 1908-1909 and Imagisme
proper. If we compare this poem with H.D.'s "Oread" which
Pound considered the epitome of Imagiste poetry, we shall
be able to discover some of the differences between the
two schools. However, these distinctions can never be
clear-cut, since many of the avowedly "Imagiste" poems
harken back to the earlier manner which has closer affi¬
nities with symbolism and impressionism.22
Here is H.D.'s "Oread":
Whirl up, sea -
Whirl your pointed pines
Splash your great pines
On our rocks,
Hurl your green over us,
Cover us with your pools of fir.23
Each of these poems presents an image, in each case
a compound image whose simpler elements we may partially
analyze. Both poems reveal how much the image depends on
analogy or simile, or some sort of stated or implicit
correspondance. This is the stuff of metaphor, which we
may define, loosely, as any joining or equation of two
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(or more) ideas or figures where the meaning and richness
of each term is increased and where a new image or figure
is projected as a synthesis or fusion of the original
terms or parts. We may compare Stanley Coffman's descrip¬
tion of Pound's Imagism.
Again, the poem is a single metaphor or simile,
a clear indication that the Imagist sought to
achieve his poetic effect through the single,
dominant figure. Both terms of the metaphor were
images of phenomena, images bringing language
close to the hard, physical object. The second
term of the comparison was chosen for the variety
of sensuous connotations which it could bring to
bear on the first, especially striking impressions
of color, light and shadow. If, as the illus¬
trations implied, this single metaphor was intended
to carry the poem, then an Imagist poem was nece¬
ssarily brief - a point further underlined by the sen$ilC'vt>
character of the associations evoked. However,
Imagist practice did not wholly substantiate this,
and the foact is that Pound's examples were to a
certain extent misleading; he seemed to be explaining
the image when actually he was explaining the Image -
the total pattern, the organism or complex the poet
succeeds in creating, a definition which could theo¬
retically apply to a poem of any length - though the
two meanings were in his mind closely related. **
The emergence of metaphor as the dynamic principle would
prove crucial for Vorticist poetic and those later theo¬
ries which make use of the concept of energy to provide
a basis for the creation of a long poem. In an Imagist
poem, the Image may be identical with its fundamental
metaphor or it may be much more: the sum of the terms of
the major metaphor together with its dependent sub-
metaphors as well as the implications of the whole poem,
including the nuances of poetic form, use of rhyme, rhythm,
syntax, rhetoric and so on.
If we attempt to abstract the prose "sense" from
Storer's poem we arrive at something like "To suffer the
disappointments or frustrations of love is like being
burnt on a bonfire". A subjective experience, the loss
of love, is matched to a material, therefore public and
communicable experience which is further substantiated
by the widely shared knowledge of the Hindu custom of
suttee. In the poem, both subjective and external or
-56-
objective terms are presented, but they are fused by the
transfer of epithets: the moon acquires the enforced
"chastity" of the lovers, the pyres are "strange" because
the subjective emotion is strange; in any case, they are
not real pyres but abstractions built up of "loneliness",
again more appropriate to the lovers' experience, and
"drought" which is neither a real "drought" nor a physical
thirst, nor anything to do with an actual fire, btit a
spiritual lack experienced by the lover. The increasing
abstraction of the poem reflects back on its beginning:
we realise that the lovers are not actually burning but
undergoing the torments of loss and sexual frustration;
that they may not even have been physically forsaken,
but rather are suffering mental or spiritual desertion.
We recognize that there probably are no "lovers", that
they are an objectification by the poet of a real or
imagined emotion of his own, an objectification which
enables him to move through various levels of concrete-
ness and back to the final abstraction "loneliness and
drought".
In the sense that it is an attempt to render a parti¬
cular subjective feeling through a juxtaposition of words
and figures which do not, objectively considered, have a
natural connection this could be described as an "impre¬
ssionist" poem. However, it is not impressionism in the
sensationalist sense where the impression to be rendered
is simply that recorded by the mind as a passive receiver
of sense data from the external world. Clearly, the mind
itself was active in the original experience, and in the
presentation of the image, either the imagination or
Hulme's deliberately applied faculty of "fancy" has acted
to bring together the different ideas in the poem. The
success of such juxtapositions will depend on the poet's
skill and on a shared cultural heritage. Here, Storer's
lightness of touch allows him to exploit the tradition
of burning lovers and chaste moons without lapsing into
cliche. The one failure seems to me the use of the word
"strange" which adds nothing to our understanding of the
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subjective feeling of the poem nor to our visualization
of the objective picture. In its redundancy and vague¬
ness it breaks not only the laws of 1913, but also offends
against the precepts of Hulme and the 1909 school with
their demands for accuracy, hard, dry poems and fresh
images. Apart from this, it is a remarkably successful
if somewhat enamelled image, conforming to Storer's own
account of poetry, given above, and to the Bergsonian
view of symbolism which Hulme accepted so enthusiasti¬
cally in his review of Tancrede de Visan's L'Attitude
du Lyrisme Contemporain:
For life is a continuous but unanalysable curve
which cannot be seized clearly, but can only be
felt as a kind of intuition* It can only be got
at by a kind of central vision as opposed to
analytic description, this central vision ex¬
pressing itself by means of symbols. M. Visan
would then define Symbolism as an attempt by means
of successive and accumulated images to express and
exteriorize such a central intuition... It is very
interesting to see how a complex thought like that
of Bergson should be unconsciously anticipated and
find a tentative expression in a purely literary
form.25
Cyrena Pondrom points out that Hulme fails to emphasize
De Visan's concern "to define the symbolist and Bergson¬
ian:, achievement as the perception and communication of
a higher, but empirical, realism".26 Both schools of
Imagism emphasized the need to escape from mysticism
and neo-Platonic idealism. This was perhaps the result
of an over-reaction to extremes of theosophy and the Celtic
twilight on the one hand, and the aggressive common sense
of positivism on the other. Even among those poets gene¬
rally recognized to have been Imagists, many moved back
to a semi-magical semi-religious belief in the power of
poetry and the Word. The brusque no-nonsense tone of
Hulme and Pound is an affectation, as much as a self-
deluding device as a sign of real conviction. The Image
remained a mystery.
Storer's poem may be regarded as Imagist, but it
is an image in the post- or neo-symbolist manner, pre¬
sented to suggest something which is itself inexpressible.
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It thus conforms rather to Hulme's theory of poetics
than to Pound's, for while it presumably derives from
an intuition to which Storer, as a poet, was expected
to be particularly susceptible, it is not that intuition,
and while it may induce similar subjective experience
in others there is no guarantee of this. All it can be
said certainly to achieve is a fresh perception, a new
way of looking at things, awareness of a previously un¬
recognized correspondance. For Pound, the connections
between the ^poet1s mind, the external world, the poem
and the reader's mind had to become necessary, objec¬
tively real and effectual. Storer's poem agrees with
Hulme's theory in another respect: it is a "fixed"
impression, a stilled image. It takes its material from
the flux of experience and confers upon it the stasis of
art. So perhaps the image becomes an "idea", unchanging,
perfected, but loses its actuality, its capacity for
development. There could be no possibility of a long
poem developing from a sealed-off image of this descrip¬
tion .
If we turn to H.D.'s "Oread", we will discover a
different sort of image, though there are important re¬
semblances to that of Storer's poem. Again we are pre¬
sented with a compound image whose terms may be analyzed
and prosaically abstracted as "The sea is like a pine
forest". In this case both sides of the equation are
derived from the natural world, and the effort is not
explicitly to match a subjective experience with an ob¬
jective state of affairs but rather to present as accu¬
rately as possible a perceived correspondance between
two natural phenomena. Here is direct treatment of the
"thing". We notice the austerity of the diction, the
absence of any words which could be considered abstract
or related to the emotions. In the true positivist manner
the language is confined to observables. Yet we cannot
ignore the influence of the personality the interference
of the subjective; this correspondance, no matter how
objectively real, was selected and perceived by a
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particular eye. The individual mind and ear of H.D.
worked together to control the consonances and sylla¬
bic patterning which decide the linguistic form. Nor
can we doubt that the whole image of the poem, Pound's
"natural object" is a symbol, or an equivalent, for some
subjective experience, be it merely the experience of an
individual watching the waves.
But the form of the poem itself reveals more than
this. The subjective aspect has been purged from the
imagery only to creep into the form, the syntax, the voca¬
tive mode of the poem. Behind the first and natural
antinomy of land and sea lurked a second, more subtle
opposition of "you and us"; on the one hand, the vast-
ness of nature in forest and ocean, on the other, frail
and alienated humanity. The effect of the entire poem
is to express the recognition of separateness and the
longing for fusion, for the assumption of the human into
the world of nature.
Thus a poem which seems at first sight the simple
recording of a fleeting observation turns out to be what
Pound was to call a Vortex, or a "radiant node", drawing
into itself aesthetic, emotional and cosmic significances,
radiating outwards other correspondances. In the theory
of Robert Duncan, it would be recognized as part of the
Great Poem, some of which is written, some of which is
yet to be realized.26 Storer's "Image", however, could
not be part of a long poem unless some explanatory narra¬
tive were invented to sustain and place Lit. Here we have
a crucial difference between two kinds of image, and two
sorts of poetry. On the one hand, "closed verse" which
aims at a crystallized perfection and springs from an
aesthetic which regards art as wholly separate and differ¬
ent from life. As we recognized in the previous chapter
this view is based on metaphysical dualism. On the other
hand, we have what has come to be known as "open" or
"projective" verse where art, like mind, is part of the
natural world and interacts in time and space with the
rest of nature.
-60-
In perhaps the most famous Imagist poem written by-
Pound a similar process is revealed:
In a Station of the Metro
The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet; black bough. 27
It was while describing the circumstances leading up to
the composition of this poem in his article on Vorticism,
Pound wrote, "In a poem of this sort one is trying to
record the precise instant when a thing outward and objec¬
tive transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and
subjective".28 Yet there is in this poem no direct men¬
tion of anything subjective. Both terms of the poem are
public observables, images of phenomena.29 What is new
and constitutes the single image of the poem, is their
equation and this equation is itself a part of the fusion
of the subjective and objective. In other words, the
image of the poem is an objective equivalent or natural
symbol of an otherwise incommunicable experience. The
difference between Pound's poem and Storer's is that
Pound never refers directly to the subjective and inward.
We may distinguish four aspects of the imagist poem,
often confused. First there is the triggering external
experience in the life of the poet, in this case, a throng
of travellers on the Paris metro; second, there is the
subjective experience and emotions induced in the poet
by this stimulus; third, is the attempt to render or
record them which becomes an object, the poem; fourth,
is the reader's subjective experience and emotions on
reading the poem.30 Each of these aspects could be and
has been described as an "image". Yet these are not iden¬
tical with each other and there is no a priori reason to
suppose a necessary link or correspondance between them.
The sceptic, and Hulme, for one, at times approached
complete scepticism, would deny that there was any link,
would deny the certainty of causality and hence deny the
possibility of order or communication. For Pound, however,
coherence in nature and the ability of the human mind to
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discover and impose order, was, from the beginning, a
first principle. Thus between the metro faces and their
analogue, the petals, there would be a real relationship,
whether already existent in nature or imposed by man,
and that real relationship, objectified in the poem,
would be communicable, at least in form. The form of the
two elements of the image united in the poem imitates the
fusion of the outward and objective with the inward and
subjective, as well as conveying, through the unexpected
natural image, the startling beauty originally experienced
by the poet.
In the best Imagist poems an aspect of an external
object is caught in words as freshly and accurately as
possible. The resultant poem then stands independent
of its creator, at once a "thing-in-itself" and a poten¬
tial symbol with varying significances for different
readers. The Imagists, like Pound and Eliot, wanted a
work of art that could be appreciated before it was inter¬
preted, though interpretation might deepen appreciation.
In this they were trying to escape the pitfalls of herme¬
tic symbolism, where elaborate systems and private mytho¬
logies tended to eliminate poetry. In the best work of
the great symbolists such as Blake and Yeats, however,
the poetry does convince on a level where a knowledge of
the system is not required. Hence this stipulation was
not innovatory but corrective. But the best examples of
presentation of the image, untrammelled by overt subjec¬
tivism or symbolism, are found in the austere poetry of
H.D., where the natural object is indeed the symbol, but




You quiver like a sea-fish.
I cover you with my net.
What are you - banded one?
This poem requires the title to denote its objective
reference. The uncertainty the reader feels within the
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poem itself about what is, being presented is reflected
in the last line, "What are you - banded one?" Thus the
poem conforms to the theory of the 1916 anthology's pre¬
face, that the poem should imitate, even in form, what¬
ever the author seeks to convey,
"Imagism" refers to the manner of presentation, not
to the subject. It means a clear presentation of
whatever the author wishes to convey. Now he may
wish to convey a mood of indecision, in which case
the poem should be indecisive; he may wish to bring
before his reader the constantly shifting and changing
lights over a landscape, or the varying attitudes
of a person under strong emotion, then his poem must
shift and change to present this clearly.31
"The Pool" is about uncertainty, therefore it is uncer¬
tain and stirs a feeling of uncertainty in the reader.
But the poem is also "about" the pool, seen in a certain
way, at a certain moment. Its effectiveness rests in
the meticulous recording of finely observed detail: "I
touch you/You quiver like a sea-fish". We may say that
this image of the pool has been discovered and presented
as the natural symbol for one sort of uncertainty. The
form of the poem and the way it operates upon the reader
creates (or is) the connection between the subjective
and objective. But this poem becomes much more than the
objectification of a simple correspondance. The imagery
through which the pool is described and the mode of address
in which the poem is couched set off further reverbera¬
tions for the reader. As in "Oread" there is an opposi¬
tion between "you" and "us", self and not-self, inscru¬
table Nature and the sensitive subject. The poem is
dynamic in that it continues to operate, setting off a
chain of reflections. One perception leads "immediately
and directly to a further perception"32 as we move from
the pool, to the simple emotion of uncertainty, to wider
philosophical speculations about the nature of percep¬
tion, about how much of what we perceive as pattern in
nature is in fact pattern imposed by outselves, "I cover
you with my net". It is a very fine poem, but its high
quality perhaps reveals the poverty of official Imagist
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theories and doctrines;, for although it conforms to them
it goes far beyond them. If we wish to discuss it ade¬
quately, we have to follow Pound into the world of dyna¬
mism, energy and Vorticism.
Vorticism itself must be understood in the context
of art movements in the first two decades of the century.
Poetic theory was much influenced by the arguments of
the avant-garde painters and sculptors who succeeded the
Impressionists. Hulme, we remember, particularly in the
1ait years of his life, spent as much time in the company
of artists - Epstein, Gaudier-Brzeska, Wyndham Lewis - as
of poets. Pound too was fascinated by art, by Wyndham
Lewis and Gaudier-Brzeska in particular. Wyndham Lewis's
practice, when he was a Vorticist and when his interest
in abstract or non-representative art was at its height,
found successive apologists and interpreters in Hulme
and Pound. With typical arrogance he asserted at differ¬
ent times, "What (Hulme) said should be done, I did.
Or it could be more exact to say that I did it, and he
said it", and "Vorticism, in fact, was what I, personally,
did and said, at a certain period".33
A brief consideration of the ideas in art which led
from impressionism to post-impressionism, expressionism,
cubism, futurism and vorticism will throw light on con¬
temporary problems in literature. This was a period of
ferment in all the arts. Pound was not alone in sensing
a "risorgimento".34 In his autobigraphical writings,
Lewis looked back to the period:
It was after all a new civilisation that I - and a few
other people - was making the blue-prints for ... A
rough design for a way of seeing for men who as yet
were not there ... It was more than just picture-
making, one was manufacturing fresh eyes for people,
and fresh souls to go with the eyes.35
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John Berger, in his essay, "The Moment of Cubism" quotes
D.H. Kahnweiler's description of the time:
I l;>ved those seven crucial years from 1907 to 1914
with my painter friends ... what occurred at that
time in the plastic arts will be understood only if
one bears in mind that a new epoch was being born,
in which man (all mankind) was undergoing a trans¬
formation more r adical than any other known within
historical times.
John Berger attempts to explain this wide-spread belief
in socio-economic terms:
An inter-locking world-system of imperialism: opposed
to it a socialist international: the founding of
modern physics, physiology and sociology; the increas¬
ing use of electricity, the invention of radio and
the cine.ma; the beginnings of mass production; the
publishing of mass-circulation newspapers; the new
structural possibilities offered by the availability
of steel and aluminium; the rapid development of
chemical industries and the production of synthetic
materials; the appearance of the motor-car and the
aeroplane;what did all this mean?
The question may seem so vast that it leads to
despair. Yet there are rare historical momemnts
to which such a question can perhaps be applied.
These are moments of convergence, when numerous
developments enter a period of similar qualitative
change, before diverging into a multiplicity of
new terms. Few of those who live through such
a moment can grasp the full significance of the
qualitative change taking place: but everybody is
aware of the times changing: the future, instead
of offering continuity, appears to advance towards
them.3 6
It was the exhibitions of painting and sculpture
which aroused the greatest furore and the theoretical
debate which was to spill over into all artistic activity
and which so much influenced Pound. In Blast, tracing
the ancestry of Vorticism he concluded:
Picasso, Kandinsky, father and mother, classicism and
romanticism of the movement.37
This statement reveals from what varied sources Vorticism
in general, and Pound's own Vorticism in particular, was
derived. It could be said to encompass some of the diver¬
gent terms emerging from the convergent moment of post-
impressionism. But probably of greatest significance for
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the vorticists, was the new emphasis on energy and form
which allowed exploration of time and space instead of
the representational and therefore mainly spatial art
of impressionism and its predecessors. If it is accepted
that Vorticism is not representational art in the naturalis¬
tic sense, there would seem to be some conflict with the
Imagists" insistence on the external, on the rendering
of the natural object. This insistence on externality
was prompted by some of the same laudable motives as
inspired Vorticism. It was an attempt to suppress ex¬
cessive subjectivism, or self-indulgent emotion; it was
a search for clear, hard definition in language comparable
with the strong lines, massed blocks and bright colours
of Vorticist art; it was modern and anti-romantic, even
positivist in its effort to treat only observables, to
avoid the pathetic fallacy, cosmic abstractions and all
forms of subjectivism. But the extreme Imagist position
proved to be both inadequate and absurd. From the begin¬
ning Pound had recognized the necessary subjective aspect
of the image, "that which presents an intellectual and
emotional complex in an instant of time".38 A completely
objective "thing" can never be rendered in poetry (though
the poem itself is an object); the stimulus or image from
which the poem springs is inevitably a fusion of the
outer, or physical, and inner, mental worlds. Thus a
completely naturalistic art is impossible, since the
object which 'is apparently represented will always be
alloyed with the subjective experience of the artist.
Realizing this the artist becomes more interested in
exploring form, that which persists, ideally, apart from
its medium, and provides the basis of the correspondance
between natural phenomena, perceptions of them by differ¬
ent individuals, and their re-presentations or recrea¬
tions in art.
It was the quest for enduring form which inspired
Picasso and the analytical Cubists:
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What Picasso and Braque were aiming at was to get
back to the durable form of the thing seen, by
eliminating incidentals, bringing out as clearly
as possible prototypal geometric forms ...
... the thing represented is never a specific
object viewed under certain conditions, but a type
object whose attributes are found in each of its
successive individuations. Differing from his pre¬
decessors, the Cubist does not represent a single,
necessarily arbitrary aspect of the subject, but
seeks to reveal its basic constant properties.
Not that his standpoint is one of immaterialist
idealism. Tviie, in one of his essays on Aesthetics
(Sobre el punto de vista en las artes published in
Revista de Occidente, February, 1924) Jose Ortega
y Gasset says that all painting subsequent to Cezanne
depicts ideas alone, and that while Ideas, too, are
"objects" they are objects of a special kind, immanent
in the subject and thus 1intrasubjective'. Cubism is
idealist in the sense that it deals with types, but
it is also and above all realistic, in the sense that
it always keeps in close touch with the outside world.
Though not a literal depiction, the cubist picture is
an objective representation, and nothing could be
more erroneous than to think the Cubist turns his
back on nature.39
Such a position, the search to render the type instan¬
tiated in particular experiences of particular phenomena
is found also in Pound's poetry. Indeed, the structure
of The Cantos rests on the belief that there are types,
recurrences, patterns in nature. As Donald Davie has
pointed out, 110 in this sense The Cantos is a poem of
ideas, of forms which are established by the patterning
of their particular instances. Here too, Pound's notion
of the "luminous detail" becomes relevant, though super¬
ficially it might seem to be the very opposite of the
Cubist approach described above. This idea is first put
forward in Pound's "I Gather the Limbs of Osiris" series
for the New Age, 1911-1912. The "luminous detail" is a
"key" or "significant" fact which provides an insight into
the circumstances of an entire historical period. Instan¬
cing a sentence from Burckhardt's history, "In this year
the Venetians refused to make war on the Milanese because
they held that any war between buyer and seller must prove
profitable to neither", Pound continues:
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In the history of the development of civilisation
or of literature we come upon such interpreting
detail. A few dozen facts of this nature give us
intelligence of a period - a kind of intelligence
not to be gathered from a great array of facts of
the other sort. These facts are hard to find.
They are swift and easy of transmission. They
govern knowledge as the switchboard governs an
electric current.
The similarity of this energy metaphor to the later
vortex is unmistakeable. The "luminous detail", like
the vortex, is a nodal point which is charged with and
can transmit energy. By plotting the "luminous details"
in the history or the poem-epic the entire field of
knowledge can be opened up. The system of nodal points
is the equivalent, concretely presented, of the essen¬
tial structure or form underlying events and appearances.
Furthermore, not only can this system of relationships
reach across time and space, it can also bridge the gap
between the internal and external. The vortex itself
may be a fusion of subjective and objective, or corres¬
pondences may be established between subjective and his¬
torical experiences, between patterns of events in nature,
in history and in one's own life-time. The vorticist
poem can be an organic whole whose parts are bounded by
their reciprocal relations, but at the same time it has
the potential to enter into further relations or esta¬
blish further correspondances within a larger work, with
the world, or with successive readers. Thus the work of
art, though an autonomous whole is not hermetically
sealed; it can relate to further events as the world
continues and so communicate to successive readers.
This is the method of The Cantos.
Pound's most important theoretical exposition of
Vorticism comes in his book on Gaudier-Brzeska. Pound
was impressed by the sculptor's own formulations of Vorti¬
cism which appeared originally in Blast, and which he
reprints in the memoir. He was particularly struck by
the sweeping historical and racial generalizations on
which Gaudier-Brzeska based his art history, generali¬
zations reminiscent of the systems of German philosophers,
Hegel, Spengler and even Wilhelm Worringer the art-historian.
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His interpretation of different eras in terms of differenly
shaped vortices appealed to Pound no less than his funda¬
mental assertion that the Vortex was energy, a notion
reinforced by the vehemence of its statement:
VORTEX IS ENERGY! and it gave forth SOLID EXCREMENTS
in the quattro e cinque centos, LIQUID until the
seventeenth century, GASES whistle till now. THIS is
the history of form value in the West until the FALL
OF IMPRESSIONISM.
The second manifesto which Gaudier-Brzeska sent from the
trenches contained one of his most significant statements,
at least as far as Pound was concerned:
I SHALL DERIVE MY EMOTIONS SOLELY FROM THE ARRANGEMENT
OF SURFACESt I shall present my emotions by the
ARRANGEMENTS OF MY SURFACES * THE PLANES AND LINES BY
WHICH THEY ARE DEFINED."1
This insistence on art as form and form itself as the
arrangement of constituent elements in relation to each
other was carried over by Pound to the other arts, music
and poetry:
I am aware that most people cannot feel form "musically".
That they get no joy, no thrill from an arrangement of
planes. That they have no nense of form. I mean the
form of things, as distinct from composition of a form
or of a statue...
The pine-tree in mist upon the far hill looks like a
fragment of Japanese armour.
The beauty of this pine-tree in the mist is not caused
by its resemblance to the plate of the armour.
The armour, if it be beautiful at all, is not beautiful
because of its resemblance to the pine in the mist.
In either case, the beauty in so far as it is beauty
of form, is the results of "planes in relation".
The tree and the armour are beautiful because their
diverse planes overlie in a certain manner.
Applying this formulation (itself a prose poem) to poetry,
Pound continues:
...The poet, whatever his "figure of speech", will not
arrive by doubling or confusing an image.
Still the artist, working in words only, may cast on
the reader's mind a more vivid image of either the
armour or the pine by mentioning them close together
or by using some device of simile or metaphor, that
ia a legitimate procedure of his art, for he works
not with planes or with colours but with the names of
objects and of properties. It is his business so to
use, so to arrange, these names as to cast a more
definite image than the layman can cast;"2
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This passage suggests that the images of a poem should
have the clear, hard outlines favoured by the Imagists.
In order that the overlap in forms of particular things
may be revealed, those things must be rendered in all
their particularity. We may note also that the argument
assumes the reality of the physical world and its avail¬
ability for perception and knowledge. The poem is not
simply a collection of these "real" things, but a re¬
presentation of them and the relations between them.
These relations are matters of form and can be established
through the formal arrangements of the poem. It is the
formal configuration which can be translated from one
medium to another, which can be communicated from one
mind to another through art. This formal relationship
may be described as the image or the vortex.
The image is not an idea. It is a radiant node or
cluster/ it is what I can, and must perforce, call
a VORTEX, from which, and through which, and into
which, ideas are constantly rushing. In decency
one can only call it a VORTEX. And from this necessity
came the name "vorticism". Nomina sunt consequentia rerum,
and never was that statement of Aquinas more true in
the case of the vorticist movement.1*3
If we turn back to H.D.'s "The Pool" we will recognize
it as a vorticist poem of which this is a fair description.
As we saw earlier, different elements - the pool, fish,
net, narrator - are brought together in a particular manner
to form the "radiant node or cluster". The medium by
which this cluster is conveyed is language, certain words
which are the names of objects and properties, arranged
in a certain order; the poem is thus other than the first¬
hand experience but can transmit or reproduce its formal
relationships. Initially, ideas are communicated to us
from the poem-vortex; later, depending on the strength of
the poem, we read ideas into it, as I have read into this
poem the question about the ultimate relationship between
perceiver and perceived. Eventually, the poem is recog¬
nized to conform to patterns discerned in other areas of
experience and itself takes up a place in relation to the
total experience. Perhaps the image is not an idea, at
least in the general or abstract sense. It is rather the
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concrete universal, the instantiation of an ideal form
in the particular. There can be no image until there
is a realization, but what is realized, what provides
the poem with its pattern and significance is the ideal
form.4 4
The most prominent features of the concept of the
vortex were energy and stillness. Although it receives
and transmits energy, thus promoting activity and ful¬
filling its place in a dynamic universe, the vortex
itself is still. Poems or pictures may represent move¬
ment, but they do not themselves move. However, the
total separation of art and life is avoided by the con¬
cept of the radiant node, of the work of art as a con¬
figuration receiving and transmitting energy. Herein
lay the difference between the Cubists and Vorticists
on one side and the Futurists on the other. The Futurists
were equally preoccupied by energy and movement; they
wanted their work to live. But instead of seeking the
hard lines and formal patterns of a Wyndham Lewis paint¬
ing or the analysis of a cubist work by Braque or Picasso,
formal patterns which are analyses and thus communica¬
tions of shape and movement in space and time, the
Futurists - Marinetti, Severini, Nevinson - sought to
represent superficial movement by cinematographic tech¬
niques such as blurred and superimposed images. This,
at any rate, was the substance of the charges made against
them by their rivals, the argument which lay behind Pound's
designation of Futurism as "accelerated impressionism".
Lewis was even more strongly opposed to misplaced
quests for the dynamic. Later, in Time and Western Man
(1927), he was to disown even Joyce and Pound along with
Alexander, Bergson, Whitehead and other exponents of
philosophies of time, what he called the "deification of
the flux". At this period, he sought a non-vital geometric
art, rendering the form rather than the appearance of the
"machine age". "Je haxs le mouvement que cieplace les
lignes", he told Marinetti,45 qvotiAtj yroYn aiif€A 1
ptftm "Let fettftvCey this r4sj>ect he wai
-71-
closer to Hulme than to Pound. In later life he was
to write in a letter which was never sent:
Lastly, Vorticism. This name is an invention of
Ezra Pound. When he writes me from his prison
in Washington he addresses me as 'Old Vort'.
What does this word mean? I do not know...46
Nevertheless, in 1914 he issued such statement as "The
Vorticist is at his maximum point of energy when stillest"
and "The new vortex plunges to the heart of the present".47
Indeed, one of his quarrels with the Futurists and the
time philosophers was that they denied the present by
their insistence on duration and becoming. Lewis, in
contrast, treasured the present, refusing to sacrifice
"the beautiful objective material world and (his) own
individuality"48 for Whitehead's flux.
For Lewis, the Vortex was Art's answer to life, a
conservation of energy and perfection of form counter¬
balancing the flux and entropic tendencies of nature..
For Pound, on the other hand, the Vortex was not only a
centre but a transmitter of energy, so that in his view
art and life were mor intimately connected. Both men,
however, believed in the creative power of the artist to
organize forms in such a way as to reach through the parti¬
cular to the universal. They did not deny history or
nature but abstracted from them to produce works of art
in the timeless present:
The Vorticist rejects the traditional mimetic and
representational idea of art, for it is "harder to
make than to copy"... he tries, on the contrary, to
organise and express equivalences and mutual rela¬
tions among the data of his analysis, thus creating
a unity of controlled forces. He seeks "the universal
existing in perfection, in freedom from space and time".
Vorticism abolishes the categories of space and time
in an simultaneity of representation.49
For Pound, this representation of a vortex or image,
though in one sense free of time and space was neverthe¬
less an organisation bound by balances of energy, what
Olson was later to call a "high-energy construct":
Vorticism is an intensive art. I mean by this, that
one is concerned witW the relnt ivx? ternsifc^or relative
-72-
significance of different sorts of expression.
One desires the most intense, for certain forms
of expression are "more intense" than others.
They are more dynamic.50
In searching for intense forms of expression Pound was
much aided by his encounter with Fenollosa's work, parti¬
cularly the essay which he edited, "The Chinese Written
Character as a Medium for Poetry". In the essay,
Fenollosa insists that it is actions, processes, the re¬
lations between things which are important. These actions
or relationships are the characteristic forms of nature
and they are represented in language not by single elements
such as nouns or verbs, which are no more than analytical
or conceptual conveniences, but by the relationship between
words, by the whole sentence. He shows how a Chinese
ideogram may be built up from simplified pictorial re¬
presentations of different terms, and how a Chinese sen¬
tence may be constructed by a series of such ideograms
which retain the vividness and concreteness of the action
they represent. "Chinese notation... is based upon a
l / .—|
vivid shorthand picture o-j$ 'fche: opercttjOA^ (?£ ttotvyft
The recognition of the natural or pictorial as opposed
to conventional symbolism in the Chinese written character
leads Fenollosa back to the debates fo the Romantics and
Transcendentalists over how far all language is derived
from natural symbols, how far all language is an accre¬
tion of metaphor:
...the Chinese language with its peculiar materials
has passed over from the seen to the unseen by exactly
same process which all ancient races employed. This
process is metaphor, the use of material things to
suggest immaterial relations.
The whole delicate substance of speech is built upon
the substrata of metaphor. Abstract terms, pressed by
etymology, reveal their ancient roots still embodied
in direct action. But the primitive metaphors do
not spring from arbitrary subjective processes. They
are possible only because they follow objective lines
of relations in nature herself. Relations are more
real and more important than the things they relate...
...Metaphor, the revealer of nature, is the very subs¬
tance of poetry. The known interprets the obscure,
the universe is alive with myth. The beauty and
freedom of the observed world furnish a model, and
life is pregnant with art.52
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We notice in these passages the insistence on the
natural world, the emphasis on its reality as the source
of language and art. Fenollosa's theory of poetry allows
a fusion of the Imagist position with its valuation of
particulars and of externality with the abstract, formalis-
tic aspects of Vorticism which looked through appearances
for patterns and relations. For Fenollosa, as for
Thoreau and Emerson, metaphors are not arbitrary and
subjective since they spring from real relationships in
nature; however, they demand for their articulation the
services of the poet, who is the discoverer of metaphor
and the inventor of language. From this view, art and
life are totally interdependent and art acquires a moral
force. Pound, particularly in his early period, has
sometimes been thought of as an aesthete, a pursuer of
beauty for its own sake. But he was at the same time
always a moralist, and his art was always part of a total
engagement with life, embracing politics, economics and
ethics. In a note to the passage quoted above, Pound
refers to his own article on Vorticism (1914) where he
affirms both a belief in permanent metaphor and therefore
in a world of objective relations, and asserts "All poetic
language is the language of exploration". (We may note a
further affinity with Kandinsky, "The spiritual life to
which art belongs, and of which it is one of the mightiest
agents, is a complex but definite movement above and beyond,
which can be translated to simplicity. This movement is
that of cognition").53
In other words., through poetry and metaphor, the sum
of man's understanding of himself and his universe is
increased. The new image is the "word beyond formulated
language", it names something which is objectively real
and thereby makes it available to the subjective con¬
sciousness of the tribe. Fenollosa argues that there is
no such thing as a complete, closed sentence;
in nature there is no completeness. ...no full sentence
really completes a thought... The truth is that acts
are successive, even continuous; one causes or passes
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into another. And though we may string together
ever so many clauses into a single compound sentence,
motion leaks everywhere, like electricity from an
exposed wire. All processes in nature are inter¬
related; and thus there could be no complete sentence
(according to this definition) save one which it would
take all time to pronounce.5h
This 'bomplete sentence" is affirmed differently by
Whitman and Robert Duncan, by MacDiarmid and Charles Olson;
even by Pound, for whom it is that which The Cantos seek
to project - "that the body of light come forth/from the
body of fire" (Canto XCI). He recognizes the impossibi¬
lity of the poem which is a complete and simultaneous
articulation of the universe in mimetic or representa¬
tional terms; instead he seeks the essential vortices or
images, "luminous details" which are so arranged, as in
the ideogram, to re-enact in a different medium the process
of natural relationships. Thus The Cantos is constructed
out of images which are intended to cast or project a
complete Image, as Louis Zukofsky has recognized:
Pound has not concerned himself merely with isolation
of the image - a cross-breeding between single words
which are absolute symbols for things and textures -
The sand that night like a seal's back
Glossy
- but with the poetic locus produced by the passage
from one image to another. His Cantos are, in this
sense, one extended image. One cannot pick from
them a solitary poetic idea or a dozen varieties of
it, as out of Eliot's Waste Land and say this is the
substance out of which this single atmosphere emanates.
The Cantos cannot be described as a sequence. A
synopsis may no more be given of them than of a box,
leaf, a chair, a picture: they are an image of his
world, "an intellectual and emotional complex caught
in an instant of time".55
What Zukofsky here calls "poetic locus" might equally well
be termed the "field" of the poem, extending in all direc¬
tions, without boundaries, open, yet only incomplete in
so far as areas of it are not articulated. This field is
the area of the "Imagist" long poem, a poem plotted or
mapped as interrelating vortices of energy. Since it is
assumed that the energy of the subject, of nature, life
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and art is common and that all these realms are equally-
real, the vortices or luminous details may be drawn from
history, personal experience, works of art or literature,
or from natural phenomena. All are in relation and diverse
particulars may conform to similar formal patterns; "their
planes may overlap" resulting in new metaphor.
In The Cantos a number of themes or patterns recur
in different particular instances, instances which HUgh
Kenner calls homeomorphic;for' instance, the political
philosophy of Confucius and of John Adams. At the same
time specific events, facts, moments from personal ex¬
perience, myth or art appear again and again, sometimes
as mere passing allusions. These allusions are used as
a sort of ideogrammatic shorthand at particular points
of the poem to remind us how the whole is implicated in
every part and to stress particular correspondances between
different elements.
Clearly this is not the place for an explication
of even one of the Cantos; such is their interdependence
and range that only a mammoth work like Hugh Kenner1s
The Pound Era can attempt to match them. We may feel
that Pound's attempt at the total poem, the grand image
cast by the fragmentary notation of The Cantos is not as
successful in execution as it is impressive in its ambition.
This may be because elements of the poem are too allusive,
too dependent either on private experience or upon ranges
of knowledge not widely available. As a result, even
the reader who has taken pains to inform himself of the
background to the poem will find himself, in Fenollosa's
words, "juggling mental counters" rather than "watching
things work out their own fate".56 Nevertheless, Pound's
theory of poetry as presented in his critical writings
and partially illustrated in The Cantos does provide a
methodology for the long "imagist" poem, the poem where
the organizing structure is worked out in the language
itself.
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Thus we have moved from the minimal poems which fix
fleeting personal experiences or impressions to the long
open poem where such impressions, "the smell of mint under
the tent flap"57play their part as the particulars they
are and as instances of patterns which recur in nature
and history. We have moved from the symbolism where the
poem only treats its subject indirectly, through impre¬
ssionism and early imagism with its concentration on the
particular, to a poetry where the symbol and the natural
object become one, where the universal and the eternal is
discovered in the immediacy of the particular. The scep¬
ticism of Hulme which saw language and words as distor¬
tions of reality and placed value on metaphor only as it
stimulated a temporary fresh perception is reversed to
become the optimistic view of poetry as an ever-increas¬
ing discovery and articulation of natural forms, as a
processin itself unending and therefore abreast with and
an influence on contemporary reality.
In this poetic the alternatives of materialism and
idealism, of form and of substance are transcended. Form
is as real as substance, and lies in the dynamic and real
relationships between things, be they words, notions or
natural objects all of which are equally real. Thus the
clear hard definitions of Imagism and Vorticism need not
be abandoned in the attempt to render process as Lewis
seems to have feared. Nor are the definitions unreal or
false, as Bergson and Hulme intimated; they exist in their
own right and interact with other entities in the totality.
Poetry becomes the quest for knowledge, knowledge which is
at once the discovery of the world and the organization of
that discovery into significant patterns and forms. The
material available for the poet widens to include the
wealth of nature and culture. It is his task to recreate
language so that this material may be organized and artit
culated as fully as possible for his own time.
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The possibilities of Pound's theory were more exten¬
sively taken up by later generations, the Objectivists,
Zukofsky, Olson, Duncan, the post-moderns, writers of our
own time. David Jones and Hugh McDiarmid, Pound's con¬
temporaries , struggled with the same problems and came
to some of the same answers. In the next chapter, I
hope to show how David Jones in The Anathemata wrote a
"Vorticist" long poem, though his inspiration was primarily
a religious rather than a humanist one.
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CHAPTER THREE
DAVID JONES AND THE ANATHEMATA
In the first two chapters of this thesis I have attempted
to provide some of the background ideas and theories which
have influenced poets writing in this century. I have sought
to establish the importance of the "image" as a key concept
in modernist poetics and to bring out some of the many problems,
difficulties and confusions which surround this central and
highly fertile notion. In particular, I have tried to show how
imagist theories might bear on possibilities for the long poem.
Perhaps the single most significant feature of the "image"
is that it can provide an internal structure principle for the
poem, a principle whereby form is not imposed but arises from
the generation of content. In the long poem, as in the lyric,
the chief organising force will come, not from a preconceived
narrative or plot, nor from any predetermined verse form, nor
even from the arbitrary decision of the author, but from the
coherent and dynamic development of the imagery, or, in other
words, from metaphoric process. The difference between image
and metaphor has become insignificant since both terms have
been used so generally that they have overlapped almost
totally. However, the previous chapters have shown how much
the theory of imagism is based upon the functioning of metaphor,
not as decoration, but as the constituting feature of the
poetic organism. For Hulme, the vividness of the image could
only be conveyed by the invention of new metaphor. Indeed,
as we saw in the first chapter, he accepted the Romantic
belief that all language was originally metaphorical though
through usage words lose their imagistic or sensible content
and become "counter-words", merely symbolic. According to
this view, the process of generating metaphor, the process of
poetry creates the history and continuation of language.
We saw too, how important metaphor was for the Imagists,
how many of their poems were based on a single resonating
metaphor. Even where an Imagist poem contains only one element,
and such poems are rare,1 the working of metaphor is implicit
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since the words of the poem are themselves the expression
or vehicle of the idea, intuition or emotion which the poet
seeks to convey. Words are always other than their
referents, yet the decision to use words significantly
implies a belief in some sort of correspondence between
the word, or sign, and what it refers to or signifies. Any
new word or arrangement of words which refers beyond itself
must be considered as the birth of a metaphor, since through
the matching of the sign to what is signified new meaning
is created. Nonsense words cannot be metaphor, not until a
reference has been found for them, when they are no longer
nonsensical. Metaphor must have meaning, and meaning itself
entails communicability, openness and continuation.
There might seem to be some distance between modernist
poetic doctrines, Ezra Pound or even the Imagist.s and the
work of David Jones, the Anglo-Welsh, Roman Catholic writer
and artist. Yet Jones shares with the great modern innovators
the interest in the medium itself as the matter of the work,
in actual words as the content of the poem. Commenting on
a broadcast talk by Henry Reed, he wrote:
If the formal problems attaching to the making of poetry in
1923 were such that could not be resolved by resort to
'external discipline' the same would seem to apply in 1953.
Unless some radical change has indeed occurred, not in our
own inclinations or wishes, but in the actual civilisational
situation. But that situation, insofar as it conditions the
making of works, seems not to have changed except in the
sense of a considerable intensification and extension of its
earlier characteristics. So that it would appear that the
problems of the poet remain essentially the same, except that
thoseproblems are even more intensified and more complex.2
David Jones realised that he must find his discipline
inside his work and recognised that this must come from
language, from the medium itself. This allowed him to
become an innovator in form, for in his work the image does
become the internal structuring principle, so much so that
we may indeed argue that The Anathemata is a Vorticist poem.
Acknowledgement of Jones's achievement and importance
in the modern movement came from no less a figure than
T.S. Eliot:
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The work of David Jones has some affinity with that of
James Joyce (both men seem to me to have the Celtic ear for
the music of words) and with the later work of Ezra Pound
and with my own. I stress the affinity, as any possible
influence seems to me to be slight and of no importance.
David Jones is a representative of the same literary genera¬
tion as Joyce, Pound and myself, if four men born between
1882 and 1895 can be regarded as of the same literary
generation. David Jones is the youngest and the tardiest
£o publish.3
In his study of the poet's writings, Jeremy Hooker also
testifies to Jones's modernity:
He is, it seems to me, unquestionably a writer who is post-
Joyce and post-Eliot in his approach to language and form,
but their influence, occasionally detectable in the use of
language or material, is largely upon the sense of possibility
that be brings to the construction of form. In this respect
he imitates neither, but has learnt from both. He is, I
believe, the only major poet for whom the revolutionary
modernism of Eliot and Joyce has been a stimulant to the
creation of an individual imaginative world, which extends
some of the possibilities, in the realms of language and
form, which their work opened up.1*
David Jones drew many of his own beliefs and theories
about art and writing from his somewhat singular experience
as a Catholic convert and a painter. It may well have been
the practice of painting, engraving and lettering which made
him so aware of craftsmanship, of the actuality of his medium
and the objective reality of the art product. At the same
time, any philosophical depth in his critical writings
derives from the most part from the teaching of Thomas
Aquinas whose system was accepted in 1879 as the official
philosophy of the Catholic Church. However, Jones' under¬
standing of Aquinas was mediated by certain works by Catholic
artists and philosophers. Most important of these were
probably Art and a Changing Civilisation (London, 1934) by
Eric Gill, for a long time the poet's mentor and friend;
Art and Scholasticism (London, 1930) by Jacques Maritain,
which is the basis for most of Gill's aesthetics and which,
in its first translation by Fr. John O'Connor, was published
by Gill's Ditchling Press in 1923; and Barbara Celarent
(London, 1949), an introduction to Thomist dialectic by
Fr. Thomas Gilby, O.P. Other important influences on the
poet were Mysterium Fidei by Maurice de la Taille 5 along
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with The Mass and the Redemption (London, 1926) by Fr. Martin
D'Arcy which summarises and expounds de la Taillie's thesis
in English, Like most of his generation, Jones had read
The Decline of the West (London,- 1926) by Oswald Spengler,
but although he found some of the ideas and terminology use¬
ful, it is unlikely that he was in general sympathy with the
work.6 In citing these books as sources for David Jones I am
considering his broad philosophical position rather than the
specific content of his writing. Therefore I have not attempted
here to enumerate the many works on Roman, British and Welsh
history, on ancient literatures, mythology, archaeology and
anthropology which the poet used.
In the first part of this chapter I wish to consider
Jones's theory of the nature of art and poetry, to show how
these are in some respects derived from the writers cited
above but are modified by his own artistic experience. This
discussion should bring out the many similarities between
David Jones's Thomist-influenced poetic theory and the ideas
debated by Hulme, Pound and the Imagists. Let us turn there¬
fore to the central issues of image and metaphor which have
been touched on above. We encounter an immediate difficulty
with terminology for Jones speaks of "analogies" and "valid
signs" where we might expect to find "images" and "metaphors",
and though there are similarities between the notions, the
terms by no means completely correspond. Perhaps the first
concept we should consider is that of "analogy" which is
crucial to Thomist dialectic; on it are based the system's
claims to rationality, while at the same time it allows for
an almost devious flexibility and the capacity to deal with
the contingent and temporal world. The function of analogy
in the Thomist system is very similar to the function of
metaphor or a cohesive and relating force:
For him (St. Thomas) analogy is not just a method of arguing
by examples, but is a response to the inter-relatedness of
heterogeneous things and an exposition of their affinities.7
Analogy includes the figures of metaphor and simile but
is more often thought of as a method of argument, a reasoning
from parallel cases than a device of poetry. however, no
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analogy is necessarily or a priori valid and the acceptance
of an argument by analogy implies a belief in the possibility
of communication and common experience, of pattern and order.
This belief is already assumed by Aquinas for he bases his
system on man's rationality and the harmony of the created
world. Gilby asserts in his discussion of dialectic:
We must take for granted that language is expressive of
thought, that thinking itself is an admirable and profitable
form of activity, that the purpose of thinking is to discover
real meaning, that different minds can share in the same
meaning, and that this meaning is not just a label we write
out, but part of the stuff of reality.8
Faith in the human intellect and the intelligibility of
the world are central to orthodox Catholic thinking, and it
was this belief in rationality which led Maritain to reject
Bergson:
Thanks to analogical intellection, that natural marvel of
strength and lightness, thrown from one limit to the other,
which makes us capable of knowing the infinite, the concept,
divinely elaborated in the dogmatic formula, contains without
limiting it and brings down to us, as in a mirror and an
enigma, but also in all truth, the very mystery of the
Deity, which states itself eternally in the uncreated Word,
and tells of itself in time and in human language by the
Word made flesh. Therefore it is likely that there has
been some fundamental misunderstanding at the root of
Bergson's combat against carnal reason. He made the concept
the normal vehicle of rationalism and there is the mortal
error. He confused the affirmation of the ontological
value of the intelligence and its assertions with the
impotence of a barren intellect anxious to bring everything
down to its own level. 9 •
Analogical argument is thus to be considered as a
method of acquiring knowledge, of proceeding from the known
to the unknown. Clearly this has much in common with the
metaphoric processes which function in poetry. We might
compare Pound's example
The image is the word beyond formulated language,
I once saw a small child go to an electric light switch
and say 'Mamma, can I open the light?! She was using the
age-old language of exploration, the language of art,Ja
The most important feature of poetic metaphor is
normally held to be its fusion of different elements, of
tenor and vehicle, to create a new meaning, enriching one
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or both of the original notions. Yet, as many writers have
noticed, a metaphor only remains valid and effective so long
as the consciousness of the difference between the terms is
maintained; if the synthesis is complete and fully accepted,
the metaphor dies into cliche or the mere convention of
common language, e.g. "iron will". On the other hand,
analogical argument would appear to depend on the maintenance
of the distinction between one side of the comparison and
the other, since it can only proceed by moving between them.
At the same time, the perception of an analogy is a unifying
and ordering activity, bringing different elements to exper¬
ience into coherence. If the analogy is valid, therefore,
there must be a real link, a real likeness or sameness in
the two notions compared. This real relation may be con¬
sidered as equivalent to metaphor in poetry, to the discovery
of "homologues" or "rimes".11 In Thomist philosophy, though
the subject of such controversy, this real relation is predi¬
cated on the transcendent unity of God. It is this reality
of analogical relations which we must now investigate, for
it has considerable bearing on the theory and practice of
David Jones in poetry.
God is the first cause of all the created world and all
things have their source in him, and all things are good.
Evil is not in itself real or substantial, it is a privation,
a lack of good. The different perfections or virtues we
discover in the world we predicate of God, as, for instance,
intelligence, wisdom, beauty, mercy. However, we can only
predicate of God "pure perfections", that is, those which
are not dependent on finitude or materiality, and we can
only predicate these pure perfections analogically. This
is because our notions of beauty and wisdom derive from our
experience which is limited. We know that these qualities
proceed from God and therefore God must be of at least the
degree of virtue that we have discovered in the world. God's
wisdom is therefore, in some respects, like human wisdom,
in other respects unlike and unknowable, at least to the
natural human intellect. Moreover, though we discover
different virtues in the world and predicate these of God,
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these attributes, $,re not distinct in the Deity but ontolo-
gically identical.
The divine nature, however, can be known by us only piece¬
meal, as it were. Our ideas are derived from creatures, and
we conceive god under different aspects according to his
different representations in finite things. We ..naturally
introduce distinctions where there are no real distinctions.
The infinity of the divine perfection which cannot be compre¬
hended by our minds, forces us to do this. For the infinite
richness of the divine nature cannot be apprehended by us in
one concept. As our concepts are based on experience of
creatures, the terms predicated of God are not for us
synonymous; they do not all mean the same thing if we are
talking about the meaning which they have for our minds and
which we can state. Ontologically, however, they all refer
to the same being, in which there is no real distinction
of attributes.12
In other words, as we saw in the extract from Maritain
quoted above, the eternal and single Logos, when it becomes
flesh, as incarnated in creation, splinters into the Many,
into different "goods" or perfections which are analogous
and really related by reason of their origin in the One.
Maritain further expands this real relation in Art and
Scholasticism, in the chapter on Art and Beauty:
... the beautiful belongs to the order of transcendentals -
that is to say, of concepts which surpass all limits of kind
or category and will not suffer themselves to be confined
in anyclass, because they absorb everything and are to be
found everywhere. Like the one, the true and the good, it
is being itself considered from a certain aspect, it is a
property of being: it is not an accident superadded to being,
it adds to being merely a relation of reason, it is being
considered as delighting, by the mere intuition of it, an
intellectual nature. So everything is beautiful and every¬
thing is good, at least in a certain relation. And as being
is everywhere present and everywhere various, the beautiful
likewise is scattered everywhere and everywhere various.
Like being and the other transcendentals, it is essentially
analogous, that is to say it is predicated for diverse
reasons, sub diverse ratione, of the divers subjects of
which it is predicated: each kind of being is in its own
way, is good in its own way, is beautiful in its own way.
Analogous concepts are properly predicatable only of God, in
whom the perfection they describe exists in a "formal-
eminent" manner, in a pure and infinite state. God is their
"sovereign-analogue" and they are to be found in things only
as a scattered and prismatized reflection of the face of
God.13
Maritain goes on to note:
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Once we touch a transcendental, we touch being itself, a
likeness of God, an absolute, all that ennobles and makes
the joy of life: we enter the realm of the spirit. It is
remarkable that the only real means of communication between
human creatures is through being or some one of the properties
of being. This is their only means of escape from the
individuality in which they are enclosed by matter. If
they remain on the plane of their sensible needs, they tell
their stories to one another in vain; they cannot under¬
stand each other ... Men are only really united by the
spirit: light alone gathers them together, intellectualia
et rationalia omnia congregens, et indestrictibilia facens. 111
We should notice that the power of analogy so derived
from divine perfection and unity allows us to consider the
different forms of human activity as analogous and directed
to the same eventual end. Science, which is described as a
disinterested virtue of the speculative intelligence, has
wisdom as its object; Prudence, or Morality, is a practical
virtue directed to the good; while Art, also a practical
virtue, is directed towards its product, in the case of the
fine arts, towards the production of beauty. However,
beauty, good and wisdom are aspects of being, identical and
perfect in the Deity, so that all human activity is directed
towards God,
Having recognised the importance of analogy in the Thomist
system we perceive that it functions dialectically to arti¬
culate order and unity in the world and to increase knowledge.
This quest for ever wider knowledge, the desire to proceed
from the known to the unknown is strongly akin to the gene¬
ration of metaphor in poetry.
The notion of the "valid sign", so important to Jones's
conception of art, very much relies on the acceptance of the
theory of analogy outlined above. David Jones demanded
that the work of art be a product, an object existing in
its own right:
For one of the more rewarding jhotions implicit in the post-
Impressionist idea was that a work is a 'thing' and not
(necessarily) the impression of some other thing.15
We may note that Jones mentions Hulme in connection with
objectivism in art: "We did not sufficiently take into
account the tide of subjectivism against which such objec¬
tive views were struggling. For example, the rewarding
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speculations of T.E. Hulme can hardly be said to have made
his book a best-seller",16 In other respects, Jones had
little affinity with Hulme.
Yet though the work of art was a product, existing in
its own right and though not necessarily the "impression"
of something else, nevertheless Jones demanded that it
must be a "sign", or what others might term a symbol. It
should refer beyond itself, be plurisignative, be possessed
of analogic or metaphoric power. It is the duty of the
artist, Jones claimed, to lift up "valid signs" 17 by
arranging and shaping elements of the medium in which he
works. Moreover, the particular problem of the artist is
to judge what, in his own time, constitutes a valid sign:
In practice one of his main problems, one of the matters
on which his judgement is exercised ('The virtue of art is
to judge') concerns the validity and availability of his
images. It is precisely this validity and availability
that constitutes his greatest problem in the present
culture-situation.18
However, before considering the problems of judgement
and validity, let us investigate the sources of this concept
of "sign". Again, it has its roots in neo-Thomist dialectic
and sacramental theology. According to Gilby (Barbara
Celarent, Ch.VI) every mental concept or image is a sign
or relation pointing towards the naturally existing thing
of which it is the concept or image. But signs do not
include only mental images, they cover anything which is a
means of knowing, or an indication of another thing. So
an object may exist in its natural being (esse naturali)
and as a sign, but only in so far as it is an idea pointing
towards another natural being. "An idea consists in beckon¬
ing or pointing; in other words it is a sign; not a facsi¬
mile, but a means of knowing another".19 For example, a
road sign depicting a cross-roads has a natural being, is
an object in its own right, but also points towards or
suggests another entity, i.e., the actual cross-roads. A
mental image, on the other hand, would seem to be a sign
only. It is through the objectification of such images
that art is produced and from which it derives its dual
nature as esse naturali and esse intentionali.
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Gilby further distinguishes between natural and arti¬
ficial signs, natural signs being those which do not depend
on convention but on some real likeness, while artificial
signs are arbitrarily chosen and their signification
dependent on agreement and custom. Language, Gilby argues,
is composed for the most part of artificial signs, though
onomatopoeic words may shade into natural signs, while the
power of emotion, association or poetic skill may confer
on other words the force of natural signs. The question is
then raised as to whether ideas, i.e., mental images or
concepts, are natural signs. As a Thomist, a realist and
a rationalist, Gilby asserts roundly that they are:
A realist and vital. philosophy, however, if it is a
rationalism as well must claim more, it cannot be content
with Q let's pretend or with knowledge that has no roots
in the physical world. Such a doctrine, doubtful of its
contact with what is real, dries thought into artificial
specimen^ . and makes the communication of ideas just the
exchange of convenient counters, By affirming that ideas
are natural signs we break out of ourselves and find company.20
This passage could easily be an attack on the position
of Bergson and Hulme, for whom, as we have seen, concepts
were merely "convenient counters" and were distortions of
the reality of duration. For Hulme this led to a position
of near-scepticism and solipsism which was inadequately
redeemed by his theory of intuition and imagism. Pound
and Lewis, leaders of the Vorticists, agreed in asserting
the reality of the idea and the concept as well as the
reality of "the beautiful objective material world".21
Moreover, they insisted on congruence between the ideas
of the mind and the external world, a congruence which is
realised through the discovery and articulation of form
and relations.
Gilby goes even further (in his next chapter) when he
discusses image and meaning. An "image" is the sensible
impression effected by a sign while meaning is the abstract
idea which it indicates. The "image" may be vivid but it
is peculiar to the individual and very temporary; the
abstract idea is less immediate but is lasting, consistent
and communicalble. "The adoption of the distinction between
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image and idea is indispensable for scientific thinking.
For the imagination is always present, and however lively,
fresh and clean, its images are thick and solidified
compared with the subtle and fluent reality of meaning".22
Again, this passage might be a direct confrontation of
Hulme, for whom it was abstract ideas which were thick and
solidified, while images and intuition were in touch with
the fluent reality of duration. However, we saw in the
first chapter that when images were crystallised or objec¬
tified as art, they too become fixed and in fact eventually
lost their immediacy and were downgraded to concepts.
Though the Thomist position may seem to contradict
ordinary experience where Bergson(ism) was most convincing,
in the end perhaps it will prove more satisfactory. While
allowing a place for intuition in aesthetic theory, it
permits us to extend the range of poetry beyong the brief
expressions of fleeting individual experiences envisioned
by Hulme. Works of art, as sensible and intelligible
signs, do not only delight through their appeal to the
senses, they may also increase understanding by their
burden of meaning. The discussion of St. Thomas's definit¬
ion of beauty, "id quod visum placet", in Maritain's
Art and Scholasticism may be cited in support of this
suggestion. Maritain argues that while Art is a virtue
of the practical intellect, having a product as its end,
the fine arts in particular are directed to the beautiful
and thus partake of the transcendental:
Art in general tends to make a work. But certain arts tend
to make a work of beauty and thereby differ essentially from
all the rest. The work which involves the labour of all
the other arts is itself ordered to the service of man and
is therefore a mere means: it is completely enclosed in a
definite material genus or kind. The work which involves
the labour of the Fine Arts is ordered to beauty: insofar
as it is beautiful it is an end, an absolute, self-sufficient;
and if, as work to be done, it is material and enclosed in
a kind, as beautiful it belongs to the realm of the spirit
and dives deep into the transcendence and infinity of being.23
Since every work of fine art, therefore, is so by virtue
of its beauty, it will be apprehended as any thing of beauty
is apprehended; by delighting the senses.
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It is important, however, to observe that in the beauty
which has been turned connatural to man and is peculiar
to human art this brilliance of form,2h however purely
intelligible it may be in itself, is apprehended in the
sensible and by the sensible, and not separately from it.
The intuition of artistic beauty so stands at the opposite
pole from the abstraction of scientific truth. For in the
former case it is precisely through the apprehension of sense
that the light of being penetrates to the mind.
The mind then spares the least effort of abstraction,
rejoices without labour and without discussion. It is
excused its customary task, it has not to extricate some¬
thing intelligible from the matter in which it is buried
and then step by step go through its various attributes;
like the stag at the spring of running water, it has nothing
to do but drink and it drinks the clarity of being. Firmly
fixed in the intuition of sense, it is irradiated by an
intelligible light granted it of a sudden in the very
sensible in which it glitters; and it apprehends this
light not sub ratione veri, but rather sub ratione delec-
tabilis, by the happy exercise it procures for it and the
succeeding joy in appetite, which leaps out to every good
of the soul as its own peculiar object. Only afterwards
will it more or less successfully analyse in reflection
the causes of such joy.25
Thus it seems that the primary or initial impact of a
work of art is as a sensible sign, what Gilby calls an
"image" and is forced to disprize for its subjectivity -
"But images and experiences are personal and cannot
properly enter into psychological commerce; they can be
suggested but not explained; in a sense they always remain
solitary".26 The image is vivid but unrepeatable; even
for the same person, each reading of a poem will be a new
experience, an event in time. But this is not the only
way in which poetry operates. Though Maritain declares
it to be at the opposite pole from the abstraction of
scientific truth, nevertheless truth and beauty as trans-
cedentals are identical and the pursuits of poetry and
science are analogous:
In short, if, because of its matter, which is contingent,
it (Art) accords with Prudence more than with Science,
according to its formal reason and in so far as it is a
virtue it accords with science and the habits of the
speculative intellect more than with Prudence: ars magis
convenit cum habitibus speculationis in ratione virtutis,
quam cum prudentia.z'
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It is when we come to reflect on the experience of a
poem, to consider and discuss it critically, that we appre¬
hend the poetic sign as intelligible or meaningful. This
meaning is reinforced and, depending on the strength of the
sign, enriched by each interpretation, whether by the same
or different readers. The meaning is what can be shared
and communicated, the significance which can be attributed
objectively to the work. It is, as it were, the plot or
myth of the poem perpetually reenacted on every individual
occasion of interpretation. The meaning of the poetic
sign, however, differs from that of the scientific sign in
that it includes and unifies instead of defining and
excluding. David Jones, seeking for valid poetic signs,
demanded this richness which restores and unifies human
experience:
If the poet writes 'wood' what are the chances that the
Wood of the Cross will be evoked? Should the answer be
'None' then it would seem that an impoverishment of some
sort would have to be admitted. It would mean that that
particular word could no longer be used with confidence
to implement, to call up or set in motion a whole world of
content belonging in a special sense to the mythus of a
particular culture and of concepts and realities belonging
to mankind as such. This would be true irrespective of
our beliefs and disbeliefs. It would remain true even if
we were of the opinion that it was high time that the word
'wood' should be dissociated from the mythus and concepts
indicated. The arts abhor any loppings off of meanings
or emptyings out, any lessening of the totality of conno¬
tation, any loss of recession and thickness through.28
We come now to consider what is a sign in poetry, how
it works and what is its relation to what it indicates.
In our examination of Imagism we discovered that the
creation and communication of a poem could be broken down
into numerous stages: external stimulus on the poet; poet's
intuition; poem or poetic image; reader's intuition and
interpretation of the poem. (Whereas Hulme and some of
the early Imagists tended to over-emphasise the artist's
special experience and paid inadequate attention to the
objective aspects of creation, artistic skill and the
problem of the measure of identity between the artist and
the eventual experience of the reader, that is, of real
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communication, David Jones, on the other hand, very much
plays down the individual personality of the artist,
stressing his role as a craftsman, a maker, a means for
producing objective works which will perpetuate a common
culture). This is not to say that the poet's own back¬
ground and antecedents are unimportant; on the contrary:
Part of my task has been to allow myself to be directed by
mo-Mfs gathered together from such sources as have i>y cicc-
been available to me and to make a work out of
those mixed data.
This, you will say, is in a sense, the task of any artist
in any material, seeing that whatever he needs must
necessarily show forth what is his by this or that
inheritance ...
... What is th^writing about? I answer that it is about
one's own 'thing', which res is unavoidably part and
parcel of the Western Christian res, as inherited by a
person whose perceptions are totally conditioned and limited
by and dependent upon his being indigenous to this island.
In this it is necessarily insular; within which insularity
there are the further conditionings contingent upon his
being a Londoner, of Welsh and English parentage, of
Protestant upbringing, of Catholic subscription. 29
In this passage the poet's concern is not to present
his biography or personality; rather he is locating the
centre of his work, so that we may be able to place our¬
selves in relation to it.
In the deliberate denial of the personality of the man,
the insistence on craft, Jones is again an orthodox Thomist.
Art is a virtue of the practical intellect, and as a virtue
inclined to the good and therefore infallibly correct.
Defects are introduced into art through the fallibility
of the artist in material execution:
Although extrinsically and on the material side involving
contingency and fallibility, in itself, that is to say,
on the formal side and so far as regulation by the mind
is concerned, art does not fluctuate like opinion, but is
firmly fixed in certitude,30
It is necessary for the workman to be possessed of the
virtue of art in order for the work to be good, "for the
manner of the action follows the disposition of the agent,
and, as a man is, so are his works".31 So, though Art
works through the artist, the form and the success of a
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work will be dependent on the particular character and
circumstances of that artist.
We might compare David Jones's rejection of subjectivity
to the famous "impersonality theory" advanced by T.S. Eliot.
... for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a "personality"
to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium
and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences
combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. Impressions and
experiences which are important for the man may take no
place in the poetry, and those which become important in
the poetry may play quite a negligible part in the man, the
personality.
In his theory of impersonality, Eliot, like Jones, sees
the poet as the transmitter and preserver of tradition:
And the poet cannot reach this impersonality without surren¬
dering himself wholly to the work to be done. And he is
not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives in
what is not merely the present, but the present moment of
the past, unless he is conscious, not of what is dead, but
of what is already living.3 3
This notion is very close to Jones's assertion that it
is the task of the poor to be able to judge what is a "valid
sign" for his own particular time. However, when Eliot
speaks of the tradition, we tend to feel he is emphasising
the literary tradition. There is not the sense of a wholly
shared background, as there is in Jones. Moreover, while
Eliot does recognise the importance of craft in writing,
he still clings to the notion of the poet as possessed of
a special sort of sensibility. Describing poetic creation,
he says:
It is a concentration, and a new thing resulting from the
concentration, of a very great number of experiences which
to the practical and active person would not seem to be
experiences at all.34
Jones's theory of art does not require the erection of
this barrier between the practical and active person and
the artist. He stresses rather the importance of the
objective nature of the particular art in which the artist
is engaged, and his skill in the means and modes of that
art:
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The artist, no matter of what sort or what his medium, must
be moved by the nature of whatever art he practices. Other¬
wise he cannot move us by the images he wishes to call up,
discover, show forth and represent under the appearance of
this or that material, through the workings of this or that
art.
The artist is not, necessarily, a person vastly more aware
than his friends and relations of the beauty of nature, but
rather he is the person most aware of the nature of an art.
The inception or renewal or deepening of some artistic
vitality normally comes to the artist via some other artist
or existing art form, not via nature. This is observable
in the art-forms of whole cultures and among individual
artists. I don't regard myself as an exception to this
rule - on the contrary, an example of it.35
Thus, Jones places much less emphasis on the initial
stimulus or intuition experienced by the artist and much
more on the manner in which the artist seeks to represent
his idea in his own particular medium. Where T.E. Hulme
expected the artist to penetrate the flux of duration to
extricate and crystallize in art a fresh image, the sort
of image those who are not artists cannot achieve for
themselves, Jones rather sees the poet as a "rememberer",
a preserver and perpetuator of images of the common culture:
That is to say our making is dependent on a remembering of
some sort. It may be only the remembering of a personal
emotion of last Monday-week in the tranquility of next
Friday fortnight. But a 'deed' has entered history, in
this case our private history and is therefore valid as
matter for our poetry. For poetry is the song of deeds.
But it seems to me that a deed that entered history a
millenium, or fifty milleniums, ago and which has been
assimilated into the mythos of whole groups of men, perhaps
of the whole group called mankind, is, other things being
equal, of even more validity for our poetry.d b
But this claim, which is in essence a demand for epic
poetry, has its difficulties as Jones readily acknowledges.
He quite understood the feeling that led Hulme and others
to assert that the time for large-scale public poetry was
past, that the only work which was possible and relevant
was that which mirrored the fleeting and invididual
experience. He stated that no sign could be "valid" unless
it belonged to the "here and now". The task of the artist
is to select and order his material in order to create a
sign which is meaningful at his own moment in time, but
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which simultaneously can indicate the "deeds" of the past
which it is his duty to recall, by re-presenting them.
Again, the artist's role is to discover continuity in his
own experience and that of his people. The whole effort
of The Anathemata is directed towards so arranging elements
from remote history and forgotten myths with images familiar
to contemporary experience in such a way that the past may
be reviewed and our understanding of the present enriched
by it. We may come to The Anathemata with little feeling
for the potential of the word "tree" as a sign, but when
we have read the poem we have come to accept it as indeed
"axile", repeated in the figures of Ygdrasil, mast, keel,
Roman battering ram, maypole and all the symbols men have
invented for the Cross of Christ.
Jones's sense of the richness of certain words and their
power to evoke past events and even to project the future
is very much reinforced by traditional notions of typology
and particularly by the idea of figures and prefiguration
which is central to Maurice de la Taille's thesis, Mysterium
Fidei. For instance, all Hebrew sacrifices and apparent
acceptance of the same by God were only effective as they
prefigured Christ's sacrifice, and similarly, fifteen
centuries of Passover feasts have served to foretell the
Last Supper, "Behold here, the Lamb of God, the Lamb fore¬
told by fifteen centures of Paschal feasts"37 In de la
Taille's thesis the Last Supper and the Crucifixion are
identified as two aspects of the same event, the first
symbolic, the second real.
The whole Passion is sacrifice, because the whole Passion
is bloody immolation offered by the Priest; and the Supper
is the same sacrifice, one and indivisible, because it is
the gesture of the Priest, offering, in an unbloody rite,
the same bloody immolation.38
The importance of the identity of the Last Supper and
the Crucifixion will become apparent when we come to the
study of the text of the poem.
We should recognise that for Jones, as a poet, the signs
of which he speaks are the actual words and arrangements of
language in the poem, not any idea or image which the words
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may represent. He never affects to believe that the image
or even the object can somehow be rendered, unaltered, in
the work of art, or that there is some necessary connection
between word and thing. The effectiveness of the image
depends more on the skill of the artist to choose his words
than his peculiar susceptibility to startling mental images.
Such a view removes much of the mystique from the notion
of the "image". The moment when something inward and sub¬
jective darts into something outward and objective, the
mental synthesis of SpinoSa, cooking and the sound of the
typewriter, none of these can become poetry until the right
words are found to become their sign. This, to be fair, is
the import of Pound's account of the composition of "In a
Station of the Metro"; he describes the various stages
whereby he discarded the wrong words for the poem, until
at last he arrived at the correct formulation, the "valid
sign".
In these views, Jones is asserting his own beliefs since
the Thomist writers he followed did give some space to
explaining the special faculty of the artist to intuit
reality.
The human artist or poet whose mind is not, like the Divine
Mind, the cause of things, cannot draw this form complete
out of his creative spirit: he goes and gathers it first
and foremost in the vast treasure of created things, of
sensitive nature as of the world of souls, and of the
interior world of his own soul. From this point of view
he is first and foremost a man who sees more deeply than
other men and discovers in reality spiritual radiations
which others are unable to discern.
Gilby,in Poetic Experience, a work which Jones did not
cite, adopts a position which, though couched in Thomist
terminology, interprets poetic experience, which is for
him the first requirement of a poet, as experience of the
concrete and particular, a reality which is primary and pre-
conceptual. His views have considerable affinities with
those of Bergson and, in some respects, with Whitehead,
whom, indeed, he mentions, "This would agree with Professor
Whitehead's view that poetic knowledge is a fragment of
the concrete real of primary experience".h1
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The autonomy and objectivity of the work of art is
discussed by David Jones in several essays, notably in
"Art and Sacrament". He believes that all art is "abstract"
and that all art re-presents. Using Hogarth's picture
"The Shrimp Girl" as an example, he states:
It is a 'thing', an object contrived of various materials
and so ordered by Hogarth's muse as to show forth, recall
and re-present, strictly within the conditions of a given
art and under another mode, such and such a reality.42
We suppose that the order of the parts of the picture
which are constrained by its nature as a painting, its
painterly aspect, constitute the abstract side of the work.
A painting is "a 'thing' having abstract qualities by which
it coheres and without which it cannot be said to exist.43
Jones goes on:
It is a signum of that reality and it makes a kind of
anamnesis of that reality. What that reality is it is hard
to say owing to its complexity. Superficially what is here
shown forth under the sign of paint is, I suppose, a female
street-vendor's mortal flesh and poor habiliments seen under
our subtle island-light in the gay squalor that was eighteenth-
century low-life England. Or had this sketch been made in
Calais, no matter, or had the girl not been a fish-girl,
but a model dressed up to look like one - still no matter,
for whatever the accidents of the flesh and blood 'reality'
this reality did but supply the raw material for whatever
concept the sight of it set in motion in the mind of the
painter ... So we can say only one thing for certain: that
whatever the material and immaterial elements of that
'reality' may have been, the workings of Hogarth's art
gave to the world a signum of that reality under the species
of paint. It is this objective sign that we can apprehend
and enjoy in the National Gallery, provided that we have
the right dispositions.44
Though this passage applies to painting, it is equally
relevant to poetry. Though art re-presents, the "reality"
which it does re-present need not be immediately accessible,
in fact its present reality may lie only in its incarnation
in the work of art. We may note here a similarity to White¬
head. Only the actual object is real, though it makes
itself by prehending eternal forms. Of course, Jones does
not go as far as Whitehead in suggesting that only the
actual event, the present instant is real, since he accords
objective reality to the work of art. However, his notion
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of the "here and now", the requirement that the sign be
valid in the present, and the recognition that certain
signs lose their validity and can only be revived by
incorporation into the contemporary work, surely comes
very close to the spirit of Whitehead's philosophy, if
it does not match its rigour.
The work of art, therefore, is not strictly mimetic.
Its representative function is formal or essential rather
than slavishly imitative. This is Maritain's view:
So, because it is subjected in the mind of man, the law
of imitation, of resemblance, remains constant for our art,
but in a sense purified. It must transpose the secret
rules of being in the manner of producing the work, and
it must be as faithful and exact, in transforming reality
according to the laws governing the work to be done, as
science in conforming thereto. What it makes must resemble
not the material appearance of things, but some of the
hidden significances whose iris God alone sees glittering
on the neck of his creatures - and for that very reason it
will also resemble the created mind which in its own way
discerned those invisible colours. Resemblance, but a
spiritual resemblance. Realism, if you like, but trans¬
cendental realism.1*5
Such arguments easily lead to abstract, non-represen¬
tational art, the quest for form which is described by
Hulme in "Modern Art" as belonging to the religious rather
than the humanist world-view. Hulme, we remember, derived
his ideas from Wilhelm Worringer's thesis in Abstration
and Empathy, but his hope for a new formalism in art was
shared by figures as diverse as Wyndham Lewis and Eric Gill.
Gill agreed with Hulme in valuing the medieval, religious
approach to art above that of Renaissance humanism. He
believed that art should be based on the imagination,
not on the physical data provided by the senses:
Before the Renaissance painters were like the child who
said: "first I think and then I draw my think". After the
Renaissance they said:"first I look and then I draw my
look".46
He argued that in medieval times the natural world was
primarily of use to the artist as source material or as a
kind of dictionary from which he could draw ideas or images
to serve as ingredients in the work of art which he was
creating: "his imagination was not a camera recording
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accurately every appearance; it was a sort of kitchen
wherein the food for his mind was prepared, re-created,
created anew. Art was indeed re-creation".47 It is clear
both from this work and his autobiography that this was the
approach to art which Gill favoured. Though Gill himself
delighted in the physical world as is evident from his own
writings and David Jones's testimoney, the urge towards
form and the inner essence of things may be a retreat from
the physical. Hulme certainly saw it as an escepe from
the "messiness" of flux. This is a common religious
position, an aspect of asceticism, but in orthodox Catholic
theology it is condemned. St. Thomas, in particular, delighted
in the reality and variety of the created world and exalted
the physical. David Jones shared this delight and though
he always remained grateful to Gill as his teacher, became
sufficiently confident to assert his own sense of the
importance of the physical and the actual:
The concrete, the exact dimensions, the contactual, the
visual, the bodily, what the senses register, the assembled
data first - then is the imagination freed to get on with the
job.48
He came to find some of Gill's ideas rather over¬
simplified and though placing just as much value on the
function of the work as sign of symbol, he considered that
Gill's practice of symbolism or conventionalism was inadequate:
His method was deliberate and direct -he, so to say, attacked
frontally. If required to carve the figure of a king he
would carve a figure wearing a crown - whereas most of us
today would be more likely to make a kingly figure by some
suggestion or other - obliquely, by some disposition of the
design.4 9 .
Jones chose the oblique method, the ordering or assembling
of naturalistic details to reveal the hidden patterns in
things. He accepted that it was the artist's role to make
"the universal shine out of the particular" and with his
particulars he was meticulous. This can be seen most
obviously in his painting. Take, for instance, the frontis¬
piece to In Parenthesis, 1936-1937, where the figure of a
soldier appears against a background of military parapher¬
nalia and trench warfare, dishevelled, disoriented and
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missing the right boot. Clearly this has symbolic value,
yet we know that it is based on a humiliating and terrify¬
ing incident experienced by Jones himself. Similarly,
though none of his work could be described as naturalistic
or representational in the photographic sense, they convince
by the accuracy of observed detail. There is the delight¬
fully incongruous ship's cat in the paining of Tristram
and Isolt on board ship50 as well as the accurate detail
of the ship's architecture and rigging. In the water-
colour, Tir y Blaenau,51 we see ponies pasted on their
background with a disregard for detail which we associate
with primitive and neo-primitive art. Yet, undeniably,
Jones has managed to capture the bleakness of the Welsh
hills and the rough sturdiness of the native ponies. His
poetry reflects the same care for detail. We think of the
ship-building section, "Redriff" in The Anathemata or of
the exhaustive itemisation of Gwenhwyfar's dress in "Mabinog's
Liturgy". This concern for accurate detail is seen also
in seen also in his fascination with vocabulary and parti¬
cularly with exotic and technical words whose meaning is
often precise, but unfamiliar, forgotten, or obscured by
careless usage.
For Jones, a "valid sign" must be created from the real
data of experience, experience which is, to some extent,
common to those for whom the sign is made. It is through
its participation in the "here and how" that it is able
to enact the process of anamnesis. This is the second key
term in Jones's theory of art and again it is based very
largely on Catholic theology and particularly on doctrines
relating to the Mass. In a footnote in The Anathemata
the poet quoted the definition of Gregory Dix:
Anamnesis. I take leave to remind the reader that thi* ii q
key-word in our deposits. The dictionary defines its
general meaning as 'the recalling of things past'. But
what is the nature of this particular recalling? I append
the following quotation ds being clear and to the point:
'It (anamnesis) is not quite easy to representj^Ccvrateiy in fc uk,
words like "remembrance" or "memorial" having for us a
connotation of something absent which is only mentally
recollected. But in the scriptures of both the Old and
New Testament anamnesis and the cognate verb have a sense
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of "recalling" or "re-presenting" before God an event in
the past so that it becomes here and now operative by its
effects. Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy^ p.161.5A
The origin of the term is Christ's injunction at the
Last Supper, "Do this for a remembrance of me" which is,
of course, repeated at every celebration of the Mass.
According to de la Taille, this anamnesis or commemoration
enacted by the Priest is an effective and real sacrifice,
a new offering of Christ as"Victim" which is nevertheless
identical with the original sacrifice of the Passion.53
Jones, however, extends the idea of anamnesis to all
acts which recall an event from the past so as to make it
effective and actual in the present:
Poetry is to be diagnosed as "dangerous" because it evokes
and recalls, is a kind of anamnesis of, i.e., is an effective
recalling of, something loved.5 4
Repeatedly, Jones applies the word "anamnesis" to the
recalling of the dead, both as the prayer of intercession
in the Mass and in all rituals or acts which are concerned
with commemoration, whether these be laments like the
Y Gododdin or the most primitive burial rites of ancient
man:
We have ample archaeological evidence to show us that pal- •
aeolithic man, whatever else he was, and whatever his
ancestors were, was a sacramental animal. We know for
instance, that this creature juxtaposed marks on surfaces
not with merely utile, but with significance, intent; that
is to say a 're-presenting', a 'showing again under other
forms', an 'effective recalling' of something was intended.55
It is in his essay on "Art and Sacrament" that David
Jones attempts to justify his conviction that "the activity
called art is, at bottom, and inescapably, a 'religious'
activity, for it deals with realities and the real is
sacred and religious". His arguments are several, circuitous
and not always completely clear. Yet in his essay and in
his poetry he does succeed in convincing us that the practice
of art and of religion are for him the same activity,
although ultimately we may charge him with making religion
serve art, rather than the other way about. Let us consider,
then, the work of art as "anathemata", as at once a "valid
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sign" and an "anamnesis" and therefore something sacred,
set apart.
We have already seen that the valid sign "re-presents"
some reality in its own medium; this is necessarily an act
of recollection, that is, of anamnesis. It is successful
or "valid" if the sign is "here and now operative by its
effects". In Catholic doctrine, this means a satisfactory
enactment of the Mass by priest and congregation; in art
it is the correct exercise of judgement to order the work's
constituents so that it will have present significance. A
successful work of art not only recalls reality, it creates
it by bringing about new form:
That is to say a number of existing shapes (which themselves
may or may not require re-shaping) are shifted about; by
which activity a form, not previously existent, is created.
In so far as form is brought into being there is reality.55
We may compare Maritain's statement:"The creator in art
is he who discovers a new type-analogy of the beautiful,
a new way in which the brilliance of form can be made to
shine upon matter".57 Furthermore, every work of art
involves a process of making other, making over, of dedi¬
cating the constituents, whether they be the ingredients
of the kitchen, the grain for the bread, the colours on
the palette or the words of language, to a new end, apart
from whatever they have previously been. Thus, they are,
in the widest sense, anathemata. Jones explains his use
of this term most fully in the Preface to The Anathemata:
So I mean by my title as much as it can be made to mean,
or can evoke or suggest, however obliquely: the blessed
things that have taken on what is cursed, and the profane
things that somehow are redeemed: the delights and also
the 'ornaments', both in the primary sense of gear and
paraphernalia and in the sense of what simply adorns; the
donated and votive things, the things dedicated after
whatever fadkon, the things in some sense made separate,
being"laid up from other things'; things, or some aspect
of them, that partake of the extra-utile and of the
gratuitous; things that are the sign of something other,
together with those signs that not only have the nature
of a sign, but are themselves, under some mode, what they
signify. Things set up, lifted up, or in whatever manner
made over to the gods.5 8
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This passage contains many of the assumptions which
made the writing of The Anathemata possible. For David
Jones every work of art is an offering to God, a sacrament,
whether through deliberate intention of the artist, or
symbolically. The rituals and artistic works of primitive
man, of the Romans and the Greeks, of Indians and Eskimos
all figure the essential activity of creating something
which is set apart, the supreme and informing example
being the consecration and sacrifice of Christ as enacted
at the last Supper and the Crucifixion and re-enacted in
every celebration of the Eucharist.
Here it may be useful to discuss the notion of the
"extra-utile": Jones insists that every true work of art
has about it some element of the gratuitous, some feature
which testifies to the free will of the artist and by virtue
of which it can be a sign. It is this extra-utile element,
he declares, which distinguishes the works of man from
those of the beasts. Even the most magnificent animal arte¬
fact is created instinctively; there is no freedom of will
in the choice and the work is made only for use; it is purely
functional. Man's works, on the other hand, even those of
the craftsman or strategist, for Jones considers strategy
an art, are distinguished by the virtue of judgement and
every art product has, over and above its practical function,
the quality of being an end in itself. Thus art is evidence
for the nature of Man as rational, "A creature which is not
only capable of gratuitous acts but of which it can be said
that such acts are this creature's hall-mark and sign-
manual" .59 So if a work of art is significant of nothing
intermediate, it always indicates by virtue of its gratui¬
tous element, man's special nature as a free-willed and
rational animal. Moreover, Jones argues, did Man not
possess this capability for choice in his works he could
not be a moral being. It is only because he can do other,
that he can lay claim to the virtues of Art and Prudence;
and it is only because he has the "substantial advantage"60
of a physical body that he can be an artist, a corporal
creature making material works. Not only does the gratui¬
tous element in every work of art testify to Man's nature,
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it is also a sign or anamnesis of the creation:
With regard to the gratuitous quality which is said to
adhere to Art it is well to remember that theologians say
that the creation of the world was not a necessary, but a
gratuitous, act. There is a sense in which this gratuitous¬
ness in the operations of the Creator is reflected in the
art of the creature.61
There are, however, difficulties in this notion of the
extra-utile, for which Jones stresses here art's gratuitous
element, elsewhere he emphasises its use and deplores the
division between the purely decorational and the purely utile.
As Art becomes a select practice for the few and most human
products are mass-produced, their form determined entirely by
function, it seems that the works of man are losing their
sacramental quality and that the notion of man as man-the-
artist is an outmoded one. But for David Jones art is a
"truncal activity" and should it be lost to man his free will
and rationality would also be l<5§t and the determinist world-
view would rule unquestioned.
The wholly utile (or utilitatian) product has its shape
L
predetermined by the use to which it is to be put and this
applies equally to some intricately designed mechanism in
a space-rocket and to the mass-produced tea-cups on sale
in Woolworth's. Though the one may have been conditioned
by complex and specific demands of a technical nature while
the other conforms to the demands of the market as ascertained
by market research, in neither is there any freedom for the
artist, any representing of a concept, any element of the
sign or the gratuitous. This argument demands some quali¬
fication. The engineer who designs the rocket component
is, surely, a rational being, realising a concept in
material form, and therefore must be an artist. It is
only in so far as he loses touch with the actual means of
production, the physical materials of this work, that he
resigns freedom and responsibility. The workmen to carry
out his designs, however, have no freedom at all and their
skills are used entirely mechanically. Eric Gill was parti¬
cularly concerned by the divorce of art and technology,
seeing artist and workman in their separate roles as
equally slaves of capitalism. The hankering after medieval
craftsmanship, the interest in a sort of craft socialism,
with or without religious undertones, may be traced back to
William Morris, and certainly inspired the communities at
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Ditchling and Capel-y-ffyn.62
The development of more mass-produced and purely
utilitarian products does not free art:
there cannot in fact be any absolutely "gratuitous" work
of art - except the universe. Not only is our act of
artistic creation ordered to an ultimate end, true God
or false god, but it must of necessity, because of its
environment, be closely in certain proximate ends affect¬
ing the human order; the workman works for wages and the
most disincarnate artist would like to influence souls and
serve an idea, even if it be only an aesthetic idea. What
is required is the perfect practical discrimination between
the end pursued by the workman (finis operantis, said the
Schoolmen) and the end to be served by the work (finis
operis) ... 63
It was his apprehension for the future of Art and for
man as artist and therefore as a rational, moral and religious
being which inspired Jones's most despairing fragment:
A, a, a, DOMINE DEUS
I said, Ah! what shall I write?
I enquired up and down.
(He's tricked me before
with his manifold lurking-places).
I looked for His symbol at the door.
I have looked for a long while
at the textures and contours.
I have run a hand over the trivial intersections.
I have journeyed among the dead forms
causation projects from pillar to pylon.
I have tired the eyes of the mind
regarding the colours and lights.
I have felt for His Wounds
in nozzles and containers.
I have wondered for the automatic devices.
I have tested the inane patterns
without prejudice.
I have been on my guard
not to condemn the unfamiliar.
For it is easy to miss Him
at the turn of a civilisation.
I have watched the wheels go round in case I might see
the living creatures like the appearance of lamps, in case
I might see the Living God projected from the Machine. I
have said to the perfected steel, be my sister and for the
glassy towers I thought I felt some beginnings of His
creature, but A, a, a, Domine Deus, my hands found the
glazed work unrefined and the terrible crystal a stage-
paste ... Eia, Domine Deus. c. 1938 and 1966.64
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Yet he continued to belive that "in spite of any
appearances, man remains, by definition, man-the-artist".65
It was this conviction which allowed him to struggle against
the ugliness of mass-production and the uniformity of
international culture, what he called our "hyper-Alexandrian
and megalopolitan situation",66 to assert individuality and
the valid sign.
Art is sacred and sacramental because it produced signs;
these signs are significant of some reality, "so of some¬
thing 'good' so of something that is sacred"67; also as
we have seen already the art product itself is a new reality,
and therefore sacred in its own right. Jones seems to
argue, and here he follows Maritain, that man creating a
work of art is not only symbolising Divine activity, but
also collaborating with the Creator
they (animals) are luckier than ourselves, they do not have
to collaborate with God in making 6 8
Art is constructive and creative and through art, says
Eric Gill, we experience ourselves as God, "I have said ye
are as gods".69 \ Gill also believed that art was collaborat¬
ion in creation, but that that role had been resigned with
the rise of post-Renaissance representational art:
The artist shall no longer be a collaborator with God or
so fancy himself. He shall be a critic of creation. He
shall no longer make things, but only pictures of things
and, first of all, pictures of what rich patrons fancy and
painted as such patrons fancy them.70
The collaboration argument, as we have said, stems from
Maritain, who writes:
that the artist is as it were an associate of God in the
»aking of acts of beauty; by developing the faculties with
which the Creator has endowed him ... and making use of
created matter, he creates as it were in the second degree
... Artistic operation does not copy God's creation, but
continues it.
This idea is analogous to the theological one which
forms such an important part of the arguments of de la
Taille and D'Arcy. They assert that every celebration of
the Mass furthers the fulfillment of God's will. According
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to de la Taille, as interpreted by D'Arcy, Christ is the
"glorious Victim" risen from the grave, "who no longer
weeps nor suffers agony. He is the Lord of Grace, the
Head of the Mystical Body which is risen with him after
having been baptised into his death".72 Therefore, though
Christ is present as a victim in each celebration of the
Mass, his suffering is past. Through the Mass the congre¬
gation is incorporated into the Church which is the visible
body of Christ:
the Resurrection signifies this new Adam risen from the
grave where the sins of the old Adam and his descendants
were buried, the new head of that Mystical Body whereof we
are members. A new solidarity in Christ - a new race
shares in the divine nature through Christ risen,73
But the Mystical Body is not complete and will not be
complete until the end of the ages. However, each celebration
of the Mass augments the Church and raises its members to
the divine nature. Those who partake of the sacrament of
the Mass are literally members of the Body of Christ, they
are as Gods, part of the Divinity. But apparently that
Divinity, at least in the person of the Son, is not complete
and can only become complete through the responses of men.
D'Arcy argues that "The motive behind all God's action from
the creation of Adam in grace to the restoration of man in
Christ and the foundation of the Church was love".711 But
"all love is reciprocal. Our Lord loved his own to the
extreme of love and showed it by the shedding of his blood.
This is all that a lover could do; and for that act to be
profitable there was need of a response, an acceptance, an
act on the part of the beloved. Therefore he continues as
the passive Victim and the Church is now active and does
her part by reciprocating freely the love of Christ, and
making it complete and efficacious for herself. This
response is the Mass".75 And he adds, "the Masses which
are being celebrated throughout the world are being offered
by them (the laiety) as members of the Mystical Body, and
the fruit of these Masses is increased or diminished by
the degree of holiness they possess".76
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Therefore, we see that that art which is religious
ritual, the celebration of the sacrament is a part of the
process, a part of becoming, although we know that in his
eternal aspect, God is unchanging and all events are simul¬
taneous. But all art, according to Jones, partakes of the
sacramental and therefore all art contributes to the evolution
of God, or at least to the Mystical Body of Christ. The
anamnesis of the Mass is legitimately extended to all acts
of recollection or commemoration, for such acts restore the
unity of the Logos:
The Word, says St. Augustine, is in a way the art of Almighty
God, And by the Word the whole divine work was done, omnia
per ipsum facta sunt. It is through this Word and his Art
that God attains, controls and realises, everything He does.
An^ in the same way it is through his art that the human
artist ought to attain, control and realise all his work.77
The work of art, through anamnesis, achieves a kind of
resurrection in the present. The roles of poet and priest
come very close together as art and ritual are identified,
just as they were in the ancient oral epics of Babylon and
Sumeria. As he is a poet, this figure unites his people by
acting as "custodian, remember, embodier and voice of the
mythus";78 as he is a priest, he unites them by the ritual
which raises them towards God. In The Anathemata the figure
of the artist-priest is a central one; as chief male prota¬
gonist of the poem he is the poet, the priest and indeed
Christ, both as Victim and Redeemer. He is the principal
actor of the poem, but the central "vortex", whose sign is
the "axile tree" is neither male nor female.
The Anathemata
Since the inception of this study a number of works, both
critical and explicatory, relating to the art of David Jones
and in particular to The Anathemata, have been published.
Among the most valuable of these is (probably) Rene Hague's
A Commentary on the Anathemata of David Jones (Wellingborough,
1977). Although this work is not exhaustive it offers a
section by section gloss on the poem as well as an overall
guide to the structure of principal themes. It is particularly
valuable for its inclusion of many of David Jones's own
comments on his poem.
My own major concern in this study of the poem is to
show that The Anathemata may be described as a Vorticist
poem and should take its place alongside The Cantos and
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those other modern long poems which have attempted to use
the innovations of modernism, and particularly of imagism,
as internal structural principles. We remember Pound's
notion that the long Vorticist poem will, like the Japanese
Noh plays, be based on one informing image, a central vortex
which will generate and condition the rest of the world.
We remember also Northrop Frye's principle, in Anatomy of
Criticism, that all archetypes are reducible to one another:
The literary universe, therefore, is a universe in which
everything is potentially identical with everything else ...
All poetry, then, proceeds as through all poetic images were
contained within a single universal body. Identity is the
opposite of similarity or likeness, and total identity is
not uniformity, still less monotony, but a unity of various
things. 79 .
The Many are the One, but while this provides for unity
and coherence in the world and in art, it is only as differences
and particularities are maintained that poetic value and
indeed meaning can be achieved. Thus in The Anathemata we
do have a central image, itself a "radiant node", a point
of generation and of intersection, the "Axile Tree" which
is the Cross of Christ. This is the symbol of the One, but
it is through metaphoric process, through the discovery of
analogy and types, through the metamorphosis of this image
into other images and signs that the One is diffracted into
the Many and the complex unity of the whole is realised.
It will be seen that while David Jones's inspiration is
religious rather than humanist his vision transcends simple
dualism and moves towards a unitive cosmology which goes
beyond the classicist position of T.E. Hulme and perhaps
even orthodox theology.
Later in the chapter we shall investigate the major
themes and images of the poem, particularly as they are
generated from the node of the "axile tree". This generation
is rather in the manner of neo-Platonic, theosophic or
alchemical systems for the first division is into male and
female, the distinction of the Cross from the altar-stone,
the tree from the rock, the active male protagonist, the
"quester", from the passive yet powerful object of the
quest, "margaron", sybil, mother and bride. Among the
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most important themes constituted by these images are "the
sacrifice of the god-hero, the evolution of man-the-artist,
the importance of Woman, the creation of Britain. In the
different sections of The Anathemata, as different themes
are emphasised, we shall see how these primary images generate
further images, and how even single words are chosen to
conform with the whole.
However, before proceeding to the specific analysis of
the imagery and themes, it will be useful to outline the
eight sections of the poem in order to provide context for
the discussion which follows.
1. Rite and Foretime
This section, while it opens at a scene which may evoke
the present day, the period immediately following the 1914-
1918 war, or the last days of Roman Britain, is mostly
concerned to trace the evolution of man-the-artist through
geology and prehistory from the very beginnings of the world.
Emphasis is given to the Pleistocene period and the last
great glaciation which created the shape of the earth as
we now know it and which saw the emergence of modern man,
our direct ancestors and the first artists. Already special
notice is given to Britain and Wales, and already all
events are related to the one event which was fore-ordained
and is in and out of time. The Crucifixion dates, all
events before or afterwards:
From the year of
the lord-out-of Ur
about two millennia.
Two thousand lents again
since the first barley mow.
Twenty millennia (and what millennia more?
Since he became
man master-of^plastic.80
Pre-Christian and even pre-human happenings are shown
to be significant prefigurations conditioned by this nodal
point:
Chthonic? why yes
but mother of us.
Then it is these abundant ubera, here, under the species
of worked lime-rock, that gave suck to the lord? She that




And see how they run, the juxtaposed forms,
brighting the vaults of Lascaux; how the linear is wedded
to volume^ how they do, within, in an unbloody manner,
under the forms of brown haematite and black manganese on
the graved lime-face, what is done, without,
far on the windy tundra
at the kill
that kindred may have life.81
Here, the reference to the Lascaux caves prefigures the
ritual of the Eucharist and the sacrifice "without" which
buys life for the people. But the reference to the Willen-
dorf Venus (c. 20,000-25,000 BC), while it includes the
notion of Mary, mother of God, also extends to the much
wider theme of ancient chthonic religions and the power of
the mother principle. And by using the Latin words Venus
and "ubera" Jones threads in his Roman theme, for it was
the Roman and Trojans, as ancestors of the British, who
interested Jones rather more than the Greeks. The Trojan
influence is also in the passage, latent in the echo from
Tennyson's Ulysses
Far on the ringing plains of windy Troy
an illusion which also serves to remind us of the continuity
of cultural and poetic tradition.
2. Middle-Sea and Lear-Sea
This section of the poem moves into the realm of ancient
history and concerns the journey or argosy of a ship and
its crew from some unspecified place in Asia, via Greece
and Rome, through the Mediterranean, into the Atlantic and
at last to Britain. The period of the journey, the identity
of the crew and particularly of the ship's captain are
left deliberately problematic. One interpretation is that
the captain comes from Troy, that he is first Aeneas (the
section opens in Troy) and then his descendant, Brute, the
legendary founder of Britain whose exploits in Italy, Greece
and Gaul are detailed in Nennius's Historic Britonum and in
Geoffrey of Monmouth's Histories of the Kings of Britain.
Certainly, some of the ports mentioned coincide with battles
and other encounters described by these authors. Jones
offered a partial explanation in a letter to William Hayward:
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It is a disadvantage of my method (or lack of it!) that
the reader is faced with rather sudden and unwarned of
changes of occasion, and that caused confusion. So here,
the voyage from the eastern Aegean to the port of Piraeus,
the harbour of Athens, gets merged in the voyage from the
Middle Sea out into the ocean of the West, and so to
Britain, which occupies the rest of this section.82
On the identity of the skipper he provided Hayward with
the following gloss:
its a bit complex, but you've clearly got the general idea.
First (as the medieval theologians would prefer it!) there
is the literal meaning of the text: the skipper is a
Mediterranean padrone and he is described in the section
Keel, Ram, Stauros, page 182, as pious, eld, bright-eyed,
"of the sea" (marinus). Pius in the sense of Aeneas; indeed
Aeneas is much in mind owing to his wanderings, and of his
foundational nature in our Western deposits. But, he's a
'caulked old Tritan', a 'hard case'. 'The vine-juice skipper'
is, of course, in part drawn from the sea-shanty 'A Yankee
Mate and a Limejuice Skipper', but recalls the Dionysiac
thing also, the 'ancient skipper', the 'ancient staggerer',
the 'Iacchos in his duffle-jacket'. Ischyros with his sea-
boots on, 'Agious Ischyros' is one of the Greek epithets
used of Our Lord still, in the Latin rite, during the
Reproaches, on Good Friday. 0, Holy Strong one!
He is 'Diocesan of us' (p.182) and (107) 'gladiatorial vicar
of the seas - so he's Peter the Fisherman, with the keys
and who drew the sword also Manannan mac Lir of course,
see Note 2.
107. Manannan or Manawydan was both navigator and god of,
or in some way identified with the element he navigated -
and much besides - just as with all those great mythological
figures - there's the duality, or rather the multiplicity
of function ... 8 3
The myth of Trojan Brutus was valued by Jones because,
although he knew it to be factually inaccurate, he believed
that its very existence and popularity conferred truth
upon it. He was not greatly exercised by the question of
distinguishing between history and myth since both are
inescapably part of our culture. Rather, he sought from
both their essential truth. A later note illustrates his
attitude to such material:
In this factual community-name (civitas Trinobantum for
London) we have the origin of the legendary city of Trino-
vantum, or Troy Novant, which the work of Geoffrey of
Monmouth made an integral part of our national mythological
deposit, whereby^ thro 'the TrojOnV&r'VH oj' tN? '•
Vent/6 oncl Jove, e>or fcradUiov *5 keel witK all that thoC
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succession can be made to signify; and seeing what we owe
to all that, the myth proposes for our acceptance a truth
more real than the historic facts alone discover.84
As long as myth and fable have enriched poetry rather
than merely served as decoration, they have been recognised
as alternative ways of presenting what is felt to be true
about the world or human nature. The revival of myth from
its decline into ornament in the nineteenth century has
accompanied the growing realisation of the uncertainty of
so-called fact whether in history or in science and the
increasing recognition that all accounts of experience,
"poetic" or "scientific" are selective interpretations.
It would be wrong, therefore, to suggest that "Middle Sea
and Lear Sea" was simply an account of the journey of a
fictional hero; that theme is only one of its many aspects.
It is also an imaginative recreation of all the journeys
of the early Mediterranean sea-peoples, the Pelasgians,
Phoenicians and Achaeans. As such, it is informed by
archaeological and historical findings. Hence it is marked
by accurate descriptions of ancient shipbuilding, specific
nautical landmarks and convincing weather conditions. But
as it recalls the fact of successive nations whose empires
or fortunes were made on the sea, from the early Phoenicians
until the supremacy of the British Navy in modern times, at
the same time it commemorates their legends and their heroes.
Ulysses is remembered in this section - "they say he made
Thule" - and so also are Jason, Triton, son of Poseidon,
and even Dionysus:
Is it the Iacchos
in his duffle jacket
Ischyros with his sea-boots on? 85
Here, as we have seen, Iacchos can be a type of Christ,
as are the other sacrificed gods, Adonis and Attis. But
here are remoter analogies implicating British material,
for Taliesin, the legendary bard of Wales, and St. Patrick,
like Iacchos/Dionysus were captured by pirates. Moreover
as poet and priest respectively they embrace two of the key
functions of the protagonist of the poem.
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The theme of the journey in the poem concerns not only
the geographical voyage from the Mediterranean to the
English Channel, but also the journey through time which
is the development of our western civilisation. This
section opens with the fall of Troy and the death of Hector,
another type of Christ, and then, inspired very largely by
Virgil and the Aeneid, moves on to the foundation and great¬
ness of Rome. Virgil and Virgil's Rome are pivotal in the
poem because not only was Rome a recreation, an anamnesis
of Troy, but at the same time it was a forecast both of the
Catholic Empire and even the City of God, as well as of the
foundation of Britain and the British Empire. Virgil, who
lived in the difficult age of Augustan imperialism, was
fully aware of the ambivalences of the civilisation which
he glorified, a civilisation based on a city which, in one
sense, could be the universal city, the polis embracing all
men in spiritual and material unity, but which differently
perceived was already the "hyper-Alexandrian megalopolis",
the corrupt and degraded capital of a crassly materialist
empire. David Jones's idea of Virgil is taken very largely
from the writings of W.F. Jackon Knight 86 who credited the
Latin poet with almost superhuman percipience. But Jones
is also remembering Virgil's importance to the Middle Ages,
as, for instance, to Dante, and indeed his infiltration into
early Welsh tradition where his name became the synonym for
a chemist or Wizard.87 In The Anathemata the roles of the
magician, priest and poet are frequently fused. Virgil is
also important to Jones because of his famous prophecy in
the Fourth Eclogue,88 which by seeming to foretell the
coming of Christ is at once a sign and a justification of
prefiguration as well as of the poet's role as prophet.
Moreover, it is yet another strand linking pre-Christian
and post-Christian times. Indeed, in his concern to show
that time, as it were, radiates from the central point of
the crucifixion rather than coming before or after, Jones
seems implicitly to be denying the damnation of the pagans.
By his assertion that every artistic act or act of anamnesis
is in some sense sacred and in some sense a celebration of
the Eucharist, he includes the whole of humanity in the
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Christian community. It is only as man seems to abandon
his role as artist that perhaps he is truly in danger of
being damned. Clearly, this is not orthodox Catholicism
but it is a view which must, I think, be inferred from the
poem. In David Jones's Heaven there is room even for
Neanderthal man.89 >
(He would lose, not any one
from among them.
Of all those given him
he would lose none).
The focal point of the crucifixion is kept in mind by a
dating technique which we have already seen in "Rite and
Foretime". In "Middle Sea and Lear Sea" the device is used
to locate remote events of ancient and prehistory not only
to the crucifixion but also to us:
Twelve hundred years
close on
since of the seven grouped Shiners
one doused her light.
Since Troy fired
since they dragged him
widdershins. 9 0
We notice here the double reference to Christ, one by
dating, the other through Hector as a prefiguring type.
Six centuries
and the second Spring




are gay and stepping it
but stanced solemn. 9 1
In this second passage Jones refers to archaic Greek
art, the onset of the Golden Age, a springtime in the ages
which did not recur until
... on west-portals
in Gallia Lugdunensis
when the Faustian lent is come
and West-wood springfnew.9 2
The cyclical pattern in history suggested by Spengler
is useful to Jones because it allows him to draw analogies
between periods, not only of growth, but of decline, such
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as the important parallels he discerns between the decline
of Rome in the time of Christ, the collapse of civilisation
in Roman-Celtic Britain as the Saxons advanced, and the
decadence at the end of the first World War. All of these
are periods of the "waste land", periods for which T.S. Eliot's
poem and the anthropological and cultural contexts of that
poem are important signs. In fact, Jones makes extensive
use of the Grail legends and their interpretations so that
a knowledge of Jessie Weston's From Ritual to Romance is at
least as important for understanding this poem as for "The
Waste Land". Jones used the notion of the waste land not
simply negatively but as a unifying device which brings in
the matter of Britain as well as identifying all the "freers
of the waters", from the pre-Christian Attis and Adonis to
the post-Christian figure of Peredur or Perceval, in the
archetypal figure of Christ.
This view of time as radiating from a central point, the
intersection of time and eternity, for which as we shall see
later the Cross is the supreme symbol, means that although
this second section deals for the most part with events in
ancient history it can flash forwards without incongruity
to later occasions or persons when these appear to be equally
valid instances of a mythical or persisting pattern or truth.
Thus, a stone Kore of the sixth century B.C. can comprehend
those who come before and after her:
by the radial flutes for her chilton, the lineal,
chiselled hair,
the contained rhythm of her
is she Elen£ Argive
or is she transalpine Eleanore
or our Gwenhwfar
the Selene of Thule
West-Helen?
She's all that and more
all korai, all parthenai made stone.9 3
Or, somewhat differently, the dangers of the Scillies
are illustrated by incidents which occurred long after the





many a Schiliar's people
many men
of many a Clowdisley's ship's company.9 ^
Nevertheless, despite this freedom in time, the section
confines itself on the whole to the Celtic and Roman contri¬
bution to the British tradition and does not touch on the
arrival or influence of the Saxons or Vikings. These
Northern peoples make their appearance in the next section,
"Angle-land". Thus, although there are many flashbacks and
palimpsests of time, the first half of the poem does move
gradually forwards in building up the history of Britain
in the context of the development of the West.
3. Angle-land
Did he strike soundings offVecta Insula
or was it already the gavelkind igland? 9 5
These opening lines describe the Isle of Wight, and the
change of name signifies the replacement of the Romans by
the Anglo-Saxons, in this case, the Jutes who were supposed
to have settled in this area and in Kent. Their role in the
creation of Britain is stressed by Jones for they are
believed to have had a more advanced civilisation than other
Anglo-Saxon tribes, and there is evidence that in their
areas there was a higher culture and a greater assimilation
of classical customs than in other parts of England.
Geographically, this section moves from the very south
of England up the east coast of Britain to the far north of
Scotland. In doing so, it also travels forwards in time to
include the Scandinavians and even Nelson, born at Burnham-
thorpe in Norfolk:
past the weathered thorps and
the Thorpe
that bore, that bred
him whom Nike did bear.9 6
North again, in Scotland, we touch on the material of
Anglo-Saxon literature, the sagas, the Romances and, much
closer to the present, the internecine wars of the Germanic
peoples:
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I speak of before the whale-roads or the keel-paths Were ^rom
Q'codCes to;-tio r<Miu'vebr tjht 3 rcyedl g reet\ waifcesUkat
'
fche/ Sferitt iy qrld
quadrate and number on the sea-green Quadratkarte
one eight six one G
for the fratricides
of the latter day, from east-shore of Iceland
bis Norwegen
(0 Balin O Balan!
how blood you both
the Brudersee
towards the last phase
of our dear West) .9: 7
4. Redril^
Or
did he make the estuary?
was the Cant smiling
and the Knock smooth?
Did our Tidal Father bear him
by Lower Hope to Half Reach?
Did he berth on the GreenLand or was she moored
in the Pool?
Did he tie up across the water
or did she toss at the Surrey
shore? 9 9
With this return to London, the poet moves into a
celebration of his own City from its earliest days to
contemporary times, demonstrating his affection for and
knowledge of the churches, streets and docks which formed
one half of his heritage. Appropriately then, this part
of the poem is a tribute to his maternal grandfather, ship's
joiner and master craftsman, and therefore himself an artist.
It seems fitting too, that Bradshaw should be on the mother's
side of the family, for his role as the native Briton, the
stay-at-home, is much closer to that of the various female
voices in the poem, though of course he does epitomise the
virtue of art, which allies him to the poet and the priest.
Like the other sections of the poem, this part is not
set in any definite period of time though the poet's grand¬
father would in fact have been Victorian. It ranges across
time by referring to and thus encapsulating the traditions
and customs of the Thames dockyards and the city of London.
This strong foundation of fact then allows the poet to draw
in other maritime legends and myths so that once again the
matter of Britain is implicated in the total culture of the
West:
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Not for as many cubic fathoms of best Indies lignum vitae
as' Id stock us till we re-sheave the blocks' for maSter-
bargees plying the Styx.
• •• ••• ••• •••
And, as for next Thor's Day's night tide
tell the Wop, to-go-to
Canute. 99 ■.
We note that David Jones mixes mythical and even legen¬
dary material with a meticulous care for factual detail.
This can be seen later in his description of Gwenhwyfar, who
is dressed in a way which is consistent with that of the wife
of a high-ranking Roman-British official. This attention to
accuracy was seen by Jones as part of his artistic duty; he
must realise as closely as possible, whether in words or in
paint, the artistic concept which inspired his work. In
Ebenezer Bradshaw he recognises and honours an artist of the
same, painstaking kind. For him too, no matter what the end
of his art, it was his duty to devote the whole of his crafts¬
manship to making it as perfect as possible in its own kind.
This illustrates the Thomist distinction between Art and
Prudence, for in Art the action is directed towards the
product, while in Prudence it is concerned immediately with
the moral good. So, Bradshaw, if he were given the task of
constructing the Cross on which Christ would be crucified,
would be obliged, as an artist, to make that Cross the best
instrument of its kind that he was capable of fashioning:
As sure as I was articled, ha^ J the job of fr\oftt$in
the bea nns to which was covtd the. Poyit dil
us. fy take* wx'frWu. cui4 jet that* sqca r^fco
the Rootless Tree100 -•
5. The Lady of the Pool
This section begins with the final disembarkation of
the mysterious captain. Rene Hague explains that this
skipper is not the same man, though of the same type, as
the captain in the previous section.
we have moved back some four hundred years or more in time.
'The setting', D. writes to D.M.C., 12 March 1953, 'is
toward the end of the middle ages There were a number of
reasons necessitating this. For one thing she (the L. of
the P.) had to represent to some extent the British sea
thing which rose only after the end of the 15th century,
so that the figure had to combine the Hogarthian, Turneresque,
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even Dickensian worlds with the Catholic world of "Dick
Whittington", Chaucer, Langland, Geoffrey of Monmouth's
Trojan-London myth and so on and so on.101
The opening lines reflect this consciousness of the
wealth and heterogeneity of London's history:
Did he meet Lud at the Fleet Gate? did he count the 6op-
t fe.es i-n the anchored forest of Llefelys
under the White fjpunt?
Did pver he walk the twenty-six wards of the city, wiihjn
aoci tX t rQ > did he cast his nautic eye on her
clere and lusty under kell
, in the troia'd lanes of the city?
And was it but a month and less from the septimal month,
and did he hear, seemly intuned in East-Seaxna-nasal
(whose nestle-cock polis but theirs knows the sweet
C\ a c\ a r\ d f n. what urbs would he hear it if not (t-> Selmis
0£>Pl cl \j <Y\ l? the greatest burh in nordlands?) 102
The allusion to Lud and Llefelys, which comes from the
Mabinogion, reminds us of the ancient link between the
Welsh Britons and London. We are also reminded that the
head of the hero Bran was, according to legend, buried under
the White Mount or Tower, and that ifc presence there was a
guarantee of Britain's integrity:
And when it was buried, that was one of the Three Happy
Concealments, and one of the Three Unhappy Disclosures
when it was disclosed, for no plague would every come
across the sea to this Island so long as the head was
in that concealment.103
According to the legend, Arthur himself caused the head
to be dug up for he wished to show that he maintained his
hold over Britian independent of any such supernatural aid.
The reference to Bran is significant; he appears several
times in the poem for he too is a saviour who gave his life
for his people. Possessed of certain magical or god-like
qualities, he is one of the identities of the male protagonist
of the poem and when leading his army across the Llinon
river in Ireland (the Shannon of Liffey) he makes a bridge
of his own body, he thereby becomes the Pontifex, a type of
Christ:
Bendigeidfran (Bran) came to land and a fleet with him,
towards the bank of the river. 'Lord', said his noblemen,
'thou knowest the peculiarity of the river: none can go
through it, nor is there a bridge over it. What is thy
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counsel as to a bridge? said they. 'There is none' said he,
"save he that is chief, let him be a bridge. I will myself
be a bridge'.10 k
In the next lines of the poem we find ourselves walking
the city with the captain, through the twenty-six wards
whose names and administration dated from medieval times.
Again, Jones uses an echo from a earlier writer, the Scottish
poet, Dunbar, to show the unity of the entire Island. The
frequent quotations, echoes and half-echoes from other poets
reinforce our sense of the continuity of our literary
tradition. These echoes are particularly effective when the
poem is read aloud and it should be remembered that despite
the prosy appearance of many sections of The Anathemata it is
very much a poem intended for the ear.
"Troia'd lanes" is a reminder of the mythical Trojan
inheritance, but also refers to the maze-like streets and so
indirectly to the thesis of Jackson Knight in Cumaean Gates
that there was in the complex nature of so many city-plans
a religious significance which is also the reason behind
many mazes.105 Often these mazes were intended to make some
treasure inaccessible to the intruder, or particularly
difficult of attainment by the quester. In The Anathemata
this treasure can be a hidden pearl, it can be the Holy Grail,
it can be Christ or the ransomed world which Christ himself
won.
Having thus woven in the theme of ancient Troy, Jones
includes the power of imperial Rome - "the septimal month" -
and moves past its decline to the arrival of the East Saxons,
the men of Essex, whose accent we gather from the poem may
not be that much different from modern Cockney. In the
parenthetical clauses which follow, a similar progress
through London's history is portrayed through a skilful
deployment of vocabulary. The classical and somehow universal
"polis" becomes a specifically Roman "urbs", (to which,
however, cling suggestions of imperial power and Catholic
ceremony) then declines into the more local "oppidum", town
of Berlin, a legendary king, and finally becomes the "burh"
known to the Scandinavian and Viking invaders.
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Almost immediately the captain encounters the Lady of
the Pool who, despite the title which relates her to the
naiads and water nymphs as well as the Ladies of the Lake
and of the Fountain in Welsh and Arthurian romance, is here
a Cockney lavender seller of easy virtue and some experience.
She could well be every girl that every sailor has in every
port. (The Pool of course, is the Pool of London). She
may owe something in conception to Joyce's Molly Bloom or
even to the anonymous cockney voices in The Waste Land,
but nevertheless she becomes Jones's own creation with a
very particular identity. She embodies the spirit of London,
and by extension the whole of Britain, but remains very much
a woman of the people, whether of the early Celts, the
Saxon tribes or of medieval and modern London. David Jones
himself sprang from the artisan class and both his major
works, In Parenthesis and The Anathemata, express the con¬
sciousness of the "other ranks", the lower orders, though
they reach also to kings, wizards and mythic heroes. What
emerges from his writings is that the tradition of a culture,
though it may be remembered and preserved by the poets and
artists, is nevertheless not the private property of that
elite but belongs to the whole people who, indeed, increase
and enrich it. Thus, quotations from the classics, from
works of scholarship and from the poets are found side by
side with snippets of folk-lore, nursery-rhymes and tags
from the army.
The Lady of the Pool, the female protagonist or principle,
who speaks for the first time in this section,106 has a
dramatic role which is not accorded to the male protagonist.
This may be because one of his identities is that of the
bard who narrates the whole poem. The bardic mask is dropped
once when the poet recalls his own experience:
If this, though sure, is but allegory
at all events
and speaking most factually
and, as the fashion now requires, from observed data:
On this night, when I was a young man in France, in
Gallia Belgica, the forward ballista-teams of the
Island of Britain green-garlanded their silent three-
o-threes for this I saw and heard their cockney song
-125-
salute the happy morning; and later, on this same
morning certain of the footmen of Britain, walking in
daylight, upright, through the lanes of the war-net
to outside and beyond the rusted trip-belt, some with
gifts, none with ported weapons, embraced him between
his fossa and ours , exchanging tokens . 10 7
This, despite the Roman trappings, is an account of an
incident in World War I during which Jones served as a
private soldier in the London Welsh Battalion of the Royal
Welsh Fusiliers. However, the bardic role is not entirely
shed for it was characteristic of the bards tho.t they
accompanied their chieftains into battle and even fought
alongside them.108
But the Lady of the Pool speaks only as a character
within the poem though even in this section her identity
shifts as easily as that of the male protagonist. After we
have come to accept her as an illiterate but generous light-
of-love, suddenly she reveals her ancient wisdom, her skill
in necromancy, her kinship to the dreaded Morgan le Fay. 109
She seems earthy, fleshy, real, but she is also supernatural,
a myth who asserts the reality of that myth. Discussing the
sirens she teaches the captain:
0, they was real
bodily quicksand mammals alright, captain, though
granted of a Faeiry genus . . .
I do affirm: All that is comprised under mermaid is n©
ion irat^e o. 110
Then, in a startling transformation she acquires a new
dignity and significance:
We are a water-maid
fetch us a looking-glass!
a comb of narwhal ivory, a trident
and a bower anchor -
and the Tower lion
nor twisk his lasher.
Here is our reg/\crfc hand:
this ring you see upon it were gave us long since by a'
ancient fisher; 'tis indulgenced till there be no more
sea:
kiss it.
No, no, on y'r marrow-bone - though you hooked behemoth,
you shall kneel!
This bollard here
where keels tie, come from all quarters of a boisterous
world,
hand us to it to sit upon.111
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Is is not too much to see the Lady in this role, not
simply as a mermaid, hut also as Britannia and at the same
time the personification of the Church. Hers is the Tower
and the Royal Lion, here also, it seems, is St. Peter's ring
and surely the bollard she demands to sit on is the Rock of
St. Peter, but also the omphalos, the central oracular stone
and ultimately the earth itself of which she is the personi¬
fication. For though the male principle in the poem is more
active, more adventurous, though he has the roles of pcet,
priest and even god, the female is his inspiration and his
genetrix, his protector and his bride. Without her, both as
she is Sophia - Wisdom and mother of the Logos,112 and as
she is material - the consenting flesh - there could be no
Creation and no Christian incarnation, for these two events
are analogous. David Jones accords an importance to the
female principle which reduces the omnipotence of God as
Father and Son, and is more in keeping with a Mother Gcddess
religion. So although in some of her aspects the Lady is
presented as a dramatic voice within in the poem, in her
more powerful and universal form she is the motivating force
of the entire poem and all the actions within it.
This entire section is almost wholly taken up by the
Lady's monologue as she addressed the sea-captain, the latest
in a long line of conquests, whom she regales by telling
stories about his predecessors! "They come and they go,
captain".113 The first part, however, seems to be devoted
to a description of old London churches and their traditions
and to acquaintancing the captain with the history of the
city. We discover that the Lady has learned much of this
from a former lover, an Oxford student and schoolman, who
seems to have had much in common with Duns Scotus "a seraph
for sub-distinctions".111' Her next tale is of a freestone
mason who appears to have come from a mixed Kentish and
Roman tradition (like the Jutes in "Angle-Land"). Her
encounter with him took place under the city walls and he
seems to have idealised her as the personification of Rome,
the ideal whose reality was the imperial fragmentation and
collapse. It is difficult to place this mason's time in
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history; sometimes he appears to be a Roman-Briton in the
Dark Ages, at others, according to Hague, he is a soldier
in the "Royal East Rents, raised in the sixteenth century
as one of the 'independent companies' serving in the
Netherlands against the Spanish".115
When I were
a young man in France impressed for service in Artois
an' drafted to Ordnance, an ingeniator out o' Burgundy,
but a Breton b_ birth, tells me that at Augustodunum,
the great works there, was, in times far far back,
reared of men, like those of my mob, from Kent, and
how from the provinces of this island came the best
artists in those days 116
Whoever this mason was, he remembered the Golden Age
of Roman-British civilisation with admiration and regret,
apparently from a period of decline.
The Lady continues the tale of her /ea-faring lovers.
The first she mentions is the skipper of the Margaron, sister-
ship to the Troy Queen.117 We may feel that if the Troy
Queen represents the Trojan-Roman inheritance, perhaps the
Margaron may bring in the sea-farers of Scandinavia and
Ireland, for it was they who first imported walrus-tusk
(the Margaron's freight) into Britain for ivory and certainly
it was the Celtic influence which was strong in the tradition
and practice of magic. It seems that Jones is trying here
to weave in the Welsh and magical strands of the poem.
The next captain, whose ship is the Mary, comes from
Aleppo apparently because of a reference in Macbeth: "Her
husband's to Aleppo gone" and "Though his bark cannot be
lost/Yet it shall be tempest-tost" (Macbeth I,iii)118
His voyage has multiple allegorical significances including
the bringing of Christianity to Britain, the period of
Christ's gestation and, analogously, the period of his
mission and passion, his argosy to redeem Mankind and ransom
the Church. At the same time, it is of course an anamnesis
of all the voyages of the peoples who came to Britain and
created her identity as well as those voyages of the British
naval and merchant ships which established her sea-born
Empire.
-128-
It is difficult to follow the sequence of events, for
the Lady is garrulous and rambles in her talk. This story
is interrupted by the long boast of her power from which I
have already quoted, a passage in which we leave the
adventures of the sea-farers and come to the Lady herself.
However, she recollects herself and returns to her theme,
describes battles and the ship's crew, who seem to be un¬
commonly similar in composition to the companions of In
Parenthesis, Londoners and Welshmen. And, as in In Paren¬
thesis , there is a Welsh boast, this time by the boatswain
from Milford. This boast is retold to us at third hand:
Dont eye me,, captain
for I did but relate him as I were told, what I had (Ved
Mi ine■<\> VvKdt Y\k V\<xd I'htV tsGckl"toy's
part■is'tr as way w tkctfr tr\f> ,l<?
The rambling discourse of the Lady of the Pool with
her tales within tales, her digressions and confusions,
does bewilder; but at the same time it demonstrates the
process of preserving and enriching the "mythus". Through
her monologue we see anamnesis at work, and it is significant
how often words to do with recalling and story telling
appear in her account: "they all be apt at their rehersals,
captain, what was upon a time and long since";120 "or should
my re-teller have told me untrue";121 "But to my tale/that
I regaled my mason with";122 "The Boatswain from Milford,/
for each circumstance finding antique comparison";123 the
passage on false story-tellers;121* "And those as after them/
whose fathers shall relate to them of these old times/before
them";125 and so on. The Lady is handing on her culture,
acting here as a female bard, transmitting the tradition,
perhaps not always accurately, but significantly. Even the
mistakes can be important:
Wow so be that
he sweared by the Tree of Chester
by a certain Jessy Mowers and by the owls, with many
darroes an' dammoes, Dukes and Jews and B' their god's
great athlete, Samson, and by Cassandra, as I take to be
$or Delilah bKcvgK" theiV fcwa /byrtal wti'nt*\ seem scarce
Sorted, yet '(rfvly b>JtV WQS wK-te el ifrs 1
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Jones interprets this passage in his footnote:
The Lady of the Pool of London is here giving her Cockney
version of: Iesu Mawr, Great Jesus; y diawl, the devil;
daro, colloquial for dammit; damnio, damn; Duwcs, colloquial
for Duw; Duw, God; Samson, St. Samson of Dol; Cas Andras,
andras is colloquial for the deuce and cas means hateful.127
Despite her mistakes, the Lady is translating the
unfamiliar terms into what she knows and thereby is creating
something which may not be in point to point correspondence
with the original story, but neverthelss is true to the fabric
of her own culture. We notice how easily unfamiliar names
become women: "Jessy Mowers". "Cassandra", and how this
conforms to the Lady's general sense of the importance and
power of womankind. "Owls" too is a fruitful mistake, for
the owl was not only the symbol of wisdom and Minerva's bird
as had already been mentioned in the Oxford passage, 128
but it was also a Druidic symbol and thus represents the old
Celtic magical lore which is so close to the surface of the
Lady's thinking.
It might be as well here to comment on David Jones's
use of notes. In the Preface he himself says of them:
I have a last point that I wish to get clear. Although in
the notes to the text and in this apology I refer to or cite
various authorities and sources that does not mean that this
book has any pretensions whatever of a didactic nature. I
refer to those sources only to elucidate a background. As
often as not I have no means of judging the relative accuracy
of these data. I refer to them as a traveller might, in
making a song or story about a journey he had taken from
his home through far places and back. He may have been
impressed by the clarity of a waterfall here, by the courage
and beauty of the inhabitants there, or by the note of a
bird elsewhere. And these phenomena would be deployed through¬
out his song as providing part of the content and affecting
the form of that song. Such a person might choose to gloss
what he was writing, or to break off from his narrative in
order to tell his audience what the locals averred of those
falling waters, or what the anthropologists had established
with regard to the ancestry of those inhabitants, or how the
ornithologists maintained that that bird-song was the song
of no bird known to them. Such glosses might be made in
order to explain some 'how' or 'why' of the relevant text.
The notes, because they so often concern the sounds of the
words used in the text, and are thus immediately relevant to
its form, are printed along with it, rather than at the back
of the book. But this easy availability would be a disadvan-
-130-
tage if it detracted attention from the work itself. So I
ask the reader when actually engaged upon the text, to consult
these glosses mainly or only on points of pronounciation.
For other purposes they should be read separately. 123
Jones intended his poetry to be heard, and clearly the
interruption of the notes would destroy the aural fabric of
rhythm, rhymes and resonance which form such a powerful
feature of the poem. On the other hand, the work is too long
to be read aloud without any kind of interval, and its eight
sections which are themselves divided into sub-sections and
paragraphs, do allow for the consultation of the glosses.
Jones himself in the passage quoted above suggests that a
tale-teller, such as he clearly aspires to be, might well
pause in his narrative to explain a point or to provide an
interesting sidelight on the story. As we have seen, this
discursive style is practised by the Lady of the Pool. In an
oral rendition of the poem, therefore, the matter of the notes
might well be conveyed less formally thaA in the literary
text. However, the notes, though they may not be part of
the "poetic" text, are inescapably part of the complete work.
Without them we lose much of the richness and significance of
the poem, and it is only in the unlikely event that we manage
completely to assimilate them, that we can read the text
without their aid. One of their most valuable functions is
that they provide the poetic text with a context, a context
which in our dispersed and fragmented civilisation is not
automatically available to us. Thus though Jones refers to
innumerable authorities in his preface and in the notes, we
ourselves are not obliged to consult these works if we pay
close attention to the text and the notes. Between them
they weave a fabric in which all the essential references
become internal to the work, so that an initially elusive
section may be illuminated by a passage elsewhere. In this,
it seems to me, there is a parallel between the poetic text
of The Anathemata and Pound's Cantos, though in Pound's case
the equivalent of the notes would be the rest of his
collected works including the complete prose writings. It
takes a disciple with the devotion of Hugh Kenner to collate
such a huge body of material, but eventually Pound's work too
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may be seen as a self-contained, self-explanatory universe.
Yet neither work is hermetic. Each of them encourages us to
plumb our tradition for ourselves, to increase our own
knowledge. They send us to source.
But from this digression we must return to the digressions
of the Lady of the Pool. Eventually she finished her retell¬
ing of the tale she told her mason; not so much because it
had ended, but because she had run out of breath: "After what
narrating I were something put for wind".13 0 She turns then
from her memories to address the captain directly, in fact
to deliver something of a homily, describing to him the
various sacred places of the city, the altars or burial stones,
old churches and walls under which lie the ancient heroes of
Britain, London's tutelary spirits:
aged viriles buried under
that from Lud's clay have ward of us that be his townies -
and certain THIS BOROUGH WERE NEVER FORCED,
cap-tin!! 131
One cannot escape the impression that the Lady is here
speaking of herself and that, like the city, she may never
have been forced, but certainly yielded to the foreigner
more than once of her own free will.
At the end of the section, the Lady warns the captain
of the approach of winter and suggests that his sojourn with
her, like that of his predecessors, is coming to an end.
She sends him back to sea, becoming that Lady of Good Voyage
welcomes and despatches her sailors from her island promon¬
tories. Under a less favourable aspect however, she may
also be the enchanting siren or ensnaring mermaid:
You'd best weigh
you'd best be off, skipper
you're wrong side the Pillars
for this tide o' the year
vou in y'r carvel-built - an' look qt
•bier W spars!
LorksI you ancient man
you'd best weigh!
I' Id make a whale of a mere-maid, captain, had | scales
bo b ell'y. • 132
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She blesses the crew with her bunches of lavender and
demands the captain's mercy for the pretty boatswain's boy
before turning back to ply her trade:
m' living flower?
Who'll buy my sweet lavender? 133
6. Keel, Ram, Stauros
In contrast to the overwhelming feminity of "the Lady
of the Pool", the sixth section, "Keel, Ram, Stauros" is
decidedly masculine in flavour. The narration is taken over
again by the poet, and as in the previous two parts, opens
with a question:
Did he hear them bawling a Frigg-day's ichthyophagous
feast
at the Belling Gate? 13h
This device of a question, sometimes followed by a
response, often by more questions, is a favourite device of
Jones. It occurs throughout his work, notably in The
Sleeping Lord. One reason for it may be the poet's unwilling¬
ness to assert, his refusal to plump for one possibility
which will exclude other possibilities. In the words of the
Lady:
I will not say it shall be so
but, captain, rather I would say:
You never know! 135
and again, in this section, in the poet's own voice, over¬
laid by T.S. Eliot and "Oranges and Lemons":
I do not knowl
I do now know!
I do not know what time is at
or whether before or after 136
Another reason might be that the question is particularly
effective orally, allowing the elaboration of parallel
structures where half-line may answer half-line, clause
unfold clause, and sentence respond to sentence. This device
echoes and deliberately recalls the half-lines of Old English,
the response of the Litany and the parallalism of Biblical
prose.
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At the end of the previous section we were warned that
Holy Cross Day, September 14th, was approaching 137 and
appropriately "Keel, Ram, Stauros" is a celebration of the
Cross, this central image of the poem, under three of its
most important guises. The Keel is the keel and foundation
of all the voyaging ships; the Ram is the battering ram of
the Roman armies, all engines of war, Christ conquering.
Stauros is the Cross itself, the maypole, all trees and all
scaffolds, Ygdrasil, the axis of the world. Each manifes¬
tation melts imperceptibly into the next, or is described
in terms of the others in a series of highly stylised meta¬
phorical substitutions. At the very beginning the captain
himself, the poem's hero, is identified with his ship:
He looks a bit of a clencher-guild
himself
His bends are of thick stuff! 138
Then again he becomes the captain, the master of his
ship which reverts to its usual female status:
Who else should they choose
to handle the bitch 1 3 9 >
There follows a passage where the importance of the
keel in the architecture of a ship is described quite
accurately, but in vocabulary which unmistakably establishes
an analogy with Christ: "Yardstick, prime measure";11*0 "roved/
or lashed".1k1
Rapidly, the tree changes first to a gibbet, then to a
Roman weapon of war. Roman rituals, both the public, state
ceremonies and the more esoteric, imported rites of Attis
and Mithras are introduced, while military traditions from
Roman and Old German times up to World War I are evoked:
"Storm-goat, rodded in the Aesir's yard";1**2 "Given pet
agnomina";11*3 "Off to the secret list".11*h
Such is the tree, horizontal. "Vertical'd" again, it
becomes the Cross, first the maypole of spring, or the oak
of the Druids, then the Christian Cross itself on the day of
its discovery, "the glad invention morning".11*5 Happily
for David Jones, this feast is celebrated on May 3rd so that
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it coincides with the older Mayday rites. Even more fortuna¬
tely, the Cross was supposed to have been rediscovered by
St. Helen, wife of Constantious Chlorus and mother of
Constantine the Great, who according to popular tradition
was of British birth.146 Jones fruitfully confounds this
Helen with Helen of Troy and also, as she is wife of the
emperor who was "REDDITOR LUCIS AETERNAE" 147 and mother of
the Constantine who did so much to bring Christianity to the
Roman Empire, with Mary, mother of Christ.
After this passage, when the Christian Cross has become
a sign of all sacred or venerated symbols, the tree turns
back into the keel and we find ourselves once again at sea.
This time the ship is unmistakably the Christian church, its
crew mankind and its captain Christ, certain now, after the
tempest, of safe harhour and salvation. Nevertheless, the
captain is still also Dionysus, or Manawydan, or
The old padrone
the ancient staggerer
the vine-juice skipper. 148
"Pious, eld, bright-eyed", he seems in many ways most
un-Christlike, yet he is our "diocesan", our bishop and
shepherd. Perhaps, unexpectedly and audaciously, he is not




This is the penultimate section and it brings us back
to Britain, dry land and the voices of the women of the
island. On p.200 there is a note which explains the title:
Mabinogion ... The singular is mabinogi ... the repertoire
of a mabinog ... a tyro bard; and meaning also a tale of
infancy as in the tale called Mabinogi Iesu Christ.
Thus, Jones may be deprecating his own skill and at the
same time and more importantly, celebrating the birth and
infancy of Christ. Yet although this part of the poem does
treat of Christmas it is still dated by the central event
of the crucifixion and the introduction of the section
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stresses the events of the Passion before moving through
them to the Incarnation,




since three dukes venerunt;
halted Arya-van
at Star-halt.150
Again, this use of chronology allows the poet to recall
the Roman and European tradition and to situate it around
the crucifixion. But having stressed the primary importance
of Easter, the poet moves through a series of negative
references to Christmas and the celebration of the Virgin
Mary:
Not Lalla, lalla, lalla
not rockings now
nor clovered breath for the health of him as tVie
Stravvi^ trJcKS tVvat ba Idac ku^ld m Stav-lit wheve V\e
was bervv bhe cav<?'his dwellincj* ir'
Other mythical female figures are disparaged to Mary's
advantage; first Helen of Troy, then Aphrodite, then Britain's
Gwenhwyfar. Once more, this is a negative lead into the
main scene of the section, Gwenhwyfar's attendance at
Christmas Mass:
more lovely than our own Gwenhwyfar
when to the men of this Island
she looked at her best
at midnight
three nights after the solstice-night. 152
Despite the earlier disclaimer, the poet approaches the
transcendental virtue and beauty of Mary through the earthly
beauty of Gwenhwyfar, whom he celebrates in terms of the
goddesses and whom he clothes in all the riches obtainable





who but Manawydan himself 15 3
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This section returns us to the opening scene of the
whole poem where in the last days of Roman Britain a feast
was being celebrated, a mass or royal supper, maybe even an
appearance of the Holy Grail. Here it resolves itself into
the Midnight Mass, but a midnight Mass which we are conscious
may be the last of its kind, for Arthur is absent, at war,
and Gwenhwyfar and Mordred (medraut) have betrayed him.
Civilisation itself seems to be ending, yet in this moment
is a respite, a time for joy and celebration. We move away
from the lit hall, into the countryside where the beasts
and the Celtic witches still hold sway. The voice of the
poet melts imperceptibly into that of the ancient mothers.
But on this night their magic is harmless, they tell "their
aves/unreversed" and they too claim affinity with the Mother
of God:
Sisters, not so jealous! Someone must be chosen and
forechosen - it stands to reason! After all there
should be solidarity in woman. No great thing but
what there's a woman behind it, sisters. Begetters
of all huge endeavour we are. The Lord God may well
do all without the aid of man, but even in the things
of God a woman is medial - it stands to reason. Even
the gigantic dynion gynt and mighty tyrannoi of old
time must needs have had mortal women for mothers, if
demi-gods or whatever father'd 'em - it stands to
reason. For these were of flesh and bone, not
illusions men. So here also there is occasion for
very flesh, for how should the eternal hypostases be
conjoined with a flesh not substantial?
Perhaps advisedly this claim does not carry the full
weight of the poet's authority. Yet it seems to contain
within it what the poet is moving towards. Without woman,
God is powerless; without flesh, God is powerless. Moreover,
it is woman who moves God, who gives birth to him and inspires
Him, as she inspires men. Woman is the Muse, the virtue of
Art, the fount of creation and it is through art that man
is man and through Creation that God is God. We have
already suggested that the true hero of The Anathemata is
the artist; but behind the artist, enabling the artist,is
Womankind, fleshy and at the same time the eternal wisdom
celebrated in the third Mass of Christmas.:
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Then back to Mary Major to hear then tell of how that from
before all time Minerva is sprung from the head of Jove.155
Before leaving "Mabinog's Liturgy", it is perhaps worth
noticing that it is the most British of the sections, per¬
vaded by ancient fairy-lore, reminiscences of Romance and
Celtic mythology. We tend to associate this oldest culture
with chthonic religion and tfye worship of the Mother Goddess.
Certainly, Jones identifies Rhiannon as a Mother Goddess
and celebrates her as May:
This is the night ...
of ... Rhiannon of the bird-throats,
was it? Spouse of the lord of Faery? Matrona of the
Calumniations, seven winters at the horse-block




that we must now call MAIR. 156
He gives this note: "Rhiannon is essentially a mother-
figure, in fact the Great Mother, Ragantona. She gave birth
to the Great Son; long penance was inflicted on her unjustly
and the song of her celestial birds is still proverbial in
Wales".
8. Sherthursdays and Venus Day
The consummation of the poem comes in the final section,
the celebration of the Last Supper and the Crucifixion
which, as we have seen from de la Taille, are essentially
the same sacrifice. The sense of culmination and arrival
is marked by the fact that the section opens, not with a
question, but a statement:
He that was her son
is now her lover
signed with the quest-sign
at the down-rusher's ford.
Bough-bearer, harrower
torrent-drinker, restitutor. 157
Here at last, Christ comes into his own. Even the
Mother becomes secondary, dependent "What will the naiads/
do now, poor things?" 158 He subsumes and comprehends all
the types, the vegetation gods and victims, Adonis, Odin,
the scythed wheat; the heroes, captains, Roman soldiers;
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the questers, Jason, Peredur, Perceval; the paterfamilias,
the priest; indirectly, even the artist and the poet. The
poem finished at its central point, the indivisible sacrifice
of the Last Supper and the Crucifixion, which happened at one
time and in a particular place, but which was fore-acted and
is re-enacted at all times and in all places:
He does what is done in many places
what he does other
he does after the mode
of what has always been done.
What did he do other
recumbent at the garnished supper?
What did he do yet other
riding the Axile Tree? 159 \
In the preceding pages I have attempted to give an
overall idea of the shape of the poem and some of its major
concerns. David Jones subtitled this work "fragments of an
attempted writing" and indeed forms and ideas are "juxtaposed"
in sequences which often appear disjointed rather than linked
on a causal or chronological basis. However, this disconnec¬
ted, collage-like effect which the poem shares with contem¬
porary long poems and indeed painting, particularly Cubism,
does more than reflect the artist's despair over a crumbling
culture, fragments shored up against ruin. On the contrary,
this form results from a cosmological view which sees the
whole implicit in every part and every part, no matter how
fragmentary, with its place in the whole. In poetry this
means that images, words, sounds interact and are inter¬
related, they reverberate in every direction and every part
of the poem modifies every other part of the poem. In the
final part of this chapter I intend to examine more closely
the operation of the key images and their ramifications
which create the structure and fabric of the poem.
It has already been claimed that the central vortex of
the poem, the focus of energy is the "Axile Tree", the inter¬
section of the arms of the Cross. I shall now consider at
greater length the significance of this key image and its
importance as a prime generator of metaphor in the poem.
We have remarked in the first half of the chapter
David Jones's interest in the notion of the "sign": man the
-139-
sign-maker is man the artist, the artist's task is to lift
up "valid signs". The Cross itself is the epitome of the
sign; its supreme importance is not itself but what it
points to, in fact, it is only as sign that it can be
venerated without idolatry:
Things as signs occasion the kind and degree of honour due
to what they signify. The cross, considered purely as a
sign, happens to be the specific and unique sign of the
God the Son, the Redeemer of the World, and, as such,
occasions divine honour, latria. To offer latria to the
cross, crucifix or relic of the cross, qua sacred object,
image or relic would be idolatrous. But to offer anything
less than latria to the cross, qua sign, would be to offer
something less than latria to what is signified (namely the
Redeemer) which would be insufficient, or rather, an
impossibility. For which reason, using the inexact language
of everyday speech, we say we pay latria 'to the Wood',
because the word 'wood' or 'tree' here signifies the stauros,
and the stauros is the singular sign of our Redemption. 150
As it is the sign of Redemption, in this poem the
Cross comes to subsume all signs, just as we have seen that
the figure of Christ subsumes all types of the god-hero-
victim. Indeed, the Cross becomes the sign of signs, in
its two elements, joined but separate, a visual symbol of
metaphor. As it is a figure of intersection, a nodal point,
it becomes also a sign of the chief abstract ideas of the
poem. It signifies the central moment where time and eternity
cross, and also the infusion of spirit into matter to create
form; thus the Passion and the Incarnation are analogous,
or two manifestations of the same truth: God become Man
or Man become God. These overarching themes generate or
include further analogies, more particular ideas, such as
the separateness and identity of male and female, for which
the Cross itself can again be a visual sign. In the poem
the Cross as sword, lance, battering ram is male; as altar,
sacrificial stone, perhaps as flowering branch it is female.
Then again, the Cross as sign of the Incarnation is sign
of all new forms, all artistic creation, and is itself, as
object, a product of art. These abstract ideas, of which
the Cross is sign, in their turn inform and generate further
"cross-images" in the poem. Images of intersection, foci
and nodal points pervade even the detail of the poem. The
Cross as sign is seen everywhere:
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Crux-ruound at the node
gammadion'd castle 161
The reference is to the hill and fortifications of
Troy, recognised as archetype, but even " gainmadion' d" , a
specialised architectural term, refers us to the Cross, for
it is a sort of swastika pattern used to fill the base of
a painted window. A few lines later Troy is described as
"matrix for West-oppida", an image which unites the idea
of the Cross as intersection and that of the womb, generat¬
ing vortex or node. The congress of male and female is
conveyed again in images of intersection in "Middle-Sea
and Lear-Sea", when the female genius of Rome (Flora?)
recalls the city's foundation:
he first, with his butt-iron, marked the intersection cmc(
Reared q spocc too<' own bimV' on fcku b — a^cl Si cjnetf
me to ' sbanMb t.y, thtvV,' ftWlW Hvs elt>ovy> tcA
a*mpie bo dov^tevyvfc; Arc alined to bK-^ScufcHworcl) mirscl^ Kls dfesjm<y:/ifc£ bKe £cot- mak-YAa jl-terhe. e/BS, - or a har^ cKecfc^^Afe^ugurator. > "
The insistence on locus, on the intersection of axes
even manifests itself as nautical compass bearings or map
instructions:
Thirty-seven forty-five north
twenty-three thirty-nine east: 163
the greyed green wastes that
they strictly grid
quadrate and number on the sea-green Quadratkarte
one eight six one G 1 6 **
These specific indications of specific places in their
turn are a sign of, or point us back to, the most significant
moment and place of all, which conditions all other space-
time events:
on this hill
at a time's turn
not on any hill
but on this hill. 165
Thus the Cross as a sign of intersection, of focus,
of meeting, of separateness in identity. But in the poem
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its type is discovered in many other symbols and material
products of our culture and as the significance and function
of these are included in all the Cross stands for, so the
power of the Cross as central sign extends through our lives
and history. In Keel, Ram, Stauros" we saw the main sub¬
types of the Cross. The Stauros extends beyond the Christian
Cross, for as the tree "vertical'd" it includes Ygdrasil,
the world-tree of Scandinavian myth on which the earth
depends, the tree on which the God Odin sacrificed himself
in a true type of the Christian passion:
(Nine nights on the windy tree?
Himself to himself? 166
As instrument of execution, the Cross becomes all
gibbets, all scaffolds, even the most ignoble:
To be set up?
pole for the garlands?
gibbet?
for the dented spolia?
gibbet at Laverna's cruxed-way
for dolorous queans to mourn an Adonis ad vincula?16
This reference here is to The Beggar's Opera and the
thieves' gallows; we notice again the pervasive image of the
Cross in the allusion to the custom of executing criminals
at the cross-roads. We see also that this grim instrument
of execution may also be the festive maypole, the symbol
of fertility set up since pagan times at the summer Calends,
celebrated equally by the Celts and Romans. The Cross
includes all such raised signs, all totems, and extends as
far as the natural tree, the oak venerated by the Druids.
As maypole and as living tree, flowering branch, it recalls
Christ's aspect as saviour and renewer, as vegetation god,
guardian of crops and fertility:
Erect?
for the wheat-waves to be high?
for the sea-wattles to be full?
for the byres to be warm with breath, for the wflteon
J> ree*d € o 11' to b e" C I&WW&L6 ( , e o
for the lover's lass?
We saw earlier that as the Cross is the Keel it allows
the introduction of the argosy theme, the inclusion of all
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sea-yoyages and by extension, all quests and trials, include
ing the hunt for the Grail and for the Golden Fleece, the
course of Christ's life, the travail of the Crucifixion,
the achievement of God's will and the fruitation of the
Church as Christ's Mystical Body at the end of the ages.
Similaraly, the Cross as Ram brings in the most specifi¬
cally masculine and aggressive elements of the poem. It
recalls the Christ who stormed Hell and can storm men's
hearts; it reminds us that the immaculate conception, no
matter how spiritual, no matter how willingly accepted by
the Virgin, was a dynamic act, a moment of creation; it
reminds us that the Crucifixion itself was a bloody, cruel
event. Also, it allows David Jones to recall all battles
and all those who have endured and died in battle, victims
of wars from Trojan times to the carnage of World War I
which he himself had experienced, victims who, as they are
remembered, recall all those who have died, who have gone
before us and bring them into the uniting moment of anam¬
nesis .
In all its manifestations, except perhaps as a growing
tree, the Cross is the product of art. Thus, whether it is
Keel or Ram, great attention is paid to the details of
construction and their correct execution:
Of selected boles, orneus, assembled and tied
or of tall beams, coniferous, bolted.
Thirty paces and a bit from butt to business
end - well above the maximum last show-done -
eleven an' a half hands thick where she takes
her war-head. 169
This insistence on craft, on the proper exercise of
the virtue of art, as we saw, was the main theme of "Redriff";
it extends also to the art of ritual, the proper setting
for a feast, be it the Last Supper of later celebrations
of Mass:
In the high cave they prepare
for guest to be the hostia.
They set the thwart-boards
and along:
Two for the Gospel-makers
dne for the other Son of Thunder
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One for the swordsman, at the right-
board, after;
to make him feel afloat. One for the man from
Kerioth.
seven for the rest in order.
They besom here and arrange this handy, tidy
here, and furbish with the green of the year the
cross-beams and the gjbaming board.
They make all shipshape




Who d'you think is Master of her? 170
We mark in this passage David Jones's own art, his
skill in matching sounds and manipulating half-ryhmes, his
bitter puns: "hostia" is "victim or sacrifice" but it may
also to sound to us as host, and Christ, the guest at the
Last Supper and invoked presence at Mass, was and is also
the Host of all mankind. Again, we are aware of the skill¬
ful inweaving of our own culture through the echoes from
"Green grow the Rushes 0" or from phrases like "Bristol-
fashion". At the same time, the range is extended beyond
Judaeo-Christianity by naming the Son of Thunder who reminds
us of Thor and Mars and the other Thunder gods, and by
the suggestion of world-wide vegetation festivals in
"furbish with the green of the year". Also the poet has
managed, even at this early stage of the poem, to establish
the analogy between the board of the Last Supper and the
wood of the ship, thus providing for the nautical and
voyage themes of the poem. Incidentally, even in this
passage, the figure of the cross is pervasive and prophetic,
"thwart-boards", "cross-beams".
In "Mabinog's Liturgy" the details of ritual in the
celebration of the Eucharist are similarly specific:
And on and over the stone
the spread board-cloths and on this three-fold linen
the central rectangle of finest linen and on the
spread-out part of this linen and up-standing calix
that the drawn-over laundered folds drape white.
( And before the palled cup
the open dish and on the shallow dish and in the
wide bowl of the stemmed cup
the three waiting munera.171
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The celebration of a ritual is itself a work of art
and its efficacy depends on the proper realisation of the
artistic form in the material act. Thus the priest is an
artist; but conversely, the artist is also a priest, who
actually or metaphorically is contributing to God's creation
and the achievement of His Will. It has been seen that the
description of Gwenhwyfar's Christmas Mass is not simply
that, but could easily pass for an account of the appearance
of the Holt Grail; "calix", "palled cup","shallow dish".
By letting his images be multivalent in this way, Jones
does not simply assert that the feast of the Grail is a
type of celebration of the Eucharist. Rather, because of
his constant reference to mythological and anthropological
researches such as those of Frazer or Jessie Weston, we
understand that the poet is telling us that the Eucharistic
feast itself includes within all that is comprised in the
traditions and lore associated with the Grail, be they rites
of fertility, renewal of vegetation, restoration of the
Waste Land or whatever. In The Anathemata the signs and
images never point only one way, and it is for this reason
that the poem is not narrowly, or even only Christian, in
this way that it avoids didacticism or dogma, and, indeed,
from the orthodox point of view, steps over into heresy.
The Cross is the central image of the poem, but the
action occurs through the male and female principles which
are themselves derived from the central image. That this
is true of the male principle can be seen from the previous
discussion of the "ram" image, from the identification of
the captain with the keel of his ship, from the fact that
the Cross is, predominantly, the sign of the hero, the emblem
of Christ. But the Cross also generates female images: the
stone, the mound, fort, pearl, city, woman, mother, maid,
bride witch, earth, water. We could say that the function
of the Cross in the peom, as central vortex, was itself
feminine, for it is the matrix from which the other con¬
stituting images are generated. Though this may be reading
into the work what we hope to find, it can, I think, be
substantiated by an examination of the evolution of female
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imagery within the poem:
Crux-mound at the node
gammadion'd castle.
Within the laughless Megaron
the Margaron. 172
As we have noted already, the primary reference is to
the fortifications of Troy. We see here how Jones moves
from the cross imagery, with its suggestion of woman,
"mound", to notions which are much more specifically female.
He glosses the second two lines:
I am associating the rock called Agelastos Petra, 'the laugh-
less rock', at pre-Hellenic Eleusis (where the modelled cult-
object in its stone cist within the cleft of rock represen¬
ted the female generative physiognomy) with the Magarom-
type buildings on Troy-rock where Helen was the pearl-to-
be-sought within the traversed and echeloned defences of
the city. But apart from this association we can accurately
describe the hall of Priam as 'laughless' and certainly
Helen was a margaron of great price. 173
If this quotation did nothing else, it would at least
illustrate how the notes are an intrinsic part of The
Anathemata. Many of the ideas contained in this passage
are derived from Jackson Knight's Cumaean Gates which
examines the links between ancient burial practices, customs
of fortification and city foundation and sybilline or
oracular mystery cults associated with caves and rocks; the
entire study is derived from a reference to a maze depicted
on the Cumaean Gates which occurs in Book VI of The Aeneid.
We will see that the associations between these themes is
carried over by Jones into his poem. We should notice also
that, apart from the scholarly background, Jones reinforces
his associations through purely poetic devices such as here,
the half-rhyme "Megaron/margaron". By this technique two
of the key female images - the rock chamber or hall (i.e.
the womb or the mother) and the pearl, the prize, Helen
(i.e. the bride) - are made equivalent. Yet even this
interpretation is too clear-cut: the division between male
and female is always somewhat arbitrary, somewhat temporary.
The pearl which here is Helen and elsewhere is the ransomed
Church can also be the child in the womb, Mary's Son.
Again, the imagery is plurisignative, ambivalent. The
-146-
quest works both ways: Christ travails to rescue us, the
Church, his bride; we struggle to find Christ, our salvation.
Ultimately, the Mystical Body of Christ is the same as the
Church triumphant, and differentiation of sex melts away.
The same process of separation and fusion is observed with
the keel and the ship. The ship is always female, the keel
seems to be male but occasionally they are one and the same:
Recumbent for us
the dark of her bilges
for fouled canopy
the reek of her for an odour of sweetness.
Sluiced with the seep of us




Lignum for the life of us
holy keel. 17h
In this passage, the emphasis is on the ship as container
and womb; the "tree that tabernacles" is clearly female.
Yet the "holy keel" has in the rest of the section been
quite definitely male.
We recall from de la Taille and D"Arcy that the Last
Supper and the Crucifixion are essentially the same act, and
therefore recognise that the festive board in the upper room
and the Cross on Calvary are equivalent. This identity is
reinforced by the recollection of the many prefiguring
sacrifies where what was killed was, in fact, eaten; where
the sacrificial stone and spread table were, to all intents
and purposes, the same. Jones identifies the Cross with
sacrificial altars throughout the ages, altars which may be
the scenes of actual bloody immolations or of symbolic
rituals, such as that of the Mass. Moreover, as he tells
us, the place of the altar should be on the tumulus or
burial mound:
'tumulus' because the tumuli, the barrows on our downlands
and hill-sites, were essentially burial places and because
a Christian altar, by the requirements of Ca_n.on Law, and
in observance of a use at least as old as the fourth century,
should contain relics of the dead. Cf. at the beginning of
Mass, the priest kisses the altar, saying ... "by the
merits of thy saints whose relics are here ...' and cf.
-147-
the Offertory prayer Suscipe sancta trinitas in which the
words occur 'and of these here'(et istorum). This prayer
is very explicit1", it says that oblation is offered to the
Trinity, in rememburanee of the Trinity, in remembrance of
the Passion, Resurrection and Ascension and in honour of
the Theotokus, of certain named saints and those whose
relics lie under the particular altar at which the Mass is
being celebrated, together with all the saints departed. 175
Now this tumulus is also a cave, a tomb and a womb-
again female:
All the efficacious asylums
in Wallia vel in Marchia Walliae,




Enclosure of the Children of Troy! 176
These are the sleeping lords and heroes who may yet be
reborn, who are reborn through anamnesis, ""What's under
works up"'179 and their various burial mounds, caverns and
rings of standing stones are the mothers who shelter them.
The true altar is thus the cross or sacrificial stone
and the burial mound or hill on which it is situated, be it
Calvary or a Celtic long barrow. But the burial mound
itself extends to include all hills, particularly those
which are the foundations of cities. The city itself
becomes the equivalent of an altar, for it too is founded
on the bones of the dead. The archetype of the city, the




that but 750 paces would circuit
first revetted of anguish-heights
matrix for West-oppida
for West-technic
for West-saga 17 8
But "hill of cries", anguish-heights" informs us that
the bill and city of Troy are only another type of the
central figure of the Cross on Calvary:
not on any hill
but on Ariel hill
that is three green hills of Tegeingl
in one:
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the hill of the out-cry
the hill of dereliction
the moel of the mamau
that is all help-heights
the mound of the in-cries. 179 ,
Of course, in its wider significance the hill is the
earth itself, the earth as mother who is personified in
the goddesses Demeter and Rhiannon who appear in the poem.
But even when the female achieves this greatest impor¬
tance she remains temporal, material, "this unabiding
rock", 180 dependent on the eternal spirit, the power of
God "by whom all oreogenesis is": 181
Ante colles he is and
before the fleeting hills
in changing order stood. 182
Yet we should notice that as the female principle is
Sophia, God's eternal wisdom, and as it is the form of the
Incarnation which is outside all time, so the mother
herself, at least as Platonic idea, is eternal. Jones
echoes the tortuous interdependence of male and female,
bride and bridegroom, mother and son, in his own tortous
syntax:
He by whom she is to whom by a wise allegory they make
apply, ante colles ego parturiebar: she that laughs
last.
Sophia's child that calls him master
he her groom that is his mother. 183
As the female is the sheltering earth so also she is
protective water, the amniotic fluid in the womb, "her
federal waters ark'd him",189 and thus all fountains,
rivers, oceans, personified in the naiads and the mermaids,
in the sirens and in the goddesses of seamen like
Aphrodite and Athene.
But, more specifically, the female principle is dis¬
covered not only in the hill but in the city founded on
the hill, particularly as that city is a site, an enclosure
capable of protecting, in danger of being taken. Thus
Troy, Rome and London are all female, all cities of living
communities founded on communities of the dead. The city
becomes the type of all communities, of the ship's crew,
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the army camp or regiment and most importantly of all,
it is the community of the Church, the City of God on
earth. Every secular city is a type of the holy city,
as clearly secular Rome and the Roman ideal are for
David Jones the type, albeit very imperfect, of the ideal
of the Roman Catholic Church, the community of Christ on
earth working towards the completion of his Mystical Body.
So the female principle is discovered in the images
of earth and water, rocks, caves, stones, in the burial
mound, the fortress and the city. Let us consider some
of the personifications of the female principle, the
women, witches, nymphs and goddesses who appear in the
poem.
By separating his concept of womankind into all the
different women of the poem, from the Virgin Mary to Helen
to the Cockney Lady of the Pool to the goddesses Aphrodite,
Athene and Demeter, Diana and Persephone, Scandinavian
Freya and Celtic Brigid, to the female saints and to the
less respectable semi-divine beings such as mermaids and
sirens, witches and sibyls, David Jones succeeds in
establishing Woman as a universal and many-sided force.
In a sense, all his women are one woman, or are the type
of the Virgin Mary, mother and bride. But by ranging so
widely he avoids the dangers of Mariolatry, and indeed
makes of Mary something much more fundamental and universal
than she is in Catholic theology, though not perhaps than
she is in the hearts of men or in the traditions of Christian
literature.
Mary is the pattern of womankind whom all the other
female persons in the poem figure or are related to:
Now sisters! What said our pious father, Maro,
Pentref Andes, son of Maia, queen of Mantua, in
Gallia Transpadana.
There's always a Mari in it, I warrant you!
Yet different sections of the poem emphasise different
aspects of woman and have different "heroines". In the
first section which recalls oreogenesis, mountain-building,
the very formation of the planet, the chthonic theme is
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important and the poet emphasises the sheltering female
hills, the burial mounds, the tumps:
West horse-hills?
Volcae-remnants' crag-carneddau,
W|oel of the Mothers?
the many colles Arthuri? 186
the folowing rivers:
But had they as yet morained
where holy Deva's entry is?
Or pebbled his mere, where
still the Parthenos
she makes her devious exit? 187
We notice here the play on Deva, the Latin name
for the River Dee. The word sounds as "diva", goddess,
and then modulates to "devious", another aspect of woman
and at the same time a reference to a change in the river's
course which occurred at the end of the last Ice Age.
The earth herself is the presiding female force in this
part:
When is Tellus
to give her dear fosterling
her adaptable, rational, elect
and plucked-out otherling
a reasonable chanca? 188
The goddess of this period is the archaic fertility
symbol, the Willendorf Venus:
Chthonic? why yes
but mother of us.
Then it is these abundant ubera, here,
under the species of worked lime-rock, that
gave suck to the Lord? She that they already
venerate (what other could they?)
her we declare? 189
Woman in this section, therefore, appears in her
primordial aspect. In "Middle-Sea and Lear-Sea" the
emphasis is on the voyage, on male action and the most
important female figures are those associated with the
sea. These figures take the form of female statues,
korai and parthenai of archaic and classical Greek art,
as well as their Roman imitations. The goddess is a
presiding guardian over a city or an island, often
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realised in the form of an Aphrodite or an Athene placed





Polias and star of it
but Tritogenian.
As a sea-mark then
for the navigating officers. 199
At a less exalted level, this female the sailors look
to is their sweetheart in every port. David Jones unites
the two levels by naming his mariners' girls after divine
and sibylline figures:
you shall have y'r warm-dugged Themis
and you, white Phoebe's lune




A note on p.104 glosses these names:
These names of the three sweethearts of the matelots each
connote various aspects of femaleness: the earth, the
seasons, the fates, the sibylline art, the menstrual
cycle, the moon, so the tides, the huntress, the mother.
Telphousa in particular has affinities with Delphi and so
with Petra Agelastos. 193
The image of Petra Agelastos, the centre of Eleusinian
mysteries, whose cleft is "representative of the female
generative physiognomy" echoes the Rock of St. Peter and
this Christian theme is reinforced by the further suggestion
of the hymn "Rock of Ages". This analogy or metaphor,
this fusion of two different strands or traditions is
effected by the poetic devices of word-play and sound,
yet we accept them as valid, as a perception of a new
coherence.
Eb Bradshaw, the poet's grandfather and hero of
"Redriff", as we have already seen, has an almost herma¬
phroditic role. As craftsman and artist he is male, but
pray.
cleft for us! 192
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as stay-at-home, as a voice of the City he seems to have
much more of the passive role of the female and indeed
his Cockney speech links him closely to the garrulous
heroine of the following section, the eponymous Lady of
the Pool. She is, first of all, every sailor's sweetheart:
she is a woman of the people, in some ways ignorant, semi-
illiterate, yet possessed of folk-wisdom made up of tradit¬
ion and the stories of her sea-going lovers. In a way, she
personifies the culture itself, not merely the literary
culture but the entire hodge-podge of myth, history,
pseudo-history and fold-belief through which a people
creates an identity for itself. We might choose to see
her as a figure of the poet, the preserver and creator of
the culture butthis, I think, would be mistaken. She is
rather the poet's inspiration or Muse, and, at the same
time, the matter of his poetry. We think we hear the Lady's
voice in this section, but she speaks always within the
context of the poem which as a whole is the invention and
narration of the poet.
This Lady is very much a fleshy creature, a London
wench; but she has affinities with other supernatural and
more exalted beings, and indeed herself identifies with
the goddesses and heroines of history, Iphigenia, Helen,
Flora the spirit of Rome, and above all, with Mary whose
churches she recites and whose patronage she invokes. It
is the Lady who voices the idea that the concept of Mary
is, for men, a conflation of their ides of mother, mistress
and muse:
You see, Master,
I were not honoured of a' aurioled clerk to no
purpose, nor but fleshly ... and 'twere he that
did name me when and as he would favour me, after
the name of her dower; and in the secret garth and
inmost bailey of him, where such unlike conjoinings
are, he did meddle me with his Bountiful Mother and
with that other, that nourished him bodily: these
too were England - if with differences. 19 ^
Jones also uses the Lady to introduce the element of
mystery and terror which is part of his concept of woman.
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No matter how fleshly, how human, there is always a
lingering suspicion of the alien, or other-ness about
the female. Thus she is transformed into a siren, a
mermaid, a creature not wholly human, not completely
subject to the laws which govern man. The section reveals
the Lady's latent power and when she dismisses her captain
her threatened curse carried with it all the force of
ancient witchcraft and matriarchal tradition:
by Gogmagog!
and the thirty-two fornicating
daughters of the Island o' Britain, may the Loathly
Worm have you, before you've so much as made the
Nore on a favourable tide.' 1 9 9
In "Mabinog's Liturgy" woman again comes into her
own, this time in the person of Gwenhwyfar, wife of Arthur.
Although she is portrayed as of Roman-British or Roman-
Welsh descent and is an aristocrat she is very similar to
the Lady of the Pool. Both characters are an attempt to
realise the idea of woman in a British context, and,
being much more the poet's own creation than the goddesses
and heroines of mythology or even the overarching figure
of Mary herself, they are so much the more rounded and
complete. Gwenhwyfar is portrayed as majestic and vain,
beautiful but flawed. Jones describes her form and her
dress almost in terms of ritual; her clothes are similar
to those adopted by the priesthood and her very shape
appears statuesque, larger than life:
And from where over-gown and under-gown and linea
draped the clavicled torus of it, her neck-sha^t of
full entasis, as though of Parian that never ages,
still as a megalith, and as numinous:
Jones made several paintings of Guinevere which are
among his most impressive works. In them she appears as
a huge, very beautiful but rather threatening figure,
daunting in her female sexuality and otherness. For him,
she seems to have symbolised his concept of woman more
completely even than Mary, from whom the aspect of danger
or even evil, must be absent.
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The supernatural element is brought out in the
second part of the section when the poem moves out of
doors and a voice speaks, ostensibly the voice of a witch,
but very close to that of the Lady of the Pool, though
without her Cockney accent. The Arthurian link is also
there, for the witches belong to the company of Morgan-le-
Fay, Arthur's sister, and we can imagine that even Gwen-
hwyfar out of doors and in less regal circumstances might
have some knowledge of the magic arts. In allowing his
witches power and the traditions of faery and magic,
Jones is paying tribute to the native pre-Christian
inheritance of the Island. But by making his witches
acknowledge the power of Mary and of Christ he assimilates
the pagan tradition to that of Christianity and of Rome
and brings together the separate strands that make up his
own inheritance:
Wherefore we malkins three
for all our sisters
of Anglia et Walliae and of Albany
our un-witched aves pay
if only on this, HER NIGHT OF ALL.
Unto the bairn, as three clerks inclining
when they confess themselves before his Stone
at the Introit-time.
Kneel sisters!
Greymalkin! Kneel. 19 ?
In the final section, the power of woman yields to
that of Christ and her dependence on him is made evident:
What will the naiads
do now, poor things:
the lady of the ffynnon
Es Sitt that moves the birket, fays del lac, the
donnas of the lyn, the triad-matres, the barley-
tressed mamau and the grey-eyed nymphae at the
dry ffynhonnau whose silvae-office is to sing:
UNUS HOMO NOBIS
(PER AQUAM)
RESTITUIS REM. 1 9 ®
This passage shows us yet again how closely the
female principle is associated with natural things, with
wood, water and earth. The male principle, on the other
hand, is much more anthropomorphic in its manifestations,
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and although the hero is associated with vegetation rites
and renewal of crops, even appearing in one type of the
victim as John Barleycorn, 199 he is not shown as natural
object but either as a product of human culture or as a
personification, an active figure with human or divine
attributes. The three main types of this hero are, as we
have seen, the poet-artist, the priest and the god-hero,
types which generate further sub-types and allow the in¬
weaving of the poet's mythological, anthropological,
historical and religious themes.
By looking at the different persons of the male
protagonist and the ways in which their roles merge or
overlap, we shall discover more about the myth of the
poem, the central idea which is conveyed through the
events enacted and re-enacted in the work. Each male
figure plays his own part, but the plot or myth of that
role is re-enacted by the others; so Adonis, Attis and
John Barleycorn are all types of Christ. In the same way,
Jason, Brute, Roman, Anglo-Saxon and Viking sea-captains
repeat the theme of the voyage and as they do so again
preficure the life and passion of Christ. The questing
knight is very similar to the voyaging sea-captain, though
where the idea of captain emphasises the case for ship
and crew, that of the questor brings out the notion of
the mission and the prize. And as we have learned from
the works of Frazer and Weston the mission of the questing
knight is closely linked to the myths of the god-victims,
Attis and Adonis, in that both are traced back to vege¬
tation rituals and ceremonies intended to bring about the
renewal of fertility and of crops. These principal types
of the god-hero are repeated again in individuals: in
Hector, the victim outside Troy:
Since Troy fired
since they dragged him
widdershins
without the wall.
When they regarded him:
his beauties made squalid, his combed gilt
a matted mop
his bruised feet thonged
under his own wall. 200
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in Nelson, captain and victim - "him whom Nike did bear";
in Bran, legendary god-hero of the Mabinogion. Such are
the figures of the god-hero; captain, quester and victim.
Each is reducible to the other and each is comprehended
by the archetypal figure of Christ, yet already an ambiguity
appears. Christ is the Redeemer and the Victim, the
quester and the maimed King; as Victim, Christ is the
passive sufferer, his immolation and the renewal of his
resurrection must be completed or made efficacious by
another, in the Grail legends by Perceval or Peredur, the
quester. In the Christian myth the active part is played
by the priest, of whom Christ is again the archetype:
In the prepared high-room
he implements inside time and late in under lt1
by )oce»% avyA dthherrihonj made
Ovko£- b\vr\*-', all o*Ve vy,
J
According to de la Taille and D'Arcy, Christ himself
is the first celebrant of the Mass, a "priest of the
order of Melchisedek", in the prospective ritual of the
Last Supper. He himself makes his own sacrifice efficac¬
ious and it is the Last Supper as much as the Crucifixion
which is re-enacted in the celebration of the Eucharist.
The figure of the priest is central to the poem; he is
disclosed in the first scene:
We already and first of all discern him making this
thing other. His groping syntax, if we attend,
already shapes:
ADSCRIPTAM? RATAM? RATIONABILEM ... and by
pre-application and for them, under modes and
patterns altogether theirs, the holy and venerable
hands lift up an efficacious sign. 202
He appears again and again and need not necessarily
be Christian; he may be a pontifex of Rome, a priest of
Mithras, a member of the Arval Brethren or a British
Druid. He may be a cult-man, a magician, a sooth-sayer
or haruspex, and as he is seen further back in time and
meddles more with the supernatural, he may merge with
the semi-divine figures of Celtic lore, Ludd, Merlin and
Manawydan.
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The priest's role is to make the sacrifice of the
Mass efficacious by re-enacting the sacrifice of Christ
and one aspect of his assumption of the divine nature in
his power to create, make other, to bring about through
the proper celebration of the ritual the transformation
of the elements of bread and wine, really or symbolically,
into the blood and body of Christ. But it is just this
ability to make other, to raise up valid signs which
Jones says is characteristic of the artist, and when he
goes back into pre-Christian and pre-historic times, he
finds that artist and priest are one:
Did the fathers of those
who forefathered them
(if by genital or ideate begetting)
set apart, make other, oblate?
By the uteral marks
that make the covering stone an artefact.
By the penile ivory
and by the viatic meats
Dona ei requiem. 204
Jones extends the priesthood to include all men who
are artists and, since he holds that all men are, if they
are fully men, also artists, he thus allows that all men
are, or may be priests. In other words, all men, whether
they come before or after Christ, as they are makers,
participate in making their own redemption efficacious
and collaborate in God's creation. Christ's Church, his
Mystical Body, cannot be completed except through the
actions of the artist-priest, the successive acts of
anamnesis made by the poet. Priest, artist and god are
one, and in this poem the emphasis is placed on the
correct exercise of the virtue of art, for only through
efficacious art can the will of God be achieved and Man's
divinity reattained in the God-head. In the penultimate
lines of the poem when all nations are brought together
in Christ's double sacrifice, the correct forms and rules
of the ritual are stressed by the vocabulary and deliberate
movement of the verse:
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On Ariel Hill, on Sion tumulus
on Uru Mound, in Salem cenacle
in the white Beth-Si
according to the disciplina
of these peculiar people
in accord with the intentions
of all peoples
and kindreds




• •• ••• ••• •••
Here, in this high place
into both hands
he takes the stemmed dish
as in many places
by this poured and that held up
wherever their directing glosses read:
Here he takes the victim. 205
So the images and themes of the poem are drawn
together, tree and stone, Celt, Roman and Saxon, in the
celebration of the archetypal ritual. Jones says in a
letter to Saunders Lewis:
The action of the Mass was meant to be the central theme
of the work for as you once said to me: "The Mass makes
sense of everything". 206
Certainly, the Mass and the Cross, which is its
symbol, do make sense of everything, insofar as they
themselves are signs. The action of the Mass indicates
that Man is divine and that he effects his own redemption
through his art. Christ, as he was incarnate and actually
suffered on earth, was only a type, or manifestation, albeit
the supreme one, of this eternal truth. The Mass is the
archetype of the work of art, and every work of art, including
The Anathemata, is in some sense, a celebration of the Mass.
In this poem David Jones puts on the mantle of the bard and the
vestments of the priest and in so doing celebrates his
own and our divinity. Through the act of anamnesis, in
the "actual event", the intersection of time and eternity
is made present and real. In the celebration of the
fucharist mind and matter Gome together and dualism is
transcended. At the centre of that event, at the centre
of the community which he unites and creates is the
figure of the poet, Man as God.
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The only example I have been able to discover is
Ezra Pound's "Ts'ai Chi'h":
The petals fall in the fountain,
the orange-coloured rose-leaves,
Their ochre clings to the stone.
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"The manner after which Christ is the offerer in
the Mass will, I hope, by now be apparent. The
whole of this book may be said to be an explanation
of the relation of Christ's priesthood to our priest¬
hood. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience
and clarity, a short summary may be added here.
According to the theory defended in the text every
Mass is, in one sense, a new sacrifice, but this
quality of "new" does not come from a new real
immolation, but from a "new" offering of a perennial
victim. This "new" offering is made by the Church.
I say "new" but here further qualifications are
necessary. The church does not make a "new" offer¬
ing in the sense that it can make an offering inde¬
pendent of that of Christ. Not only is the Victim the
same, but the Church is Christ continuing in his
Mystical Body. All the virtue of that Body comes
from Christ, its Head. Christ, therefore, can be
said to be the principal offerer on the Mass, in
that the members are offering by virtue of the Head;
and the priest-hood of the Church is, so to speak,
enveloped by or a participation of the priesthood
of Christ. The priest, then, offers by virtue of
Christ; he consecrates, as St. Paschasius says, in
sacerditio ipso Christi. "The part which Christ's
offering has, is that of the principal and universal
cause in its own order; our part is that of a sub¬
ordinate and particular cause. And so Christ
offers through our offering without himself making
any new offering in his own person. From the
Church comes all that is new; from Christ, all the
virtue and power" (Mysterium Fidei, p.296)".
"Welsh Poetry" in Epoch and Artist, p.58.
"Art and Sacrament" in Epoch and Artist, p.155.
"Art and Sacrament" in Epoch and Artist, p.159.
Art and Scholasticism, footnote, p.46.
The Anathemata, p.28.
"Art and Sacrament" in Epoch and Artist", p.148.
"Art and Sacrament", p.166, quoting Aquinas.
"Art and SacramentP p.153.
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The Sleeping Lord (London, 1974) p.9.
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The Anathemata, p.19.
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Unless we count the brief appearance of Flora or
Roma in "Middle-Sea and Lear-Sea", p.87.
Anath, p.216.
"The poets themselves often fought before composing
accounts of battle and old Welsh Law accorded a
special reward to the poet who took part in the
raid he celebrated. Aneirin may well have been the
sole survivor of the commando raid on Catterick,
and Taliesin and Myredin, for I feel sure Myradin
must have existed, were warriers as well as poets".
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112 Anath, footnote p.234Before the hills was I brought
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Wisdom. She was quickened by the Spirit and the
bringer-forth of the Logos-made-Flesh. Or to use
a mythologer's terms, she is both bride and mother
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Letter to Saunders Lewis, April, 1971. Published
in Agenda, Autumn-Winter 1973/1974.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HUGH MACDIARMID AND IN MEMORIAM JAMES JOYCE
There can be few more striking contrasts than that
between the work of David Jones the Anglo-Welsh Catholic,
and the poetry of Hugh MacDiarmid, Scottish Nationalist,
Marxist and self-proclaimed modernist. Yet both poets have
sought in the post-Imagist era to write the long poem which
makes use of myth and history, of tradition and contemporary
realities, the sort of poem which, because of its awareness
of community, of its political or social function, might
be accounted a twentieth century epic. In Memoriam James
Joyce has been chosen for study because, like The Anathemata,
it possesses these features and is at the same time dis¬
tinctly a modernist poem, to be understood in the light of
the Imagist inheritance.
Indeed, MacDiarmid's poem could be said to fulfill
the main tenets of Imagist doctrine by carrying them to
extremes:
(i) "Direct treatment of the thing - whether subjective
or objective".
In In Memoriam James Joyce the "thing" is the word and
where words naming "things" (i.e. existing outside language
and the poem) are introduced it is their "wordliness"
rather than the "thingliness" which is more important.
In the Author's Note to Lucky Poet, written in 1941,
MacDiarmid declares:
Because of a profound interest in the actual structure
of language, like Mallarmes, like Mallarme,I have always
believed in the possibility of "une po^sie qui fut^comme
deduite de 1"ensemble des propri^tes et des caracteres
du langage" - the act of poetry being the reverse of what
it is usually thought to be; not an idea gradually shap¬
ing itself in words, but deriving entirely from words.
Since the subject of the work and its medium are the same,
i.e. language, the treatment could hardly be more direct or
intimate, for subject and object are fused in the process
of the poem as it is realized.
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(ii) "Use no word which does not contribute to
presentation"•
For MacDiarmid, whose subject is language, every word
contributes to presentation. On his terms, if he fails
it is not through an excess of verbosity, but because he
cannot include all words and locutions that man ever has
or ever could utter.
(iii) "Compose in the sequence of the musical phrase -
not in the sequence of the metronome".
MacDiarmid obeys this injunction too, but again he goes
to the extreme, following the example of modern musicians
in realizing that the musical phrase can include silences,
series of thumps on the lid of the piano and even the dis¬
paraged "sequence of the metronome". He chooses the
perhaps 'primrose path1
To the dodecaphonic bonfire.2
Thus we see that MacDiarmid shares the general modernist
preoccupation with the medium itself, with language, re¬
cognizing that the significance of words lies as much in
the way they are used, "how they say", as in the matter,
conventional meaning, content, or "what they say". David
Jones stressed the autonomy of the literary work as an art
object made out of words and his philological and etymo¬
logical interests were apparent. MacDiarmid carries this
concern a stage further; language itself becomes the sub¬
ject of the poem, words and arrangements of words the images.
The universe of the poem is truly "The World of Words"
(the title of the second section) and it could be argued
that the central, informing image or, if we prefer, vortex,
is the Word or Logos itself in the process of its own crea¬
tion. This process is the structural principle or life
force of the poem; its form is its own dynamic development:
So long as the growth-mechanism persists
It must of itself result in changes of form.3
The doing is the will.
The deed once accomplished is the exact definition of the will?
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This again is in line with the Imagists for they
placed great emphasis on the poem having its own internal,
individual and organic structure, a form which was stricter,
though often less obvious, than the imposed external forms
of conventional verse. However, since MacDiarmid's poem
is evolving, as it seeks to attain or realize itself as
the Logos, it is necessarily incomplete and therefore its
form may not be evident to our understanding which is nece¬
ssarily limited by our physical and temporal natures.
MacDiarmid, as a man, is of course as mortal as the rest
of us (though we might note that MacDiarmid as a man did
not exist, since he is a fictional identity or penname
for Christopher Murray Grieve), but working as a poet in
the world of language, cooperating in, contributing to the
total poem, he transcends temporality. Such is the ration¬
ale, but nevertheless, in many of his long works, MacDiarmid
has incurred the charges of formlessness, chaos and lack
of control. These are similar to the charges levelled
against the Cantos, and it may be that in either case they
should be sustained. But perhaps MacDiarmid differs from
Pound in that though he knowingly risks such charges he
does not feel bound to answer them since he is, as it were,
playing to different rules.
As in the case of Walt Whitman, arrogant egotism masks
the true democratic or communistic ideal where everything
by virtue of its existence has the right to exist, con¬
tributes to the totality and must be included in the poem.
We remember Blake, that earlier revolutionary, and his
dictum "Everything that lives is holy" and compare MacDiarmid's
own "professional motto", taken from Marcus Aurelius:
How all things upon earth are pesle mesle; and how
miraculously things contrary one to another, concurre
to the beautie and perfection of this Universe.5
We understand how, for the most passionately rebellious and
iconoclastic poets, in one sense everything that is, is
right. Pound, on the other hand, does seem to operate on
the same terms as his critics, in that he appears to be
seeking a form ordering, or interpretation of the world.
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However, this is based on his own arbitrary and exclusive
selection from world history and culture. In relying thus
on his "ego-beak"6 he sets himself an attainable though
unattained target. But at the same time he reveals him¬
self as truly arrogant and elitist so that we understand
how his political and ideological beliefs may be related
to his poetic practice. MacDiarmid escapes this asser¬
tion of the self, by engaging in a task which cannot be
achieved at the personal level; his work and the persona
which the world creates become part of the Total Poem.
Again, political ideology and poetic practice are seen to
be interdependent, an interdependence which will become
clear in the discussion of MacDiarmid's political involve¬
ment as a Nationalist and a Communist.
By focussing on language itself MacDiarmid finds room
in his poem not only for what we might normally think of
as images, those physical or sensual images whose primary
and immediate appeal is perhaps sub- or pre- conceptual,
but also for abstractions, concepts and arguments. These
intellectual operations appear in the poem as ratiocina-
tive content, yet often the thread of the poem's argument
becomes tantalizingly elusive. We should understand that
the concepts and arguments themselves appear as images
and attack our apprehension in the same way as the more
physical images.
MacDiarmid employs something akin to the ideogramma-
tic method by juxtaposing a number of concepts or argu¬
ments which are obliquely related in such a way that a key
figure, pattern or myth is established without necessarily
ever being explicitly stated. He refers to his poetry as
"tessellation" and "Mosaic"; it is a poetry at once of
ideas and facts in which fact and idea become equal in
value; all must be included in the poem because all exist,
ideas are as real as physical things. Moreover, a parti¬
cular fact or idea very often appears in the poem not for
the sake of its content or orthodox meaning, but because
it is emblematic of some more general concept or even of
facts or ideas in general. The long dissertation from
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Ernest George White's "Sinus Tone Production"7 is intro¬
duced not simply as an example of "suppressio veri",
though that is its pretext, but also as a further aspect
of the poet's main theme in that it is concerned with the
production and articulation of language; moreover, it is
an image of knowledge, of the impossible erudition which
should be possessed by the ideal poet, and can only be
possessed by the ideal poet, and can only be possessed
by the projected Major Man who is totally conscious and
totally articulate, the synthesis towards which the whole
of creation is driving. Finally, the passage is included
simply as itself, as a piece of information with a value
which lies not in its emblematic or representative quali¬
ties, but in its particularity, the unique contribution
it makes to the whole. In the same way, one page in any
book or poem by MacDiarmid may present an argument or idea
whose exact converse appears slightly further on. Of
course, MacDiarmid believes in the synthesis which will
comprehend all contradictions, every thesis and antithesis.
He would "aye be whaur extremes meet" he says, declaring
himself the poet of antinomies. But at the same time, all
ideas and all arguments capture some aspect of reality,
have meaning, and as products of the human mind merit in¬
clusion in the poem. They are part of the achievement of
language.
MacDiarmid does not seek a world of words as an escape
from the real world. On the contrary, it is only because
he believes that the process of language and particularly
the highly self-conscious process of poetry are part of
the process of the total life force, and indeed the highest
part, that he sets himself this enormous task. Almost from
the outset of his career he sought the bardic role, as a
role which he interpreted as a political activity: "My
ambition was to be the creator of a new people, a real
bard who sang things till they 'became', yet as an indi¬
vidual the incarnation of an immemorial culture".8 Here
MacDiarmid suggests that the poet as the voice of his people
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not only restores for them the meaning and significance of
their past, or simply interprets their present but also
through his songs and poems, through the renewal of lang¬
uage, creates new meaning which may be physically realized.
In other words, he furthers the future of his people,
heightens consciousness and hastens the progress towards
the New Man, which is also, somehow, the achievement of
World Communism. In Lucky Poet he quotes with approval
from a review of his own work:
For,...what matters in poetry is neither meaning nor
vocabulary, but the fusion of both in utterance that
is itself an experience. Such utterance MacDiarmid
has, both in English and in Scots, in phrases and
in imagery. His metaphors, like Rilke's, become
^'autonomous imaginative realities'.' He is in fact a
makar, creating new life...9
This quotation supports the suggestion that MacDiarmid
believes that language is really effective in the affairs,
of men, that he rejects the dichotomy between art and
life, between the poet and the man of action, a doctrine
which is entailed by the philosophies of Bergson and
Hulme.
Although MacDiarmid accepted Bergson's notion of
an elan vital, he rejected his anti-intellectualism:
I find (^immediate experientej to be a flux or 'stream of
consciousness', whose constant basis is sensation.
Distinction, variety, individuality, and definite-
ness are all the work of thought, and not given to
immediate experience as such. So far, I go along with
Bergson - and also with Kant. The clearly defined
'perceptual object' which we see, transcends the vague
mass of sense-data presented to our visual organs; .
i +- ■) c mnrp ihan f-hpqp qpnqp-dafa V *Y/b' b,on because it u t>emantntis ore m mese se se a i , ondpvbU to many objvrv/erJL ^eveos the sensz data
private. The object, in short, is object of thought end
(i.e. of sensation plus memory and imagination plus
conceptual interpretation) and not object of sensa¬
tion alone. But I do not follow Bergson in his view
that thought falsifies or distorts the object... All
thought is analytic, a 'breaking up'of the immediate
unity of experience ; and it has two principal phases -
analysis of the concrete datum, and universalization
of the elements thus analyzed out. This latter phase
yields judgements that are universal and necessary
(and not mere tautologies) and gives rise to deductive
inference. Thus the original unity of experience is
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reconstituted on a higher plane; unity given has
become unity understood. Along this path we reach
the notion of substance. For substance is precisely
an 'intelligible unity', to which the mind pene¬
trates by means of sense-data and the analysis of
them. Thought's true and final object is an enduring
'thing* 'more fundamental than sense-data and which
embraces and dominates sense-data in a higher unity'.10
This argument which goes beyond Bergson is in many
ways compatible with A.N. Whitehead's theory of per¬
ception and conceptualization. Its advantage is that
it allows for the intellectual faculty, the mind inter¬
acting with the physical world. For Whitehead, this
process of interaction might be described as "concre¬
scence" and the emergence of the object as an "actual
event", while the object itself joins the world of
"eternal objects", unreal only in Whitehead's special
sense of not being actual but potential, available for
inclusion in actuality. MacDiarmid's argument, like
Whitehead's philosophy, transcends the oppositions of
subject, material and ideal. The object which is the
enduring "thing" of his higher synthesis is neither
matter nor an idea, but a fusion resulting from the
interaction of mind with the physical world. If this
is true for the objects of our everyday experience, it
is also true for the poetic image which therefore becomes
equally real or effective. The poetic image, like the
object, emerges from the process of the interaction
between the mind and the world, from the analysis and
universalization of the elements of the concrete datum.
The resort to universals entails transcending the parti¬
cular instance and the private experience and ensures
that the eventual product will communicate and endure.
(In this respect, MacDiarmid is actually closer to the
Thomist position as expounded by Thomas Gilby which was
discussed in the previous chapter). MacDiarmid thus
avoids a difficulty in the aesthetic theory of Bergson
and Hulme, for whom we remember, the poetic image was an
objectification of a private intuition of reality (real
time or duration) experienced by the privileged but passive
poet. His intellect in abeyance, this poet's only activity
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was to consist in translating his intuition into words.
Even then,as we saw in previous chapters, Bergson tended
to underplay this technical aspect of art and stress
instead the peculiar quality of the artistic personality.
A major drawback of this theory is that it ignores the
public quality of language, and provides no guarantee
that the artist's product will communicate his intuition
or indeed anything at all.
The whole aim of MacDiarmid's poetry is to communi¬
cate, not only to communicate but to improve; not only
to convey existing meaning but to create new meaning:
not only to interpret life but to,heighten and intensify
life. He believes fervently in the perfectibility of
man, in the emergence of a super race, not through any
divine intervention, but through human effort. He be¬
lieves " with Professor H.J. Muller that scientific
development and a better social order can tap genius in
every human being and create a society in which men like
the greatest philosophers, poets and scientists in human
history will no longer be, as they have always been
hitherto, very rare exceptions, but the rule"11. Hence
his Communism:
If communism did not mean that - if it only meant
doing away with a great deal of hardship and pre¬
ventable pain and disease and death - if it only
meant raising the economic level of everybody until
it was as high as that of the wealthiest man in the
world today, I would not move a little finger to
assist the process.12
Man does not cease to interest me
When he ceases to be miserable.
Quite the contrary!
That it is important to aid him
In the beginning goes without saying,
Like a plant it is essential
To water at first,
But this is in order to get it to flower
And I am concerned with the blossom.
-Reflections in a Slum13
In the poet's opinion only a very few people are
capable of promoting humanity; thus his stance is one of
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extreme humanism and at the same time highly elitist.
The elite are the artists and creators:
Since I reached my majority I have understood clearly
that only those few who are to some extent creative
artists are really alive and capable of receiving
and reciprocating true intellectual or spiritual
communication at all, while all the others are
consciously or unconsciously, but in the aggregate
overwhelmingly and in a way that is responsible
for all the major problems of mankind - on the merely
practical as well as the higher plane - traitors
to the human process.14
The creative artist, however, and especially the
poet, can project new possibilities for the people. Not
only can the poet renew and purify the language of the
tribe, he can actually improve it. MacDiarmid quotes
his friend, George Davie:
The lesson of Erasmus and Scaliger is to show how
a language by reverting to its classical words and
usages can be transformed out of a colourless jargon
into language grand and precise, capable of being
put to the highest literary uses ... Doughty then,
learned from the Humanists that the artificial improve¬
ment of language (denied on all hands) is within
human power.15
These passages reveal something of MacDiarmid's
concern for language, his interest in linguistics, his
ceaseless experimentation in Scots and English, his en¬
thusiasm for gleanings from other languages and litera¬
tures with which he augments his own writing. This con¬
cern has been lifelong and in some respects culminates
in In Memoriam James Joyce which as the longest complete
and published example of his later writing and as "A
Vision of World Language" is of crucial importance for
understanding the motives which have driven MacDiarmid
from English to Scots back to augmented English, and
which have inspired his life work. However, before we
come to the actual text we need to consider the wider
context of the poet's exploration of Scots, English and
"world language" particularly in relation to his politi¬
cal commitments as a Communist and a Scottish Nationalist.
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MacDiarmid's role in the Scottish Literary Renai¬
ssance and in recovering Scots as a respectable literary
medium has been attested and documented by a host of his
contemporaries and successors, even by those who, having
suffered from his irascible pen, have little reason to
love or flatter him. The question of a separate Scottish
culture, of a distinct Scottish temperament, of the in¬
adequacy of English for Scottish writers: all these issues
were hotly debated from the early twenties though the
controversy became most acrimonious with the publication
of Edwin Muir's Scott and Scotland (London, 1936) which
rejected the Scots revival and was regarded as a
betrayal by MacDiarmid and his followers.
Several accounts have been written of the Scottish
Renaissance and the part played by MacDiarmid, the best
known and most substantial probably being that by Duncan
Glen.16 But since our concern is primarily with
MacDiarmid and his individual quest for a language, we
must confine ourselves to two or three central questions.
Why, particularly in view of his early awareness of a
wide range of international literature, did MacDiarmid
feel it necessary to return to the impoverished and
provincial vernacular, to write in Scots? Secondly,
how far are the politics of Scottish Nationalism compa¬
tible or involved with the work of the poet? And thirdly,
why, having almost single-handedly recreated Scots as a
literary medium, did MacDiarmid use it less and less
from the thirties onward and turn instead to the writing
of very long poems, or rather one enormously long poem,
predominantly in English?
Perhaps the first thing we should remember is the
distance MacDiarmid had to come, may be further than any
of the other moderns, even including Pound. Though he
himself was widely read in English and American litera¬
ture even in his teens,17 he was largely self-educated
and the literary circles in which he moved as a young
student-teacher in Edinburgh were far from advanced.
-177-
As late as 1925, writing his notorious column on "Contem¬
porary Scottish Studies" in the Scottish Educational
Journal, he was forced to hold up the English Georgians
as an example to Scottish poets:
the English Georgians have severally an address, a
range, a body of work, and a representative status
and influence that not one of the Scottish Georgians
has yet reached.18
Indeed, when we look through the tepid late Victo¬
rian lyrics of kailyard verse which constituted the mass
of published Scottish poetry, we can understand why,
as late as in 1925, the English Georgians were considered
a worthy model and how pointless it would have been to
introduce the names of Eliot, Pound or Joyce, even if
MacDiarmid himself had assimilated these authors. In
1920 MacDiarmid, at that time still C.M. Grieve, began
the series of publishing and editing ventures by which
he was to promote Scottish literature with his first
Northern Numbers anthology. MacDiarmid explains the
exercise in Lucky Poet:
I began, when I issued my Northern Numbers anthology,
by displaying the best of thework available by living
Scottish poets; and side by side with it introduced
work by other younger and then quite unknown poets,
including myself, who had very different ideas from
those prevalent. I was able to do this because I had
a completely different background myself - I was not
limited to or over-affected by English influences,
but was thoroughly au fait with the work of 1'avant-
garde of several European countries - France, Germany,
Belgium, Russia. The well-known poets represented
alongside les jeunes in the earlier issues - Neil
Munro, John Buchan, General Sir Ian Hamilton,
Violet Jacob, Charles Murray, Lewis Spence, Donald
Mackenzie - were speedily, and no doubt a trifle uncere¬
moniously dropped, and the field was left to the
rising school. I have been accused of ill-faith in
securing the association in this way of men who were
relatively distinguished - and then dropping them.
I cannot see any ill-faith was involved at all. I
simply took the position as it then was at its best -
determined to proceed thence to a different position
altogether. Whatever use I had for the work of Neil
Munro and others at the beginning I speedily lost
as I got 'further ben' in my chosen task.19
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The quality or lack of it in available Scottish
poetry may be gauged from these three anthologies.20
There are a few glimpses of promise, but even Grieve's
own lyrics (in English) rarely rise above the common¬
place or the cliche, though there are hints of his own
peculiar talent, as in the last lines of "Mountain
Measure":
Lifts sheerly in the staring light
To the unknowledgeable skies
Bastions of ivory and jet,
Vivid with ice and black with antique fire,
That have withstood the whirling suns and storms
Of countless centuries
Whereunto they were vibrant cymbals once,
Instant with black and scarlet chords,
Frenzying the stars.
And all man's thoughts are but as winds
That in the valleys still
Spin gravel.
-First Series, p.71
We recognize the predilection for the sensation of cosmic
vertigo, as well as the fondness for ornate vocabulary
which occasionally results in magnificent oddness but
equally likely in poetic cliche, "Bastions of ivory and
jet". It might be suggested that this uncertainty of
touch is not simply the mark of a young poet but of one
who is writing in a language which is not his own, or
not his first language, and who therefore falters between
idiom, cliche and poetic coinage.
As an example of how tired Scots verse could be
even in Northern Numbers here is the first stanza and
refrain from "Hame (St. Andrew's Day under the Southern
Cross)" by Mary Symon:
God bless our land, our Scotland,
Grey glen an'misty brae,
The blue height o' the Coolins,
The green haughs yont the Spey,
The weary wastes on Solway,
Snell winds blaw owre them a'




It's Hame, its Hame for ever,
Let good or ill betide!
The croon o' some dear river,
The blink o' ae braeside.
-Second Series, p. 127
If then, Scottish literature was in such a parlous
condition when MacDiarmid started to write, why did he
not choose to write in English as so many Scots had done
before him. After all, Yeats and the chief figures of
the Anglo-Irish Renaissance had succeeded in producing
great work in English. MacDiarmid rejects this view
roundly, though we may consider his argument specious:
Viewed comprehensively, modern Anglo-Irish literature
derives all its motivation from the movement for the
repudiation both of England's Empire and language, and
is intentionally cultivated as at once a sort of
barrier against English culture and a preparation for
the creation of an Irish culture in Gaelic. Far from
taking advantage of the English literary tradition,
as Mr. Muir in advising Scotsmen to assimilate them¬
selves to it avers the Irish have done, the Irish have
rejected it and their present Anglo-Irish work is
completely influenced in technique and in matter by
Irish-Gaelic traditions and by foreign non-English
models.2 1
More positive and convincing reasons, both personal and
representative, for his rejection of English and deci¬
sion to write in English may be adduced. First of all,
we know that he was brought up to speak Scots. George
Bruce says:
MacDiarmid's synthetic Scots, as it unhappily has
been called, was based on a Scots that he himself
spoke, and which he heard all about him in the
Borders. To this day the English he speaks is
closer to Scots or Lallans than anything spoken
south of the Tweed. Hence in all his poetry in
Scots the language has authority, no matter how
much vocabulary he may have added by consulting
literary source for Scots words.22
Certainly, in his Scots poetry MacDiarmid is capable
of a directness and simplicity which he rarely achieves
in English. As was suggested earlier, both his poetry
and prose in English, with their poly-syllabic vocabu¬
lary, convoluted phraseology and accumulating clauses,
seem like the production of someone for whom English
is predominantly an acquired and literary language.
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He himself argued that English as a literary medium
was exhausted, that it had become a language of abstrac¬
tions and dissociation. Discussing Burns, he quotes
from Trigant Burrow's The Biology of Human Conflict:
"Because of the increasing extension throughout
the community of a dissociative process that substitu¬
ted words for the physiologicial experience assumed
to underlie them, man has increasingly lost touch
with the hard and fast milieu of actual objects
and correspondingly with the biological solidarity
of his own organism."23
This dissociation is felt particularly strongly by Scots
men and women because:
Scots is used for the full range of discourse by
the great majority of Scots still (though, of course,
they know English too and can screw themselves up
to "speaking fine" when need be, albeit in so far
as thinking in any language is not a mere metaphor -
they think in Scots and have to translate their
thought into English utterance).2k
Scots is, therefore, the language of daily speech,
although the cultural imperialism of England with the
imposition of English as the respectable language for
literature and polite society which began at the Reforma¬
tion and was reinforced by the Act of Union, has led to
the decline of the vernacular into kail-yard dialect.
However, even these disjecta membra, as MacDiarmid calls
them, of the old Scottish tongue, retain a vividness which
is missing from English, an inherent physicality, direct¬
ness, pre-conceptual appeal. Remembering Hulme's term,
we might say that the Scots language had not degenerated
into "counter-words" as English had. It is interesting
to note that MacDiarmid, like T.E. Hulme, sees the
Renaissance as a turning point, though his objections
to the Renaissance are more narrowly linguistic. He
feels that the medieval writers, even up to Chaucer,
and in Scots, Dunbar, were able to use language with an
"intensity of feeling... a power of direct utterance",25
a "here-and-now"-ness, which was destroyed by the
ascendancy of classical and Romance literatures:
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Not only has English pursued an Ascendency Policy
and refused practically all intercourse with Irish,
Welsh and Scottish Gaelic, the Scottish vernacular
and even its own dialects, but it attempted to
disown its own Anglo-Saxon sources in the same
fashion.2 6
Kenneth Buthlay has shown how the directness of
Scots and its retention within itself of live metaphor
("yow-trummle" = the cold spell in late July after the
sheep-shearing when the newly shorn ewes tremble, or
shiver)2 7 allowed MacDiarmid to write lyrics in an
austere, direct style much closer to the Imagists than
anything he had achieved in English. Of course, one
reason for the vividness of these Scots words is that
they have not been staled by usage. But, as Buthlay
further argues,28 the medium of Scots bring MacDiarmid
a certainty of touch which goes far beyond vocabulary;
in particular, a subtlety of rhythm where the individual
modern voice is counterpointed against the traditional
ballad with a skill which answers the demand for the
"sequence of the musical phrase" as successfully as any
of the more innovatory forms of the Imagists. Here, in
little, is the paradigm of tradition and the individual
talent, where, through the exploitation of the old forms
and the inherited language of the Makars and the anony¬
mous balladeers, MacDiarmid enriches his own contribu¬
tion and renews the culture of the past in the present.
So, in order to be able to write in the present, to pro¬
duce poetry of the same pitch and modernity as his peers
in England, America and Europe, MacDiarmid had to go back
to his own tradition and accelerate it into the twentieth
century.
Given the history of the cultural tradition, the
decision to use Scots has a political dimension. English,
as we have said, is in Scotland the language of cultural
imperialism and it is socially divisive. Scots was rele¬
gated to the working and peasant classes and became a
purely verbal medium. Since it was thus repressed, it
fragmented and decayed. Discussing this issue in rela¬
tion to Robert Burns, MacDiarmid writes:
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Even in Burns's own day, the Scottish national
tradition was in a stage of fragmentation and had
so many mutually exclusive elements that it was
practically impossible to articulate the disjecta
membra and see it as a whole. Burns was constantly
trying to get hold of books but even when he could
get them they were generally the wrong books, since,
owning to his circumstances, he was largely subject
to English literary over-influences incompatible
with his genius...
He quotes from Burns's letter:
"This curse of fragmentary knowledge of what in all
its fullness should have been their birthright, has
afflicted all modern Scotsmen with any spark of
ii 2 9
genius .
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century,
this decadent dialect Scots had become unfit for anything
but vulgar or sentimental verse. Yet this degraded
language was used day and daily by the great majority of
Scottish people, particularly by the lower or working
classes. Inevitably, this decay in language would lead
to a dulling of awareness and prevent the heightening of
political consciousness, social or national. Hence the
imposition of English and the concomitant disparagement
of Scots is an instrument of imperial and class repre¬
ssion, and the decision to use Scots, to renew Scots, as
an attempt to "purify the language of the tribe" but in
particular the Scottish working-class "tribe", was at
once socialist and nationalist. MacDiarmid did believe
that the repression of Scots, particularly through the
educational system, had stunted the Scots mentality:
Many teachers tell me that the children's abilities
to express themselves, and, behind that, to think,
are largely suppressed by official insistence upon
the use of "correct English"... They actually think
and could express themselves a great more readily and
effectively in dialect. This tenacity of Scots in the
life of our people is extraordinary. Observe the way
even "educated people" lapse into it on convenient
occasions, or when they are genuinely moved. To ban
it from our schools is, therefore, a psychological
outrage. A distinctive speech cannot be so retained
in the intimate social life, in the thinking of a
people without an accompanying subterranean continuance
of all manner of distinctive mental states and
potentialities.3 0
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He argued that there was a distinctive Scottish
psychology which could not express itself through the
medium of English: "English is incapable of affording
means of expression for certain of the chief elements
of Scottish psychology".31 This Scottish personality
MacDiarmid explains in terms of the "Caledonian
Antisyzygy", a notion first developed in Professor
Gregory Smith's Scottish Literature: Character and
Influence (1919). Smith suggested that the Scottish
psychology and literature are composed of a number of antim
mies and contradictions, most striking of which is the
predilection for concrete realities, for the commonplaces
of everyday living, even to the earthiest and most lewd
particulars, counterbalanced by an enthusiasm for fantasy,
for speculation, for giddy flights of imagination:
Though the Scottish Muse has loved reality, sometimes
to maudlin affection for the commonplace, she has
loved not less the airier pleasure to be found in the
confusion of the senses, in the fun of things thrown
topsy-turvy in the horns of elf-land and the voices
of the mountains... There is more in the Scottish
antithesis of the real and fantastic than is to be
explained by the familiar rules of rhetoric. The
sudden jostling of contraries seems to preclude any
relationship by literary suggestion. The one invades
the other without warning. They are the 'polar twins'
of the Scottish Muse.32
However true this notion may be for the Scottish
people in general, it clearly helped MacDiarmid inter¬
pret himself to himself and reconcile his different en¬
thusiasms and the conflicting aspects of his personality.
He was probably further encouraged by his reading of
Chestov (Shestov), the Russian writer and religious
thinker whom the poet owns as one of his early masters
and who also based his philosophy on the pursuit of
opposite extremes.33 Thus the contradictions in
MacDiarmid's work become, not an embarrassment, but a
guiding principle. It is a risky procedure to quote
from MacDiarmid's writings or to claim that he holds a
particular opinion for, as in the Bible, a text can always
be found to support exactly the opposite point of view.
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Buthlay quotes from The Annals of the Five Senses (1923)
an attempt by the poet to interpret a personality similar
to his own:
So his tendency was always to the whole, to the
totality, to the general balance of things. Indeed
it was his chiefest difficulty (and an ever-
increasing one that made him fear at times cancella¬
tion to nonentity) to exclude, to condemn, to say
No. Here, probably, was the secret of the way he
used to plunge into the full current of the most
inconsistent movements, seeking, always in vain,
until he was utterly exhausted ... to find ground
upon which he might stand foursquare.34
This constant need to interrogate himself, to try and
find out who or what he is,the awareness of chaos and
confusion which underlies his most dogmatic assertions
may be inferred from the famous passage in "A Drunk Man
Looks at a Thistle":
I'll ha'e nae hauf-way hoose, but aye be whaur
Extremes meet - it's the only way I ken
To dodge the curst conceit o' bein' right
That damns the vast majority o' men.
I'll bury nae heid like an ostrich's
Nor yet believe my een and naething else.
My senses may advise me, but I'll be
Mysel' nae maitter what they tell's 35
We may speculate that this fundamental uncertainty
stems in part from the language problem, that the process
of education which deprived the poet of his native accent
and forced him into a language and rhythm not his own
brought about a dissociation between his literary efforts
and the intimacy of his own voice and speaking patterns.
MacDiarmid and the majority of Scottish writers believed
that they had no choice other than to write in English,
whether their work was poetry, prose or mere journalism,
and so it seemed their condition was imposed rather than
chosen. The return to Scots therefore was an act of
self-liberation, whereby MacDiarmid asserted his indepen¬
dence and nationality, dared to acknowledge his own
accent and thereby reunited the spoken and written word.
It was only when he found that he could write success¬
fully in the "braid Scots" that he could extend his range
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to a mixture of Scots and English and eventually to that
augmented English of his later poems which is not the
English of the Home Counties nor of English Imperialism
but the individual English with a Scottish or Borders
accent of Hugh MacDiarmid, and at the same time, with
its influx of foreign influences and "weltliteratur" an
internationalist English, transcending class and race,
a contribution to and prefiguration of the total poem,
or the "world language".
So MacDiarmid returned to Scots and became the
principal instigator for its revival as a literary lang¬
uage. But the Scots was not simply the vernacular which
he had grown up with in Langholm, nor was it the hackney
vocabulary and cliches of Burn^'s imitators and the
kailyard versifiers, nor was it even the Scots of the
Auld Makars, despite the cry of "Back to Dunbar".
MacDiarmid did not want a Scots which was that of the
historian or scholar, nor that of the village "wut" but
rather a poet's Scots, a Scots which was capable of becom¬
ing a language for the whole man and for an entire people,
a language which could serve intellect and emotion by
making use of the complete range of existing vocabulary
and locutions available to it and by absorbing and gene¬
rating new usages. This indeed would be a synthetic and
synthesizing Scots, but only thus could it become a living,
natural language.
Nevertheless the controversies over "synthetic"
Scots have been protracted and acrimonious: battle has
been waged against MacDiarmid not only by those who
opposed any return to Scots, but also, often as a result
of misunderstanding of his aims, by supporters of regional
Scots dialects on the one hand, or by linguistic scholars
and historians on the other. The first group objected
to MacDiarmid's eclecticism, his mixing of dialects from
different areas; the second group pounced with delight
on anachronisms and inaccurate usages. MacDiarmid may
have drawn very largely on Jamieson's Etymological
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Dictionary of the Scottish Language and on the old ballad
books, but his practice was that of a poet rather than
a pedant. Buthlay writes:
In availing himself of such rich and concentrated
resources of language, the poet was not concerned
with whether any particular expression became
officially obsolete ages ago, or was used only
within a twelve-mile radius of Kirkcudbright in
1899. But, on the other hand, neither was he
systematically building up what Saurat termed a
"synthetic" language with the help of Jamieson
and the "Golconda of racy old terms" he found in
George Beattie's John o'Arnha' and William
Nicholson's Brownie of Blendnock. Rather, he
approached Scots words, any Scots words, as
potential material for poetry, and relied on his
sensitivity towards verbal stimuli to select what
his imagination could put to use in a poem.3 6
Since MacDiarmid placed the date for the Scottish
'dissociation of sensibility" at the Renaissance and looked
to Dunbar as Eliot looked back to Donne for his poetic
model of a unified consciousness, it was on the re¬
discovery of the "Auld Makars" that he based his call
for a revival of Scots. In Lucky Poet he expresses his
own sense of the advantages which arise out of the long
neglect of Scottish culture; "we found ourselves with so
much to discover, a whole terra incognita to revel in".37
A prime reason for going back to Dunbar and Henrysoun
was, of course, to escape the terrible over-familiarity
of the Burns tradition. "Not Burns - Dunbar!" is the
poet's cry in Albyn (p.36) and he argued that: "Those
who would try (to revitalize Scots) must first of all
recover for themselves the full canon of Scots used by
the Auld Makars and readapt it to the full requirements
of modern self-expression".
In Dunbar (young poets) see (the richness and resource
of the Scots language) displayed in a way far beyond
anything accomplished since. They see Scots allied
to noble ideas, high imaginings, 'divine philosophy',
and no longer confined to the foothills of Parnassus,
and when they resurvey the problem of the revival
of Scots from that angle, many of the difficulties
of readjusting and utilizing it to serious literary
purpose which have hitherto proved baffling are
dispelled.3 8
-187-
The revival of outworn vocabulary and forgotten
usages results in the enrichment of language and the
recovery of meaning and history. MacDiarmid quotes
Vivante: "the words find by themselves a thousand
avenues, the deepest and truest conceptual affinities;
'they reconnect forgotten kinships'".39 On the larger
scale this process becomes the attempt to restore the
unity of the language, to reintegrate and revitalize
the disjecta membra and thereby to reunify the national
identity of the Scots. Declaring in his chapter "on
Seeing Scotland Whole" in Lucky Poet that the search for
Scottish unity was "one of the main concerns of my life",110
MacDiarmid has tried through his poetry to bring to¬
gether all aspects of Scottish life and history so as
to create a Scottish identity. Hence the long "Direadh"
poems which "attempt to give birds'-eye views - or,
rather, eagles'-eye views - of the whole of Scotland,
each from a different vantage-point". These poems are
crammed with names of places, with details of natural
history and geology, with persons and occupations, in a
manner which reminds us of Whitman:
Now I remember in particular an inn near Coldingham.
Mine host was a man after my own heart ... 41
Now I see all my land and my people
As I saw Berwickshire and East Lcthian then
With every particularity completely realized,
Brimming with prosperity and no waste anywhere,
And note once more as I cast my eyes this way and that
How the healthy well-fed flickering turnip breadths
Are more vivid in their green between the woods...
Or, again, turning to fishes,
I sing of
The Sandsucker and the Blue-striped Wrasse,
Six kinds of Crobies, the Saury Pike,
Yarrell's Bleny and the Silvery Gade
(Long lost to science), and scores of the like.
The Bonito, the Tunny, the Sea-Perch, and the Ruffe,
The Armed Bullhead, the Wolf-fish, and the Scad,
The Power Cod and the Whiting Pout,
The Twaite Shad and the Alice Shad,
The Great Forked Beard, the Torsk, the Brill
The Glutinous Hag, the Starry Ray,
Muller's Topknot, and the Unctuous Sucker.
So much for cataloguing]1'2
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This passage is surely revealing with its invitation
to laughter. One aspect of MacDiarmid's poetry is that
it is comic, perhaps as Joyce is comic. His catalogues
differ from Whitman's in that they are self-conscious;
the technique is in itself part of their significance.
Moreover, the catalogue is carried to an extreme which
is absurd; yet though we may laugh, it is not invalida¬
ted; part of our laughter must spring from the recogni¬
tion of the ludicrous richness and variety of life and
language here presented to us. In his ambition to be
the bard of his people, the regenerator of their culture
through theprojection of language, MacDiarmid "kept
constantly in mind Rilke's dictum that 'the poet must
know everything', and Pushkin's dicta (1) that 'the whole
of his country's history beongs to the poet', and (2)
that 'only barbarism, villainy and ignorance do not
respect the past, cringing before the present alone'".1'3
Scots was to be revived to reunite the Scottish
people, yet these later poems are not in Scots. In any
case, Scots is not the first language of large numbers
of Scotsmen, for instance, the Gallic speakers or even
the Shetlanders with the traces of Old Norse which dis¬
tinguish their dialect. From the outset, MacDiarmid was
very aware of the importance of Gallic and originally
contemplated the renaissance of Scotland as a Celtic,
Gaelic speaking nation, with the revival of Scots as
a half-way stage.1'1' However, he realized that the Scot¬
tish Renaissance must exploit to the full all the
different linguistic and cultural traditions of Scotland:
The Scottish Renaissance Movement is even more
concerned with the revival of Gaelic than of Scots.
It regards Scotland as a diversity-in-unity to be
stimulated at every point, and, theoretically at
any rate, it is prepared to develop along tri¬
lingual lines.1'5
MacDiarmid as leader of the Scottish Renaissance and its
chief voice sought to combine in himself these diverse
cultural traditions. His early interest in Gaelic was
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reinforced by the translations he made in association
with Sorley MacLean of the "Birlinn of Clamranald" by
Alasdair MacMhaighstir Alasdair and Duncan Ban Maclntyre's
"Praise of Ben Dorain". Tags from the Gaelic poets and
reference to Gaelic writing in Scotland and Ireland recur
throughout his poetry, illustrating his conviction that
Scotland is essentially a Celtic nation and that the future
of history lies with the Celtic peoples, indeed in a
Celtic-Slav alliance.
However, as has been pointed out, MacDiarmid's
nationalism is always to be placed within the context of
his internationalism. He speaks of his
comprehensive concern to take in all the elements in
the situation or scene, wherever possible bringing
the theme down to concrete cases, individual men and
women, and giving the latitude and longitude with
reference to the world outside Scotland - placing
the Scottish instance in the widest international
context - and always interpreting Nature in terms
of human activities, being alert to the historical
process etc.
Hoping to take Scotland as his centre and from it move
out to world consciousness, he wishes:
that it could one day be said of me, as of
Mistral:
Singing not of particular deeds and persons
But of a whole land and a whole people,
And beginning with his native region,
Ended by embracing all nations
In one amphictyoncia - a vision in parvo
Of the labours of all mankind. 47
MacDiarmid complained that when he began to write
"Scotland had nothing ready for me".1*8 Singlehandedly,
or virtually so, he forged a language and restored a
culture, but while his fellow-poets were still attempt¬
ing to assimilate the revival of Scots and the nationalist
stance he moved on to his poetry of world-language and
international consciousness. His career and writings are
as much a projection as an achievement, forecasting the
direction he expects literature and humanity to take;
his poetry may be regarded as a prototype for language
and through language, for mankind. In seeking the motives
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which led MacDiarmid beyond Scots to long poems like
In Memoriam James Joyce we must now consider some of
his wider philosophical and ideological notions, his
internationalism and his communism, his general "Weltans¬
chauung" .
In Memoriam James Joyce, part of the "unpublished
long poem of world consciousness" is philosophical and
political in the widest sense in that it entails a vision
for the future of mankind the realization of which it
tries to further. Clearly MacDiarmid's politics and his
philosophical ideas are very relevant to the form and
nature of his poetry. He has developed his own peculiar
version of Marxism, modified by Celtic mysticism, the
wilder flights of Russian and German metaphysicians as
well as by the more eccentric speculations of biologists,
eugenicists and cultural anthropologists. Among the
difficulties in trying to establish what the poet actually
does believe is that where ideas are concerned he is a
magpie and will incorporate an isolated thought or para¬
graph into his own ideology even from a writer with whom,
in other respects, he Kas no sympathy. Moreover, since,
as we have seen, he believes every idea to have value
and considers that truth emerges as much from the juxta¬
position or synthesis of contradictions as from indivi¬
dual ideas in themselves, it is beside the point to charge
him with inconsistency or self-contradiction. These
problems point to an important feature of MacDiarmid's
work: the text stands on its own. The poet as creator,
inventor and sometimes anthologist has retreated; we are
forced to concentrate on the surface of the poem, on the
relationships enacted between the different passages,
ideas and words as they appear in the text. This may be
termed the poetry of process: the elements of the poem
interact creatively to establish an action and an orga¬
nism which are purely poetic but which can refer back
to or project action in the physical world. If we attempt
to go behind the words, to follow up the cited authors,
to trace sources, or to interpret the poem by knowledge
of external systems or works, more often than not we shall
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entangle ourselves in irrelevancies and add to the con¬
fusion. We may see this quality in MacDiarmid's work
as an aspect of his communism; individualism is suppressed,
so is the notion of copyright, or authorial property,
as the work of art itself becomes autonomous and organic,
"the production and property of all".49
Yet we still have difficulty reconciling MacDiarmid's
strident egotism, his intellectual arrogance, his de¬
clared elitism with his equally vigorous profession of
communism and concern for the common man. In many ways,
MacDiarmid's views seem to coincide with those of the
Fascist sympathisers, Pound, Yeats and Wyndham Lewis
rather than with other British, or at least English,
left-wingers. We know how he despised the "MacSpaunday"
fellow-travellers and how little sympathy he had for
popularised art, or literature watered down for the masses.
However, his attempt at the long poem or epic, in its
very inclusiveness, its refusal to select, differs from
Pourrd^s Cantos which, despite their range, are above
all exclusive and selective. This difference is a con¬
sequence of the fundamental difference in the world views
or ideological stances of the two poets.
Despite the clutter of antinomies and contradictions,
and his enormous output, we can, I think, extract MacDiarmid's
ideology from his writings; in fact, he has remained
remarkably consistent in his essential beliefs at least
since the mid-twenties though there have been additions
and modifications which are the result of his work re¬
maining open to the changing world. The danger lies in
attempting to impose on him the system of any other
thinker, be it Lenin or Chestov, two of his avowed
"masters", or in seeking to interpret his ideas accord¬
ing to one's own notions of orthodox logic. In other
words, we must to some extent regard MacDiarmid's entire
opus as the artistic work, as a poetic universe with its
own laws to which we submit, at least temporarily. This
concession is a usual one to make to a work of art, but
one which we may incline to withold from MacDiarmid's
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writing partly because of its argumentative, ratiocina-
tive qualities, partly because the demand he makes of
us is too great. He seeks to absorb us into his "world
of words", a total world which is to include every aspect
of experience, but ordered according to MacDiarmid's
vision. The poem of world consciousness is a political
state and a totalitarian one; if we enter it, we surrender
our freedom or at least our present concept of our freedom.
Yet we have seen that thts <S one of the functions
of the epic poem as it is social and contributes to
community. It seeks to involve us with each other as
it absorbs us into itself by interpreting the past to us
and projecting our future. The Anathemata draws mankind
together in a celebration of the Mass, a ritual which
at once revives and unifies the past and furthers the
future reunification of God and man, the restoration of
the One, the Logos, the creation of the Divine Man.
MacDiarmid's poem pursues the same end, though his faith
is placed more in the power of the human will than in
the Divine. But ultimately this apocalyptic humanism
differs very little from the milleniarian religions, as
Middleton Murry for one seemed to recognize:
What difference is there between believing in God
and believing in Man - in life, in the future, in
the unknown. The Communist does not believe in
past Gods, he rejects them utterly and forever
because he believes in the God that creates himself
eternally in Man.50
MacDiarmid always refused to admit any specifically
Christian quality in his work, but religious feeling, in
the widest sense, is there, even in this denunciation:
...I do not believe in God at all. Like Etienne
Gilson, 'I still want to know if my religious
experience is an experience of God, or an
experience of myself... In the first case only can
there be a religion;... I can follow Bergson in
his description of mystical intuition as a source
of religious life, but I am still left wondering
what the nature of that intuition actually is.'
Only I do not still want to know, I know - it is
just 'an experience of myself'. There is no
religion.51
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In 1975, in an interview with Walter Perrie,
MacDiarmid discussed the relationship between poetry
and religion:
CG (Christopher Grieve i.e. MacDiarmid):
I find a lot of people who think they are Christians
very anxious to call me a Christian poet, perhaps
because I use a certain number of references to
Christian dogma, because I may show a compassionate
spirit in certain connections... If you're an
atheist, there's no reason on earth why you should
not create great poetry. As a matter of fact,
study of literary history shows that far more of
what we call the body of great poetry in Europe
has been written by materialists than by believers,
and that what is called religious poetry in any
of the European literatures is derived from non-
Christian and, indeed, anti-Christian sources...
WP: Do you think then that all good poets are essen¬
tially pagans?
CG: Yes, of course they are.52
This argument, as was seen in the study of The Anathemata,
may have a degree of truth, even when applied -to David
Jones. He has recourse to Celtic, pre-Christian,
Mithradic and Roman cults, while the fundamental theme
of his poem, man-the-artist makes himself into God, is
heretical in the tradition of alchemical, neo-Platonic
and Gnostic thinking.
In the same interview Perrie asks MacDiarmid:
WP: I take it you regard communism as essentially a
spiritual force rather than in material terms.
CG: Yes I do.
WP: Given the nature and the trends which are evident
in the contemporary world, do you see spiritual forces
developing coherently in that world? When society
is going through a period of great fragmentation do
you see communism as a spiritual force and the practice
of poetry developing along fruitful lines?
CG: It may take time. We are living at a very
critical period in world history. But it was, I
believe, an American who said that the main task
confronting thepoet today is a great task of assimi¬
lation. . . It's because of the enormous variety {.the
new perspective of the sciences} (which ought to be
the preoccupation of poetry and so seldom is) that most
modern poetry is trivial and worthless.
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WP: ...You would agree then that an important poem
is necessarily a long poem?
CG: I think so. The epic is the only form which
can discharge the duties of the poet in the modern
world.5 3
Certainly, when we look at MacDiarmid's communism
as it features in his poetry we find a much greater
concern with man's spiritual development than with econo¬
mic matters. The poet rarely stoops to advocate a prac¬
tical programme, nor does he devote much time to an
analysis of the present system on Marxist lines. His
economic ideas, in so far as he does present them seem
to have been as much shaped by C.H. Douglas and his
Social Credit scheme as by anything in Marx. As late
as 1966 MacDiarmid reaffirmed his opposition to the
orthodox banking system and his support for Douglas.
He makes two interesting points. The first, in anec¬
dotal form, raises the problem of the link between Social
Credit and Fascism:
A friend said to me in London when I was associated
with Douglas, Orage, Mairet, Symons, Beckett, Canon
Demant, John Hargrave of the Green Shirt movement,
Arthur Brenton and other Douglasites: 'What are you
doing among these people? Don't you realize they
will all go religious-Fascist?' I did not realize
anything of the kind, but they all did go religious-
Fascist and I still do not see why that should be
so. It certainly has not happened in my own case.5k
This is a question which has not yet been satisfactorily
answered; for our purposes, it is perhaps easier to ask
why MacDiarmid did not go "Religious-Fascist", why he
remained a socialist, a communist, despite his clear
sympathies with Pound, Orage and the more shady figures
who constituted the intellectual demi-monde of the
twenties and thirties.
The second point MacDiarmid raises, again without
answering it, is the problem of Communist opposition
to Social Credit:
The Communist parties are vehemently opposed to
Social Credit. Why? They operate the orthodox
financial system - basically the same as in the
capitalist countries... I myself, though a member
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of the Communist Party have always believed -
and still believe - that Major Douglas's proposals
should be applied in the transitional period
before the achievement of integrated Communism.
Over thirty years ago I was in regular correspondance
with leading Social Creditors in the United States.
One of them, Gorham B. Munson wrote a series of
articles showing that Marxism and Social Credit were
perfectly reconcilable. My other like-minded American
correspondants included Waldo Frank and Kenneth Burke.55
MacDiarmid's own political development may be traced
back to his childhood. From the first, he seems to have
had a strong class consciousness, and awareness and deep
hatred of the power of the gentry. He attributes this
in part to his working-class, non-Conformist upbring¬
ing, so different from that experienced by the majority
of the leftist English intellectuals:
If I came in the end to Communism (that is, to
membership of the Communist Party, instead of the
Independent Labour Party, of which I had by then
been over twenty years an active member), I also
grew into it through a class-conscious upbringing
which conditioned but did not distwfc my view of
life. My development owed a very great deal to
my growing up in a working-class family and being
fed on out-and-out Radicalism and Republicanism
when still a child...
The tremendous proletarian virtue of the Langholm
I knew as a boy saved me - despite the religiosity,
the puritanism of both my parents, and the ambitious
gentility of my mother, and despite my own literary
gifts - from the ordeal so many writers and young
artists are going through today, the extremely
difficult ordeal of getting back to the people,
of becoming once more organically welded with
the working-class. From the beginning I took as
my motto - and I have adhered to it all through
my literary work - Thomas Hardy's declaration
'Literature is the written expression of revolt
against accepted things.56
Reinforcing this class-consciousness was a growing aware¬
ness of the English oppression of Scotland, of the Scots
as, at least culturally, a colonized people: (We notice
again how intimately language is involved in political
and social processes)
This class antagonism has been strong in me from
the very start: when I was a boy to speak English
was 'to speak fine', i.e. to ape the gentry and
the very thought of anything of the sort was
intolerable.5
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So MacDiarmid, though he desired to be a poet from
his youth, did not do so from a wish to escape or trans¬
cend his origins. His ambitions were bardic or Druidic
but the tribe he wished to serve was based on the
Scottish working people. Yet though he does sometimes
indulge in that sentimentality which has so often been
a failing of Communist propaganda and.Communist sympa¬
thisers, that is, the belief that workers and peasants
are somehow nobler, or have an essential goodness which
is not possessed by the upper of middle classes, on the
whole he interprets his task as being to raise these
people through his poetry to the desired level. "My
ambition was to be the creator of a new people". He
was always aware of his intellectual superiority but
had no wish to use it to climb socially and had as much
or more contempt for the stupid aristocrat as he had
for the stupid slum-dweller. Unlike so many of the
English leftist writers of the thirties he maintained a
deep and continuing commitment to Communism, albeit his
own version of Communism, derived as much from James
Connolly and John MacLean as from Marx or Lenin and
coloured by his enthusiasm and by Social Credit. But
he never did become a Fascist and probably never could
have, as we feel Eliot or Auden might; neither did he
retreat into the political conservatism of these writers,
nor into the aestheticism of Others.
Unlike these middle-class English products of the
public schools and Oxford and Cambridge, MacDiarmid's
impulse towards socialism sprang from material circum¬
stances as well as from intellectual (or emotional) consi¬
derations. Though his education had a good foundation
in Langholm Acadamy and the Broughton Junior Student
Centre in Edinburgh( a sort of teacher training insti¬
tute) he worked for a living from the age of nineteen
and his vast erudition was acquired without the benefit
of university facilities or the time in which to make
use of them. He was a serving soldier (RAMC) in World
War I and in his subsequent career often suffered severe
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hardships many of which would have been avoided had
he been a member of the middle-class establishment.
In Whalsay, however, the Grieves were very hard up.
It had from the first been Christopher's rule to
give at least half of his literary output without
fee to aid the Renaissance and the Nationalist
movement, so that, though Chris was writing a lot
at this time, he was receiving very little for it.
It came to the point that the local store refused
further credit and starvation, literally, threatened.58
Involvement in civic and political affairs had been
characteristic of MacDiarmid's life since he joined the
Independent Labour Party at the age of sixteen; in
Montrose, as well as working as a campaigning editor-
reporter, he was a Labour Councillor, member of the
School Management Committee and a J.P.; he campaigned
vigorously and variously for Scottish Nationalism, for
Communism, for MacLean Worker-Republicanism (after 1939)
from the platforms and periodicals available to him,
several of the latter which he founded himself; he stood
twice for Parliament, once as a Scottish Nationalist,
once as a Communist, both times unsuccessfully. During
the war MacDiarmid was directed to a munitions job on
the Clyde:
I qualified as a precision fitter and obtained a job
with a big general engineering firm, Mechans of Scotts-
toun... I was given charge of the Copper Shell Band
Section, turning the bands of copper cups by a battery
of power lathes, and then case-hardening them in an
electric furnace. I enjoyed this work, but the hours
involving compulsory overtime were long and I had to
travel to work in the morning and return home at night
all in the black-out conditions. So my health began
to trouble me again. I had made a good recovery from
a serious general break-down I had in 1935, but the
very rough condition at Mechans and the fact that I
suffered serious injuries when a stack of copper-
cuttings fell on me and cut both my legs very severely
led me to seek a transfer to the Merchant Service.59
This was granted and MacDiarmid spent the rest of the
war as a seaman on ships engaged on estuarial duties
at Greenock.
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These biographical details have been introduced
to show that for MacDiarmid the question of action has
never been a problem. He never had to choose between
the cloister and the active life; experience was thrust
on him, he did not have to seek it as "material". The
dichotomy between art and life did not trouble him for
his theory, his literary activity and his working life
were all directed to the same end. This accounts for
the nature of such periodicals as the Voice of Scotland
where ephemeral journalism, political theorising and
propaganda are found side by side with and are often
indistinguishable from (especially in the case of
MacDiarmid's own writings) literary discussions and
contributions. This quality is reflected in the later
poetry; for MacDiarmid, it all forms part of the whole.
Moreover, because for MacDiarmid the impulse towards
socialism came from the first-hand experience of depri¬
vation and inequality, his attitude to political involve¬
ment, while it may be anarchic, is not nihiiistic. His
communism is positive, not as it was for John Strachey,
the last recourse, the lesser of two evils, Communism
and Fascism. Indeed, it was only after Mosley's New Party
had failed him that Strachey became a Communist. Several
writers have pointed out that for Auden and many of his
generation communism or socialism were seen as an escape
from the Waste Land, but an escape that was nihilistic,
suicidal; - "In the Destructive element, immerse". It
was seen as the only possibility remaining since the
nursery world of pre-war Edwardian England and "country-
house at the ends of drives" could never be recovered.60
MacDiarmid from birth had been on the opposite side to
the country house dwellers and he well remembered that
pre-war Britain had been just as much of a struggle for
his classes as were the thirties. Hence though the final
end of his Communism was as visionary as that of Auden,
Spender or Day Lewis, his sense of present needs and
practicalities was much stronger, and his political
awareness on the tactical and strategic levels was greater,
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with the result that his poetry relates to the adult
world and and contingent realities rather than to private
fantasies of derring-do, or allegories of the schoolroom
and college study.
It has already been noted that MacDiarmid's posi¬
tion is humanistic rather than religious; on T.E. Hulme's
terms, he would be regarded as a Romantic, for he be
believes that man can improve himself through his own
will and that the whole is to be created, rather than
restored. Poetry is therefore creative and its ultimate
aim is total meaning, to achieve the Logos. The only
political philosophy compatible with this goal is, for
MacDiarmid, his own brand of Marxist-Leninism which
stresses the potential of man:
This faith that human experience and culture will
expand immensely in an era of abundance and social
ownership has been an essential of Communist think¬
ing from Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875)
and Engels's Socialism, Utopian and Scientific (1880)
to Lenin's The State and Revolution- (1918), and-it
appears again, with confidence that it is on the verge
of realization, in the Programme of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union adopted by their 22nd Congress in
October 1961. ^
So though MacDiarmid may be a Romantic in one sense,
his is not the Romanticism which harkens back to child¬
hood, or to a better, simpler age. He is writing for
adults and to create adults.61 In "Second Hymn to Lenin"
he castigates his fellows:
We're grown-ups that ha'ena yet
Put bairnly things aside 6 2
but finds the remedy in poetry, a poetry which demands
the full rigour of the intellect and the whole range of
human knowledge:
Nae simple rhymes for sil)y folk
But the haill art, as Lenin gied
Nae Marx-without-tears to workin' men
But the fu' course insteed.
Organic constructional work,
Practicality, and work by degrees;
First things first; and poetry in turn
'11 be built by these.63
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In this vision, poetry becomes the overarching
activity of man to which all other activites, includ¬
ing science and politics are subordinate contributors:
Sae here, twixt poetry and politics,
There's nae doot in the en'.
Poetry includes that and s'ud be
The greatest poo'er amang men.64
Poetry is man's articulation of himself:
language as the instrument
For the progressive articulation of the world
In spatial and temporal terms.65
and thereby the working out of his will. Since, if man
is to be as whole, as complete, as complex as possible,
no element of human experience should go unnamed or un¬
placed, the poet is forced to adopt a radical egalitaria—
nism:
For a poet maun see in a' thing
Ev'n what looks trumpery or horrid
A subject equal to ony
- A star for the forehead!_
A poet has nae choice left
Betwixt Beaverbrook, say, and God.
Jimmy Thomas or you,
A cat, carnation, or clod.
He daurna turn awa' frae ocht
For a single act o' neglect
And straught he may fa' frae grace
And be void o'effect.66
The poet's end then, is the end of the entire
species; to be as God, to know the sparrows of the field,
number the hairs of the head, to be omniscient. David
Craig accuses MacDiarmid of failure in the later long
poems, seeing them as:
terrible monuments to his final failure to fulfil a
text from Lenin that he quotes twice in Lucky Poet:
"It would be a serious mistake to suppose that one
can become a Communist without making one's own the
treasures of human knowledge... Communism becomes an
empty phrase, a mere facade, and the Communist a mere
bluffer, if he has not worked over in his conscious¬
ness the whole inheritance of human knowledge"..
(Speech to the 1922 Comintern Congress)67
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Whether or not we agree that MacDiarmid has failed,
we must recognize that this sort of Communist must be
his sort of poet, and herein lie the reasons for his
voracious appetite for facts, for knowledge, for 'welt-
literatur'. All these things are products of the inter¬
action between mind and matter; they are, therefore,
real and in that reality lies their truth. MacDiarmid's
enthusiasm for facts is not to be regarded as a rejec¬
tion of fictions; he knows, as we also should have come
to realize, that even apparently glaringly obvious facts
are no more than fictions or theories. The whole body
of knowledge amounts to all the products of the human
mind to which we assign temporary value and order; true,
false, fact, fiction, art, science etc. Today we accept
a modified Copernican system of astronomy, but Ptolemaic
theory remains a part of our knowledge. The "world of
words" attempts to capture this total knowledge and to
give it form through order and evaluation:
A protest, invaluable to science itself
Against the exclusion of value
From the essence of matter of fact.58
-A fact that has no value is not a fact
It means that when the scientist has discovered a fact
Which is a fact, he has therefore discovered a value
That is sufficient to gainsay all the nonsense
That is being talked about blind forces I
If a force is real it is also important.
If it is blind its blindness has value.
Why are so many people clamouring for free will?
Because they cannot see that fact has value,
They cannot see that will as a fact
Has any significance. To give it value
They must divorce it from fact.59
Here MacDiarmid seems to be arguing that it is our
consciousness which constitutes our freedom and the greater
our consciousness, the greater will be our freedom as we
find ourselves more fully in accord and in command of
the process of history. If individual consciousness
arises in the more highly evolved organism, so political
consciousness arise in the highest form of society. But
that progress of evolution to consciousness is poetry;
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without poetry, without articulation the universe conti¬
nues, but it is apprehended blindly and with terror as
Chaos, the void, the Abyss, silence. The study of
In Memoriam James Joyce will reveal further the impor¬
tance of this silence, the silence which is the tota¬
lity or plenum, the unsayable Logos:
We know that total speech is impossible of course,
Like a too big star that therefore could transmit no light,
Like the dumbness finally desired by Tyutchev and Pasternak 70
All speech, all individual articulations are only
products of the process which moves from the inarticulate
silence of total disorder to the inconceivable silence
of fully achieved order. Yet that silence or nothing¬
ness which arises out of ignorance, or failure to name,
is evil in the Thomist sense that it is a deprivation
of good, a deficiency in actuality. The poet's task,
therefore, is not simply to impose pattern on his exper¬
ience by selection; it is to order the whole of his ex¬
perience and to extend that experience through the process
of appetition71 in the continuing struggle of life for
higher and more complex organization and against disorder
and entropy. The poem itself, as the most intense order¬
ing of language, is the product and sign of complex orga¬
nization. It is as the total poem, the whole of know¬
ledge is assembled and ordered, made available, that the
envisioned new Adam, Communist Man will emerge, a super¬
man in whose advent MacDiarmid believed sufficiently to
embrace the eccentric eugenics of H.J. Muller in Out of
the Night (London, 1936). This new man who is to arise
from man's conscious development of science, biology
and genetic engineering is not, however, the romantic
hero or great leader of the Fascists; he is rather a
representative member of an improved species. The notion
and their connotations may seem equally frightening but
they are not the same. MacDiarmid believes that mankind
collectively has tremendous potential and unused power,
and that it is the task of the poet as humanity's voice
and most highly developed consciousness to put man in touch
with himself so that he may realize his full capacity.
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We shall see in the study of In Memoriam James Joyce
how this is attempted through the creative power of the
word and through the absorption of the physical and
subjective worlds into the higher reality of language.
In Memoriam James Joyce
Hugh MacDiarmid's In Memoriam James Joyce; A Vision
of World Language was published in 1955 as the first of
four volumes of a major long poem, Mature Art. This
vast poem has had several titles, or else several pro¬
jected long poems have merged with or superceded each
other, e.g. Cornish Heroic Song for Valda Trevlyn,
Impavidi Progrediamur, etc. This total work has never
been published, and since it seems that its essential
nature is to be a projection, a potentiality, probably
its completion was never a real possibility. A number
of volumes intervene between this poem and MacDiarmid's
earlier masterpiece A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle
(1926) at least as far as we can tell from publication
dates, although MacDiarmid was probably working on many
of his projects concurrently. Much of the poem was
certainly written between 1933 and 1941 while the poet
was on Whalsay in the Shetland Islands. A version of
Mature Art was finished some time before 1938, but sec¬
tions of In Memoriam James Joyce can only have been
written later. The Karl Kraus passages (p.44f), which
were cited in the notorious Times Literary Supplement
correspondence of 1965, derive from a Times Literary
Supplement leader for May 5th, 1953. Long extracts
purporting to be from the larger work have appeared at
different dates and in different forms. Part of the
overlap and confusion no doubt arises from publishing
difficulties, but on the other hand the interdependence
of so many of the works is an essential feature of
MacDiarmid's poetry.
We find, for example, that long passages of In
Memoriam James Joyce first appeared in Lucky Poet (1943).
Again, there are passages of In Memoriom James Joyce
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which quite clearly form part of "The Kind of Poetry I
Want", Chapter III in Lucky Poet, but do not actually
appear there,72 while this chapter and indeed the book
as a whole provide the best commentary and explanation
of In Memoriam James Joyce. Other prose passages from
Lucky Poet appear in In Memoriam as verse (e.g. "England
is our Enemy"). Moreover, favourite sources and themes
will be used over and over again. The Gaelic vision
poem "Gile na Gile" which is used in "Plaited Like the
Generations of Men" and informs many other sections of
the book has already been used by MacDiarmid on a number
of other occasions, such as in Circumjack Cencrastus
(1930), "Aodhagan 0 Rathaille sang this song". Thus
we cannot point to anything so simple as a development
through English, Scots and Gaelic stages. All the ele¬
ments overlap; common to them and central to MacDiarmid's
entire poetic effort is the search for a language, a
language which will first allow him to speak in a full,
undivided voice and which will make possible the unifica¬
tion of human consciousness. In Memoriam James Joyce
is the poet's most ambitious attempt to deal with the
nature of language. Hence Hilary Corke, reviewing the
poem for Encounter, acclaimed it as a "Text" despite its
"guttersnipe trumpetings" because it is a "profoundly
measured contemplation of one of the central problems of
our time, that of language".73 It is a poem about lang¬
uage and seeks to extend itself to the boundaries of
language, to become or include the whole of language
or to have all language become poetry.
One problem which should be confronted as soon as
possible in any consideration of MacDiarmid's work is the
question of authorship. Even the most perfunctory read¬
ing of In Memoriam James Joyce will reveal that large
chunks of it are not by MacDiarmid, at least not in the
sense that he was the first to use particular words in
particular arrangements. Apart from these verbatim quota¬
tions, there are passages which are very roughly para¬
phrased and others which are potted arguments from dther
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men's work. Some of these sources are acknowledged; most
are not. The manner of acknowledgement may be mislead¬
ing; for instance, the passage on de Quincey which
appears on p.137 and is cited in the prefatory note,
does have the footnote "Vide Thomas de Quincey's
Suspiria". This is fair enough, as far as it goes, for
the quotations indicated in the passage are indeed by
de Quincey and from Suspiria; but they and the passage
in which they are embedded are taken, with virtually no
alterations apart from line divisions and certain
omissions, from a Times Literary Supplement article of
June 10th, 1939 (p.340). The persona of the poet who
has read everything is thus reinforced. This pattern
is repeated throughout the poem, as in the Stifter
passage (p.110) discussed below.
The plagiarism, if such it be, is not confined to
the obviously "prosy" passages. The revelation that the
poem "Perfect" (Selected Poems, 1934), "the poem the
Imagists talked about but did not write" had appeared
first as prose by Glyn Jones, and was then versified by
Keidrich Rhys, before reaching print over MacDiarmid's
name, must make any critic very wary of praising the
gifts of the poet rather than the poetry itself. The
complexity of the problem is increased by MacDiarmid's
disingenuousncss. He "forgets", he "subconsciously memo¬
rizes" , he gives misleading or inadequate acknowledge¬
ments, he makes straight denials which later have to be
modified. "Minor poets borrow, major poets steal":
maybe, but most are more tactful.
MacDiarmid's psychological constitution would no
doubt have made a fascinating study, - but for the psy¬
chologist not for the critic attempting to come to terms
with the poem. Whatever the reasons for his behaviour,
ignoble, unconscious, subtle or devious the effect is
the same. There is no author, no external figure to
take responsibility for the poem. If we are prepared
to engage with it at all, we must confine our attentions
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to the text and the interpretations of significance will
be reached very largely through the reader's interaction
with the work. Perhaps we should consider it as anony¬
mous or as nearly anonymous as Homer. MacDiarmid, or
perhaps Grieve, the man as he is external to the poem
is irrelevant, though of course MacDiarmid as he appears
in the poem as an actor, as the speaking voice, is most
important.
This problem of MacDiarmid's personality, the shrill
voice which sounds so characteristic, so definite, yet
which when examined breaks up into other men's voices
and somehow disappears, is only one aspect of the poem.
It is to be related to the dogmatic uncertainties, the
insistent materialism which collapses again and again
into a form of idealism, the poetry of fact which is also
to be a poetry of ideas, the poetry of words which re¬
peatedly aims itself at silence. In the discussion which
follows specific passages from the text will be examined
in some detail in order to illumine some of these issues.
The first passage to be considered begins on p.35,
"Let the only consistency" and continues to "dodeca¬
phonic bonfire" (p.37). This is the extract which
appears in the Grieve and Scott anthology as "In the
Fall" (p.271).
Let the only consistency
In the course of my poetry
Be like that of the hawthorn tree...7k
Immediately we notice that the whole of this passage is
an extended symbol or image for poetry itself, cast in
the form of what we might call an "epic analogy". When
the poem is anthologized, the physical realization is
so successful that the substance appears to be a poem
about nature, appreciation of which does not necessarily
require apprehension of the intellectual significance:
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The tree to winter condemned
Stands forth at last
Not bare and drab and pitiful
But a candelabrum or oxidized silver gemmed
By innumerable points of ruby
Which dominate the whole and are visible
Even at a considerable distance
As flame-points of living fire.75
This remarkable passage is one of the most physical or
visual images in the entire poem, yet while it makes
the hawthorn immediate to us it does so through a series
of subordinate metaphors which return us to the world
of human artifice: "candelabra", "silver", "gemmed",
"ruby" (clearly this ruby is cut and polished, not the
natural stone). The haws of the hawthorn are metamor-
phosized into flame, at first the highly controlled
flames of the candle which are in turn stilled into the
higher art of the ruby, then transformed again into an
intenser fire. These intensifying transformations return
us to a notion of poetry which transcends the initial
position:
That so it may be
With my poems too at last glance
Is my only desire75
However, there can be no resting at this stage. The
poet rededicates himself to the work. The haws become
the poet's "heart's blood", the essence of his life, as
poetry is the essence of human life.
See how these haws burn, there down the drive,
In this autumn air that feels like cotton wool,
When the air has the gelatinous limpness of a body dead
as a whole
While its tissues are still alive.77
The poem moves out again from the poet, back into the
physical Autumn and from there to the whole of humanity.
We may note in passing a recurrence of the characteristic
so marked in MacDiarmid's earlier lyrics, the ability to
move from the minute or immediate particular, to an ima¬
ginative, almost palpable apprehension of the world as a
whole. We may not before have conceived of the earth as
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something flabby and brain-dead, but in these words it
becomes so. "Gelatinous limpness" a phrase emotively
effective in its repulsiveness is reinforced by the quali¬
fication which tells us that the death described is not
complete, hence there has been no inset of rigor mortis
as we might expect.
There follows one of those singularly ruthless and
uncompromising statements which we must accept afe being
the voice of MacDiarmid, the poet inside the poem, man
struggling to become superman. Otherwise, they may
strike us as totally unsympathetic, because they make
inhuman demands which we, as yet unregenerate, are unable
to respond to . The notion of human regeneration and
the emergence of the superman is a founding myth of the
poem which must be understood in the light of MacDiarmid's
political beliefs:
Poetry is human existence come to life,
The glorious energy that once employed
Turns all else in creation null and void,
The flower and fruit, the meaning and goal,
Which won all else is needs removed by the knife
Even as a man who climbs up high
Kicks away the ladder he has come up by.78
The poet seeks an art which will not be an escape
from life, but a redemption of life, the intensifica¬
tion of living, "the narrowing intensity" which we
apprehend more readily through the already established
association with the flame-like haws "sweetened and
polished by the frost". This intensity of life will be
that of a unified poetic sensibility and the poetry
imitates this aim in a daring image which unites the
physical and ideal, the emotional and the intellectual
and at the same time exploits the devices Of rhythm and
incantation
I who am infinitely more un-English than you (Yeats)
And turn Scotland to poetry like those women who
In their passion secrete and turn to
Musk through and through.79
However, the ultimate union can only be projected; in
the meantime the poet recognizes his fellows on the "aonach";80
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he invokes the presence in the poem of those who like
Yeats and Joyce have advanced above the ruck because
of their vision. Thus he returns us to a forest which
is more than ever a literary one - the Caledonian forest,
a place made out of words. The highly aureate descrip¬
tion which follows is not an attempt to produce a fresh
and faithful picture of nature, but to regenerate lang¬
uage, to use and redeploy the cliches of Nature Notes
columns, so that they appear no ihore and no less hackneyed
than the stock epithets of epic. So this phase of the
poem performs, not a circle which would be closed, but
a spiral, or a loop in the snake whereby we move from a
simile where objects of nature seem to illunine the con¬
cepts of poetry to a fusion where nature and poetry become
one, in the world of words.
One of the major strengths of this passage lies in
the skilled handling of metrics, which is based on quan¬
tity rather than accent. The effect is to provide a firm
but not easily identifiable control for the verse, a move¬
ment which is not really English, but cannot be attributed
fully to any other language. Again, this is a movement
towards synthesis, towards the world language.
Through his own mode of quantitative verse MacDiarmid
can accommodate a vast number of syllables or juxtaposed
stresses in a manner which would be impossible in tradi¬
tional English metres or indeed in much free verse. Of
course, this is not quantitative verse in the classical
mode; rather, MacDiarmid is using the concept of quanti¬
tative scansion to pattern the stresses of English (or
Scottish) intonation. Thus he produces his synthesis,
a verse which is not classical, nor English, Scots nor
even Gaelic, but which derives features from a number
of traditions of poetics. Similarly, MacDiarmid uses
rhyme, rhyme schemes and all the devices of assonance to
suit his own purposes. Where quantitative notions are
concerned, Pound may well have been an influence, through,
for instance, his essays or How to Read. MacDiarmid was
familiar with and an admirer of Pound's work which he
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frequently quotes. Both were associated with Orage1s
New Age; both were Douglasites. MacDiarmid has a typi¬
cally idiosyncratic statement of his own on quantity
in the essay "Charles Doughty and the Need for Heroic
Poetry":
{Wagner} knew (as Charles Doughty knew) that we were
coming to another of the quantitative - as against
accentual - periods in culture. It is that lack of
historical knowledge which disables no Marxist that
is wrong with our mere impressionist commentators
on such a phenomenon. It is this question of quantity
as against accent that distorts to most Scots the
nature of our pibrochs of the great period. These
knew no "bar". They were timeless music - hence
their affiliation with plainsong, with the neuma.
Barred music - accented music - finds its ultimate
form in symphony. Unbarred music - quantity music -
expresses itself in pattern-repetition; hence the
idea that the Celt has no architectonic power, that
his art is confined to niggling involutions and
intricacies - yet the ultimate form here is not
symphony; it is epic.81
These remarks could be taken as an oblique commentary on
MacDiarmid's own poetry.
Much more could be said about this first passage,
but in the meantime it is worth pointing out how the last
few lines return us to the idea, to the intellectual
concept:
Other masters may conceivably write
Even yet in C major.
But we - we take the perhaps 'primrose path'
To the dodecaphonic bonfire.82
These four lines almost epitomize the effort of the poem;
the analogy is with Schonberg 6tnd the pioneers of the
twelve-tone scale. Incomprehension, distaste, disaster
are to be risked for the sake of realizing the idea, the
new form which is first of all an intellectual or con¬
ceptual advance. Thus we have the uncertainties of
'primrose path' which clangs like a flat note, and the
ambiguous success of "dodecaphonic bonfire" where an
extraordinary discord of sound and image discloses new




The passage discussed above has shown how the ana¬
lytic or intellectual device of simile may be transformed
in its working out to something much closer to the radi¬
cal fusion of metaphor; the world of the forest became
an image for the world of words, the world of words
images the world of the forest till word and thing become
one in the creative process of the poem. Another example
of Extended analogy, less beguiling but less obscured
than the extravagant sylvanism of the previous extract
is found in the final section of the third poem, "The
Snares of Varuna" (pp.103-112) now to be considered.
Varuna is a Hindu god, Lord of the West, of water and
morality. His role is similar to that of the Iranian
Mithras and he seems in this poem to symbolize the physi¬
cal entanglements of the spirit as well as the ordering
and restrictive powers of received thought. He does not
appear in the poem; his name is used as a word symbol to
invoke all the connotations of the god who has, however,
no substantial role in the poem.
"The Snares of Varuna" is an examination of the evil
in the world, but the theme is implicit and ambiguous.
It opens (p.103) with a declamation, an intemperate roar
reminiscent of Old Testament prophecy, Presbyterian pulpit
oratory, or even Pound's Dantean Hell in the Cantos.
But the evils are real and urgent, and as the poet lists
apparently more trivial wrongs with the worst excesses
of Nazism we are convinced of a pervasive ugliness and
chaos, disguised by the imposition of a mechanical and
authoritarian order:
The countless thuggeries of Jacks-in-office
The vile society women, infernal parasites,
The endless sadism, Gorilla-rule,
The live men hanging in the plaza
With butcher's hooks through their jaws83
Yet the poet recognizes that this horror, the Fascist
terror, class oppression, economic deprivation, make only
one aspect of a structure which degenerate man requires
to live:
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But if, as could be, ninety per cent
Of human drudgery were abolished tomorrow
And the great masses of mankind given
Ample incomes, and freed for 'higher things'
They could no more live than fish out of water,
They could not sustain life on that level
-On any level worthy of Man at all811
Many run the risk of losing his intelligence through
atrophy; barbarism is returning and mankind faces extinc¬
tion. He returns to the revelation of violence mas¬
querading as law and order, dehumanisation increasing
with the advance of bureaucracy:
More and redder tape
In every phase of life.
/Svt evtvyk/kre.8 5
Then with one of those sudden and elliptic contrasts
which bewilder the unprepared reader, the poet moves to
a celebration of the individual, the particular which
resists classification and pressure to conform. Variety
and change are celebrated in men and in the natural world,
and the paradox is revealed of universality achieved
through the greatest intensification of the individual
and the particular - "to the Nth degree".
There follows a passage which seems totally un^-
connected and, indeed, is placed within a not very effec¬
tive parenthesis. It begins:
(And in a poem like this, of course
Dealing with Plato and the East,
One must range the library
Of an Epicurean contemporary of Cicero86
Two clues help us to ascertain the relation of this passage
to the whole. First, there is a suggestion that the
Alexandrian Library is only one area of literature, one
part of the world of words which the poet has travelled.
We recognize that much of the material for this poem does
not come from hospitals, market-places, farmyards or
moorlands but rather from periodicals and books: "as
Leonard Woolf has said", "It is pleasant to find the
books/describing it as very local", "the masterly work
of Rudolf Hirzel", The actors in this piece are mostly
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writers or artists, scholars and poets with one musician.
A footnote (p.107) reveals the source of the passage
above as itself a scholarly work: The Alexandrian
Library by Edward Alexander Parsons (London, 1952).
Secondly, this passage introduces the East, the
unknown, at once the counterpart of and escape from
Varuna, Lord of the West. But what we consider as belong¬
ing to the East is at the same time part of all of us
and is mysterious or even potentially evil if we do not
make it conscious. It lies behind the "mysticism" of
Plato and even the metaphysics of Aristotle. The mis¬
take of Western philosophy, it is suggested, is to
attempt to clarify the mystery by defining it. Thurman
Arnold is quoted
Definition is ordinarily supposed
To produce clarity of thinking.
It is not generally recognized
That the more we define our terms
The less descriptive they become
And the more difficulty we have in using them.87
MacDiarmid's approach is different, oblique. Through a
succession of similes, often with multiple references
he seeks to capture or "land" the multi-faceted mystery.
This mystery can only be discovered through words, but
the conventional logical deployment of words is inade¬
quate. More devious means are used: similes and images
are juxtaposed, apparent non-sequiturs have alogical or
associational links which weave a net to trap the truth.
The poet has told us that Aristotle and Plato were
deluded in regarding logic and epistemology as the keys
which would make all things clear. It seems the super¬
ficial clarity and apparency of nature is deceptive and
now we move into the simile, or rather, analogy, which
is to illustrate this point
Hence it is here to the Nth degree
As it is with Mozart...88
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But no sooner is Mozart introduced than his work is
subjected to analogy in its turn:
They have felt certain Mozart masterpieces
As one would feel a still,bright,perfect,cloudless day.
It is infinitely protean
It is intangible, immaterial,
Fitting your spirit like a glove.
Then suddenly there will pass through you a tremor of terror.
A moment comes when that tranquillity,
That perfection take on a ghastly ambiguity.
That music still suggests nothing, nothing at all.89
We turn from this to a portrait of Mozart "with a too-
prominent nose/And an extraordinary salience of the upper
lip" from which we experience a fleeting revelation, but
are:
left face to face with a mask
Whose directness and clarity is completely baffling.90
The apprehensions of terror and evil are the more
terrifying and the more evil because they are nothing; the
unknown reality is only unknown because we do not realize
that there is nothing beyond what we do know. None of
the similes which succeed and qualify each other is more
real than another; there is no hidden referent towards
which they all point. There are sunny days, there are
works by Mozart, there are even similarities between
them. They are all real, they all exist and play their
part.
The paragraph ends with a further bafflement, a new
association which disorients even more thoroughly our
sense of the level of reality:
Pushkin's Salieri who wanted
To poison Mozart was right.
He should have poisoned Pushkin too91
How can a character poison his author? Qhite easily,
if they are all inside the same book. Mozart is dangerous,
Pushkin is dangerous, MacDiarmid must be dangerous.
And why? Because they show us that appearances are real,
that they are effective, and that the sum of things is all
there is. There is no "something I never mention"92
except in so far as the poem or catalogue cannot be com¬
pleted. The metaphor is the reality, it is the words of
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the poem and the words of the poem are real and refer
to other things which are real, though they may belong
to different orders of reality - a portrait, symphony,
a clear day, even a "ghastly ambiguity" for relation¬
ships and perceptions of relationships and feelings are
also real.
A language is
A form of life; but there are many forms of life.93
The next section, referring to the German poet, Stifter,
comes from the Times Literary Supplement of August 35th,
1952, from an article "Growth and Consummation" which
is a review of books about Stifter, including the two
MacDiarmid mentions in his footnote. Like the Karl
Kraus passage, it would seem therefore to be a late
addition to the main body of the poem. Again we notice
that there is no direct sequential thread; rather this
section goes off at a tangent on the theme of the demonic
"behind the idyllic facade".
Stifter, trying to eliminate all
The demonic elements from his world
And substitute for them the Sanftes Gesetz des Seins
Only to have the demonic reenter his work
In the subtle and uncanny disguise
Of simplicity and innocence.9
The original passage read:
He speaks, for instance, of Stifter's dread of
the demonic, of how he tried to eliminate all
demonic elements from his world, and to subs¬
titute for them the Sanftes Gesetz des Seins.
The critic seems to have overlooked the fact,
that in a hidden form, the demonic enters into
a number of Stifter's characters in the suotle
and uncanny disguise of simplicity and innocence.
We should notice how MacDiarmid has shifted the emphasis,
by the slightest alteration of wording, to suggest that
it is Stifter, rather than the critic, who is unaware
of the presence and power of the demonic.
In some respects MacDiarmid may be disingenuous
about his sources, but he makes very little attempt to
cover his tracks. In fact, he provides a gloss on his
own technique in an early play, The Purple Patch.95
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The subject is a hell-fire sermon from a new minister
which thoroughly stirs the congregation. However, the
beadle provides the denouement, revealing it to be pla¬
giarized from the previous incumbent, who in turn had
taken it from the work of "Dr. Donne". Furthermore,
in Lucky Poet, discussing his exile on Whalsay,
MacDiarmid cites with admiration the case of Tom Mooney
who kept himself informed while in prison by "reading
his paper thoroughly, caver to cover, and by having a
good enough background before he went inside1", (p.xviii)
It is often comparatively simple to uncover
MacDiarmid's sources. More interesting is what becomes
of them in the poem. In the section quoted above several
lines are taken verbatim from the article, though the
passage as a whole has been modified to some extent, cut
down and otherwise adapted to the movement of the verse.
However, no matter how little MacDiarmid alters his
sources, "the method is his ain"; 96 the words of dthers
are appropriated by the poet and repeated in his voice.
This is achieved in part by a certain uniformity in the
verse. In these long prosy passages, the normative line
approximates to a rough tetrameter, the measure which is
probably closest to natural speech rhythms and is so
common in ballad and folk poetry. One need not claim
that MacDiarmid's long passages of "chopped-up prose"
have metrical felicities hitherto unnoticed; but he uses
the arrangements of his lines to point up the innate
rhythms of prose, the subtle music in all assemblages
of words which may exist even apart from their meaning.
In the paragraph on fishing, the hackneyed cliches and
technicalities of specialist journalism achieve a start¬
ling success in their new setting:
It requires 'iron nerves' for all fishermen
English or others, to hold their hands
When the nose of a great four-pounder
Slowly rises to the fly.97
Again, we recognize that words are the primary reality
of the poem; "iron nerves" is a cliche, so much is acknow¬
ledged by the quotation marks, which have the effect of
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turning it into a unit or complex word. But here it is
simply a word, interacting with other words, as it
happens, chiming with "requires", just as "fishermen"
does with "English". It is shorn of all need to appear
as a metaphorical event; there is no attempt to restore
a tension of meaning, to stimulate connotations; the
figurative meaning is taken so much for granted that it
has become literal. MacDiarmid often uses the non-
creative, or rational, devices of simile and "dead",
therefore accepted and "literal" metaphor, and by thus
exploiting a convention enacts a more subtle and radi¬
cally creative process. We notice how the literalness
of language emphasizes again and again the theme of
"nothing there", of appearances, what is seen, no matter
how superficial, being all that there is. This may seem
to be a contradiction of the content of the passage
which concerns the raising df the mystery from the
depths, a mystery which changes from the familiar British
trout and salmon through the pages of the natural history
books to a Zambesi crocodile, dorado, tiger-fish shark,
until eventually it reaches its consummation as Moby Dick.
However, this mysterious quarry is raised not from dark¬
ness but from clear water. "Clarity" provides one of
the connections which knits this passage to the Mozart
section: the cloudless day, the clarity of the Mozart
masterpiece, the "gin" clearness of the chalk streams
are equivalents, and the demonic element is to be iden¬
tified with that which lay behind Stifter's "idyllic
facade".
The poet of In Memoriam James Joyce is optimistic,
he looks to the future, he has a vision of world language
and regenerate man. If such optimism is not to be shallow,
it must confront the problem of evil, as MacDiarmid
does here. What the poem demonstrates, rather than
states, is that evil is negative, it is ignorance,
lack of knowledge, privatio boni. This accords very
well with other statements by the poet, particularly in
"The Kind of Poetry I Want", but here the poet as teacher
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makes us learn for ourselves, makes us construct our
own meaning, our own knowledge from the meshed but un-
construed data.
Thus what is evil is what we do not know, or cannot
know, what we do not or cannot see. Evil is human and
subjective, a failure of consciousness. It is our ignor¬
ance, what we lack. As it exists objectively it is
neither good nor evil, but as it is unknown it does not
exist subjectively; for us it is nothingness. Stifter
(in MacDiarmid's version) refused to admit the demonic,
refused to see what objectively was there; the evil was
his failure of consciousness, his unwillingness to fish
the monster from the clear depths. Knowledge and vision
demand this action; the subject must work to create the
mystery which he reveals. The poet does this by naming,
acknowledging, making conscious all that he touches, all
the relationships he perceives. The poem is "a vast
metaphor for something I never mention". That something
is nothing, the unknown, the unnameable, which is always
implied by that which has been named, and is only that
which has not yet been named, or known.
Ill
Reinforcement of these suggestions may be discovered
in the third passage to be considered, the address to
Speech as the means to self-transcendence and higher
consciousness. She
Rouses that by which, through the deceits of their emotions
Men reach out to those things which are beyond their grasp
-The embodiment of every vital desire
That gives them consciousness of being.98
It would be to falsify the poem to suggest that this
passage corresponds exactly to the one discussed above.
Each passage names a part of reality, is part of the poem,
but these parts are not identical or even necessarily
consistent, though there may be similarities between
them. If one of the aspects of the poem could be inter¬
preted completely through another it would suggest that
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one of the two aspects was more "real" or more valuable
than the other.
This section opens with a direct address to
Speech, personified or hypostasized. The form recalls
again 0"Rathaille's aislin, or vision poem, where the
beloved is occupied Ireland.
Speech. All men's whore. My beloved.'99
An earlier version of this spoiled beauty appears in
A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle:
And on my lips ye'11 heed nae mair
And in my hair forget
The seed o' a' the men that in
My virgin womb ha'e met.100
This mysterious woman also appears as Sophia, the whore
of God, female person of the Deity who figures so promi¬
nently in some forms of Gnosticism and Cabbalism.
"She" is not a real woman, nor is she simply speech or
language: she is the object and lure of MacDiarmid's
passion, made manifest as Scotland, poetry, knowledge,
the earth, a loving woman.
She, Audh, the Celtic Muse, is the power of poetry,
the power of knowledge to entice a man beyond himself.
A "femme fatale" who is herself beyond the common and
so hated by the herd, she inspires her lovers to super¬
human deeds. She is, though a member of the Godhead,
of the Devil's party in respect of most orthodox reli¬
gions. Not only does she encourage man in his own aspira¬
tions towards divinity, the way she provides is made
out of emotions, sexual desire and deceits. But through
this vision man is exalted to a higher one:
Not lust but exhilaration
They are roused to exalted visions of themselves101
The next paragraph moves on to this higher plane,
where the vision of love transcends the physical and
seems to be moving towards the hermaphroditic union
which is one of the higher alchemical stages and the
penultimate step before Godhood:
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-an absorbing attachment of the spirit,
Not a sexual relationship as that is generally understood
But an all-controlling emotion
That has no physical basis.102
As the conception of love develops, the figure of the
woman takes on a new dignity and impersonality. All
the lustiness of the first paragraph disappears; she
is likened to the "snowcap on a mountain"... She becomes
the personification of Love, but at the same time her
struggle is dramatized so that she becomes again a human
woman:
Death cannot intimidate her,
Poverty and exile, the fury of her own family
And the calumnies of the world
Are unable to bend her will
Towards courses she feels to be wrong.103
We are reminded of MacDiarmid's constant search for the
universal in the particular. Here his imagination moves
from the intellectual abstraction to a particular drama¬
tic situation, and then out again to a vision of Love
as the World-Spirit, where world and spirit, matter and
mind, intellect and emotion, are thoroughly fused.
-Imparting with every movement, every look
Some idea of what the process of literature could be,
Something far more closely related
To the whole life of mankind
Than the science of stringing words together
In desirable sequences.10
These words tell us the poet's vision without wholly
capturing or presenting it, so that the fusion is not
achieved but still only projected. The gap between as¬
piration of this order and achievement can only be bridged
in a transcendent moment, if at all, yet consciousness of
the gap generates more and more poetry. The alterna¬
tive is despair and silence, which is the only rational
course if resolution is to be taken as the supreme goal,
rather than as the lure of process. If process in it¬
self is valued, the battle against nothingness becomes
heroic. We might compare the conclusion of A Drunk Man
Looks at the Thistle:
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For aince- it's toomed ray hert and brain,
The thistle needs maun fa' again.
But a' its growth'11 never fill
The hole it's turned my life intil!
Yet ha'e I Silence left, the croon o'a'.
and then, with particular relevance for the later poem:
No' her, wha on the hills langsyne I saw
Liftin' a foreheid o' perpetual snaw.
• •• ••• •••• •••
- But Him whom nocht in man or Deity,
Or Daith or Dreid or Laneliness can touch,
Wha's deed owre often and has seen owre much.
0 I ha'e Silence left105
This unnamed figure is everything which has been
named, the Man who comprehends male and female, the
silence which is nothing and the poetntial of all words,
the process and flux which is eternal and unchanging.
The "Silence" of A Drunk Man also governs In Memoriam
James Joyce and indeed the whole of the poet's work.
Its importance is shown by one incident in the Karl
Kraus passage, which has been recognized as a quotation
from the Times Literary Supplement. At one point
MacDiarmid breaks from the quotation:
Then Holderlin sought,
And often miraculously found
The word with which silence speaks
Its own silence without breaking it.106
In the original prose this reads: "The word with which
anguish speaks its own silence without breaking it".
MacDiarmid has heightened the poetry and emphasized
the importance of silence by a single repetition; signi¬
ficantly this heightening of tension is followed by a
break from the Kraus text and the insertion of the medical
analogy which has been admired by Morgan and Buthlay:107
(Silence supervening at poetry's height,
Like the haemolytic streptococcus
In the sore throat preceding rheumatic fever
But which, at the height of the sickness,
Is no longer there, but has' been and gone.108
This silence is at once the terrifying void of chaos which
threatens all life and at the same time the source or




To live is to be at war, and language is the field
of battle. Hence the ferocity, even frenzy, with which
MacDiarmid seeks to catalogue all the words, all the
facts. If they are not known, not spoken, they will not
exist. Human intelligence will atrophy, humanity become
extinct. This returns us to the notion of the immorality
of exclusiion or the problem of the catalogue. As an
example of this at its most extreme we may consider a
section of the "The World of Words" which reads like
a nineteen thirties bibliography on physiological and
psychological aspects of art, linguistics, and stylis-
tics. Sometimes we are given a little more than the
bare title but this leaves us little the wiser:
Pluss's 'Das Gleichnis in Erzahlen der Dichtung',
Which concludes that the value and purpose of a poetic comparison
Are not to be found in the arousal of a visual image
But in the creation of a 'Gesamtvorstellung'
Common to both the principal and subordinate object.
Muller-Freienfels's 'Psychologie der Kunst',
Bullough on 'Psychical Distance',
And are learned in all manner of hypnagogic images,
Verbal reflexes, visual onomatopoeia,
Word-physiognomy, colour associations, tactile values,
The psychological experiences differ ciating
Noun-consciousness from verb-consciousness,
And the adjective state of mind from the adverb.109
And so it goes on.
Here MacDiarmid seems to be carrying to its utmost
and most scientific or technical extreme, Ezra Pound's
requirement that the poet study his craft. There is
some sort of syntactical or punctuational confusion in
the eighth line of this extract which suggests that even
the poet has been overwhelmed by the mass of his material.
However, the projected poet, the articulator of fully
achieved consciousness would have full control and under¬
standing of this body of knowledge. As it stands, the
catalogue cannot tell us very much, nor does it present
a coherent argument. We do not even believe that
MacDiarmid himself has read all these works. But still,
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the attempt has been made; a reading list has been given,
access to an important part of knowledge has been opened,
a direction has been given to whomsoever would take up
the task of the poet.
V
In striking contrast to the previous passage, let us
turn to short section from the early part of the poem, a
passage which follows the "Let the only consistency"
extract which was the first to be discussed. In that
extract we were led into a new world, neither an actual
physical forest nor the abstract forest of language, but
a fusion of the physical and intellectual ideas on the
poem which is truly metaphorical. These last two para¬
graphs, paradoxically, are able to emphasize the sensa¬
tional aspects of this experience through gleanings of
unfamiliar vocabulary from technical and dialect
dictionaries:
The gold edging of a bough at sunset, its pantile way
Forming a double curve, tegula and imbrex in one,
Seems at times a movement on which I might be borne
Happily to infinity; but again I am glad
When it suddenly ceases and I find myself
Pursuing no longer a rhythm of duramen
But bouncing on the diploe in a clearing between earth and air
Or headlong in dewy dallops or a moon-spairged fernshaw
Or caught in a dark dumosity, or even
In opening country again watching an aching spargosis of stars.110
I append a glossary:
pantile A roofing tile curved to an ogee shape,
one curve being much longer than the
other. When laid on the roof the greater
part of their surface forms a concave
channel for the descent of water, while
one side forms a narrow convex ridge,
which overlaps the edge of the adjoin¬
ing tile. (The Longniddry cottage
where MacDiarmid lived for a time in
1932 was pantiled.)
tegula a) A small scale-like structure cover¬
ing the base of the forewing in hymenop-
terous and other insects,
b) Each of a pair of membranous scales
(prehalteres) in front of the halteres
in dipterous insects.
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imbrex A curved roof-tile (Archaeol.) Also
associated with Latin, imbrex,
rain shower.
duramen The central or heartwood of an
exogenous tree.
diploe a) Anat. The light porous or cancella¬
ted bone-tissue lying between the hard
dense inner and outer layer of the
bones of the skull.
b) That part of the parenchyme of a
leaf which intervenes between two
layers of epiderm.
dallop (dollop) clump of grass or weeds in a field
(but see below)
We notice that in this passage there is no priority
given to Scottish dialect; technical vocabulary and
archaic English forms are equally favoured. Thus "moon-
spairged" is certainly Scottish, but "dallop" while it
may be Scots, a variation on "doolloup" meaning a glen
or hollow between two areas of low-lying flat ground,
more probably, in the context, is a variant of "dollop",
meaning "clump of grass of weeds in a field". This
occurs in Scots and English dialect and is conjectured
to be Norwegian in origin.
I have spent so much time on this point because it
reveals the extent to which it is necessary to translate
MacDiarmid. This is a consistent feature of his poetry
from the first lyrics in Scots. We forget too easily
that the Lallans or "synthetic Scots" of MacDiarmid's
poetry must be nearly as unfamiliar to most Scots as
to anyone else. Indeed, part of its value for MacDiarmid
is its very strangeness, despite its foundation in the
intimate language of his childhood.
moon-spairged moon-sprinkled
dumosity Full of bushes, thorns. 1656, Blount;
"that hath many or is full of Brambles
or Bryers"
spargosis Path. (or sparganosis) distension
of breasts occasioned by too much milk
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One quality comes through again and again in
MacDiarmid's poetry: the love of and delight in words,
words as words. Very often his images are verbal and
intellectual rather than visual or sensual. Thus, if
we seek some sort of physical nub or orientation for
the associations and connotations in this work we may
be bewildered; for very often the idea or the word it¬
self is the central reality. In the passage under con¬
sideration the sensual and verbal elements enhance each
other so that despite the latinisms and poly-syllables
we have an impression of the poet as an Ariel or Puck¬
like figure disporting himself in the magical Caledonian
forest. So, on the first impressionistic reading the
passage is successful, appealing. However, its strange¬
ness demands considerable effort if we are actually to
understand what is being said, for unless we take the
extreme view that poetry should not be intelligible,
only musical, this writing forces on us the sort of de¬
tailed exegesis used in medieval scholarship or modern
paractical criticism. In this way it obstructs the
superficial reading habits which a too casual literacy
encourages. The reader is forced to interpret and so
participate in the creation of the poem.111 He must find
a satisfactory reading to account for "tegula" and
"imbrex"; he must himself provide whatever sense there
may be in "rhythm of duramen". The author has abscond¬
ed, removing himself from judgement and leaving us with
the proper object of investigation, the poetic text.
This insistence on the intrinsic value of words is
also manifested in the collector's obsession with lexical
curiosities; archaisms, "hapax legomena", dialect words
etc. If these words are known to the poet he must attempt
to propagate them. Every word represents a realization
of an aspect of human experience, a nuance which cannot
otherwise be articulated. The loss of a word is there¬
fore the loss of an awareness of the human experience,
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no matter how subtle or slight this might seem to be.
MacDiarmid is searching for precision, particularity
and he praised these qualities in other writers.
Doughty is applauded for
Making language at once richer and more precise
And passionate for naming particular things 112
Yet though MacDiarmid insists on variety and exact¬
ness of vocabulary, he also speaks sometimes as if there
were one word, the Logos or Omnific Word, which, if
uttered, would name everything. This word is to be
identified with the great work, the "supreme fiction"
whose attainment, we have seen, the poet admits is
impossible for the individual "We know that total speech
is impossible of course".113 Still "we must know all
the words". 1 111 In order to reach towards the Logos,
or to recreate its unity, all the separate constituents
must be gathered and spoken, even the secret languages,
such as that of Meredith:
Uttering a secret language as if in the belief
That it was a universal speech, yet even if
A secret language it contains a body
Of thought and intuitions worth unravelling114
Every word, no matter how local or specialized its use,
is also universal, a part of the universal language;
again exclusion is loss.
We must now consider the themes and problems of this
whole poetic enterprise which have emerged from the
examination of specific passages.
First, the problem of exclusion. The poet in this
work is the servant of language and of man. He must
preserve and articulate or make available for the men
of his own time the whole body of human knowledge.
This entails inclusion, not only all the words but also
all the arrangements of words. It means that all sorts
of details which might seem irrelevant to the central
theme must be included, for they are part of the world.
To omit anything might be to forfeit the possibility of
man's redemptions:
There lie hidden in language elements that effectively combined
Can utterly change the nature of man115
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Everything goes in, especially contradictions. This may
explain MacDiarmid's repetitiveness and his excessive
use of unwieldy quotations. If words are used exactly
every different way of expressing an idea is a further
revelation of it. Similarly, to end or cut a quotation
is to exclude a consideration which its author thought
important and is to risk falsifying evidence. Such
scruples, awkward in poetry are familiar, indeed laud¬
able, in the historian. Another device which can puzzle
and infuriate is to provide all the material which seems,
even tangentially, to be related to the idea the poet is
striving to articulate, e.g. "The Snares of Varuna"
where a number of very different elements revolve around
certain implicit recurring themes and images such as
demonism, fishing and clarity. In this poem, after the
original bafflement, it seems to me that we do find the
different elements relating to each other and producing
a new meaning.
There are ways of avoiding the endless catalogue.
One, imposed by the poet's limitations, is to give a
bibliography directing the reader to sources of knowledge
which would otherwise have to be printed inside the poem.
Another, more creative and more dangerous, is synthesis.
When this occurs in In Memoriam James Joyce, we have the
passages which delight us and persuade us to continue
with the rest of the poem. One~example, already cited,
is the alteration of the Holderlin passage and the
following interpolation. Another might be the marrying
of Busoni's Sketch of a New Esthetic of Music116 with
01Rathaille's "Gile na Gile" which is almost the leit
motiv of MacDiarmid's Gaelic material:
And beauty - but there! Oh, Aodhagan 0'Rathaille meets again
The Brightness of Brightness in a lonely glen
And sees the hair that's plaited
Like the generations of men.117
Synthesis requires a confidence which despite
MacDiarmid's apparent arrogance is surprisingly rare in
his poetry. The fear that', he might be overlooking or
rejecting an essential element always counterbalances
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the desire for higher organization and more complex
life which is the only answer to chaos.
A poetry like pronouncing the Shemporesh
Unremitting, relentless
Organised to the last degree
(If I have evolved myself out of something
Like an amphioxis, it is clear
I have become better by the change,
I have risen in the organic scale,
I have become more organic118
This brings us to the view that art, and in parti¬
cular, poetry as the consummation of language and art,
is both the weapon and the proudest manifestation of
order and structure against disorder and chaos. Chaos
is at once the womb of matter out of which all struc¬
tures are reared and at the same time the tomb of obli¬
vion which engulfs whatever is forgotten, disorganized
or even static:
I may end here by saying that what the Scottish
people need above all today to realize is that
(in keeping with all that is really valuable
in their past) static adherence to any particular
methodology marks the decline of cs v(lization,
for the temporal character of the universe decrees
that the only alternative to advance is decay;
and the function of philosophy, as Professor
Whitehead says, is to uphold the zest of life by
the provision of novel goals of achievement;
stupefaction before any particular methodology
is that failure in adequacy which is the self-
negation of philosophy and the betrayal of the
future. The aim of philosophy is the under¬
standing of the interfusion of modes of existence.119
MacDiarmid does not always quote Whitehead with
such unqualified approval, but it must surely be in terms
of a philosophy of process, such as that of Whitehead,
that MacDiarmid's poetic enterprise is to be understood.
In his doctoral thesis,120 R.B. Watson has shown that
MacDiarmid's work may be placed in a philosophical frame¬
work of the tradition which developed from Hegel through
Whitehead, Croce and Bergson - the philosophers of pro¬
cess. He quotes Bosanquet's argument that such philo¬
sophies find room for complementary elements of realism
and idealism, and points out that these are all philosophers
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with systems, systems which are relevant to life and
culture, features which make them particularly attrac¬
tive to poets with universal aspirations, whether poli¬
tical or religious.
In a letter to Helen Burns Cruikshank, MacDiarmid
compares Mature Art, which seems to have been the proto¬
type for In Memoriam James Joyce, to Circumjack Cencrastus,
claiming that it deals with "essentially the same themes".
These themes he has already described as "The pursuit
of World Consciousness":
Our unique gift as human beings is the power
to think (the great function almost everybody
has all along evaded) and it is only by a
realization and acceptance of that that we can
give our love the necessary fullness and guidance.
In Russian religious thought (e.g. in Soloviev)
man's destiny is through his consciousness to
reconcile the lower orders of creation - animals,
plants, minerals to St. Sophia, the Wisdom of God,
who is the female hypostasis of the Deity.
My poem envisages that reconciliation (and insists
upon the part Scotland should, can and must play
in that great task) in purely intellectual, i.e.
in non-mystical and non-religious terms.121
This reconciliation is the lure which encourages the
poem and prevents its completion. The poet is an instru¬
ment through which a greater degree of world conscious¬
ness can be achieved. He serves the World Language,
the Logos, which in its temporal form is imperfectly
and partially realized, while in its eternal, primordial
and ultimate form is complete, unified,but unreal.
Every poem, every piece of knowledge implies the whole
of human culture; in the reality of the instant they are
simultaneous and the product of a unitary consciousness,
so that chronology of composition and individual author¬
ship become irrelevant. The poet is a servant rather
than a master of language and thus in the poem adopts
a priest-like role in relation to the ultimate, the Poem
of poems which is also the Great Music:
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All the knowledge is woven neatly
So that the plaited ends come to the hand.
Pull any of the tabs, and a sequence
Of practical information is drawn.
Each sound is the centre of endless circles,
And now the harmony opens out before you
Innumerable are its Voices, compared with which
The boom of the harp is a screeching,
The clash of a thousand trumpets a twitter 122
In this vision of the Great Music we are aware of
the interdependence and interaction of all events in
space and time. Poetry aspires towards the condition
of music, not through an abdication of sense, but a
transcendence whereby the realization or articulation
of all languages and vocabularies will bring about the
reunified and undifferentiated Word.
The poem attempts through its pursuit of language
to "circumjack" the principle of Life. If this total
work, the ultimate poem of world consciousness were
achieved it would resolve all the flaws or inadequacies
of individual writings. However, the poem can only be
real in its process; completion, while it is the lure
can never be achieved. The greater its achievements,
its syntheses, its projection for the world, the wider
is the gap between the poem and the totality of exis¬
tence.
The poet is the victim of the paradoxes he wields,
the extremes between which he weaves his poem. On the
one hand there is the delight in the variety of the world
as it is, and the realization that nothing else is; on
the other, there is the moral will, the urge to improve
what is wrong, to raise the world to a higher level of
existence. This conflict between what is and what ought
to be is one aspect of the central paradox of One and
Many which generates the process of the poem:
finding no intellectual solution
For this notorious conflict
Between the intellectual love of the universe as it
And the moral will that it should be other,
Concluding that perhaps the only solution
Lies in the faith, or the mystical perception,
That the welter of frustration in the parts
Is instrumental to some loftier perfection
In the universe as a whole.
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Ah! no, no! Intolerable end
To one who set out to be independent of faith
And of mystical perception.
It does not after all seem certain
That the peace I have found is entirely
Free from mystical elements. Have I found
No salvation but only Santayana again.123
Again we encounter MacDiarmid's disconcerting sense
of humour. David Daiches has written perceptively on
the comic force of the poet's work121* and certainly the
vis comica was one of the qualities MacDiarmid valued
most in Joyce, and it was a quality he discerned in his
own gold-mine, Jamieson's Etymological Dictionary.
Perhaps part of our difficulty with this poet is occa¬
sioned by a failure to realize just how funny he is,
to realize that it is possible to be both funny and
desperately serious, to be funny without being ironic.
The passage I have quoted is intrinsically funny; its
comedy is the comedy of human existence.
In Memorjam James Joyce is a poem dedicated to
language; words can create ideas and possibilities to
be realized in the physical world. Mentality, thought,
vision are valued above the actual but words are the
only bridge between them. Words are catalogued, juggled
and celebrated in all their variety in this poem, both
for themselves and for what they offer mankind. As the
words of the poem come before any things to which they
refer so the text of the poem comes before any author
or authors. Proprietary rights are insignificant in
comaprison with the interrelation of various sections
and passages of the poem on the actual text. In this
sense, the extended quotations could be considered as
"extended words" and so available for general use. If
something has been said in one way, that expression is
the "exact word" the poet must use if he chooses to
include that element of experience in his work. And,
as we have seen, by what may be called the "principle
of the immorality of exclusion" any experience perceived
must be reproduced, unless it can be synthesized into
a higher form of experience. The purpose of the poem
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is to be the spearhead of life, organization, complex
order; it is the vigilance and vision which increases
the consciousness and order, apart from which there is
nothing, the unknown, unconsciousness and chaos.
Although A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle may well
be, as a separate work and by conventional criteria,
a greater poem than In Memoriam James Joyce, neverthe¬
less the later poem must be seen as a natural development
and continuation of the earlier work. It does provide
new goals for poetry, set up new tasks of comprehension
and conception which have been too easily parcelled out
to religion and philosophy and so neutralized. For
MacDiarmid, poetry, the consummation of language, becomes
the keystone of knowledge. But the secret of this poetry
is unending dissatisfaction, the rejection of all solu¬
tions, all answers, including the rejection of "process"
itself, is regarded as an answer rather than a way.
In Memoriam James Joyce seems to me a representa¬
tive volume of a noble undertaking which can only be
compared with work by writers such as Joyce, and, whether
MacDiarmid likes it or not, with work by the younger
American poets such as Charles Olson and Robert Duncan.
In it we move from the concept of art which provides
access to reality, completely removed and other from life
and action. This was the art ideal of T.E. Hulme, Wyndham
Lewis and even Ezra Pound. Such an ideal involves selec¬
tion and exclusion and is therefore anti-democratic and
also irrational because although it seeks the imposition
of order, "ratio", it depends on intuition rather than
logic or rational discussion. If we do not accept Pound's
perception of order or his essentials we are condemned;
there is no possibility of dissent,any more than where
would be in a Fascist state. In MacDiarmid's work the
poem not only has access to the flux, it engages the
universe. Thus it remains open, capable of including
every point of view, every element of experience. In
turning to the poetry of process MacDiarmid forfeits
the possibility of completion, the finished work of art;
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but he gains the reintegration of art and life, poetry
and science or knowledge, enabling us to conceive of
a poetry which is the highest, most evolved form of
life, and as such the articulator and heightener of
human consciousness.
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So, when I looked up "spairge" to confirm its
meaning, I found it in the OED under "sparge"
from Latin "spargere" to sprinkle. By chance,
I discovered that the previous entry was
"sparganosis" with a possible variant of
"spargosis". I had carelessly assumed that
this word also came from "spargere" and was
either very unusual or a neologism intended to
convey the idea of a sky sprinkled with stars.
The juxtaposition of "spairged" and "sparganosis"
as well as a knowledge of the Latin root does
make this a legitimate secondary meaning. However,
the content of the phrase "aching spargosis of
stars" is vastly increased when we realize that
the night sky is being seen as the breasts of a
mother swollen with milk. Of course, this image
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FROM IMAGISM TO PROJECTIVE VERSE
Imagism was, as we have seen, the chief manifestation
of modernism in Anglo-American poetics in the early part
of this century. As such it was the parent of two diverging
but not altogether distinct tendencies in modern poetry.
The first line of development and the one which is the
major concern of this thesis may be traced from Imagism
through Objectivism to Projective Verse. This development,
we argue, is based on a philosophical position which is
monist, materialist and dynamic. It leads to an acknowledge¬
ment of the real existence of the world and an emphasis on
the accurate representation of images. It assumes the
fundamental unity of all fields of human endeavour and
denies the absolute division between art and science:
To think about poetry it is necessary to point out that
its aims and those of science are not opposed or mutually
exclusive; and that only the more complicated, if not
finer, tolerances of number, measure and weight that define
poetry make it seemimprecise as compared to science, to
quick readers of instruments. 1
Thus says Zufosky. Certainly, this vision of the poet as
scientist, as the accurate observer and recorder did exert
a beneficial influence on all the moderns. First Hulme
and then Pound promoted a surgical precision in writing
which was a much needed corrective of the excessive
subjectivism and flabby writing of the Georgians and their
contemporaries.
However, superficial similarities in the precepts
issued by Hulme and Pound disguise the genesis of a funda¬
mental difference. Pound's definition of the image and
the vortex was inter-actionist, the image and then the
poem being the product of the interaction between organism
and environment. Such a view is dynamic and monistic and
may be developed into a philosophy of organism and process.
This development is what will concern us when we follow
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the somewhat wayward path which leads from Imagism to Pound,
Williams, Objectivism, to Olson and Projective Verse and
finally, to Robert Duncan and Edward Dorn.
But the hard, high road of modernism, especially in
Britain, leads from Kulme and Eliot to Auden and the poet-
critics of the "New Criticism". Their poetics originate
from Hulme's assumptions which were avowedly classical,
dualist and are eventually religious. In the Bergsonian
tradition, this view emphasises subjective intuition as
the only true knowledge and understands art as the attempt
to create through the operation of "fancy" and craft some
image or analogy which will convey the intuition to others.
As we have already discovered (in Chapter Two) in discussing
Eliot's concept of the"objective correlative" there is no
guarantee of the connection of the artists intuition with
his image for it, with the words in which he represents
his image or with the image or emotion conjured up in his
reader by those words which he has chosen. Having stressed
so firmly the separation of physical and spiritual realms,
these poets have no assurance of the validity of their
poems as communications beyond the godness of God. If
God is accepted, then they can adopt something similar to
the neo-Thomist aesthetic of Jacques Maritain which we
have already discussed in relation to the work of David
Jones. Art becomes the search for valid signs, for presen¬
tations of images which will refer beyond themselves to
eternal truths. The intuition need not be wholly sub¬
jective but should contain some permanent reality which
may be abstracted and formalised in art. This emphasis
on form and abstraction was, as we have seen, touched on
by Hulme and developed by Wyndham Lewis though it has
probably been more directly important in the visual and
plastic arts than in poetry. Nevertheless in religious
poetry there is often a movement from appearances to
essences, from representation to contemplation. The
physical or visual image becomes either mere illustration
or symbolic of some universal truth beyond itself. 2
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From the classical, dualist standpoint the only
alternative to God is scepticism. If there is no God, we
have no justification for inferring from the poem any
authorial intention, or, conversely, in using evidence
of the author's intentions as in any way a key to the
poem. There is no logical reason for regarding the poem
as a communication. Further, though it may stir up our
emotions and incite us to action or, on the other hand,
reconcile our emotions and restrain us from action, there
is no logical reason why it should make us do anything at
all. Unlike the knowledge afforded by the supposedly
inferior practical intellect, poetic knowledge seems
singularly useless. When we come to discuss Charles Olson
we shall discover how much emphasis he placed on the notion
of "use". For him all activity was "useful" as it conserved
or communicated energy; activity which is not "useful"
dissipates energy and reduces order which in his philo¬
sophy of organism is a cardinal sin. Olson's position
depends on a unitary theory of knowledge. For the dualist,
as we have seen, poetic knowledge is separate; he comes
to regard the poem as autonomous, an end in itself, to be
considered and evaluated without reference to anything
beyond itself. This is the purely aesthetic approach and
seems ultimately sterile; certainly, by defending art as
separate from other intellectual activity it renders it as,
"for all practical purposes", expendable.
Attempts have been made to put poetry in the place of
religion. Thinkers from Arnold to Maritain and Hulme felt
that religion had been overthrown by scientific positivism
and determinism, but their attempts to replace it with
poetry as man's spiritual food have been unconvincing.
In his essay "Literature as Knowledge" Allen Tate condemns
Arnold's envisioned partnership between poet and scientist
where the scientist observes and describes the external
world while the poet provides emotion and feeling:
While Arnold's poet was extending the hand of fellowship
to the scientist, the scientist did not return the greet¬
ing; for never for an instant did he see himself as the
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inert and useful partner in an enterprise of which he could
not be permitted to define the entire scope. He was not,
alas, confined to the inertia of fact, his procedure was
dynamic all along, and it was animated by the confident
spirit of posivitism which has since captured the modern
world. 3
Tate however accepts the dichotomy proposed by Arnold
between the poet and the scientist and at the same time
perpetuates an oversimplified view of the scientist's own
philosophy. The very dynamism which Tate describes led
the scientist to realise the limitations of positivism
which depends on a strict separation of subject and object
and the possibility of unbiased objective observation. In
fields as far apart as physics and psychology scientists
have discovered the real effects of mind upon the external
world. Not only can mind act upon matter, it is impossible
to separate the influence of the observer from the behaviour
of the observed, even in the most clinical of scientific
experiments.
Thus the meaning of the word "nature" as an object of
scientific research slowly changed; it became a collective
concept for all those areas of experience into which man
can penetrate through science and technology, whether or
not they are given to him "naturally" in direct experience.
... The atomic physicist has had to come to terms with the
fact that his science is only a link in the endless chain
of discussions of man with nature, but that it cannot
simply talk of nature "as such". Natural science always
presupposes man, and we must become aware of the fact
that, as Bohr has expressed it, we are not only spectators
but also always participants on the stage of life. k
Tate condemns the early work of I.A. Richards as force¬
fully as he dismisses Matthew Arnold, but he comes no
closer to questioning their shared assumptions about the
role and activity of the scientist.
... even in The Principles of Literary Criticism Mr. Richards
was coming round to that view. Not that poetry would bring
back religion, or become a new religion. It would perform
the therapeutic offices of religion, the only part of it
worth keeping. In short, poetry would "order" our minds,
for although science was true, it had failed to bring
intellectual order - it had broken up the older order of
pseudo-statement, and although poetry was false, it would
order our minds, whatever this ordering might mean. 5
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Tate1s own solution which agrees with the later
work of Richards is hardly more satisfactory. He proposes
literature as a separate, independent, possibly superior
form of knowledge. Poetry, he argues:
is neither the world of verifiable science nor a projection
of ourselves; yet it is complete. And because it is
complete knowledge we may, I think, claim for it a unique
kind of responsibility, and see it at times an irrespon¬
sibility equally distinct. The order of completeness that
it achieves in the great works of the imagination is not
the order of experimental completeness aimed at by the
positivist sciences, whose responsibility is directed
towards the verification of limited techniques. The
completeness of science is an abstraction covering an
ideal of co-operation among specialised methods. No one
can have an experience of science, or of a single science.
For the completeness of Hamlet is not of the experimental
order ...
One cannot but feel that Tate is constructing straw men
to knock over, his understanding of science seems so far
from the contemporary scientist's own view of himself.
Surely it would be more correct to oppose "literature, or
a single literature" to "science, or a single science",
or a particular scientific problem, theory or hypothesis
to Haialet or any other single work of art. Moreover, the
complete knowledge of which he speaks would seem to be
achieved only by emptying the poem of all content and
therefore, presumably, of all meaning. He continues:
We must return to, we must never leave, the poem itself.
Its "interest" value is a cognitive one; it is sufficient
that here in the poem, we get knowledge of a whole object.
If rational enquiry is the only mode of criticism, we must
yet remember that the way we employ that mode must always
powerfully affect our experience of the poem. I have been
concerned in this commentary with the compulsive, almost
obsessed, application of an all-engrossing principle of
pragmatic reduction to a formed realm of our experience,
the distinction of which is its complete knowledge, the
full body of the experience that it offers us. However,
we may see the completeness of poetry, it is a problem
less to be solved than, in its full import, to be preserved.
Such a passage illustrates clearly the frustration of
this position. Poetry is complete knowledge, but can only
be apprehended intuitively; criticism is a mode of rational
enquiry but cannot, it seems, really reach the poem. The
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New Critics themselves demonstrate the contradictions of
this approach. They persist in rational enquiry and their
best work illuminates and enhances the poetry it treats.
Literary criticism, at its best, is a way of sharing
the poem, a communication between reader and reader and
between readers and the poem. The position which New
Criticism and the literary academy allowed itself to be
forced into has proved a dead end for creative art and
therefore for criticism. The critic is reduced to endless
repetitions of the same theoretical dogma - poetry is
neither science nor religion but something else, a some¬
thing else which cannot be rationally apprehended but
which the critic must nevertheless approach in a spirit
of rational enquiry, attempting to analyse the unanalys¬
able. Allen Tate, for instance, declares "Let us not
argue about it. It is here for those who have eyes to
see",7 yet writes article after article reiterating his
arguments. The poet's task becomes equally sterile. He
may strive to his utmost to create a supreme construct
of words, finely organised, ordered, intensive, which will
be a form of complete knowledge; yet his theory will tell
him that the knowledge is only of itself, that there is no
need for it to refer to anything beyond itself but that
if it does attempt external reference, there is no reason
to hope for success since there is no necessary link between
word and object nor between object and the supposedly
correlated intuition. He may conclude by finding himself
imprisoned in his solipsistic universe sending poems
purged of all misleading external reference into the void.
And what can he hope for? At best, that some alien intelli¬
gence will encounter it with awed incomprehension. Few
poets have written for long in this rarefied vein; those
who have appeal to a limited readership. It is interest¬
ing that so many of those approved by the academy, Lowell,
Berryman, Tate and, of course Eliot, should be, in the
end, religious or God-acknowledging poets. The last tv/o,
who became major theoretical writers, had to have a subject
-255-
matter beyond poetry itself. Perhaps it was one of
T.E. Hulme's most important insights to identify the
classical with the religious stance.
Wallace Stevens has been one of the few poets to
remain consistent in his struggles with the problems of
materialist scepticism. His work plays on the gulf between
life and art, between perception and representation, the
ambiguities of facts and fictions. He is a master of
language, of verbal elaboration, of rhyth .mical felicity;
but his poetry is about poetry, its theme is itself and
this, finally, has seemed to some readers sterile, even
trivialising:
Stevens is a profound misleader simply that he is in a
deeply important area (what I have yet no better word for
than ornamentation , . > s(sic)
Stevens, like Hulme, seems to see poetry as an escape
from flux:
They will get it straight one day at the Sorbonne.
We shall return at twilight from the lecture
Pleased that the irrational is rational,
Until flicked by feeling, in a gildered street,
I call you by name, my green, my fluent rnundo.
You will have stopped revolving except in crystal. 9
The ironic undertones in these lines reveal Stevens's
reservations about the ultimate value of such a goal, the
reduction of the vivid world to a formal stillness.
Charles Olson approached the problem from the other
direction; he sought to be:
caught up and going at the speed (and) at the depth of both
the knowledge of the reality we now possess, and thus the
speed and depth of reality itself, especially as that
reality is bh■ inside any one of us. 10
Olson, as the most forceful spokesman of the "post-
moderns" , developed a position contrary to that of the
academics. He wanted a poetry which would be open, kinetic,
faithful to the universe of process and flux of which it
was a part. By thus eschewing separation and completeness,
he placed himself alongside the scientists in pursuit of
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a unitary and developing knowledge. 11 Olson's theory
owes much of its philosophical substance to Alfred North
Whitehead, a debt which will be discussed later in this
chapter. However, historically, his ideas trace back
through Williams, the Objectivists, to Pound and Pound's
version of Imagism.
The influence of Pound.
We recall that Pound himself was largely responsible
for the formulae of the Imagist Manifesto including "Direct
treatment of the thing whether subject or object". Although
we have seen that this declaration is unsatisfactory if
considered at any philosophical level, in practice it
resulted in a concentration on the external, on the physical
object, an eschewal of subjectivity and of vague emotionalism.
Pound championed this development; his advocacy of exact
observation and accurate presentation may be seen as an
attempt to meet and indeed best the scientist on his own
ground. His criticism affects a bluff, no-nonsense tone,
a positivist style; it is remarkable how often he cites
the scientific method as the proper, thorough way of doing
things.
Bad art is inaccurate art. It is art that makes false
reports. If a scientist falsifies a report either deli¬
berately or through negligence we consider him as either
a criminal or a bad scientist according to the enormity of
his offence, and he is punished or despised accordingly. 11
However, Pound himself was far from believing that
art was objective. For him, the image was "that which
presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an
instant of time"; he eschewed impressionism in favour of
the intensive art of vorticism:
The logical end of impressionist art is the cinematograph.
The state of mind of the impressionist tends to become
cinematographical. Or, to put it another way, the cinema¬
tograph does away with the need of a lot of impressionist
art.
There are two opposed ways of thinking of a man; firstly,
you may think of him as that towards perception moves,
as the toy of circumstances, as the plastic substance
receiving impressions; secondly, you may think of them
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as directing a certain fluid force against circumstances,
as conceiving instead of merely reflecting and observing.12
This is a rejection not only of impressionism but of
determinist philosophy and positivist psychology where
"mind" is reduced to observable responses. However, unlike
the New Critics, Pound does not abhor science. Instead, he
recognises different fields of science or knowledge, among
which art has its place:
The arts, literature, poesy are a science, just as chemistry
is a science. Their subject is man, mankind and the indi¬
vidual. 13
Pound differed from Hulme in that he did not accept
the absolute division between life and art, where life is
a messy flux while art is permanent, ordered but removed
from actuality. Rather, he believed in "a sort of permanent
metaphor", in symbolism in its profounder sense":
It is not necessarily a belief in a permanent world: but
it is a belief in that direction.
Imagism is not symbolism. The symbolists dealt in 'associa¬
tion', that is, in a sort of allusion, almost of allegory.
They degraded the symbol to the status of a word. They
made it a form of met onomy. One can be grossly 'symbolic',
for example, by using the term 'cross' to mean 'trial'.
The symbolists' symbols have a fixed value, like numbers
in arithmetic, like 1, 2 and 7. The Imagists' images have
a variable influence, like the signs a, b, and x in algebra.14
He believed in real links between subjective intuition,
language and the material world. He believed in poetry as
an effective force:
It appears to me quite tenable that the function of litera¬
ture as a generated prize-worthy force is precisely that
it does incite humanity to continue living, that it eases
the mind of strain, and feeds it, I mean definitely as
nutrition of impulse. 15
The point of Imagism is that it does not use 'images' as
ornaments. The image is itself the speech. The image is
the word beyond formulated language.
I once saw a small child go to an electric light switch
and say 'Mama, can I open the light?' She was using the
age-old language of exploration, the language of art. 16
Poetry extends knowledge by articulating experience,
experience which is continuously changing, continuously
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novel. By discovering words which will be adequate to
fresh experience, literature increases truth and thus has
a moral as well as an epistemological function. Moreover,
by articulating our experience, art leaves us open to the
new, brings us up to the present. So that when Pound
describes artists as "the antennae of the race", he is
anticipating Charles Olson's demand that we be "equal to
the real itself" and his proposition of the poet-historian
who has to know:
By history I mean to know, to really know. The rhyme is
still "mystery". We can't stand it. Nothing must be left
undone. We have to run up against the wall. 17
The responsibility of the poet towards his universe,
the urge to articulation and the relief which it brings
may be discovered in Maximus VI:
The land was relieved. I had drawn my length all this Way
^•rvi Wad- cov/eftd tWis p\aoe. too-
But we know that respite is only temporary, the matter
of an instant for the wall recedes again and the poet's
task recommences.
We may doubt whether Pound has the same sympathy or
respect for the natural world as Olson, for despite the
tenderness which appears in The Pisan Cantos, he retained
a spiritual arrogance which made him more at home in high
art than among the rocks and fossils of palaeolithic times
which meant so much to Olson. However, the critical
writings place Pound firmly in the humanist, even romantic
camp and at the same time in the mainstream American
tradition of Emerson and Whitman. The humanist believes
that man can be redeemed through language, while the
classicist sees language as more and more hopelessly
contaminated. The former is expansive, seeking to extend
poetry and living; the latter, in his attempt to find
purity, contracts towards silence. Pound believed that
poets purify and extend language, that through poetic
dedication language could be improved, indeed had improved:
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I believe language has improved; that Latin is better than
Greek and French better than Latin for everything save
certain melodic effects. 19
Such optimism allows, in fact requires, that poetry
continue to be written and assefts its supreme social, moral
and political importance. It is an attitude naturally
conducive to innovatory poetry, poetry with a social or
political content and thus attractive to poets who see
their role as one of active involvement rather an powerless
detachment or aesthetic inutility.
Objectivism.
This humanistic strand in Imagist thinking which we
have credited to Pound fused with the progressive and anti-
academic tradition in American writing and emerged in the
work of the Objectivists. This group included Louis Zukof-
sky, William Carlos Williams, Charles Rezhikoff, Carl Rakosi,
George Oppen and Basil Bunting. Except for the last, they
were Americans and their ideas stemmed in part from Imagism,
but also from specifically American developments in the
theory of art, particularly in relation to painting and
photography. William Carlos Williams in his Autobiography
describes the Objectivist programme as a corrective to
Imagism which had fallen into decadence in the twenties
and thirties:
The Objectivist theory was this: we had had "Imagism"
(Amygism, as Pound had called it), which ran quickly out.
That, though it had been useful in ridding the field of
verbiage, had no formal necessity implicit in it. It had
already dribbled off into so-called "free verse", which,
as we saw, was a misnomer. There is no such thing as "free
verse". Verse is a measure of some sort. "Free verse"
was without measure and needed none for its projected
objectifications. Thus the poem had run down and become
formally non-extant.
But, we argued, the poem, like every other form of art, is
an object, an object that in itself formally presents its
case and its meaning by the very form it assumes. There¬
fore, being an object, it should be so treated and controlled -
but not as in the past.
The poem being an object (like a symphony or a cubist
paining) it must be the purpose of the poet to make of
his words a new form: to invent, that is, an object
consonant with his day. This was what we wished to imply
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by Objectivism, an antidote, in a sense, to the bare image
haphazardly presented in loose verse. 20
Other statements by Objectivists show the importance
of Imagism as a point of reference and of departure.
Rakosi said in an interview with L.S. Dembo:
... One way to see it is to see what it is not - how
objectivism differs from imagism or symbolism, for example.
You might think for a moment that, after all, objectivism
is a form of imagism or naturalism. But Imagism as I
recall ... was a reaction to the period immediately pre¬
ceding, against literary affectations. So the imagists
set out to do what the French impressionists in painting
did, go out into the open and look, see what you see, and
put it down without affectation of the then dominant
literary influences. And that's as much as they did, but
it wasn't complete. It was only the first step in a poetic
process. That's why imagism is not altogether satisfying;
the person of the poet is not sufficiently present.
Now symbolism, of course, is more in contrast with
objectivism. It seems to me that the subject of symbolism
is a poetic state of feeling and its aim is to reproduce
it. It didn't really matter much what you started with -
whether it was a flower or the moon. All the poet was
concerned with was his own feeling. And for that subject,
symbolism is suitable, but it's a very narrow subject. 21
Rakosi's memory does less than justice to imagism at
least as developed by Pound, since this demand for the
presence of the person is surely another way of describing
the attempt to "record the precise instant when a thing
outward and objective transforms itself, or darts into a
thing inward and subjective".22
There are some grounds for suspecting the authenticity
of Objectivism as a movement. All the poets testify that
"Objectivist" was a title invented primarily to satisfy
Harriet Monro^ for whom Louis Zukofsky edited the February
1931 edition of Poetry. Zukofsky himself rejects the
term "objectivism" and has always been scrupulous to
retain the quotation marks round "Objectivist"; he even
denies that any reference to Whitehead was implied, although
as Mike Weaver has pointed out in William Carlos Williams:
the American Background:
He now states that he (Zukofsky) had not read Whitehead
at that time although he omits to mention that "Williams
with whom he was then corresponding on poetic matters,
had. 23
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However, while the name may be as ill-defined and
nebulous as the membership of the group, it does reflect
a common sympathy and shared aims extending beyond the
desire of impoverished and unpublished poets to see them¬
selves in print. Perhaps George Oppen, a considerable
poet and an uncompromising intellect, has offered the
clearest interpretation:
What I felt I was doing was beginning from Imagism as a
position of honesty. The first question at that time in
poetry was simply the question of honesty, of sincerity.
But I learned from Louis, as against the romaticism or
even the quaintness of the imagist position, the necessity
for forming a poem properly, for achieving form. That's
what "objectivist" really means. There's been tremendous
misunderstanding about that. People assume it means the
psychologically objective in attitude. It actually means
the objectification of the poem. 24
This insistence on the autonomy of the poem, not
dissimilar from the views of the New Critics, was re-echoed
by Williams's observation, "A poem is a small (or large)
machine made out of words" 25 and by Zukofsky, who preceded
Oppen in linking objectification and sincerity:
In sincerity shapes appear concomitants of word combinations,
precursors of (if there is continuance) completed sound or
structure, melody or form. Writing occurs which is the
detail, not mirage, of seeing, of thinking, with the things
as they exist, and of directing them along a line of melody.
Shapes suggest themselves, and the mind senses and receives
awareness. Parallels sought for in the other arts recall
the perfect line of occasional drawing, the clear beginn¬
ings of sculpture not proceeded with. Presented with
sincerity, the mind even tends to supply in further suggest¬
ion, which does not attain rested totality, the totality
not always found in sincerity and necessary only for
perfect rest, complete appreciation. This rested totality
may be called objectification - the apprehension satisfied
completely as to the appearance of the art form as an
object.2 5
The primary meaning of objectivism may indeed have
been the recognition of the poem as object or structure in
its own right, but this carried with it attitudes which
might be called objective in the more usual sense. To
regard the poem as an object alongside other objects in
the world implies a belief in the real existence of the
world and of things in it. This is George Oppen's faith:
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that the nouns do refer to something; that it's there,
that it's true, the whole implication of these nouns;
that appearances represent reality, whether or not they
misrepresent it: that this in which the thing takes place,
this thing is here, and that these things do take place. 26
Such a faith allows for Pound's "absolute symbolism",
where words refer to existing things and meaning lies in
the world. So for Williams and so for Zukofsky, poetry
is thinking with things as they exist:
Say it, No ideas but in things. Mr.
Paterson has gone away
to rest and write. Inside the bus one sees
his thoughts sitting and standing. His thov^Kis
alight and scatter. 27
The consequence of the belief in objective existences
including human existence is a respect for the world, a
desire to treat the other objects among which one finds
oneself scrupulously and sincerely:
It is still a principle with me, of more than poetry, to
notice, to state, to lay down the substantive for its own
sake. 2 8
This approach to poetry though derived in part from
imagism, was strongly influenced and reinforced by contem¬
porary advances in painting and photography which was where,
in the twenties and thirties (and, perhaps, in film and the
cinema) the real developments in American art were taking
place. This influence and in particular the importance of
Alfred Steiglitz and his circle is described by Bram Dit kstra
in his book Cubism, Steiglitz and the Early Poetry of
William Carlos Williams (Princeton, 1978). Although he
underplays, in my view, the importance of imagism and
especially of Pound, he makes it abundantly clear that the
photography of Steiglitz and the pictures of Sheeler and
Dernuth on the one hand and Cubist theory on the other, were
of considerable importance for the 'Objectivist' poets and
for Williams in particular. Zukofsky's manifesto reveals
the photographic influence:
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An Objective. (Optics). The lens bringing the rays from
an object to a focus. (Military use) - That which is
aimed at. (Use extended to poetry) - Desire for which is
objectively perfect, inextricably the direction of historic
and contemporary particulars. 29
This passage assumes the real existence, not only of
that which is seen, and of the image, but also of the
aiming intelligence. In fact, the image occurs, physically,
as the intersection of the aiming force with the force of
that which is aimed at. The impact of such forces must be
considerable and we can anticipate Olson's theory of the
poem as a "high energy construct". But what we should
note as a distinguishing feature of the "Objectivists"
which separates them from the tradition of Eliot is their
denial of the objective correlative:
Crude symbolism is to associate emotions with natural
phenomena. Such work is empty. It is very typical of
almost all that is done by the writers who fill the pages
every month of such a paper as. (sic) Everything that I
have done in the past ... except those parts which may be
called excellent - by change, have that quality about them.
It is typified by the use of the word "like" of that
"evocation" of the "image" which served us for a time.
Its abuse is apparent. The insignificant "image" may be
"evoked" never so ably and still mean nothing. The work
will be in the realm of the imagination as plain as the
sky is to the fisherman - A very clouded sentence. The
word must be put down for itself, not as a symbol of
nature, but a part, cognisant of the whole - aware -
civilised. 30
Stf^glitz's aims in photography, as described by
D ij.kstra, are particularly pertinent to this view:
Steiglitz realised through the achievement of these photo¬
graphs, and through his continuing and ever more precise
observation of the objects of concrete reality, that he
could express his most intense and therefore most inarti¬
culate emotions accurately in terms of the materials of
life. In the lines and textures and shapes of things he
found the creative qualities which, if selected and
recorded carefully and precisely, would make the resultant
photograph expressive of his feelings. But this was not
a process detrimental to the reality of the object so used.
The object did not become a means to an end. It remained
autonomous; the photographer by focussing on the object
in his special way clarified certain of its hitherto
unrecognised but nonetheless inherent qualities, which
when understood, would enhance the object's independent
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significance. Thus the artist could do justice to the
object without forcing it to function as a metaphor for
something else. The photographer must therefore begin by
seeing all things with a perfect precision, perfect
penetration. If he does so, and he is closely attuned to
the elements of his own subjective experience, he will be
able to recognise in certain natural objects around him
elements not hitherto discovered but nevertheless present
in them, manifested through their shapes, lines and volumes,
which constitute not only equivalances to his original
emotions, but are, indeed, factors of the material origins
of those emotions. Hence the objects of nature are recog¬
nised to be the sources of our spiritual constitution; the
continent of our non-rational being as much as of our
intellectual existence is shown to be determined by the
contents of the physical world. Spirit, in other words,
derives from matter. The photographer, seeing accurately,
discovers in what elements of matter spirit has its origins,
and in his photograph, which represents the moment of his
discovery, he records the encounter, making his discovery
permanently accessible to everyone who is willing to meet
the object recorded on its own terms. In this sense the
photographer's record is intended to invoke in the observer
a kind of Platonic recognition. But in Plato the objects
of the natural world are merely shadows of absolutes, a
means to an end. For Stieglitz, the objects of nature
are the absolutes from which all is derived. 31
This passage indicates a number of ideas which appealed
to Williams in particular, the most "painterly" of all the
Objectivists. The views of Stieglitz provided for a uni¬
tary, organic and evolutionary universe compatible with
Whitehead's cosmology. Thus, not only did they provide
support for the Objectivists, but were, in some part, a
foundation for the theories of Charles Olson. Several
points should be noted. First, the demands for accuracy
and direct treatment set out by the Imagists were re-echoed
in the theories of the "straight" photographers:
The word "straight" as used by the photographers of Stieg¬
litz 's day was described as an absence of manipulation in
the printing process. The print was a straight one in
that it was taken direct without enlargement, local
shading, or retouching, from a negative which was equally
free from human interference. The intention was to rid
the photographic medium of painterly techniques. But
the moral fervour which accompanied this devotion to
the inherent capacities of the machine camera to render
precisely what has been visualised by the operator, later
invested 'stright' with a meaning which suggested a complete
aesthetic; moral vision and technical honesty were insepar¬
able in Stieglitz's view. The reality of life, as well as
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of God, implied an unswerving confrontation with the facts.
Thus the weight of "straight" lay not only on the printing
process, the post-visualised phase, but also on the pre-
visualising phase before the negative was made. Permitting
only a mechanical process as intermediary, the straight
print was a direct transcription of the image perceived
by the photographer.32
Thus "objectivism" in the first sense of regarding
the work of art as an object among other objects entailed
"objectivism" in the more everyday sense of accurate obser¬
vation and the supression of distorting personal emotion
or subjectivity. It was not, of course, a question of
supressing the subject completely or of attempting to deny
his inevitable bias, the selectivity of individual percep¬
tion. Rather it was an attempt of the artist to stand
outside himself and record the intersection of subject
and object in the image of the poem, photograph or painting.
The Objectivists, like the photographers associated
with Stieglitz, found confirmation for their ideas in the
work of the Cubists. When mind, physical world and the work
of the imagination are all recognised to have objective
reality in a common world, that which is common can be
identified as form; the work of art becomes the attempt
to isolate and identify that form. This process is the
reverse of generalisation or classification since it is
by the close observation of the particular that form is
discovered.
Flowers by the Sea.
When over the flowery, sharp pastures
edge, unseen, the salt ocean
lifts its form - chicory and daisies
tied, released, seem hardly flowers alone
but colour and the movement - or the shape
perhaps - of restlessness, whereas
the sea is circled and sways
peacefully upon its plantlike stem 3 3
In this poem it is by close observation of the
physical particulars that form to which the mind responds
is abstracted and presented in words. E ij kstra points
out that this poem is very close to the watercolours of
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John Marin and may indeed be taken from a painting rather
than life. Basing poems on pictures was a writing practice
continued by Williams throughout his career, right up to
Pictures From' Breughel, his last book; there is no
deception involved for which the poet pursues is the
shared recognition of form which can be transferred from
the physical world to the painting to the poem. In the
work of the Cubists and some of the expressionists the
pursuit of form might lead to a non-naturalistic art where
relation of planes and lines are stressed or where different
aspects of the image may be presented simultaneously in
order to achieve a fuller knowledge of it than in any
single moment of perception. However, there is no conflict
between naturalism and the pursuit of form if it is realised
that any representation of the physical object is a formal
representation and that its accuracy depends not on a
slavish inclusiveness of detail but on the accurate appli¬
cation of the artistic medium, in poetry, on the precise
choice and placing of words. In Spring and All, Williams
stresses again and again that form and design are functions
of the imagination. 34 Like Demuth and Stieglitz he
believed it the artist's business to see, to perceive the
instant in all its novelty and freshness, and to capture
or record the unique form of that perception which is the
product of his shaping imagination. So the poet's duty is
twofold; he must have schooled himself to perceive, to be
adequate to the novelty of the instant of experience and
he must have the technique to transcribe his image into
words. This art is not parasitic on the world but contri¬
butes to it; it is man's role in nature. "When we name it
life exists ..."; "The only means he has to give value
to life is to recognise it with the imagination and name
it". 35 The imagination affirms reality but at the same
time by the creation of new forms extends it:
Imagination is not to avoid reality, nor is it description
nor an evocation of objects or situations, it is to say
that poetry does not tamper with the world but moves
it ... 36
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The imagination liberates the mind from preconceptions
and the stale images of previous art, thus preparing man
for the novelty of reality itself, reality which can only
be the experience of the interaction of mind and nature:
Sometimes I speak of imagination as a force, an electricity
or a medium, a place. It is immaterial which: for whether
it is the condition of a place or a dynamisation its effect
is the same: to free the world of fact from the impositions
of "art" ... and to liberate the man to act in whatever
direction his disposition leads.
The word is not liberated, therefore able to communicate
release from the fixities which destroy it until it is
accurately tuned to the fact which giving it reality, by
its own reality establishes its own freedom from the
necessity of a word, thus freeing it and dynamising it
at the same time ... 37
The reference of the pronouns in this last sentence
is ambiguous but the implication seems to be that it is
through the accurate use of language, the precise "fit"
of word to fact that both art and nature can proceed into
novelty. The final poem of Spring and All is presumably

















Here we have an illustration of the theory of no ideas
but in things, the presentation of an argument, or the
development of meaning from clearly observed particulars.
The poet presents us with the first flower in the detail
and richness of its colour which he contrasts with the
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more common daisy, here perceived as lacking interest or
attraction and therefore barely named, the sole specifica¬
tion being its whiteness, the colour of generality and
lack. The poverty of whiteness extends over the next two
sections and the connotations stretch into sexual, social
and racial areas; colour and life are opposed to generality
and abstraction in the perhaps too easy image of white male
envy of dark female sexuality. We may feel that the last
two sections are not entirely successful because, after all,
they generalise, they give us a poet's notion instead of
the observed particulars speaking for themselves. However,
the poem plays aurally on the "r" sound, strong in the
first section, vanishing in the second, rolling to a climax
in the last part before being swallowed in the final "dark".
This musical effect may account for the felt power of the
poem which certainly cannot be explained at the semantic
level. We might say that by this means the poet is enabled
to renew language; by using sound he can restore old,
hackneyed images or cliches. But as an answer this evades
a real problem, a difficulty which renders the dualist
approach all the more attractive. By positing that there
are two kinds of knowing, the dualist may analyse logically
the semantic content of a piece of language while denying
or relegating its aural effect. It is these non-rational
qualities characteristic of poetry and also of demagogic
rhetoric which are dangerous, since they can move us to
conclusions which we would not arrive at analytically. If,
with the monist, we hold that all knowledge is of a piece
and that our emotional and intellectual faculties cannot
so easily be divorced, we are forced to acknowledge our
own irrationalism. This may be distasteful to some, but
it is surely the more honest, indeed the saner approach,
for it is only by knowing what we are, in all our complexity,
that we can hope to control what we do. Returning to this
poem, we may note our tendency to associate intellectual
rigour with the visual image, for it is as Williams retreats
from the particularities of the eye to concentrate on those
of the ear that we lose confidence in the relation between
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the language and that to which it refers. Nevertheless
the poem retains the degree of truth conferred by its
power and its existence as an object in its own right.
Moreover, whatever we may think of the poem, we may
observe that in this and many of the other pieces in
Spring and All Williams has solved the problem of stasis,
the fixed image which would exactly capture or crystallise
a moment but which by virtue of its fixity was totally
self-contained, sealed from development or life. In
Williams's poems
The imagination goes from one thing to another. Given
many things of nearly totally divergent natures but
possessing one-thousandth part of a quality in common,
provided that be new, distinguished, these things belong
in an imaginative category not in a gross natural array.38
This argument might be a defence, though hardly a
sufficient one, for the poem just discussed. It anticipates
Olson's proclamation that "one perception leads immediately
to another perception". Williams may occasionally restrict
himself to the "still life" proper, as in "The Disputants":
Upon the table in their bowl
in violent disarray
of yellow sprays, green spikes
of leaves, red-printed petals
and curled heads of blue
and white among the litter
of the forks and crumbs and plates
the flowers remain composed.
Cooly their allegory continues
above the coffee and loud talk
grown frail as vaudeville 39
but more often his imagination goes from one thing to
another, taking us to a different point from where we
started. George Oppen faced the same challenge in his
Discrete Series:
My book of course was called Discrete Series. That's a
phrase in mathematics. A pure mathematical series would
be one in which each term is derived from the preceding
term by a rule. A discrete series is a series of terms
each of which is empirically derived, each one of which
is empirically true. And this is the reason for the
fragmentary character of those poems. I was attempting
to construct a meaning by empirical statements, by imagist
statements. 90
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In Discrete Series, Oppen attempts by a perspectivist,
almost Cubist technique to present moments of intersection:
of different worlds "The cannon of that day/In our parks",
"The cars pass/By the elevated posts/And the movie sign/A
man sells postcards"; of human and non-human, "It is you/
who truly excel the vegetable"; of artifact and nature
Closed car - closed in glass -
At the curb,
Unapplied and empty
A thing among others
Over which clouds pass and the
alteration of lightning.
Even in the most personal category of the intersection
of self and other, the poet attempts to move the centre
from himself to the poem, co the objective centre of the
moment of meeting:
Who comes is occupied
Towards the chest (in the crowd moving
opposite
Grasp of me) 41
Oppen's attempt to eschew interpretation but to let
the image speak for itself nevertheless allows for the
emergence of recurrent themes and forms. By supressing
his own personality and pointing to "empirical truths",
albeit selected by him, it appears that the poet's pre¬
occupations match with themes or forms in the actual world.
Form becomes a matter of objective fact whether it derives
from mind, the world or the intersection of mind and world.
Oppen's abnegation of the structuring "I", his desire
to free the objects of the poem for their own development,
suggested possibilities for the long poem. But Discrete
Series is not a long poem, or at least not in the epic
sense of the poems we are chiefly concerned with; it is
rather a series of meditations using techniques developed
by the Imagists and Objectivists in poetry, by Cubists and
post-expressionists in art. Oppen's very rigour and
sincerity preclude him from the epic poem; most of his
poetry is mediated personal experience. In his later work,
for instance the long poem Route, he does tackle the public
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matter of our times but actually returns to the voice of
the first person as the organising form.
Williams and Olson
William Carlos Williams did rise to the lure of epic,
the public "long poem"; "I had known always that I wanted
to write a long poem". h2 However, his description of how
he set about it has a curiously old-fashioned ring. "The
idea was a metaphysical conception: how to get that into a
form probably came gradually".1*3 In his Autobiography, in
a passage which is quoted in the foreword to Paterson,
Williams adheres more closely to the doctrine,
no ideas but in things. The poet thinks with his poem,
in that lies his thought and that in itself is the
profundity. The thought is Paterson, to be discovered
there ...
I took the city as my "case" to work up, really to work
it up. It called for poetry such as I did not know, it
was my duty to discover or make such a context in the
"■thought" . To make a poem, fulfilling the requirements
of the art, and yet new, in the sense that in the very
lay of Paterson as Paterson would be discovered, perfect,
perfect in the special sense of the poem, to have it -
if it rose to flutter into life awhile - it would be as
itself, locally, and so like every other place in the
world. For it is in that, as it is particular to its
own idiom that it lives. "*4
The difficulty with Paterson is that while in its
parts it remains faithful to the notion that particulars
rigorously observed and recorded will themselves reveal
structure and form, its total shape is imposed according
to the preconceptions of the author and is based on an
explicit symbolic proposition:
A man like a city and a woman like a flower
- who are in love. Two women. Three women.
Innumerable women, each like a flower.
But
only one man - like a city. **5
This statement carries the advantages of honesty.
It is anti-poetic in that art does not attempt to conceal
art and we are given no licence to indulge in academic
games of spotting the allegory. However, the fact that
we find ourselves using terms like allegory, the presence
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of four "likes" in this passage, introducing similies or
analogies suggest the operation of fancy in the manner of
Hulme. The need to construct or state the analogy implies
a doubt in its universal validity. Instead of relying on
a matching of form between mind and the external world, or
rather the emergence of form from the meeting of mind and
world, Williams loses confidence in his own mind as represen¬
tative and seeks to impose a personal form on his experience.
The phrase "worked up" as used by Williams is instructive,
for it conveys the feeling of Paterson as being, overall,
laborious and contrived. In saying this, we must recognise
the energy and flow of many passages in Paterson. In fact,
it is curious how the deliberation in the total plan
contradicts . a the message of certain of the parts in
the poem itself:
There is no direction. Whither? I
cannot say. I cannot say
more than how. 1,6
It may be that this question can be resolved biographically.
Williams cherished even from his Keatsian days the ambition
to write a long poem and had long been familiar with the
tradition of poems on the Passaic River. Moreover, his
innovations in poetry generally were germinated from a seed
impla-ntdi by someone else. His initiation into modernism
was at the hands of Ezra Pound; his theory as an Objective
was derived very largely from Stieglitz and his circle. It
may be that his recognition of what he was doing in Paterson
and his later work sprang at least in part from a reading
of Olson's Projective Verse to which he paid the very great
tribute of including almost all of it in his Autobiography.
Certainly, it seems from his introductory note to Part V
that he started off with one conception of the long poem
and finished with another:
I have come to understand not only that many changes have
occurred in me and the world, but I have been forced to
recognise that there can be no end to such a story as I
have envisioned with the terms which I had laid down for
myself 4 7
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Wallace Stevens has written of V/i lliams;
Williams writes, I think, in order to write. He needs to
write. What is the nature of this need? What does a man
do when he delineates the images of reality? Obviously,
che need is a general need and the activity a general
activity. It is of our nature that we proceed from the
chromatic to the clear, from the unknown to the known.
Accordingly, the writer who practices in order to make
perfect is really practising to get at his subject, and,
in that exercise, is participating in a universal activity.
He is obeying his nature. Imagism (as one of Williams's
many involvements, however long ago) is not superficial.
It obeys an instinct. Moreover, imagism is an ancient
phase of poetry. It is something permanent. Williams is
a writer to whom writing is the grinding of a glass, the
polishing of a lens by means of which he hopes to be able
to see clearly. His delineations are trials. They are
rubbings of reality. 48
Here Stevens has recognised what was to appeal to
contemporary and later writers; the practice of poetry as
a means to knowledge. This description accords with what
is best in William's writing; the need to remain open, the
need to stay abreast with reality. This is the urge to poetry
and art as the unstoppable and necessary human manifestation
of the "creative urge of the world", the recognition that
man can only discover or pattern the world as he stays
alive to its changes.
We have already seen how Williams's receptivity was
illustrated by his acknowledgement of Projective Verse.
Olson reciprocated this respect: Williams's poetry and his
prose work, In the American Grain, were among the sacred
books at Black Mountain College during Olson's rectorship;
"no ideas but in things" and "so much depends/on a red
wheelbarrow" were slogans and shibboleths for this followers,
a new generation of counter-establishment poets. However,
Olson was critical of Williams. He was an example whose
usefulness extended only so far:
his primary contrast, for our purposes is, BILL
his Pat is exact opposite of Ez's, that is Bill HAS
an emotional system which is capable of extfee-
.'Siorh comprehensions the ego-system (the Old
Deal, Ez as Cento Man, here dates) is not. Yet
by making his substance historical of one city, (the
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Joyce deal), Bill completely licks himself, lets
time roll hi^ i^y-cW as Ez does not, and thus, so
far as what is important, methodology
contributes nothing, in fact delays, deters and
hampers, oy not having busted through the very
problem which Ez has so brilliantly fdc-ed and beci t 4 9
Olson, as we know, demanded poetry which would be
AN ENACTMENT OF
the going reality of (approximate, shot at) THAT
WHICH IS ABREAST OF US: now here and now, not
what was what was we do lament.50
The long poem as he envisaged it would not be a
narrative of the past, nor even a combination of past tales
and present particulars but a field poem whose contents
were all discovered as simultaneous and contemporary.
Pound, Olson believed, did manage to transcend historical
time, but only through a sublime egotism which is no longer
acceptable:
Ez's epic solves problem by his ego: his single
emotion breaks all down to his equals or inferiors
(so far as I can see only two, possibly, are
admitted, by him, to be his betters - Confucius, ^
Dante - Which assumption, that there are intelligent
men whom he can out talk, is beautiful because
it destroys historical time, and
thus creates the methodology of the Cantos, viz;
a space-field where, by inversion, though the material
is all time material, he has driven through it
so sharply by the beak of his ego, that, he has
turned time into what we must now have, space
and its live air.5*
For Olson, the problem in The Cantos is that while
Pound achieves the luminous detail he ignores the local
and by thus rejecting the particularism of place forfeits
the universal. The Cantos, according to his argument, do
not finally stand up, not because of an excess of erudition,
nor from a failure of the ideogrammic or collage method,
but rather because they are tied to a single, domineering
will. Thus, instead of being a reenactment of reality
they are a portrait of Ezra Pound. Williams, on the other
hand, as an objectivist, as a follower of the "straight"
photographers, did try to present the image as fully and
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as accurately as possible, seeking to discover its form
so that as recreated in art it might stand independently,
nowever, in Paterson, argues Olson, Williams does not
succeed in bringing the past into the present of the poem;
consequently sections of the poem are inert, inorganic.
H3 would attribute the failure of Williams and Pound
to a less than total commit ment to open form. In Pound's
case, he has imposed his personal will on the poem, select¬
ing and ordering its parts to conform with his own pre¬
conceived ideas of order and pattern. In the case of
Williams, the poet has allowed his preconceived theory of
what a long poem should be, what it should contain and what
are its limits, to impose a predetermined form on his work.
However, to argue that Paterson and The Cantos are not
sufficiently open is, at the least, counter-intuitive.
For most readers, their fault lies in their apparent
formlessness and lack of order. These difficulties force
us to reconsider the notions of closed and open form.
Practically and in the historical context, open form
was a reaction against poetic conventions, stanzaic patterns
and fixed metres. In the context of literary politics it
was an attack on the new academic poetry, and it was very
largely a recapitulation of the arguments about free verse
and organic form which so exercised the imagists. Closed
forms, poetic conventions, were rejected because they implied
a dichotomy between form and content which was condemned:
"Form is never more than an extension of content". However,
if the demand for open form is interpreted as no more than
a refusal to write (or read) sonnets, clearly it is inadequate.
Many fine poems are written in conventional measures, whether
in blank verse, villanelles, terza rima or whatever. Such
poems achieve a unity of form and content which is woefully
absent in other unstructured and structureless effusions.
If the distinction between closed and open form is to have
any value, it must be interpreted at the metaphysical and
methodological levels.
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The possibility of open form depends on the belief
that art is inseparable from life, and that no individual
work, no more than any individual person, can be an island
unto itself. A poem must have its structural unity, but it
will be composed of smaller structures and form part of
larger structures. Robert Duncan's poetry is the obvious
illustration. His individual poems are complete, but form
parts of series, while his work as a whole, he believes, is
only one part of area of the entire field of literature.
And again, that literature only continues as it feeds from
life, from experience, which is itself fed and shaped by the
art which articulates it.
As a work of art, therefore, open form describes the
poem which continues to be available, which stays alive for
us, which can be incorporated in the present moment. As an
instruction to the poet, writing in open form entails
abandoning predetermined ideas of what the poem ought to
be and leaving the mind alive to the impact of experience
so that the poem will emerge as a product of the interaction
of mind and world, inner and outer. Translated into more
orthodox critical language, we find we are discussing once
again the distinction between imagination and fancy. The
form which emerges from the coincidence of internal and
external, or objective and objective, is the product of
the imagination. It is a discovery; new, creative, trans¬
cending the personal and surpassing the present. Its images
are metaphors. The form imposed by the poet's decision is
the product of fancy. It is an arbitrary manipulation of
reality which rejects novelty and therefore does not go
beyond the present. In Olson's terms, it is not projective.
Its images, whether or not introduced by "like" or "as",
are similes and analogies.
In practice, every poem must be closed to a degree,
restricted by the limitations of its author, its indivi¬
duality, his mental conditioning and his mortality. However,
the commitment to open form derives from an acceptance of a
philosophy which is unitative and based on process. In
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the next chapter we shall consider the relevance of two
philosophers, Whitehead and Heidegger, to "post-modern"
poetics, and in particular to the long poem of open form.
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Alfred North Whitehead must be a central figure in
any attempt to discuss the development of "Process
poetics". In the first place, his work was known to
most of the poets under consideration, including Williams,
Olson, Duncan, Dorn and, at an earlier stage, Hugh
MacDiarmid. (There is no evidence, as far as I know,
that he had any influence on David Jones.) More speci¬
fically, because of his profound influence on Charles
Olson, who was a primary theoretician of poetry in the
fifties and sixties, Whitehead's ideas and philosophical
approach became part of the intellectual climate and
formed the basis for the unspoken assumptions out of
which poets wrote. Whitehead, after he left Britain for
America and Harvard, moved into metaphysics and away
from mathematics. As a metaphysician, his standing is
probably much higher in the United States than in Britain
and reference to his ideas has tended to confer status
and intellectual respectability on many of the fairly
loosely related notions of process, objectification and
creativity embraced by the post-modern poets.
The relationship of poetry to philosophy, and of
particular poets to particular philosophers is always
difficult to determine and simplistic interpretations
of the one in terms of the other are certainly to be
avoided. In the case of Olson, Robert von Hallberg has
pointed1 out that the poet found Whitehead's Process
and Reality of use because it provided a systematic ex¬
position of so many of the ideas Olson had arrived at
on his own account; he also shows that the poet stood
much of Whitehead's philosophy on its head to establish
man as the centre of the human universe. However, we
may still ask what it is about Whitehead's philosophy of
organism, even in its popular mediated form, which has
appealed so much to contemporary poets.
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At the most general level, Whitehead is attractive
because he claims to provide a cosmology which can in¬
clude the new physics, which can reconcile quantum theory
and theology, nuclear science and Plato. Accepting this
system, the poet can feel himself contemporary, "abreast
of reality", no longer succumbing to the domination of
positivism but rather transcending it as the most advanced
scientists have done. The sense of being at front rather
than behind raises poetic morale and authority.
More specifically, the philosophy of organism appears
to overcome the dichotomy of subject, of mind and body.
Finally, we have to consider the type of structural
society which gives rise to the traditional body-
mind problem. For example, human mentality is partly
the outcome of the human body, partly the single
directive agency of the body, partly a system of
agitations which have a certain irrelevance to the
physical relationships of the body. The Cartesian
philosophy is based upon the seeming fact - the
plain fact - of one body and one mind, which are
too substances in casual association. For the philo¬
sophy of organism the problem is transformed.
Each actuality is essentially bipolar, physical and
mental, and the physical inheritance is essentially
accompanied by a conceptual reaction partly conformed
to, and partly introductory of, a relevant novel
contrast, but always introducing emphasis, valuation
and purpose. The integration of the physical and
mental side into a unity of experience is a self-
formation which is a process of concrescence, and
which by the principle of objective immortality charac¬
terizes the creativity which transcends it. So
though mentality is non-spatial, mentality is always
a reaction from, and integration with, physical
experience which is spatial. It is obvious that we
must not demand another mentality, presiding over
these other actualities (a kind of Uncle Sam, over
and above all the U.S. citizens). All the life in
the body is the life of the individual cell. There
are thus millions upon millions of centres of life
in each animal body. So what needs to be explained
is not dissociation of personality but unifying con¬
trol, by reason of which we not only have unified
behaviour, which can be observed by others, but also
consciousness of a unified experience.2
Whitehead argues for a universe which is pluralis¬
tic but coherent; in actuality atomic. The actual entities
of which reality is made up are unique occasions in space-
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time; they are self-creative, the sum of their process
and outcome, and when they have achieved satisfaction
they perish, or become unreal. Each actual entity
evolves by prehending, or feeling, every other entity
in the universe, to a greater or lesser extent. From
its physical pole it prehends the physical data of its
environment, from its mental pole it may prehend the
eternal objects, like Platonic forms, which will cons¬
titute its subjective aim. Put the other way, each
actual entity will be "ingressed" by eternal objects
and by the physical data contingent to it. Actual
entities, as the atomic components of reality, are not
minds, nor egos; they need not even be conscious, although
they do have mentality defined by their experience. For
Whitehead, consciousness is an attribute of intensity
of organisation, or evolutionary development, not a
radically different substance from matter. Indeed, he
emphasizes that reality is to be treated as vector rather
than scalar, modifications of energy within space-time.
In physical science this principle takes the form
which should never be lost sight of in fundamental
speculation, that scalar quantities are derivation
from vector quantities. In more familiar language,
this principle can be expressed by the statement
that the notion of 'passing on' is more fundamental
than that of a private individual fact. In the
abstract language here adopted for metaphysical
statement 'passing on' becomes 'creativity', in the
dictionary sense of the verb creare, 'to bring forth,
beget, produce ...' no entity can be divorced from
the notion of creativity. The entity is at least
a particular form capable of infusing its own parti¬
cularity into creativity.3
The thing itself is what it does and it is the "how" not
the "what" which distinguishes separate entities. We
may be reminded of William's "I cannot say/more than how.
The how (howl) only/is at my disposal"1* in this passage
from Whitehead:
how an actual entity becomes constitutes what the
actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an
actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is
constituted by its 'becoming'. This is the principle
of process.5
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What does all this signify for the artists? First
of all, man is repossessed of and reintegrated with his
world. The bugbear of dualism is overcome since all
nature obeys the same general laws, mind and human con¬
sciousness being interpreted as the attributes of more
highly evolved organisms. Because man is of the same
nature as the rest of the world and because in his moments
of consciousness he experiences the concrescence wherein
one actual occasion prehends all other entities with
greater or lesser degrees of relevance, he is truly
returned to what Olson termed "ripe, live centre". So
not only can man feel that he is "one with his skin"
but also that the "world is mine" just as much as
"these hands and feet are mine".6 Thus a metaphysical
justification and toughening is provided for an epis-
temology which validates sensuality as an element of
knowledge, a view which the "romantic humanist" had ins¬
tinctively or intuitively maintained. We may think of
Walter Pater, in the Conclusion to The Renaissance
where he shows an awareness of the human organism as
part of the wider environment, as well as a conscious¬
ness of the intensity of the moment as the only reality.
Indeed, his insistence on the moment and the attempt to
achieve intensification of experience in the moment
surely anticipates and may indeed have influenced Olson.
To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to
maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. In a
sense it might even be said that our failure is to
form habits: for, after all, habit is relative to
a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the
roughness of the eye that makes any two persons,
things, situations, seem alike. ... What we have to
do is to be for ever curiously testing new opinions
and courting new impressions, never acquiescing in
a facile orthodoxy, of Comte, or of Hegel, or of
our own. ... The theory or idea or system which
requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this
experience, in consideration of some interest into
which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have
not identified with ourselves, or of what is only
conventional, has no real claim upon us.7
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Perhaps time and the aureate prose have disguised the
startling similarities between this position and the
demands for "projective verse" and "open form", the
exhortations to eschew abstraction so as to be "equal
to the real itself".
The new humanism asserted by Olson8 was quite dis¬
tinct from the liberal humanism of the universities
but may be quite properly identified with the romantic
humanism rejected by Hulme. Again, interestingly.
Pater's definition of the distinction between Roman¬
ticism and Classicism is pertinent:
There are the born classicists who start with form,
to whose minds the comeliness of the old, immemorial,
well-recognised types in art and literature, have
revealed themselves impressively; who will entertain
no matter which will not go easily and flexibly into
them; whose work aspires only to be a variation upon,
or study from, the older masters. "'Tis art's
decline, my son.'" they are always saying, to the
progressive element in their own generation; to those
who care for that which in fifty year's time every
one will be caring for. On the other hand, there are
the born romanticists, who start with an original,
untried matter, still in fusion; who conceive this
vividly, and hold by it as the essence of their work;
who, by the very vividness and heat of their con¬
ception, purge away, sooner or later, all that is not
organically appropriate to it, till the whole effect
adjusts itself in clear, orderly, proportionate form;
which form, after a very little time, becomes classical
in its turn.9
Olson's humanism is based on a concept of man's
nature and energies as an extension or intensification
of more general physical forces and a rejection of a
notion of the spirit as radically separate from matter.
Such a position is a direct denial of the possibility
of asceticism, the shunning of the material world which
is open to the dualist. In The Maximus Poems Olson
identifies with the Diorite Stone,10 an intransigently
physical phenomenon, a concretion of energy. When the
human is viewed thus, as an energy formation which albeit
highly structured or organized, is of a kind with all
other organisms, a respect for and duty towards the earth
become inevitable. Whitehead's metaphysic bestows weight
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and substance on the concern for the earth so important
in the work of Olson and his followers, an interest
very much in keeping with the more general ecological
concern of our time.
In Projective Verse Olson describes "objectism",
his reconditioned version of "objectivism".
'Objectism' is the getting rid of the lyrical
interference of the individual as ego, of the
subject and his soul, that peculiar presumption
by which western man has interposed himself
between what he is as a creature of nature (with
certain instructions to carry out) and these other
creatures of nature which we may, with no deroga¬
tion, call objects. For a man is himself an
object, whatever he may take to be his advantages,
particularly at that moment that he achieves an
humilitas sufficient to make him of use.
It comes to this: the use of a man, by himself
and thus by others, lies in how he conceives
his relation to nature, that force to which he
owes his somewhat small existence. If he sprawl,
he shall have little to sing but himself, and
shall sing, nature has such paradoxical ways, by
way of artificial forms outside himself. But if
he stays inside himself, if he is contained within
his nature as he is participant in the larger force,
he will be able to listen, and his hearing through
himself will give him secrets objects share. And
by an inverse law his shapes will make their own
way. It is in this sense that the projective act,
which is the artist's act in the larger field of
objects, leads to dimensions larger than the man.11
As well as repossessing man of his world, as we
have remarked, Whitehead's philosophy restores full dignity
and importance to the act of physical perception. Indeed
perception and objectification are the modes by which an
entity prehends concrescences, achieves itself. Physical
perception is a feeling, the way one entity actually is
in another; problems of appearance and illusion are
removed because the image is real. Deception, error
and delusion enter at the conceptual level; the senses
do not deceive.
There is, however, always this limitation to the
security of direct knowledge, based on direct physical
feeling, namely, that the creative emergence can import
into the physical feelings of the actual world pseudo-
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determinants which arise from the concepts enter¬
tained in that actual world, and not from the
physical feelings in that world. This possibility
of error is peculiarly evident in the case of that
special class of physical feelings which belong to
the mode of 'presentational immediacy'.12
"Presentational immediacy" is how we perceive the world:
It is a physical feeling - ... of a complex type to
the formation of which conceptual feelings, more
primitive physical feelings, and transmutation have
played their parts amid processes of integration.
Its objective datum is a nexus of contemporary
events under the definite illustration of certain
quantities and relations: these quantities and
relations are prehended with the subjective form
derived from the primitive physical feelings, thus
becoming our private physical sensations.
Finally, as in the case of all physical feelings,
this complex derivative physical feeling acquired
integration with the valuation inherent in its
conceptual realization as a type of experience.13
So we know the world through our senses; an artist's
duty is to refine his sensibility, cleanse "the doors
of perception", and to examine his own perceptions and
values so that he will be able to increase the richness,
intensity and accuracy of his knowledge. The "lyric
interference of the ego", or subjectivism, one source
of distortion condemned by the Objectivists and by
Olson, becomes much less threatening if one accepts
Whitehead's account of the ego and personality as a
wandering and discontinuous route of presiding occasions:
Thus in an animal body the presiding occasion, if
there be one, is the final node or intersection, of
a complex structure of many enduring objects. Such
a structure pervades the human body. The harmonized
relationships of the parts of the body constitute
the wealth of inheritance into a harmon y of contrasts,
issuing into intensity of experience. The inhibi¬
tions of opposites have been adjusted into the con¬
trasts of opposites. The human mind is thus cons¬
cious of its body inheritance. There is also an
enduring object formed by the inheritance from pre¬
siding occasion to presiding occasion. The endurance
of the mind is only one more example of the general
principle on which the body is constructed. This
route of presiding occasions probably wanders from
part to part of the brain, dissociated from the
physical material atoms. But central personal domi¬
nance is only partial, and in pathological cases is
apt to vanish.
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Such a description of personality may evoke two
responses, the first a passive willingness to be part
of nature, the second the unrelenting assertion of the
self, of "actual willful man".15 Olson oscillated
between the two, but predominantly he sought to create





is not our condition
not that relaxation16
Man's duty, task or function, as Olson sees it,
is to act, impose his will and therefore order and form
on his universe. But his capacity for order or for
intensity of satisfaction depends on his knowledge,
knowledge which derives from the actual experienced
world. Olson describes human activity in terms of a
concrescence, experiencing, prehending and reaching
satisfaction, a satisfaction which never really is
since it precipitates a new urge to creation.
But such a satisfied man is never possibly the
trope Man. The trope Man, like the sliding
concept Chaos - the trope Man is only the creature
at the second stage of feeling, which amounts to
no more than the creature crowing over his own
triumph, over incoherence. It is not the thing
man when he has the thing in hand, which is every
one of us in face of satisfaction. And at that
point any man or woman recedes as God does from
his creation. And for a good reason: that he
or she or Him must then go on to another creation.
The very motive powers, enjoyment and desire,
demand it.17
The creation or discovery of order is art. Olson
argues from Whitehead and Heisenberg that we have moved
away from the search for order immanent in the world,
for natural laws which we could apply to man as well as
the rest of creation; instead, we realize that order
proceeds just as much from man, not only from his mental,
but also from his physical constitution. Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle emphasizes the role of the observer
in what is observed while Whitehead stresses the impor¬
tance of the bodily senses:
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It is the accepted doctrine in physical science
that a living body is to be interpreted accord¬
ing to what is known of other sections of the
physical universe. This is a sound axiom; but
it is double-edged. For it carries with it the
converse deduction that other sections of the
universe are to be interpreted in accordance
with what we know of the human body.18
If order derives from the human, the highest or most
conscious ordering is that of art
art was never any more, and can be nothing other
than the order of man, specifically man, and not
nature, not history, not a creator God but simply
man's own powers of imposing form on content.19
From, however, in Olson's interpretation, is achieved
through action, action which proceeds from knowledge:
What you do is precisely defined by what you know.
Which is not reversible, and therein lies the reason
why context is necessary to us; it is only when one
can say either (if it is the person's life) here is
a perfect thing or (if it is a created thing - which
every act is, by its very source as rising from one
of us) here is form.
Now neither are ever attainable. Or, to put it the
right way, when either perfection or form is achieved,
it is already imperfect or less than the necessary
form by the very fact of coming into its own exis¬
tence it has pushed the limit of possibility by its
own achievement.2 0
The entity in concrescence prehends every other entity,
negatively or positively; in other words, it can be said
to know everything. The degree of form, intensity or
satisfaction achieved will depend on how the entity
organizes itself.
The organization of physical perceptions is deter¬
mined by subject aim which proceeds from the eternal
objects or forms. The more highly developed is menta¬
lity or consciousness the greater possibility will there
be for intensity of satisfaction. The most general
subjective aim or the lure of creativity is determined
by the final or prospective ordering of the eternal
objects as they are found in the primordial nature of
God.
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In this theory of poetics process is pre-eminent.
Achieved forms perish but become immortal: their value
is their availability for the present instants of the
universe. Art is interpreted with an analogous to every
other form of action. Like Hulme, Olson sought, as
artist, to plunge into the flux of duration:
And what I write
is stopping the battle
to get down, right in the midst of
the deeds, to tell
what this one did, how
in the fray, he made this play, did grapple
with that one, how
his eye flashed
to celebrate
(beauty will not wait)21
However, for Olson, the poet's action is one with
that of the soldier; the poem is as much the act of writ¬
ing as the final outcome, just as, for Whitehead, an
entity is its becoming plus its outcome. In Olson's
case, this results in an emphasis on the man who is poet
as an entity. In his pursuit of history he identifies
history with life, "a life is the historical function
of the individual. History is the intensity of the life
process - its life value".22 The historian's art is to
order or value the experience, to discern the form or
mythology which, according to Olson,is the prospective
or final cause of action, the lure of creativity. Olson
equated myth with Whitehead's eternal objects or Platonic
forms. Using Aristotle's definition of myth as "the
ordering of the incidents" we can see myth as the bones
on which history puts the flesh. Historical events pass
away with process but they obey or re-enact the mythical
forms which at once constitute them and are preserved by
them. Thus history is commemorative and prospective.
Olson's own personality led him to interpret
Whitehead with a certain bias. He emphasized the place
of will, the poem as the action of man making himself.
The notion of field appealed to him because it presented
the alternative to Pound's "ego as beak" and gave him
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the ego as centre. Historical time as we commonly
conceive it is abolished by the space-time continuum
in which all entities and events are available for pre¬
hension and where the actual entity is the process and
outcome of their ordering. At the same time, this
theory is an advance from the concepts of universals
and particulars, since everything is actually present
in every other thing.23 Thus not only must the artist
deal in particulars, it is impossible for him to do
anything else. In the poem every image is both parti¬
cular and universal, particular in the how of its orga¬
nization, universal in the what that is organized.
Olson's poetics have afforded a precept and his
own Maximus Poems an example of the possibilities for
the long poem, for post-modern epic. The concepts of
process, of actualities becoming and perishing, demand
that the poem be extended, indeed be co-extensive with
the poet's life, while the notion of open field allows
for an inclusion of narrative and a use of myth and
history which can be non-linear, creative and prospec¬
tive. The poem prehending forms of energy and ordering
them achieves new intensities which become available for
prehension by further actualities. The poet is restored
to the centre of the tribe as teacher and seer while
the poem becomes once again the vehicle for the tribal
ethos.
Whitehead and Olson's interpretation of Whitehead
have clearly been of significance for contemporafies
including Robert Duncan and Edward Dorn, whose work
forms the subject of the latter part of this thesis.
For both of them, Whitehead has provided an intellec¬
tual stiffening. Whitehead's metaphysics are difficult
and Olson's idiosyncratic rendering of these cannot be
considered a simplification. Duncan, an established
poet before Olson ever published, and perhaps one of
the most osmotic or eclectic writers the century has
produced, seems to have absorbed Whitehead's cosmology,
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with its Platonic affinities, into his own peculiar
meld of neo-Platonism, Gnosticism and theosophy. Dorn,
Olson's student at Black Mountain, was freed by him
to write "unpoetically" and at length, to concern him¬
self with economics, geography, sociology and politics
as subjects for poetry. However, though Projective
Verse and what it stood for became a rallying-point for
a generation of writers, the best have taken what they
needed from Olson, or from Whitehead, and then followed
their own paths, looked in other directions. Olson's
certainty, his overall optimism, his insistence on being
energetic, his advocacy of a work ethic close to that
of the Puritans so ambivalently treated in his poetry;
all these are not necessarily appealing to other poets.
Besides, poetry moves on with the world and new poems
are informed by new philosophies.
Structuralism, phenomenology, existentialism and
their variants, the fashionable European philosophies,
have exerted their influence in American intellectual
circles; much more so than in Britain where the force
of British empiricism and the "common sense" of positi¬
vism still acts a repressive force. One of the seminal
influences in European philosophy, but one which has
till recently been by and large ignored in Britain, is
the work of Martin Heidegger. His ideas have been of
particular importance in relation to language and poetry
and it can be shown that they have considerable rele¬
vance to projective verse, open form or field poetry,
and that reference to his writings can throw consider¬
able light on the poetry of Robert Duncan and Edward
Dorn.
Dorn of course acknowledges Heidegger as one of
his masters in Gunslinger and has said that Heidegger's
mind is "equal to the poem".24 Duncan does not, as far
as I know, anywhere acknowledge a direct debt to Heidegger
although he does not reject the conclusions of Rich
Blevins's Heideggerian interpretation in 10 19.25 It
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would be curious if a man of Duncan's erudition and
facility had not absorbed, at least at second-hand, a
modicum of Heidegger's thinking. Certainly, he had
declared a knowledge of and affinity with such Euro¬
pean philosophers as Merleau-Ponty and Roland Barthes,
whose writings in different respects are related to and
influenced by those of Heidegger.
In many ways, Heidegger's thought runs parallel with
that of Whitehead, though the emphases are different.
Both allow that we already know everything, but where
Whitehead seeks intensity of organisation, Heidegger
seeks authenticity through interpretation. Whitehead's
creativity, the urge which drives entities to seek
satisfaction and which causes successive entities to
arise corresponds to Heidegger's notion that the quest
for understanding of Being is peculiar and integral to
Dasein, that is, to man.
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among
other entities. Rather, it is ontically distinguished
by the fact that, in its very Being that Being is an
issue for it. The task of an intellectual analytic
of Dasein has been delineated in advance, as regards
both its possibility and its necessity in Dasein's
ontical constitution.26
This is also corresponds to Olson's response in The
Special View of History:
What makes us want to, a Lady asked me. It is what
I mean by no choice. History is to want to. It is
the built-in.27
This built-in driving force is the need to discover,
or remember the Logos, the primordial nature of God.
Heidegger conceived of man as not only ontological but
historical and therefore historiological. He posits
that the essence of Dasein is its temporality, its fini-
tude, its historicity. We exist between birth and death:
Dasein traverses the space of time granted to it
between the two boundaries and it does so in such
a way that, in each case, it is "actual"only in
the "now", and hops, as it were, through the
sequence of "nows" of its own "time". Thus it is
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said that Dasein is "temporal". In spite of the
constant changing of these experiences, the Self
maintains itself throughout with a certain self-
sameness . . .
Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch of life -
one which is somehow present-at-hand - with the
phases of its momentary actualities. It stretches
itself along in such a way that its own Being is
constituted in advance as a stretching-along. The
"between" which relates to birth and death already
lies in the Being of Dasein...
The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched
along and stretches itself along, we call it
"historizing".z H
Dasein existing authentically is futural, admitt¬
ing its ultimate possibility, which is death, but to
discover the full extent of that possibility we must
recapitulate the past and all the possibilities of the
past. Heidegger anticipates Olson in going behind Plato
and Aristotle to the early Greeks and their understand¬
ing of Being and Truth. He belived that the present
Judaeo-Christian epoch was dying in a barbarism of
technology stemming from the development of Western
metaphysics. In Olson's words "The Way doesdie" and
it is the duty of Dasein to recapitulate, go back, re¬
discover other ways, paths not taken:
To understand this tragic process, and to realize
that false technicity has edged the human race
to the brink of ecological devastation and poli¬
tical suicide, is to realize that salvation is
possible. It is precisely because exploitative
technology and the worship of allegedly objective
science are the natural culmination of Western
metaphysics after Plato, that the Heideggerian
summons "to overcome metaphysics" is, simultane¬
ously and quintessentially, a summons to "the
saving of the earth".29
Heidegger described this need to go back, to study
the history of ideas, to discover what has gone wrong,
to escape from our received, inauthentic ideas of every¬
day existence as "interpretation". Interpretation is
an aspect of ontology and an aspect of care, and thus
of the nature of Dasein. Interpretation of history is
the way in which we understand Being and our desire to
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understand Being is part of our care, our inevitable
concern for the world into which we are thrown, for
the rest of creation which we find ourselves alongside.
Heidegger's philosophy as much as Whitehead's gives us
man as "centre and circumference", as a creature who
only exists as he exists in a world, in a context of
space-time, and who therefore takes on responsibility
for that world.
Heidegger's method, "To the things themselves".30
is derived from Husserl and is avowedly phenomenological.
There are many different varieties of phenomenology,
but from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty one methodological
characteristic persists: the rejection of abstract
theory, concepts and generalizations and a concentra¬
tion on that which can be learned from the direct exper¬
ience of consciousness, from the objects themselves as
they are perceived. This insistence on what Whitehead
has termed "presentational immediacy" has obvious affi¬
nities with Imagism, "Direct treatment of the thing,
whether subject or object", with Williams, "No ideas
but in things" and Olson:
...discourse has arrogated to itself a good deal
of experience which needed to stay put - needs
now to be returned to the only two universes which
count, the too phenomenal ones, the too a man has
need to bear on because they bear so on him; that
of himself, as organism, and that of his environ¬
ment, the earth and planets.31
However, while phenomenology insists on a return to the
"things themselves" it avoids the pitfalls of mere empiric
cism which snared some of the more naive Imagists, over
zealous in their pursuit of objectivity. Phenomena, in
all their particularity and reality, are to be regarded
as the products of mental and physical interaction.
Moreover, the category of phenomena extends beyond
the physical. Heidegger regards the appearances of the
physical world as primary phenomena, but he also treats
language and words phenomenologically. If physical
phenomena are first-order expressions of the Logos, or
-295-
of creativity, then language, or discourse, is second-
order expression, that which lets something be seen
Logos is "discourse"... to make manifest what one
is "talking about" in one's discourse. Aristotle
has explicated this function of discourse more
precisely as apophainesthai. The Logos lets some¬
thing be seen (phanesthai), namely, what the dis¬
course is about 32
This passage could be a gloss for a section of
The Maximus Poems:
The soul is a magnificent Angel
And the thought of its thought is the rage
of ocean apophainesthai
roared the great bone on to Norman's
Woe; apophainesthai, as it blew
up a pool on Pound Rock shoal;
apophainesthai it cracked as it broke
on Pavilion Beach apophainesthai
it tore at Watch House Point
apophainesthai
got hidden all the years
apophainesthai: the soul
in its progressive rise
it sends out
on the path and the Angel
it will meet
apophainesthai
its accent is its own mirage.33
Language and physical phenomena are the expression
of being; but everyday usage has obscured the primor¬
dial truths which language expresses and this can only
be revealed by the attempt to interpret language, to
study etymology, to regard language as containing a
gamut of possibilities which everyday, inauthentic living
has covered up. This notion of language or Logos as
the expression of primordial truth of Being can be
traced back to Gnostic and Hermetic doctrines. The
primary agent for salvation becomes the poet, for it
is he who takes on the task of using language correctly,
of interpreting language with language, or of writing
in such a way as to conform with the truth of the Logos:
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Die Sprache spricht, nicht der Mensch. Der
Mensch spricht nur, indera er geschicklich der
Sprache entspricht (Language speaks, Man speaks
only insofar as he complies artfully with
language) 3k
The poet becomes the servant of language, living authen¬
tically as Dasein, a being in the world, caring for the
world. The dangers of egotism and solipsism are avoided.
Language is the hermetic embodiment of truth and possi¬
bility; the poet moves into the field of hermeneutics,
interpreting the past for the sake of the future.
In the following passage where Robert Duncan is
replying to Blevin's Heideggerian analysis of his work,
his own reading of Whitehead is also apparent. This
merging of two apparently disparate philosophies, those
of Heidegger and Whitehead, while it might not satisfy
the strict philosopher, has proved of use to Duncan and,
indeed, to Edward Dorn:
Rich writes that in Heidegger's analysis, Dasein
may interpret all of its ways of behaving as
"concern", is concerned with interpreting. We are
initially translators then; and in coming into our
native speech learn that language as we translate
ourselves into language. We did then come from
another world for sure. And the problems of
translation are not secondary to our being native.
The situation is not ambiguous in the sense that
it does not tell us clearly what ways it will go.
It does tell what ways it will go, so that we are
potentially surprised in the determination of the
way that emerges and pleased because it verifies
among our expectations the presence that can be
determined of a particular way. We take identity
in the thought of its assertion. The quality of the
actual... its irreversibility, its imposition as
necessary condition of our engagement with all
that is... all this heightens the field of proba¬
bilities in which it arose.
"Other" Ways have deepend or thinned values of being,
background, rejection, resonance, conflict of atten¬
tion entirely in relation to the actual path. We
"realize" that we have taken the path we have. It
is not redundant. It is not given. But every alter¬
native is kept alive in the recognition of this way
being taken in the actual.35
Heidegger's hermeneutic interpretation is derived
from Dilthey who himself took the term from Friedrich
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Schliermacher, the religious philosopher.36 In herme-
neutics understanding and interpretation is conducted
from within; the whole is understood in terms of its
parts, the parts in terms of the whole. In metaphysics
it leads Heidegger to what he acknowledges may be con¬
sidered a vicious circle:
When it is objected that the existential Inter¬
pretation is "circular", it is said that we have
"presupposed" the idea of existence and of Being
in general, and that Dasein gets interpreted
accordingly, so that this idea of Being may be
obtained from it.37
But Heidegger argues that this circularity is inevitable
and of the nature of Dasein. The task is to move,
through interpretation, from inauthentic knowledge to
authentic knowledge. In our practical everyday life
we assume a knowledge of Being in everything we do.
It it part of our nature not only to assume existence
but to project possibilities for existence. As we
advance towards these possibilities in everyday life,
so in hermeneutics the projected possibilities of exis¬
tence are articulated so that they move from possibi¬
lity to actuality.
Thus Heideggerian hermeneutics are at once the art
of language and the art of the possible. The poet can
lead us from uncritical assumption to new understanding,
from indefinite potential to real possibilities. He
works within language for he cannot move outside it,
yet he is saved from idealism by the concepts of Dasein
as temporal Being-in-the-World, a fact in space-time,
and of Being itself as real. Language is usually real -
a second-order phenomenon or expression of Being - and
it is by the reinterpretation of language, by the res¬
toration of pristine meanings and possibilities, by
what Robert Duncan would call the discovery of the real
within the actual, by looking to the past in this manner,
that we are enabled to understand and move towards the
future. Authentic existence would be the total and un¬
relenting pursuit of this interpretation, for the poet
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an unswerving commitment to writing; but this service
to language must always be conducted in the finite
succession of "nows" and in the full awareness of the
ultimate limiting condition, one's own death. This
death, which we cannot go beyond and which must be faced
with resolution, reveals that the real possibilities
are all to be discovered in the past, in history and in
language: to deny death is to deny reality, to mis¬
interpret and reject possibilities. In our practical
everyday lives most of the time we live inauthenti-
cally according to preconceived ideas and unexamined
expectations of the future which because they evade
death distort the truth.
This version of the existentialist analytic need not
be, as Creeley and Olson complained, "an awfully sad way
to think".38 Like Whitehead, Heidegger provides a free
and responsible role for man; but in his philosophy,
man is men, bounded by their own life-spans, local in
space-time, with a duty towards Being, a care for Being,
which they must interpret within the real understanding
of their own finite Being. At the same time, the recog¬
nition that each of us only does live in the "now" and
that the past, although it contains all possibilities,
is unreal and need not constrain us, can, in theory, if
we can escape our everyday commitments, set us free to
act. Responsible action is the equivalent of Whitehead's
"real potential": all entities or possibilities may be
in theory prehensible by the actual event, but, in fact,
real potential is determined by the organism's proxi¬
mate environment, the complexity of its own organization
and the intensity of its subjective aim.
In his later work, Heidegger became more and more
interested in the role of the poet and in philosophy
as essentially poetic, essentially creative and pro¬
jective. He talks about "thinking" as a "Way" and
likens it to the eastern concept of "Tao"; but the
idea also bears considerable resemblance to the "field"
of the projective poets.
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Going over the paths of this region, thinking
occupies itself with and dwells on the region.
Here the way is part of the region, a relationship
between the two which, from the point of the
view of scientific representation, is not only
difficult but altogether impossible to see.39
Thinking is poetry in the widest sense, poetry as
projective saying, poetry as creative, "Poetry is the
instituting of Being by means of the Word". This think¬
ing, this creativity does not stem from the individual
but may be voiced by him, if he adapt his proper stance,
OLson's "humilitas" or Duncan's obedience to the
Masters of Rime.
Thinking in this sense is identical with creative
utterance, though this creativity comes, Heidegger
insists, not from the assertive will of man but
from his surrender to the voice of Being.40
Duncan's poetics allow him, as poet, to live entirely
in the realm of language, listening for the real as it
moves in the actual. In the next chapter we shall con¬
sider how his metaphysical and religious though is
related to, or constituent of, his long poem Passages
and his treatment therein of themes of history and
myth.
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ROBERT DUNCAN AND PASSAGES
Robert Duncan's career as a poet coincides almost
exactly with the developments in poetic theory from Imagism
to Projective Verse. His early influences included Pound,
Gertrude Stein and, of course, H.D., while today he remains
abreQBt of contemporary movements, entering into dialogue
with the structuralists and Heideggerians. Duncan occupies
a central position in contemporary American literature and
his most ambitious poem, the series Passages, must be
regarded as a major and representative work.
However, certain reservations need to be made in
relation to Duncan's work. He must surely be one of the
most intellectually gifted of recent writers, brilliant in
his fluent versatility and verbal facility, in his ability
to grasp and counter an argument, to assimilate, adopt or
adapt a theory, in his capacity to absorb and transmute
heterogeneous and esoteric material. But this very facility
both in technique and in criticism allows him to appear as
all things to all men; his work has the chameleon-like
quality of conforming to whatever hypothesis or reading
strategy one chooses to bring to it. Moreover, his way
with words, his mellifluence, his prolixity both in verse
and in prose can distract the reader and beguile the poet
even in those critical writings where we might expect rigour
of argument. In fairness to Duncan, an awareness of the
snares of "lovely, lying muthos", the problem of Plato
and the poets, remains a continuing theme and tension in
the poet's work.
However, though Duncan reflects the innovations of his
times he is not himself an innovator. He commits himself
to the service of poetry, the service of the "Master of Rime"
and so renounces, to some extent, the necessary wilfulness
of the innovator. Instead, he seeks the role of the shaman
or bard, hoping to speak
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from the hearth stone, the lamp light,
the heart of the matter where the
house is held. 1
As the bard, the preserver of the tradition of the
race, he cannot reject the past or even parts of the past
as other avant garde writers might like to do. Consequently
his concept of open form is more accommodating than that of
the purists:
... if open form were a correction of closed form, okay.
And in Olson's proposition it sounds like that. But I
find that superfluous. Would you want to go back and
correct, let's say Housman? What do you think you would
arrive at? Actually the open thing is really to enclose
any closed form. Any passage or anything else can be
contained as part of a large open form. The essential
recognition in open form is that every event in poetry
has its form in reference to the total feeling of the
formality of the language. 2
Duncan is thus a traditionalist as much as he is a
member of the avant garde, a "modern" as much as he is a
"post-modern", and while he may owe some of this thought
to Olson and Whitehead he is equally indebted to the ideas
of Darwin and Whitman. Though he acknowledges the reality
of the actual, material present, his sympathies are with
a higher, transcendent reality, akin to Platonic idealism.
We shall discover throughout his work a yearning for a
transcendental ideal world to set against the world of
actuality and a desire to interpret the actual, the pheno-
menological, in terms of ideal forms. In Duncan's own
terminology, this is the discovery of the "real" in the
"actual", the extrapolation of myth from history. Duncan
seeks to legitimate this desire for the ideal through his
philosophy of process in which, of course, he is strongly
influenced by Whitehead. In this vision, the only reality
is the instant, the ideal forms are unreal, the transcen¬
dental world the lure for creativity which if it should be
approached in an intensity of satisfaction is as immediately
lost again. The intensity of the moment, the degree of its
"reality", lies in the extent to which it has achieved a
realisation of form.
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'Though Whitehead is important for this poetics of
evolutionary process, the influence of Whitman is perhaps
almost as significant. In this passage, taken from a major
critical essay, Duncan discusses Whitman in terms he might
have used of himself:
Whitman did not believe he came at the end of a civilisation
but at the beginning, at the apprehension of what was to
come. He does not represent his time but announces its
coming. "America", for Whitman, is yet to come. And this
theme of what America is, of what democracy is, of what
the sexual reality is, of what the Self is, rises from an
urgency in the conception of the Universe itself, not a
blueprint but an evolution of spirit in terms of variety
and a thicket of potentialities. His own work in poetry he
sees so, moved by generative urgencies toward the fulfillment
of a multitude of latent possibilities. And so we are
actually in the throes; the throes in which the ideal and
the reality are at work - now that's something to lecture
from, to talk from, not recollections in tranquillity, nor
summations of study, but, to be in the throes of a poetry
in which the poet seeks to keep alive as a generative
possibility a force and intent hidden in the very beginning
of things, long before the beginning of the poem, the
Leaves of Grass, having its form not, as the Divina Commedia
had, as the paradigm of an existing eternal form, but as
the everflowing, ever Self-creative ground of a process
in which the forces of awareness, Self awareness, of
declaration and of longing work and rework in the
evolution of what they are, the evolution of a creative
intention that moves not towards the satisfaction of some
prescribed form but towards the fulfillment of a multitude
of possibilities out of its seed.3
Duncan has constantly reiterated his belief in process
as the ultimate reality, and in his phrase, "the throes in
which the ideal and the reality are at work" we see how he
avoids the dangers of dualism. In Passages and throughout
his mature work, Duncan shuttles between the extremes of
idealism and materialism, immanence and transcendence,
structure and chaos. The strengths and weaknesses in
his poetry proceed from this struggle to contain contra¬
dictions, the continuing attempt to match inner to outer,
to respond to the actual in such a way as to achieve
intensifications of reality.
Let there be the clack of the shuttle flying
forward and back, forward and
back. h
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The image of the shuttle and of weaving is a crucial
one for it is a model of the poem as it is created from the
movement backwards and forwards between poles but also
onwards through time so that no position is ever simply
repeated, but rather is recapitulated and made new.
In Duncan's cosmology, order is the constant process
of disorder and reordering, and this also he views as the
only possible basis for poetry:
The process of Poetry is the incorporation of an event in
language. That we take that event at all to be "Poetry",
i.e. Making, or Creation, means that we take a body to be
of a creational order. Not until, with the reawakening
of the Spirit of Romance (where Pound's study remains
fundamental for us), the theology of an initial model
creation disrupted in a fall and suffering, an eschato-
logical history, gives way to a theology in process, i.e.
of a God making Love, making himself actual and real does
"Poetry" proper become possible.5
Process as the principle of rationality underlying
all flux and change becomes the principle of order within
the poem. It is a dynamic order established through the
tensions of multiple opposites and the controlled wayward¬
ness of organic growth. This is the principle announced
in "In Place of a Passage 22":
That Freedom and the Law are identical
And are the nature of Man - Paradise. 6
That Paradise is the reality of the moment in its
greatest intensity; the summation of the concrescence as
it prehends itself from all potentiality. It is Freedom
as it offers the possibilities of movement along the
spiralling path into the unknown; the Law as the working
out of process from all the determinations of the past.
It is against this background that we must consider
Passages as a poem of open form.
Passages of a poem larger than the book in which they
appear follow a sentence read out of Julian. I number
the first to come one, but they belong to a series that
extends in an area larger than my work in them. I enter
the poem as I entered my own life, moving between an
initiation and a terminus I cannot name. 7
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We recognise here a sense of the poem as historical,
in Heidegger's sense: it takes up time. 8 We are also
provided with an insight into Duncan's policy of revision,
or rather of- not revising. We know, of course, that Duncan
has made some revisions. The comparison of editions and
his own accounts of his habits or composition tell us that.
But by and large, when his work reaches typescript, he lets
it stand. Moreover, he rarely suppresses a poem or part of
a poem, even when, later he has come to regard it as an
embarrassment. "Often I must force myself to remain respon¬
sible to the error that sticks in pride's craw, not to
erase it, but to bring it forward, to work with it, even
if this flaw mar a hoped-for success".9 Such a policy
might be regarded as an excuse for shoddy workmanship, or
even as the manifestation of an excessive self-importance
which overvalues even its mistakes. However, it is probably
more instructive to view it as a practice consistent with
process poetics and as a form of loyalty to the truth.
Since every response, no matter how mistaken, happens and
has its moment of actuality, it becomes a historical fact.
To suppress such a fact is to impoverish the potential
from which the present prehends itself. In process poetics
the emphasis is on the poem in composition, which is new
but at the same time a recapitulation, a re-apprehension
of what has gone before. So in reality, the refusal to
revise is at the same time a declaration that all composition
is revision. We may discover a wider significance in the
old saw, "you never finish a poem; you simply put it down".
The poem is put down, to be taken up by the same poet or
another, by writer or reader, and is "revised" by being
included in that later individual moment. In this sense,
the openness or closedness of a particular poem's form, is
not to be measured by the regularity of its metres or end-
rhymes but by its value and accessibility for the present.
Nor should we forget that the possibility of access may
be created as much by the present reader as by the poetic
work, in his willingness, for instance, to learn Old English
so as to read "The Dream of the Rood", or to study classical
mythology in order to appreciate Greek drama.
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We have emphasised Duncan's notion of process poetics
as historical, particularly in relation to composition.
But we must also give attention to that aspect of his
theory of open form which includes the notion of "a poetry
of all poetries", the "grand collage". This notion of the
whole of literature as a transcendental realm of language
is complementary to, not contradictory of, the historical
view.. This concept of a total poetry would seem to have
affinities with Roland Barthes's theory of the"ideal text":
Let us first posit the image of a triumphant plural, unim-
poverished by any constraint of representation (of imitation).
In this ideal text, the networks are many and interact, with¬
out any of them being able to surpass the rest; this text
is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds;
it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to
it by several entrances, none of which can be authorita¬
tively declared to be the main one; the codes it mobilises
extend as far as the eye can reach, they are indeterminable
(meaning here is never subject to a principle of determina¬
tion, unless by throwing dice); the systems of meaning can
take over this absolutely plural text, but their number is
never closed, based as it is on the infinity of language. 10
One of the differences between Barthes and Duncan is
determined by the fact that the former is the reader, the
latter the writer. Barthes is thus discussing the "readerly"
text, the "fait accompli", the decisions which have reduced
possibilities and pluralities of meaning. Duncan, on the
other hand, engaged with the "writerly" text, is striving,
though the goal is an impossible one, to achieve the
pluralism, the total polysemism of the ideal text. This
"ideal" may be likened to an open field with the particular
poem as one path in it; or else we may image it as a sheet
of paper scattered with dots. Some of the dots may be
joined in a line; this we might imagine as the sequence of
Passages. The line may intersect with other lines, new
dots may appear, creating new possibilities of links and
intersections. Thus Passages intersects with other poems
and series in Bending the Bow, most significantly with
Duncan's other major series, The Structure of Rime".11
We might view the field or the page as Potentiality, trans¬
cendental but unreal; the joined line is the history of
each poem, its determined past. Or to put it in Whitehead's
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terminology: the poem in creation is the actual event
in concrescence; in completion it becomes the enduring
object. The aim or lure of each poem is the total poem,
the completed Logos, i.e. Whitehead's"Category of the
Ultimate" or God.
Duncan has acknowledged his affinities with Barthes
and Merleau-Ponty.12 There is no firm evidence that he
has read much Heidegger, who exerted a strong influence
on both these writers. Nevertheless many of Heidegger's
ideas seem very close to Duncan's conception of poetics.
His understanding of the search for the meaning of Being
as "Care" may be identified with the poet's task to reveal
the Logos, to discover Truth. Heidegger's concept of
Truth (alethea) as that which is to be discovered is
closer to that of Duncan, or indeed the Gnostics, than
it is to conventional post-Aristotelian thought where
truth is a matter of judgement, or being equal to the
facts.
Duncan writes in The Truth and Life of Myth;
For my parents, the truth of things was esoteric (locked
inside) or occult (masked by) the apparent, and one
needed a "lost" key in order to piece out the cryptogram
of who wrote Shakespeare or who created the universe and
what his real message was ...
Truth was for my parents primordially and spiritually
dangerous. The Gnosis, like Eden and the Original Creation
Itself, had once been perfect and complete - a simple
sentence - "good" as Genesis testifies. But Gnosis,
Eden and Creation, the very Word, had been lost in a Fall
from Grace that we know as knowledge. The sentence, no
longer simple, grows apprehensive of a duplicity. It
covers what it is about to say. 13
Duncan differs from his parents' theosophical views
in that for him the truth is not a "meaning behind the
story" but the story itself. Duncan makes a significant
distinction between theosophical and mythical thinking,
identifying the former with Jung, the latter with Freud
and himself. "In the philosophy of Plato or the theoso-
phies of Plutarch, Proclus or Jung the critical mind
avoids the lowness of the story and reads in high-minded
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symbols".11* He himself finds the truth of story or myth
in its enactment, its presentation rather than its represen¬
tation: "here Philosophy raised a dialectic, a debate,
towards what it calls Truth; Poetry raised a theatre, a
drama of Truth".15
However, as Duncan realised himself in tnis essay the
power of mythopoeia is two-edged; the sentence covers what
it is about to say:
The secret! the secret! It's hid
in its showing forth. 16
We are reminded again of Heidegger's hermenfiutic
circle which was discussed in the last chapter. Tnere we
saw that the searcher for truth is in a sense seeking to
discover what he already knows, to understand or interpret
the phenomena of his experience. Thus the poet, as the
principal interpreter, articulates in language the uncover¬
ing of truth, by arranging and rearranging the phenomena
of his experience, of the world, of his imagination, of
myth and of story. But by doing so he creates new "logoi",
new stories, new fictions. Charles Olson discusses this
issue in The Special View of History; his argument is
worth quoting at some length for it is not only illumina¬
ting in itself but also bears considerable similarity to
Heidegger's thought:
In short the recognition (inquiry picture story) that, to
get the density - WOT 'APPENED? - not so easy. Two alter¬
natives: make your own story - fiction, or history: when
you are up against it, to equal what went on. One can
know what one oneself makes, but to know what happened,
even to oneself? Which, then, is WHY history as the
other kind of "story", that one does also want to know
what did happen - I mean now. Or just five minutes ago.
Or right now as it is happening. It is a stance.
In other words there are TWO stances. Always are. It
isn't a question of fiction versus knowing. "Lies" are
necessary in both - that is the HIMagination. At no
point outside a fiction can one be sure.
What did happen? Two alternatives: make it up; or try to
find out. Both are necessary. We inherit an either-or,
from the split of science and fiction. It dates back at
least to Plato, who used the word "mouth" as in insult,
to say it lies, and called poets muthologists - don't
tell the truth, and so mislead the Commonwealth.
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Story was once all logos, the art of the logos. "The
normal or characteristic function of the ancient Story
Teller", says J.A.K. Thomson, from whom I draw most of
this on the Logos, "was not to invent. It was to repeat".
It was not mere word or even an expression of human exper¬
ience so much as it was a form of human experience itself.
Because it was oral it was also Muthos. Logos itself
did not originally mean "word" or "reason, or anything
but merely "What is said" in speech or story exactly like
Logos in its primary sense. Herodotus calls Aesop a
Logopies, and is himself called by Aristotle not that,
but "the Muthologos". What it all comes to is this, that
to those who listened to the Stories a Muthos was a Logos,
and a Logos was a Muthos. They were two names for the
same thing. 17
Heidegger also argues that "Logos" is "what is said",
i.e. "discourse", therefore a "letting-something-be-seen"
as something a synthesis of language and what is represented.
But as it is synthesis between word and truth, rather than
an identity, there enters the possibility of falsehood. 18
The difference or gap between the word and that which it
stands for or is supposed to stand for makes the poet both
powerful and dangerous. Fictions, as Duncan suggests, can
be true or false. Only certain stories or myths are "true"
in the deeper sense.
Herein lies the responsibility of the poet, for, in a
remark frequently attributed to Duncan,"responsibility is
the ability to respond". The poet must respond to the truth
of Being, must give the poem all his attention in order to
present the truth, to uncover the real in the actual:
We all have a sense of the difference between what the
story demands and what the teller of the story might like
the story to be. The story that has been altered to be
likely or true to some belief or to be pleasing or to have
some other special effect on the audience strays from its
Self. So too there is a Self that belongs to Story that
determines the sense of truth and life in my own daily
living. The psychosis of principle of the soul life is
its belonging to the reality of what we know to be true to
our own story sense. In the light of the mythological,
events and persons can seem true or false to the true
story of who I am. 19 .
Certain stories and myths are held to be vehicles of
truth; thus Duncan's work abounds in references to myths,
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legends, fictions and fairytales. But in what sense can
these myths be said to be true? Clearly not at the simple
level of content. In his epigraphs to The Truth and Life
of Myth Duncan quotes a passage from Jane Harrison's
Themis, a passage which, as it happens, Olson had already
used in The Special View of History (p.23),
it is the plot of the Cpoyeuou, for, says Aristotle, in a
most instructive definition,
by myth I mean the arrangement of the incidents.
The truth of myth lies in its order or patterning,
its conformation to the deep laws of the universe; parti¬
cular myths are true as they are the products or instan¬
tiations of the mythic imagination. The danger of this
structuralist approach is that it reduces the critic to
the search for underlying forms so that the specificity of
the individual myth, poem or fiction becomes irrelevant.
Truth is seen as Parmenides saw it: changeless, eternal
and inaccessible. Actuality, appearances and our sensory
experience are regarded as deceptive and illusory. This
is a relapse into dualistic metaphysics, the essentialism
which is the antithesis of process. This is what Duncan
condemns as the theosophic view.
The mythologist, the mythopoeic poet, on the other
hand, the poet of process insists on the reality of the
present moment. The structures, forms or mythic patterns
may be eternal but they are unreal, the Potential which
can only become real in the actual event. The poet's
task is to apprehend form, to bring forth from actuality
into the poem as high a degree of reality as he can achieve.
He does not seek to transcend time and history in art, the
changeless perfection of Byzantium; rather he sees his work
as happening in time, as a part of the historical process.
The poem is the moment and it is the poet's duty to make
the most of that moment:
Each poet seeks to commune with creation, with the divine
world; that is to say, he seeks the most real form in
language. But this most real is something we apprehend;
the poem, the creation of the poem, is itself our primary
experience of it. 20
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In allowing that reality is immediate ratner than
transcendent, the poet of process is an lmaaist rather
than a symbolist, an existentialist rather than an essen-
tialist. The primary reality of the poem is the words
which constitute it, not historical events, poetic
inspirations or philosophical abstractions. Thus for
instance, Passacres 22-27. Of the War, are not about
American involvement in Vietnam in the sense that that
war, that historical context is held as the level of
reality which references to various myths or fictions
may decorate, elucidate or symbolise. The poems are the
reality, prehending or including Vietnam as they prehend
their other elements.
It is only by insisting on the reality of the present
instant as the only reality that there is that we shall
be able to understand Duncan's capacity to entertain
contradictions, his ability to maintain apparently anti¬
thetical positions without any concessions of his incon¬
sistency. This is illustrated in his treatment of Gnostic
and neo-Platonic themes.
Duncan was, as we know, brought up to be familiar
with the mystery religions, neo-Platonism and Gnosticism.
He is widely read in Oriental and Middle Eastern philosophy
and religion as well as in Kabbalism and alchemical writings.
The theosophic frame of mind, though he claims to reject
it, is one to which he was habituated from his earliest
years. His poetry relies heavily on imagery and machinery
gleaned from these sources. The Structure of Rime series,
for instance, with its visions and messengers is a theory
of poetics cast in the form of a Gnostic revelation.
Yet Hans Jonas has shown in The Gnostic Religion, a
book of major significance for both Olson and Duncan,
that Gnosticism and neo-Platonism, while they arise from
the same historical circumstances and exploit many of the
same mythological sources are, as cosmologies, diametri¬
cally opposed to one another. Both tendencies arose,
Jonas argues, from the cosmopolitanism of the Alexandrian
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period. Following the decline of the classical "polis",
there was an attempt to substitute:
for the relation between citizen and city that between the
individual and the cosmos, the larger living whole. By
this shift of reference the classical doctrine of the
whole and parts was kept in force even though it no longer
reflected the practical situation of man. Now it was the
cosmos that was declared to be the great "city of gods
and men", and to be a citizen of the universe, a cosmo¬
polites , was not considered to be the goal by which other¬
wise isolated man could set his course. He was asked, as
it were, to adopt the cause of the universe as his own,
that is, to identify himself with that cause directly,
across all intermediaries, and to relate his inner self,
his logos, to the logos of the whole. 21
This was the positive side of cosmopolitanism which
emerged as neo-Platonism, but, Jonas suggests, it failed
to convince:
Does the whole really care, does it concern itself in the
part that is I? The Stoics averred that it does by equat¬
ing heimarmene with pronoia, cosmetic fate with providence.
And does my part, however I play it, really contribute,
does it make a difference to the whole? The Stoics
averred that it does by their analogy between the cosmos
and the city. But the very comparison brings out the
tenuousness of the argument, for - in contrast to what
is true in the polis - no case can be made out for my
relevance in the cosmic scheme, which is entirely outside
my control and in which my part is thus reduced to a
passivity which in the polis it did not have. 22
The Gnostics rejected the entire cosmos as an inimical
tyranny, the gross matter in which the spiritual part of
man was forcibly immersed. God, Spirit, the Good were
quite outside the Cosmos, although alien and different
and incapable to being known through the ordinary processes
of study or investigation. Gnosis of the Divine was
immediate and revelatory, a non-rational, mystical experience
though it might be prepared for by study and speculation,
che pursuit of secret doctrines and occult meanings. The
Gnostic inspiration was radically dualist, spirit and
matter being viewed not simply as different but as implac¬
ably opposed to each other. (Although one form of Gnosti¬
cism, the Valentinian speculation does derive tne dualistic
rift ultimately from a split in the godhead itself).23
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Jonas himself makes a comparison between tne Gnosticism
of the Alexandrian period and the existentialism, nihilism
and anarchism of modern times. He draws historical parallels
between the two periods: the power of centralised government,
the submergence of the local in the national and inter¬
national, the reduction of the individual to a level of
passive helplessness.
In Passages Duncan struggles with the attempt to accom¬
modate the evil in the world with a sense of cosmic good
and order. Yet as he finds the courage and the range to
confront the horror of his own time it seems that his
disgust and his desire to turn from the world increase.
Against the disordered actuality of this world, he sets
his other world, the world of language and of forms. Yet
Duncan is not an idealist, he is a realist. He must reject
the temptation to see the world of forms as a retreat,
"Fairyland, the Shining Land", but instead recognise it
as the Potential which can only become real as man, and in
particular man the artist, realises it in the actual. It
is in the present moment that idea and matter achieve unity
and reality. Robert Duncan, like David Jones, discovers
this moment in the Catholic doctrine of the moment of
transsubstantiation in the Mass:
Poetics as well as Theology is involved in the trans-
substantiation in the Mass, where men have their contro¬
versy as to whether the Presence is literal, actual, or
whether it is symbolic; whether, as for whose who would
abstract Christ as a mere idea, it is sentimental, or,
as for the positive logicians, a psychotic fancy without
intelligible meaning. The declaration in the opening
passages of William Carlos Williams' Paterson that has
been one of the axioms of a new poetry - "No ideas but
in things" - is catholic and in the spirit of Dante. 2k
This is transcendental realism and it places Duncan
firmly within the American tradition stemming from the
Puritans, who, Roy Harvey Pearce has argued, took to an
extreme the logic of Peter Ramus:
Ramist logic was Platonic, unitive, realistic (in the
technical sense), its key terms being "invention", the
"coming upon", the "laying open to view" that which was
real. Its tendency was virtually to make the word one
-315-
with the thing, to consider an idea - simple or complex -
as an "argument" for the existence of that which it represen¬
ted, and so to abolish the abstract categories of Aristo¬
telian logic and to give the syllogism only secondary
importance. Truth, thus, has not to be deduced, but rather
to be "invented" and expressed in self-evident axioms -
axioms self-evident because developed from primary obser¬
vation and judgement.25
Thus, for the Puritans as for the latter day phenomeno-
logists, there are two languages, the language of Nature
and the language made by men. Both are phenomena, forms
of energy. The view of language as really effective does
not necessarily contradict the notion of the Logos as dis¬
course and synthesis discussed above. The real links
between language and the physical world mean that the world
is charged with meaning which is revealed when correctly
matched by language. Mind and matter obey the same formal
laws so that an argument correctly made will reveal the
truth about the world.
This Ramist logic, as Pearce describes it, has evident
affinities with Heideggerian phenomenology. For Heidegger
too, the truth is to be "uncovered","laid open to view";
for Heidegger too, ontological truth can be discovered in
the interrogation of language linked to primary observation.
It is the poet's task, in particular, to interrogate
language and the world in order to bring out their form.
Duncan discusses this discovery of form, or structure, in
terms of "rime". So the truth of ancient myth or legend
or history lies not so much in its content, but in how it
"rimes" with present experience and intensifies truth and
reality. Duncan stresses the reciprocal nature of composit¬
ion, the poet's task to recognise and translate form, rather
than impose it:
Whatever I think of devices of the art, of metaphor and
simile, of development of themes and composition, when I
speak of resonances I mean that the music of the poem, a
music of sounds and of meanings - awakens the mythological
reality in the actual; and when I speak of form I mean not
something the poet gives to things but something he receives
from things.26
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It is in the reality of the moment therefore that
Word and Flesh become one; it is also in that moment that
extremes meet, the moment where we are and have our being.
However, the moment is only a moment, a point to be passed
through, succeeded by the next. To rest in the achieved
form is to fall away from reality, to lapse into decision
and closed form, to shut off life and possibility.
We have already commented on Passages as a series of
points of intersection. We might have recourse to Pound
and describe it as a succession of nodes or vortices,
moments which have no sooner reached their greatest intensity
than they are past as the process of the poem and the world
drive on. In Passages the life force or energy of the
universe, the Principle of Creativity is identified with
Love; Love as a power for order or disorder, love as it is
manifest in lovers and in communities, in the constructions
of homes and of cities, in the destructions of quarrels, of
jealousy and of war. Duncan exploits the fluidity of syntax,
the ambiguities of pun and wordplay as well as the, as it
were, dimensionless quality of language itself in his
exploration of Love both as he finds it in himself and as
it extends beyond him into the public world.
Love can be process or product, state or disruption
of state, person or abstraction. In Passages 1-24 the
imagery moves between figures of structures and figures of
process, as order is established amid opposing forces
before being again overthrown. Thus structure is always
a concentration of energy, a balance of tension, a moment
of achievement which collapses or is subverted by the
forward drive of the poem. Passages 1, "Tribal Memories",
is itself a poem of structure, a poem whose ordered confi¬
dence will be overthrown by the deeper questioning of what
follows. Yet it retains its partial truth, a truth which
remains available and which will be recapitulated even in
very late sections of the poem. It is as though this were
a gateway, a "rite of passage" in the poet's career,
marking the end of a previous stage and the beginning of a
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new one. There are certainties of self and direction some
of which have to be discarded if the poet is to live,
develop andstay abre^t of reality.
In this poem, themes from Duncan's eclectic variety
of sources have been assembled and assimilated with a
mature, relaxed, almost casual confidence. The poet draws
on his wide knowledge of different religions and cultures
and particularly on Hermetic doctrines and imagery to
present an achieved cosmology. The poem itself is a City,
the ideal "polis", the "City on the Hill" and also the
City of God. It is the eternal city which has been lost
and is projected, yet always exists. It will be actualised
as it is recalled from memory by the poet, the poet who is
the prophet of the city and the voice of its tribe, "the
company of the living". The poet speaks for his people,
but he is also the servant of the mother, Attis or the
Muse:
Mnemosyne, they named her, the
Mother with the whispering
feathered wings. Memory,
rhe great speckled bird who broods over the
nest of souls, and her egg,
the dream in which all things are living,
I return to, leaving myself. 27
Undifferentiated and unconscious, the Logos is One
inside the World Egg; as the primal urge of creativity,
it diffuses itself in the phenomenal world and individual
consciousnesses. But to rediscover that original unity,
and further to bring that unity towards consciousness, to
increase consciousness, the poet must surrender his own
egotistic consciousness and return to the entire possibility
held by the Muse of memory. Harold Bloom describes this
myth of poetic creation, which he attributes to Vico:
the Muse invoked under the name of Memory is being implored
to help the poet remember the future. Shamans return to
primordial chaos, in their terrible and total initiations
in order to make fresh creation possible.28
These lines suggest a darker, more frightening aspect
of the poet's role, emphasising the poet as shaman rather
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than the poet as bard. Duncan affects to deny the part
of shaman, of poet as outsider, yet through a favourite
poetic device of making the language describing what is
denied so forcefully that it easily overwhelms the negative,
we recognise that he cannot escape the shamanistic role:
the poet's voice speaks from no
crevice in the ground between
mid-earth and underworld
breathing fumes of what is deadly to know,
news larvae in tombs
and twists of time do feed upon 29
Similarly, the security of the City, of the home and
the hearth is evoked, only to be undermined by the realisa¬
tion that their stability is tenuous, that they are structures
demanding intense energy, to be held amid the threats of
disorder and darkness. We understand that this is a
"remembered" ruythic City, a City which is not real, but
potentially to be aimed at. The poet seeks eventually to
build this city, to restore the unity of the dream inside
the World-Egg, but as waking consciousness. Differently
imaged, this is the aim to build the Holy City or perfect
society; to complete the mystical Body of Catholicism and
Zoroastrianism, the Kabbalists' Adamic Man; to unite through¬
out the polarities of spirit and matter in the unity of the
Logos.
However, there is an unreality, an abstractedness
about this first poem. The atmosphere is one of bookishness
and musing
I sleep in the afternoon, retreating from work,
reading and dropping away from the reading,
as if I were only a seed of myself,
unawakened, unwilling
to sleep or wake. 30
But these lines in themselves prepare us for disruption;
the figure of Adam sleeping in the world of matter is a
commonplace of Gnostic mythology. He will be wakened by
the call, by the messenger who travels from the other
world, the spiritual world to bring him the Gnosis. In
some versions of the myth this figure is indeed the primal
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Eros, the intermediate between God and man, who
hides
fire among words in his mouth
and comes racing out of the zone of dark
and storm
towards us 31
Yet though the messenger is expected and disorder
has been admitted as a condition, at this stage in the
poem the wider political and cosmological themes are
less convincing than the images of the more intimate,
domestic world. It is as though the mythological and
literary scale of disorder had not yet "rimed" with the
actual as, however, they will do in Passages 13.
In these early poems the "City" remains something of
a literary notion while the more fully realised, organised
societies and structures are on a smaller scale, pertain¬
ing to the immediate and personal life of the individual
household. So in Passages 2 it is from the immediacy of
"the room where we are reading to ourselves, or I am
reading aloud",32 the domestic detail of the actual house¬
hold with its purring cat that the poem evolves; the
central weaving imagery, though its reference is literary
and allows the implication of the Homeric theme, is itself
domestic. Several of the poems concern themselves with
architecture, with the actual construction of the domestic
household and this interest in how the home is to be built
runs alongside the struggle with erotic feeling. There
is an attempt to work out or realise a love relationship
which is simultaneously and inextricably involved with
the poet's relationship to his art.
✓
In Passages 9 we enter most intimately into the actual
household; we are shown around what we take to be the
poet's own home, allowed to read his book titles, listen
to his music, assess his taste in furniture and art. We
match the actual against the ideal or at least the ideal
advocated by Gustave Stickley in Craftsman Homes which
apparently the poet is reading as we enter. But of
course, the poet's art deceives us yet again; by reducing
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the four-dimensional world to language, we are led to
judge the poet's taste by a book he himself has chosen,
to compare the picture with one of its parts. We accept
the notion of the poet reading while at the same time we
know he is writing. In the realm of language different
levels of language become equal; the architecture in the
treatise is as real as the pepper tree in the moonlight
while the legend of the Owl Sacred Pack of the Fox Indians
weaves itself into the setting of the household:
Below the house in the dark of the peppertree
stript to the moonlight embraced
for the mystery's sake mounting
thru us . the garden's recesses
" 'You are to make it', I told you in the past.
I do not suppose you recognise me. 'Owl' is what
I am called. This is how I am".
They saw an owl. 3 3
By putting this last line into the main text of the
poem without quotation marks or italicisation, Duncan
creates a bridge between the realms of actuality and of
story, so that in the poem we move freely between them.
Here a typographical device reinforces the ambiguity,
increasing our uncertainty as to whether the owl seen
was in the poet's garden or in the legend or both. A
similar bridge or rime between the actual world and the
text of Craftsman Homes is made by the repetition of
"recesses" from the first line.
The main purpose of this poem seems to be to assert
almost defiantly that a household, at least at the
domestic level, does exist, that there has been some
sort of approach to communion, and harmonious structure.
But in Passages 10, "These Past Years", the stability
of the household appears less certain:
Willingly I'll say there's been a sweet marriage
all the time a ring
(if wishing could make it so) a meeting
in mind 'found the moon
means rain. 3k
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The ring is the solid, visible symbol of marriage
and therefore of stability in love- Yet this "ring"
dissolves into evanescence and illusion "a ring around
the moon", recalling the watery, insubstantial imagery
in Passages 5, "The Moon", where the ambiguous values




as if with love
the sun at the source of light
reflects 3 5
In both poems our confidence in the reality of appear¬
ances is undermined. The moon which we perceive as light
derives its brightness from the sun, which in the poem
at least is not the source of light either, but only "at
the source of light", suggesting that the Primal Source
is the totally unknowable, the Gnostic alien God.
Returning to Passages 9, we find a literary "slant
rime" with Shakespeare's Sonnet 116, "Let me not to the
marriage of true minds/admit impediment". But here there
has not been a "marriage of true minds", only a "sweet
marriage", a ring "in mind" but not in fact. The last
two words "means rain" retrospectively after the meaning
of "ring" and at the same time introduce all the ideas
of mutability associated with the moon, so devaluing the
first line and snubbing the expectations of the lover
whom we suppose is being addressed. The tone of this
first paragraph is mocking, bitter, even bitchy redolent
of the cruelty which emerges in lover's quarrels. A gulf
has opened between the lover and his beloved and the task
of the poem is to expiate the quarrel by travelling back
to the lost love. But the gap has become cosmic, the
distance between unredeemed man and the Gnostic messenger
from the realms of light, be he Christ or be he Eros.
The tempest-born traveller of Passages 1 reappears but
this time in the person of the poet:
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In the beginning there was weeping
an inconsolable grief
I brought . the storm I came in,
the driving rain
the night-long
torrents of wind. 36
Clearly this is Eros bursting upon Psyche; but at the
same time, we must hear an echo of Blake:
My mother groand! My father wept.
Into the dangerous world I leapt:
Helpless, naked, piping loud:
Like a fiend hid in a cloud. 37
This latent image of helpless power underlines the
central ambivalence of alternation in the poem which is
further reinforced by the homosexuality, openly declared
later in the series. We cannot say whether the poet is
lover or beloved as he switches from passive to active
principle. Tempestous and masterful as Eros in the
beginning of the poem, later as the identities are reversed,
he comes the figure of Psyche in her quest to rediscover
the Lover she forfeited through her disobedience:
I have to make that journey,
the journey to you as if blindly again
along steps I have memorised -
not to forget, not to forget . the way
the way you are,
having no more weight nor strength to go by
than my will, my wraith,
calling up the steps . to the house, the door,
the stairs,
the hall, the room's dimensions, the
where you are 3 8
Thus, as the poet recreates domestic harmony by
renaming the order of the house our conciliation is
effected and he can declare in sincerity "Willingly I'll
say there's been a sweet marriage" and even return to the
tranquillity of Craftsman Homes:
"French doors
opening out upon a porch which
links the house with the garden" 3 9
But although the quarrel has been overcome and the
fault expiated in the travail of the Passage, yet uncertainty
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has been introduced with the suggestion of the conflict
between the two natures of Eros as Love and Strife. There
is a suggestion that in consoling himself with the human
beloved the poet may have evaded his duty to Poetry, the
First Beloved:
the torrents
of love-making, hiding my inconsolable grief
in your arms . 0
In the context of Gnosticism, inconsolable grief is
experienced both by Sophia, the errant female principle of
the Godhead who falls into matter, and by Adamic man as he
is aware of his alienation from God. On this interpretation,
love's consolations are inauthentic, the equivalent of the
spirit's immersion in gross matter which the Gnostics
abhorred. The poem points two ways and the struggle of
the poet between beloved and First Lover achieves only a
temporary resolution.
With the exception of Passages 13, to which we shall
return, the series continues to explore and inter-relate
the themes of love, homosexuality and poetry. As a process
of self-discovery, it is history as prospective, a necessary
ritual which is in itself the passage from an earlier to a
later mode. Thus Passages 11, "Shadows", is a recollection
of past poetic associations, previous stages in the poet's
career.
In the late fifties and sixties Duncan lived in San
Francisco, worked on medieval and renaissance studies at
Berkeley and was active in the literary and artistic life
of the city. He became intensely involved with the poetic
community, both at artistic and emotional levels. His
poetry of the period reflects both Romance and romanticism;
like Blaser and Spicer, with whom he was partly in communion,
partly in competition, Duncan was enchanted by the Romances,
whether drawn from classical mythology, Arthurian legend or
folk-lore. Passages 11 reflects the overheated atmosphere
of a period when love and art were inextricably mingled in
self-regarding fantasies derived from Spenser and Malory:
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The ear
catches rime like the pangs of disease from the a±r.\J(AS ((c
sign of a venereal infection raging in the blood? for j>
is a contagion . And Lust a lord
who'll find the way to make words ake and take on
heat and glow. 111
This is indeed love-sickness, a poem of impurity.
Like Lancelot, the poet is not fit at this point for the
Grail quest:
cx Kol among these shadows
the shadowy cap passt 42
In Passages 12, the theme of unconsummated desire is
continued with variations taken from Rimbaud and Baudelaire.
Though the literary setting moves from medieval romance to
the more recent late French romanticism and though there is
some suggestion of a consummation of love and art, the
overall tone of the poem is of langour and unreality. The
contrast offered by Passages 13, "Fire" could scarcely be
stronger.
At this point, Duncan moves into a new mode, a new
largeness of vision and style which can include the old,
Do you know the old language?
I do not know the old language.
Do you know the language of the old belief? 43
but which brings history, art, literature into the present,
so conferring relevance upon them. The erotic fantasy which
has inspired the previous poems becomes the primal Eros of
rage; the poet "takes fire" as he denounces the sickness
of the body politic, the evil abroad in the City which is
the antitype of the desired polis.
Now, the City, impoverisht, swollen, dreams again
the great plagues - typhus, syphilis, the black buboes
epidemics, manias.
My name is Legion and in every nation I multiply.
Over those who would be Great Nations Great Evils. 44
In this poem structure is shattered by the force of
fire. The resolution or reconciliation which the Neo-
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Platonists envisioned:
chords and melodies of the spell that binds
the many in conflict in contrasts of one mind 45
simply cannot be sustained in the face of evil of this
magnitude. The Christ in Bosch's painting is made to seem
irrelevant, almost inconsequential:
The Christ closes His eyes, bearing the Cross
as if dreaming. Ifi His Kingdom
not of this world, but a dream of the Anima Mundi,
the World-Ensouling? 46
In contrast with this dreaming other-worldliness, the
poet has for the first time in the series wakened from his
own dream to open his eyes, to perceive the devastation
about him:
Pan's land, the pagan countryside, they'd
lay waste. 4 7
At this moment of political recognition the poet
understands that the rape of Vietnam, the disease of society,
is also destructive of language and will rob him of the
"old language". The words which he lays out as treasures
at the beginning and end of the poem, words which have
particular, primordial value will lose that value and
meaning if the world they name is destroyed. There is no
use a poet playing with words like "purl", "plash", "stone",
"harbour", "fish", "green" if the earth is scorched, the
streams polluted, the fish dead and the harbour obliterated.
The world must be saved if the word is to be saved, but
only a right use of language can bring us the knowledge
which can save word and world. In "Fire" we move from an
inauthentic deployment of treasured language, the pastoral
unreality, a story that is false, to the agonised anamnesis
of the close where the same words, the "anathemata", counter¬
point the horror of the actual:
They are burning the woods, the brushlands, the
grassy fields razed. 48
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If this poem is the first occasion when we see the
poet as politically resolute, it is perhaps in Passages 18
that he confronts successfully the erotic and sexual elements
of the poem. It is an explicit poem; words have to be said
and are said. Eros is male:
If he be Truth
I would dwell in the illusion of him
His hands unlocking from the chambers of my male body
such an idea in man's image
rising tides that sweep me towards him
. . . homosexual? 49 \
The frank acknowledgement of the homosexuality which
has informed and charged the erotic force of the mythology
in Duncan's poetry allows him to establish a certain order,
to work out his own system after the manner of a Gnostic
speculation. The ambiguities of the homosexual relation¬
ship with its possibilities of interchangeable or alternating
roles rimes with the Gnostic theme of the divine messenger
or redeemer sent to redeem the spark of divinity or spirit
in Man. This messenger, by descending into the natural
world is himself lost or immersed in matter; in other words,
he exchanges his role from that of redeemer to that of him
who is to be redeemed. At the same time, the Gnostic
believer may work his own redemption and contribute to the
reunification of the Logos, the reintegration of the Divine
Spirit, by his own studies and speculations which may lead
him to Gnosis, the immediate knowledge of God which is also
union with God. Thus although many of the Gnostic systems
appear milleniarian, worked out in terms of aeons and ages,
in fact, their import is of a constant process of disinte¬
gration and mystic union where the Divine Man is fallen
and dispersed in matter and simultaneously reintegrated
with God in the mystic union of Gnosis. Passages 18,
"The Torso", at one level an explicitly physical love poem,
is also an account of the Gnostic experience as the human
lover is transformed into the Divine Messenger:
I have been waiting for you, he said:
I know what you desire
you do not yet know but through me
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And I am with you everywhere. In your falling
I have fallen from a high place. I have raised myself
from darkness in your rising
wherever you are
my hand in your hand seeking the locks, the keys
I am there. Gathering me, you gather
your Self
For my Other is not a woman but a man
the King upon whose bosom let me lie. 5 0
The ambiguity of role in the human sexual relationship
is carried over into the Gnostic cosmology so that the
protagonist appears as agent and patient, redeemer and
redeemed. Duncan is enabled through the clearly painful
exploration of his own sexuality to uncover rime with the
occult mythologies which are already so familiar to him.
This match of myth to the actual is what Duncan calls
the "truth and life of myth", the discovery or intensifi¬
cation of the real.
Like Passages 13, "Fire" and the later Passages 24,
"Orders", this poem might be a particularly significant
node or vortex, where the knotting or converging of different
themes results in an access of energy. It is in relation
to such critical points, such intersections, that other
parts of the poem take up their places. For instance,
Passages 14 and 15 could both be described as spring-
cleaning or organising poems, the first a revision of
appropriate Hermetic mythology to accommodate the "Cupid
and Psyche" story which is of such continuing importance
in Duncan's work:
What does it mean that the Tr-n i-nnatores, "doorkeepers aigc/
oj- "ibV wtrfcfc '[ Curry Piyckc to
in* |iuiu(,£y -- to -fkc Zcg - • - .
where Eros sleeps,
the Protoecrregorikos, the First Awakened? To
5 1
. J
while the second is a dusting-down of language itself,
undertaken in preparation for the unknown:
He could not see to the end of the corridor.
What came beyond he did not know. 52
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This poem, Passages 15, "Spelling", does not do more
than testify to an attitude to language, an attention which
includes an attention to derivations and etymology which is
shared on the one hand with Charles Olson and on the other
with Heidegger. At the same time, there is an emphasis on
pronunciation reminding us that though "rime" may be thematic
or visual it is first and foremost aural. It is the ear
which leads Duncan through so many of his Passages, his
listening for reverberations and recurrences in the very
sound of the words, sounds which he with his conviction
that the world is totally meaningful, must believe will
take him to a revelation of the truth.
It is this conviction that there is order in the universe
and that language can be really meaningful that allows Duncan
to adopt the tone of high seriousness and of political
engagement which we find in Passages 24, "Orders". This
title is as polysemous as the poem, suggesting order in the
sense of pattern and also in the sense of command; "In the
intensity of the work, It, Poetry, gives me Orders". 53
Always Duncan has conceived of himself as a poet under
orders, in the sense of the soldier or the priest. He is
not his own Master, but serves the Master of Rime, as he
declares in Structure of Rime I:
I ask the unyielding Sentence that shows Itself forth
in the language as I make it,
Speak! For I name myself your master, who
come to serve.
Writing is first a search in obedience. 5k
In Passages 24, this dedication to poetry is reaffirmed
as though the poet were making his final viws;
For the Good,
il ben del intelletto, the good of the people,
the soul's good.
I put aside
whatever I once served of the poet, master
of enchanting words and magics,
not to disown the old mysteries, sweet
muthos our mouth's telling
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and I will still tell the beads, in the fearsome
street I see glimpses of I will pray again
to those great columns of moon's light,
"Mothering angels, hold my sight steady
and I will look this time as you bid me to see
the dirty papers, moneys, laws, orders
and corpses of people and people-shit". 5 5
As in Passages 1, there is a choice of poetic role
though this time between private lyricism and public verse,
whether shaman or bard. But again, Duncan retains both
possibilities when "I put aside" is countered by "not to
disown" as he realises that his new position does not entail
a rejection of the material which inspired his former poetry,
but rather must include it in a more rigorous interpretation,
a more thorough-going committment. Old delights are not
discarded, but rather enter the poem in a new aspect, rime
in a different way. The poem acknowledges the change of
stance:
I thought to come into an open room
where in the south light of afternoon
one I was improvised
passages of changing dark and light
a music dream and passion would have playd
to illustrate concords or order in order,
a contrapuntal communion of all things.
1 b\jb Scl\uh>ert iS^ovje
the genius of his melody
has passt, and all the lovely marrd sentiment
disownd I thought to come to, a poetry
having so much of beauty
that in whose progressions rage,
grief, dismay transported - but these
are themselves transports of beauty I The blood
streams from the bodies of his sons
to feed the voice of Gassire's lute. 56
Duncan recognises here that the series and the book
have taken a different course to that expected. His vision
of alternating darkness and light, disorder accommodated
by order, this domesticated version of flux where change
was subsumed under diurnal variations and contained by the
household, all this complacency, the pretension to a serene
maturity, is shattered by the new and painful disorder which
erupts in the poem.
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Schubert's music, which represented this vision of
"orders in order" is dismissed as "lovely marrd sentiment".
But again, the very act of naming it in the poem includes
it, though with a revised significance; it is a partial
truth to be included in the larger truth of present reality.
The passage is another example of hermeneutic interpretation.
The poet has sought the detachment of art whereby human
emotion would, in the poem, be transported into beauty.
But as his arrogance is punctured and the anguish of the
actual world impinges upon him, his "rage, grief and dismay"
take over the poem and become themselves "transports of
beauty", the beauty of righteous anger:
The men who mean good
must rage, grieve, turn with dismay
to see how "base and unjust actions, when they are objects
hope, an® lovfe/y b6 those tWxt v/et^£meetly OLcAmime. cKew\ '' s~7
There is a suggestion in the ambiguities of "transported"
and "transports" that rage, grief, dismay and beauty are
all transformations of energy, and that beauty itself does
arise from the achievement of form, the right use of energy.
Thus it seems we return to the notion of art translating
anguish into beauty. But now the meanings of art and beauty
have been deepened while the possibility of detachment has
been abandoned. The poem seeks to be an authentic response
to reality, for only through its authenticity can it present
accurately possibilities for the future. There is no
possibility of not responding to reality; response may be
authentic or inauthentic, but no response is death. The
life of the poem continues as it continues to respond,
continues to stay open. The life of the poet continues
as he responds with poetry; to be authentically a poet he
must respond with poetry, with art. To abandon the poem
might be an inauthentic response to his own nature as a
man who is a poet; on the other hand, it might be an
authentic response by a man who is not or who is no longer
poet. And, at the other extreme, the final case it might
be that the authentic poetic response to reality, the
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authentic poem, would be silence. Such a response is the
denial of the possibility of the future, whether it be for
the particular poem, for poetry as an art form, or indeed
for life itself.
Duncan brings in at this point the legend of Gassire'
lute, the story of an African prince who acquires the art
of the lute only through the death of all his sons and the
loss of his kingdon, Wagadu. This tale is taken from Leo
Frobenius's African Genesis and is also used by Pound in
The Pisan Cantos. The implication seems to be that art
can only come from suffering, or at least from an authenti
response to the whole of experience. Art cannot survive
f>n a vacuum, nor live off itself. It is real blood which
must "feed the voice of Gassire's lute". But at least in
Pound, there is a suggestion that Wagadu, an example of
the legendary "polis", the ideal city, cannot be restored
without the music of the lute, so that life too needs art:
4 times was the city rebuilded, Hooo Fasa
Gassir, Hooo Fasa dell' Italia tradita
now in the mind indestructible, Gassir, Hoooo Fasa,
With the four giants at the four corners
and four gates mid-wall Hooo Fasa
and a terrace the colour of stars
pale as the dawn cloud, la luna
thin as Demeter's hari
Hooo Fasa, and in a dance the renewal
with two larks in contrappunto
at sunset 5 8
For, really, Wagadu, is not of stone, not of wood,
not of earth. Wagadu is the strength which lives in the
hearts of men and is sometimes visible because eyes see
her and ears hear the clash of swords and ring of shields,
and is sometimes invisible because the indomitability of
men have overturned her, so that she sleeps. Sleep came
to Wagadu the first time through vanity, for the second
time through falsehood, for the third time through greed
and for the fourth time through dissension. Should Wagadu
ever be found for the fifth time, then she will live so
forcefully in the minds of men that she will never be lost
again, so forcefully that vanity, falsehood, greed and
dissension will never be able to harm her. 59 \
This legend provides the tribe with a lure or goal, a
sense of their form or identity. Even in the story, the
possibility of the city being rediscovered in actuality
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seems remote. But for its maintenance even as maintained
an ideal depends on the art of the tribal poet, and it was
from a native tribal bard that Frobenius recorded the story.
The story of Wagadu and Gassire's lute rimes with many
of the themes in Passages. The song of the lute, with its
tales of battles and sufferings and its legend of the lost
city which is to be found, is the identity of the tribe. At
the same time, that song only continues as the tribe continues,
as poets and singers arise with the knowledge to sing it.
At remove, the work of Frobenius, Pound and now Duncan has
ensured the song's continuance as part of a wider literature.
Though its original function as part of a particular tribal
culture may not survive, the song has been made available
to the dominant Western culture and has made possible the
enrichment of poems proceeding from that culture. Like the
work of Eliot, Williams, H.D. and Pound, his "old masters"60
the song of Gassire's lute "comes into the chrestomathy".
And at the same time, the content of that song, the story
of Wagadu, is of a city overthrown by internal dissensions,
to be re-established and again destroyed, but to remain as
a potential, an ideal, a continuing lure for the actual.
As such it is emblematic of Passages, of Duncan's vision
of poetry and of process as a whole.
The oscillation of Duncan's verse between opposite
poles mirrors Whitehead's account of process as the oscillation
between one and many:
Opposed elements stand to each other in mutual requirement.
In their unity, they inhibit or contrast. God and the World
stand to each other in this opposed requirement, God is the
infinite ground of all mentality, the unity of vision seek¬
ing physical multiplicity. The World is the multiplicity
of finites, actualities seeking a perfected unity. Neither
God, nor the World, reaches static completion. Both are in
the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative
advance into novelty. Either of them, God and the World,
is the instrument of novelty for the other. 61
Duncan himself sees these forces of opposition as the
battle between Eros and Thanatos, the dynamic tension
described by Heraclitus in his image of the bending bow.
In the following extract from his essay, Man's Fulfillment
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in Order and Strife, Duncan attempts to explain this
notion which is fundamental to Passages and his poetry
as a whole:
But the "we" who find ourselves on the brink of destruction
of the World Order are also, wherever we have sought to
imagine the nature of our freedom and of our commonality,
the meaning of living for one's own true sake and of the
multiplicities necessary for the fulfillment of the whole
of Man's potentiality, we are also on the brink of our own
vision of World Order. There is just this apprehension
of a World Order, of a potential intellect, in which each
lives. It is the attack everywhere upon the potential
intellect of Man, the contempt for the vision of the world
ecology and animal life and for Man's work and identity
therein, that brings us to the brink. But this is an attack
that is made in every generation of Man. The bend of the
bow, Heraclitus called it. Freud in our day a Heraclitan
saw the bow bent between Eros and Thanatos. In our appre¬
hension of the potential intellect, we find superimposed
the multiplicities of What Is ... "the facts of life" ...
and ideas of World Order in which oppositions are at work
in agony. There is a deadly intent at work in life. 62
This brink on which we are poised is the present
instant, in the poem the image at the centre of the vortex;
the image which is no sooner achieved than it turns itself
inside out to become its opposite. The truth lies neither
in thesis nor antithesis, nor even in synthesis, but in
the form of the dialectic, the reversal or the return.
This is the basic theme of Duncan's Passages, manifest in
the reflexive quality of his verse and in the favourite
images of loom and shuttle, of the bow and of course the
dance. As the pattern which can only be seen as it appears
in the individual image or poem it corresponds to the secret
"hid in its showing forth", the secret which is no secret
at all but simply process.
In Passages 24, we see Duncan take on a new resolution
as he takes his poetry into the public, or political arena.
Yet his anxiety about the role, where the poet must take
on the responsibility for the guidance and protection of
his people, perhaps acquiring heroic or divine status, but
sacrificing his private humanity, was reflected in Passages
19 where he quotes a story from Kipling's Rewards and
Fairies, "The Knife and the Naked Chalk".
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This is a Prometheus-type story of a stone-age flint
user, son of a priestess, who, to save his people and flocks
from the depredations of wolves leaves his pasture-lands and
goes to the forest to obtain metal knives from a more
advanced tribe. He wins the knives and saves his people
but at the cost of an eye and his place in the tribe. His
people fear him, exalt him to the status of a god, but another
takes his bride and he is isolated from his mother who still
tends him. Only because he had her promise of faithfullness
did he hazard the adventure and take on the burden of
responsibility, "She answered, 'Whether you live or die,
or are made different, I am your Mother'".63
For Duncan too, it is only because he has this faith
in the Mother, "Story, Herself a mother of sorts"6^ that he
can continue. In these poems at least, in Bending the Bow,
this assurance of the value of poetry and of his own vocation
as a poet does not waver, but indeed in its dedication and
self-transcendence must be considered religious in intensity.
In the later Passages, we do feel that there has been some
kind of sacrifice, that the poet, like the priest-king, has
undergone maiming for the sake of the poem and therefore
for the sake of the people. Perhaps this is a necessary
suffering, a dying into life of the individual poem and
poet as they are assumed into the larger reality:
And from the dying body of America I see,
or from my dying body,
emerge
children of a deed long before this deed 65
In a sense, this necessary sacrifice of the past to
the future is so obvious as to be trivial. Any projection
which becomes actual entails change; every actual moment
makes everything which precedes it unreal except as poten¬
tial for "prehension" or selection into successive actuali¬
ties. But Duncan here charges the metaphysical truism with
political and prophetic force. The poem is the sum of the
present and as such reflects the present evils through
which process is working; it projects beyond these evils
to the future, but a future which necessitates the end of
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the present order. Yet the harder the poem strives towards
this future, the smaller become the concerns of the individual
poet.
However, the later Passages do not completely renounce
the intimacies of the earlier poems. "Transgressing the
Real", Passages 27, establishes a temporary respite, a
recollection of earlier themes and previous apprehensions,
reminding us of the language of the first poem:
(under the cloak of his poem he retires
invisible
so that it seems no man but a world
speaks
for my thoughts are servants of the stars, and my words
(all parentheses opening into
come from a mouth that is the Universe la bouche d'ombre
6 6
But the City has become the War, afternoon has become
night and "la Bouche d'ombre" prevails over the hearth-stone
and lamp-light. Passages 27, as its own images admit, is a
short-lived and mistaken evasion, an attempt to transcend
reality by retreating from the actual. Hence the invocation
of powers and spirits, "fumes, lights, sounds, crystalli¬
sations" previously denounced, and the escape into idealism:
For now in my mind all the young men of my time
have withdrawn allegiance from this ,world, from
public things 6 7
This is a dream poem, a false prophecy in the sense
that it is a projection which is incapable of realisation,
a late attempt of the poet as individual to work, or
influence, the universe through his art. He cannot dream
"industries, businesses, universities, armies" to a halt.
This momentary recoil from necessity is overcome in
the following poem, "The Light", Passages 28, when the poet
acknowledges the inexorable force of process:
that vision in which from the
old law's terrible sentence
wing'.d the new law springs 6s
In Passages 29 and 30 positive transcendence is made
possible through a confrontation of all the horror and
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terror of the present, "the roaring din of American planes".69 •,
Private lives and pleasures are subsumed:
And all times and intents of peaceful men
Reduce to an interim, a passing play,
between surpassing
Crises of war. 7 0
But from this horror, from the cosmic oppositions
enacted with more or less awareness by human protagonists,
process continues and "From the body of the poem, all that
words create/presses forth to be".71
Passages 22-30 are contemporary with protest against
American involvement in Vietnam. That war and the campaign
against it were a challenge which Duncan's poetry rose to
meet as he posed a denunciation of the actual America against
his dream of a possible America, the America which could be
polis, "the company of the living". His vision here is
Whitmanesque and his strong feeling for Whitman allows him
to interpret that poet liberally. Thus, Passages 26 is
not merely ironic:
"The United States themselves are essentially the
greatest poem?"
Then America, the secret union of all states of Man,
waits, hidden and challenging, in the hearts of the
Viet Cong.
"The Americans of all nations at any time upon the earth"
Whitman says - the libertarians of the_spirit, the
devotees of Man's commonality.72
Discussing the same passage from Whitman, in an article
published only two years later Duncan wrote:
Oracles are to be read many ways or both ways. And here,
where "the greatest poem" underlies all, the "united states"
appeared to me as the states of being or of Man united, all
one's states of mind brought together in one governance;
and "the Americans of all nations at any time upon the
earth" means clearly that "America" and being "American"
was a community that was from the beginning of Man and
everywhere in the world. 7 3
Again the poet is poised between the threat of disorder
and the vision of order and union, in that moment between
past and future which is potentially the moment of sunrise:
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we live in the darkness in back of
her rising
sing
from the ridge-pole. 7k
Yet Duncan is very aware that they who lived in
darkness may not live to enjoy the light. As part of the
old order, he too may perish:
It is as if I were moving towards
the wastes of water all living things remember the
world to be,
the law of me
going under the wave. 7 5
The force of Creativity inevitably submerges the
individual in the wave of the continuing poem. But as it
is discontinuous, real only in each successive and separate
moment, it aims at Paradise which is at once the highest
intensity of order and reality in the instant and at the
same time the primordial and prospective union of God and
Man, nature and culture. As we have seen, this is the
potential which informs and lures Duncan's poetry and
constitutes its process. We move in Passages from the
theoretic ideal City, through theories of architecture
and intimacies of the household outwards across previous
stories and histories until we come to the horrifying
actuality of the "swollen city", contemporary society in
America. The poem explicates or unfolds itself in a
process of self-interrogation which we may also describe
as hermeneutic interpretation.
As the series proceeds we note that the imagery becomes
increasingly dynamic, that we move from the notion of the
poem as a solid, created structure to the poem as turbulent,
self-creating organism. Eros as Love and Eros as War are
dominant in this section of the poem in which the inevitabili
of strife must be reconciled with the unacceptability of Evil
They've to take their souls in the war
as the followers of Orpheus take soul1' in
the poem
the wood to take fire from that dirty flame!76
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Duncan's only solution is to understand Vietnam as
the result of inauthentic vision, irresponsibility, the
mistaken use of energy, force misdirected and blind:
0 you, who know nothing of the great theme of War,
fighting because you have to, blindly, at no frontier
of the Truth but in¬
structed by liars and masters of the Lie. 77
The outrages of American policies in the 1960s
proceeded, Duncan argues, from a fundamental flaw in the
national psyche already recognised by Lawrence and prophesied
by Blake:
But the mania, the ravening eagle of America
as Lawrence saw him "bird of men that are masters,
lifting the rabbit-blood of the myriads up into ..."
into something terrible, gone beyond bounds, or
As Blake saw America in figures of fire and blood raging,
... in what image? the ominous roar in the air,
the omnipotent wings, the ail-American boy in the cockpit
loosing his flow of napalm, below in the jungles
"any life at all or sign of life" his target,
drawing now
not with crayons in his secret room
the burning of homes and the torture of mothers and
fathers and
children,
their hair aflame, screaming in agony, but
in the line of duty, for the might and enduring fame
of Johnson, for the victory of American will
over its victims,
releasing his store of destruction over the enemy,
in terror and hatred of all communal things, of communion,
of communism. 78
In his own exegesis of this poem in Man's Fulfillment
in Order and Strife, Duncan explains his notion that America's
distinctiveness comes from a failure to recognise its own
tendencies, the force of its own desire. On this Freudian
interpretation, America destroys because the desire for full
communion is feared and denied. America's disorder is not
therefore creative, but wasteful of energy, a failure in
care; the nation as a whole is afraid of the future, afraid
of the new order which will overwhelm its identity. Duncan
follows his quotations from Blake and Lawrence with a
reference to "The Firebombing" by the contemporary poet,
James Dickey, a writer by whom he was at first impressed
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but now esteems less highly. His condemnation of Dickey
represents his condemnation of this aspect of America:
From a poem by my own near-contemporary, James Dickey, I
brought forward into my own composition the figure of the
bomber - "the Ail-American boy in the cockpit loosing his
flow of napalm"-he appears in Up Rising. Freud has prepared
our minds to see how the unfulfilled and repressed desire
flares up in fear and rages in burning and killing. Blake
and Lawrence, as I have shown, saw America charged with
such force, exploding into scenes of fire and bloodshed.
In Dickey's poem "Firebombing", dwelling upon his own
phantasies, fed by his actual missions over Japan in the
Second World War, the poet projects an exultant and fearful
inner reality in which his somnambulistic experience of
power remembered in his bombing flights mingles with a
hostility towards his own American neighbourhood and even
his home ...
It is his own world, America, that now is burning in his
thought of that world. And like Lawrence, Dickey is not
only exultant in his hostile craving for destructive power
but also apprehensive in that power; in his case he is not
scornful of his scorn (Lawrence sees the Eagle in his
arrogance) but fearful of his fearfulness (Dickey sees
the Eagle in his murderous will) 79
For Duncan, the alternative to this world order is
not the United Nations ... "a bargaining table of rival
predators and their prey", 80 but the vision of a larger
order, of communion, the vision not of the treaty table,
but of the love-feast:
It is not in political right thinking or political power
that we come into the apprehension of a World Order but
in falling in love. It is in the very act of love, in
the marital union, and then in the love-banquet of brother¬
hood ... at once ideal and sexual that the meaning of
freedom and fulfillment is at work. 81
But what is to follow this love feast? It must be
the end of the world. Certainly it is the end of the world
as we know it, the end of us as we know ourselves, and this,
surely, is what we fear, unprepared to admit that though
we reject our death, individually and as our species,
mortality and evolution dictate that we will nevertheless
die. So in the last Passage to appear in Bending the Bow
Duncan comes to a fuller acknowledgement of the nature of
strife, of the eternal opposites, the successive struggles
of death and birth symbolised for him in the emergence of
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Pegasus and Chrysaor from the headless neck of Medusa;
the twain rise to form for this moment
the head of a new monster
Genius 8 2
Process is always ambivalent, the moment is always
pregnant with love and death. Pegasus, "that great horse,
Poetry", must always be accompanied by Chrysaor, father of
Geryon who was the herdsman of the underworld:
And from the dying body of America I see,
or from my dying body,
emerge
children of a deed long before this deed,
seed of Poseidon, depth in which the blue above
is reflected
released
huge Chrysaor and Pegasus sword and flash
Father of Geryon, of him
who carries Dante and Virgil into Hell's depths,
and steed of Bellerophon
beneath whose hooves once again
new springs are loosed on Helicon. 83
Duncan states in The Truth and Life of Myth, "In the
World of myth, Eros and Thanatos rule in the Creative Will".
We may see the myth of Passages as being this struggle
between Eros and Thanatos, a struggle where Eros at first
dominates, but where in the closing sequence Thanatos becomes
increasingly important. In the climactic group of poems,
Passages 22-30 (this includes 22-27 which were published
separately as Of the War) the balance is held and maximum
intensity achieved. Disorder is contained by order. The
early and mid-sixties seem to have been a most fruitful
period for Duncan. There was the poetic communion, the
polis of poetry which included Creeley, Olson and others,
a "company of the living" whose importance Duncan has
attested:
It had been awfully important to me to feel that Denise
Levertov and Robert Creeley and Charles Olson and myself
were a kind of movement and that they took care of a lot




At the same time, this community was located in the
War and in the opposition to America's involvement in Vietnam.
As the war ended and the community broke up, as poets aged,
dispersed, died (Spicer in 1965, Olson in 1970), the impetus
for Passages seems to have slackened, and Thanatos to have
become increasingly important in Duncan's work.
Not only has the tone of his poetry become increasingly
sombre but also his output has decreased. His last published
book is the pamphlet Tribunals: Passages 31-35 (1971) while
Passages 36 appears embedded in "A Seventeenth Century Suite"
(Maps 6; East Garfield, Pennsylvania, 1971). These poems
have a valedictory note and though there is no overt suggest¬
ion of finality we feel that the poet is bringing his
individual work to a close in preparation for his own death.
There is revision of the wide range of sources used in
previous poems, the suggestion of Judgement, the movement
away from this world which is at once a revulsion from
contemporary society and at the same time renunciation of
personal identity and mortality.
In the first poem Duncan returns to the theosophical
doctrines of his childhood, the notion of spirit dispersed
and lost in matters
Out of the sun and the dispersing stars
go forth the elemental sparks,
outpouring vitalities,
stir in the Sallitter of the earth
a living Spirit. 85
Each spark of spirit has a double identity, the
possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence:
the spirit can
and may raise or drawn itself
in its own qualities, or take its life
in the influence of the stars, as it pleaseth. 86
The contrast of spirit and matter is of course dualistic
and implies a Gnostic turning from the world towards the
other world, an impression reinforced in Passages 32:
Your name, Jesus, has begun in my heart
again an allegiance to that Kingdom
"not of this world" but in the beginning of things
fallen apart 8 7
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This dualism is counterbalanced by Duncan's unitive
organic philosophy where all phenomena, all individuals
obey the same law of process, so that each individual word,
each individual cell, each individual spark images and
implies the entire cosmos. In Passages 31 he identifies
or rimes "Word" with "spark", each being a "severed
distinct thing", as man himself is an "isolated satyr".
Yet it is as man follows or recognises the organic law
at work in the words that the himself is: led back upwards
to the stars:
He bends his head
to hear the sound he makes
that leads his heart upward,
ascending to where the best breaks
into an all-but-unbearable whirling crown
of feet dancing 8 8
This notion of the word as cellular individual is
reinforced by Duncan's reading of Sir Charles Sherrington's
Man on His Nature, which he cites as his source in the
following discussion:
The cell is not a polyphasic chemico-physical system merely.
Many a magic drop of complex jelly could be that. (So too,
the phone in itself as a mere noise has no "self"; it is,
as with the life-cell of the body, because it carries the
Ka or DNA, the information of the sound of the poem that
the imagination addresses that it comes as sounding. The
phone of the poem has tonal meaning or individuality that
leads towards the whole that it belongs to. We can hear
the rightness of the rime and follow it faithfully, even
when the society it means never comes to more than fragmen¬
tary realisation. The sound intends). The cell is a poly¬
phasic chemico-physical system which is integratively
organised. Hence there comes about that it can answer
to what is described as "life". 89 .
In the struggle to relate the individual to the whole,
Duncan is attempting to come to terms with his own mortality,
presaged by high blood-pressure, a condition already influen¬
cing his poetry in "The Soldiers" and "Up Rising":
the blood's natural
uprising against tryanny 9 0
and acknowledged in Passages 30, "from my dying body". In
Passages 31, paying tribute to Olson both his peer and
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master who was dying or had already died, he quotes from
Projective Verse:
Eternity
already gone up into "MUST MUST MUST
the Poet, his heart urgent,
leaping beyond him, writes: "MOVE
INSTANTER ON ANOTHERI" 9 *
From here, he moves on to a prophecy and apparent
acceptance of his own death, viewed as a death into life:
I saw
willingly the strain of my heart break
and pour its blood thundering at the life-locks
to release full my man's share of the stars'
majesty thwarted. 9 2
However, the placing of the last two words somehow
subverts the entire poem by returning to the notion of
individual power and earthy ambition.
These latest poems are rancorous, confused and confusing.
The rage against American society remains but the crusading
optimism has gone. Passages 34, "The Feast" is almost a
parody of the true love-feast in which the nations were to
be united. Instead we have a private dinner-party where the
details of the cooking become repulsive in the context of
napalm-burned flesh which has filled the previous poem:
the guests
gather round
pleasures of the household, the fine
burnt smell of the meat pleasing
to the nostrils yet
this house is not Jahweh's 9 ?
We are reminded both that we may not, in honesty,
retreat from the world into the household, and also of the
true, fearful nature of the communion supper. Eros as Lover
is also Eros as Hunger and life continues by feeding on life.
Duncan is struggling in this poem with this concept
of the process and of Paradise as present only in the here
and now of the moment against the continuing attraction of
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the "shining world", of the transcendental world of light
proposed by the Gnostics. Similarly, he seems unable to
reconcile his vision of the present reality giving way to
a greater reality with the fact that future reality, the
truth which is to come, cannot be known to him even though
his poetry may form a part of it. He castigates America
for its failure to reach its potential:
I am speaking now of the dream in which America sleeps,
the New World,
moaning, floundering, in three hundred years of
invasions - ... 9 ^
Yet this Blakean rhetoric cannot prevent us from
realising that this dream in which America is immersed
like the Gnostic Adam before the arrival of the Messenger
is only another aspect of the more usual American optimism,
the American dream which was Whitman's and had been Duncan's:
The Jews use the name Israel,
you use the name America or the name Man as if for a
chosen tribe
or nation or for one animal species the Grand Design
labord,
or for the orders of Life,
but the Golden Ones meet in the Solar Councils
and their alphabet is hidden in the evolution of
chemical codes. 9 5
The Golden Ones are gorgeous but unconvincing and the
discoveries of science about the functioning of the chemical
codes have to some extent turned against Duncan. Perhaps,
in these lines covertly, for he cannot acknowledge it overtly,
he recognises the possibility of randomness and chance at
play in the universe:
I don't believe there is any chance at all ... I mean, we
have got testimony about chance, don't we? But personally
I find myself deficient in my sense of chance.9 6
Admittedly in this same passage he does argue that
chance operations reveal "a higher not a lesser order", but
the assertion is not worked out with conviction in the poem.
In a sense, therefore, Duncan seems to have turned his back
on possibility, to have behaved inauthentically. Looked
at from another aspect, it may appear that his individual
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poetic energy and capacity for order is failing, that the
structure of his poetry is becoming looser, less intense,
that entrophy is at work. So that the plea that the human
mind must shake loose may at one level be a demand for
creative disruption but at the same time may reflect a
loss of energy, a deterioration into formlessness and
disorder.
In Passages 36, embedded in the very fine Seventeenth
Century Suite, the poet seems to have collected himself,
although at the same time he is returning to an earlier
mode of derivations from the masters which offers him some
external structurai support. But even here the very strength
of the poem lies in its despair:
Eat, eat this bread and be thankful
it does not yet run with blood 9 7
in its humility and recognition of limit:
For a moment,
ephemeral, we keep,
alive in the deepening shame of Man,
this room where we are, this house,
this garden, this home
our art would make
in what is threatened from within. 9 8
The bard's robes seem to have been laid aside as the
poet returns to the domestic hearth. But this is not a
poem of reconciliation or solution; rancour, injuries,
discontents are still fresh, still painful. Yet if this
embittered retrospective is into the final Passage it is
difficult to conceive of a sequel:
It was about the end of an old friendship,
the admission of neglect rancoring,
mine of her, hers of what I am,
And festering flesh was there.
It was very like that coming to know
my mother was at war with what I was to be,
and in the Courts of Love I raged that year
in every plea declared arrogant
and in contempt of Love.
I do not as the years go by grow tolerant
of what I cannot share and what
refuses me. There's that in me as fiercely beyond
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the remorse that eats me in its drive
as Evolution is in
working out the courses of what will last.
In Truth 'tis done. At last. I'll not
9 9
repair.
But Duncan, of course, has himself provided the
answer:
Because when he (Williams) finished Book IV, he had this
marvellous example of a Coda. Williams realised that
after his conclusion he had another book. 100
Seventeenth Century Suite ends with a coda, which
though not a "Passage" recapitulates many of the series'
concerns and images:
and into Night I go; I say
the Night was hidden in the life of me I cannot say
was hidden thru and thru.
Campfire by campfire burns thru the veil.
And to the shores
sleep knows upon a further deep
solemnity
into the infancy of a darkening bliss
Love sets me free. 101
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EDWARD DORN AND GUNSLINGER
Gunslinger is an intriguing and in many ways baff¬
ling poem. It is off-beat, casual, jokey, yet Robert
Duncan has acclaimed it as
One of the poems of the era, of the one we are
going into, or the era Gunslinger begins to
create for us.1
The poem resists interpretation, indeed it seems wilfully
difficult. When the poet makes so few concessions to
his readers it is open to them to adopt their own reading
strategy. It is legitimate for the informed reader or
critic to measure the poem against his own expectations
of what a poem in this category should do or be. It
must be stressed, however, that the reader cannot afford
to be dogmatic about categorial definitions and that he
should be willing to modify his expectations in the
light of his reading, a reading which in any case he
must not regard as definitive.
In this study we have developed certain expectations
of the contemporary long poem, of the poem with epic
pretensions and founded on a metaphysics of process.
We must summarize these expectations briefly before
embarking on the attempt at an interpretation of
Gunslinger.
We have discovered that the long poem of today will
be based on one or other of the philosophies of process,
and consequently that its founding myth or structural
metaphor will be the oscillation between the One and
the Many, a process which is the generating dynamic of
the poem. The One and the Many are at once opposite
and equal, and from this primary polarization subsidiary
opposites follow. The Many includes the world, history,
separate events, individual consciousnesses, disconnect¬
edness; the One includes Mind, the collective conscious¬
ness, myth, ritual and celebration. In the poem, mind
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seeks to integrate itself by encompassing the multipli¬
city of the world, by converting the separated events
of history into the permanence of myth. This operation
is carried out in language through the unifications of
metaphor.
We have discovered also that the poem based on
process philosophy is not autonomous and cannot be finish¬
ed except in the most arbitrary ways, for example, by
the bottom of the page, end of the book, authorial whim,
or even the author's death. The only wholeness the
poem can have is symbolized by Charles Olson's Ouroboros
or MacDiarmid's circumjack Cencrastus, "the curly snake"
which, forever swallowing its tail, represents eternal
process. As the poem is never complete, so it is never
detached. Though it operates in its own sphere accord¬
ing to the rules and expectations of poetry and litera¬
ture, it is interdependent with the world of mind and
the physical world. In an age which has concentrated
on the study of meaning, which has invented semiology
and revolutionized linguistics, poetry, in some sense
parent of all these activities, has become increasingly
self-conscious. Poetry is seen as one form of linguis¬
tic activity, one way in which mind finds and transmits
material from the external world. For some poets and some
philosophers poetry may be the epitome of linguistic
activity; they would argue that poetry's justification
lay in its capacity to structure the external world sig¬
nificantly, to innovate in language and thus extend
possibilities for communication and action. So poetry,
like other forms of language, may be a form of life,
but "there are many forms of life"2 and poetry's glory
lies not in its detachment from other forms but in its
involvement with them. The view that poetry's idio-
syncracy is found not in its separateness from life and
process but in its character as linguistic process results
in a concentration on language within the poem itself.
Worked become self-regarding, convoluted; words create
meaning instead of meaning being put into words.
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As well as the themes of process and of language,
any contemporary long poem with epic or political pre¬
tensions will perforce concern itself with matters of
myth and history. It will draw on myth and history for
its own substance, it will convert history into myth
through metaphorical discoveries of identity and re¬
petition, it will emerge as history in its own right,
an event occurring in the wider world. At the same
time, within its own limits according to its own rules
the poem will establish its own history and myth.
Let us therefore consider the "matter" of Gunslinger;
how the semi-autonomous world of the work is construc¬
ted from the facts and fictions of the wider universe,
Much more than any other poem we have studied, Gunslinger
is a fiction, a story, a world with its own characters
and rules. But these characters are derived in one way
or another from the "real" world. The geography of the
poem is "real", the action is placed in the American
South-West. Imaginary characters perform a "real"
journey travelling through "real" towns - Mesilla, Truth
or Consequences, Madrid, Cerillos, Santa Fe. But the
real and the imaginary are lifted to another plane where
one is no less credible than the other, the Rio Grande
no more real than the Talking Horse. In the other poems
which have been examined, historical and mythical con¬
tent enter with little distortion or mediation; in
Gunslinger they are transformed. This may in part result
from the suppression of the "I" since it removes the
temptation of the poet to regard the poem as the re¬
presentation of his own mind and to transfer his own
mental furnishings into the poem, unaltered. However,
though the world of Gunslinger does separate itself from
the world of its author, it cannot be read in isolation
from politics and literature. Dorn requires from his
reader a fairly high level of general education since
the poem exploits and at one level satirizes contem¬
porary culture: structuralism, existentialist philosophy,
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computer technology and so on. The real names which
appear in the poem, such as Heidegger and Levi-
Strauss, demand a sophisticated response, an ability
to recognize them as "names", code-words bandied about
in certain circles. Even as names/ apart from the
content of their writings, they are words to conjure
with:
I want these characters to have the possibility
of such names because they are widely understood
and evokable intellectual signs. After all, this
poem is addressed to the community in which I move
which is educated. My own audience might be small
but it is potentially comprehensive because the
intellectual community is a mass community as much
as the cotton picker's community, or the trucker's.3
We notice here that Dorn is addressing himself to
a community, so fulfilling one of the conditions for
an epic or public poem. This confidence that there is
a community from which and to which he speaks is essen¬
tial. Robert Duncan, to an extent, shares the same
audience as Dorn, although in his case he addresses
himself to the idea of an audience, a to-be-redeemed
American society harangued by prophet-poets from Whitman
to Olson. Dorn, in contrast, abdicates the prophetic
role as he abdicates the "I" which inside the poem is
resigned to Slinger and Poet. The romantic subjecti¬
vity which threatens to overwhelm the poems of Duncan
and, differently, MacDiarmid,is thus avoided so that
Dorn is able to write what Donald Davie has recognized
as true comedy.
What will get least attention in Dorn's Gunslinger
is just what first strikes and beguiles any half-way
competent reader ... the fact that it is a joking
poem, high-spirited and good-tempered, carried for¬
ward on a steadily inventive play of puns and
pleasantries. For centuries now English speakers
have not known what to do with comedy, in verse or
out of it. We have been quite at a loss before the
classical conviction that comedy is one of the great
canonical modes in which the imagination asserts
itself; that the comic vision is an inclusive, as
vigorous, ultimately as grave, as the tragic vision
which it complements.1*
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We may see how real names and events are metamor¬
phosed if we consider the role that Hughes plays, or
does not play, on the poem. We discover that on one
level Hughes is no mere than a code name for the object
of the quest, but that since the true object of the
quest is the quest itself, Hughes is unimportant:
He was invoked as the object of the search in a
hypothetical way, not in any real way, because
nobody's looking for him really.5
"Hughes" in the poem does not denote a single, eccen¬
tric millionaire, but is rather a sign for all the conno¬
tations which have accreted around the name. It is
this name and its connotations, its mythical qualities,
which are juggled in the poem, a lesson which Slinger
tries to teach "I" early in the proceedings:
It is that
cruelly absolute sign my father
I am the son of the sun, we two
are always in search






Because the third can never be
a texan 6
As readers, we are being deliberately bemused by
the conventions for printing dialogue. In this inter¬
change it is the crosstalk that matters, not who is say¬
ing what, since ultimately the characters are all one.
But the message is there: Slinger, taking on in this
passage heroic stature derived from Trinitarian myth
and Navaho legend, by asserting that Hughes is the name
of the quest and therefore as general as the Logos or
the Holy Ghost, as the Absolute itself, shows that he
cannot be a particular named texan, Howard Hughes. When
we proceed to The Cycle, the notions surrounding that
"individual Texan" are attached to Robart (the real
Howard Hughes's middle name) or Rupert (Rupert Bear?).
The distortion of the name Howard Robard Hughes and the
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surrealistic exaggeration of the gossip surrounding the
millionaire remind us again that this is a poetic dis¬
course, not journalism. Hughes actually was rumoured
by the press to wear Kleenex boxes on his feet but his
reputation for eating burgers is heightened in the poem
till he himself becomes the Big Cheese:
5 For He was decoyed as the cheeze in a burger
Upon a long white stretcher ferried by two poodles
While he shuffled along with his feet encased
In kleenex boxes He wobbled astride an industrial broom7
In fact, as the technique becomes more surrealistic
the political attack on the matter rather than the person
of Hughes becomes more direct. The choice of Hughes
as a name is not random, for Dorn has declared himself
fascinated by the mixture of money and power represented
in the robber barons, perhaps the real founding fathers
of present-day America:
I saw an energy there that I thought was extremely
interesting... They were like dinosaurs in a strange
way. More interesting really than the larger combines
that more efficiently make capital coalesce. It's
another aspect of that individualism syndrome that
we still, in fact, creep beneath completely in this
country ... I think it's completely interesting. It's
drama. It's drama about the most crucial thing we
know, money.8
Dorn has exploited the facts and the already mytho-
logocal stories as material for his poem. Inside the
poem they take on their own life; Hughes and Robart have
their own history and establish their own myth. But
their action inside the poem, the poem itself are an
accretion to the Hughes myth and a comment on our society.
Gunslinger insists on itself as a poem, not only
a poem, but a poem in print, a book. Its world is a
world of literature, its ancestors other poems. Gun¬
slinger is given to punctuating his conversation with
first lines from Shakespeare's sonnets.
How like a winter hath my absence been
observed the Slinger to himself 9
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Metaphor is drawn from printing convention:
the barrel justified
with a line pointing
to the neighborhood of infinity.10
(a neighborhood delimited by the full stop)
on her ankle a band
a slender ampersand 11
The Literate Projector which converts films back into
scripts also asserts the booklines of the book, and when
the Cycle is eventually delivered it comes from the Poet
who must himself be the Literate Projector. Thus the
Poet retrieves the role of story-teller, myth-keeper
from films and television.
As a printed poem, Gunslinger is able to exploit
typographical devices such as the Proclamation (p.80),
the Night Letter from I, Secretary to Parmendies, and
even the illuminated letter at the beginning of the pro¬
logue to Book IIII. The typography confers a signifi¬
cance the spoken world alone could not convey; "Goddesse"
with an illuminated G informs us that we are in an arti¬
ficial poetic world, that although the geography of the
poem is in the raw South-West, it is at the same time
firmly located in the tradition of the Greeks, the Eliza¬
bethans and all our later literature. So unlike a great
deal of writing, particularly since the insistence on
naturalism and realism, the poem does not attempt to
copy reality or replicate nature:
The replification(sic) of the world is possibly
no longer interesting. But, does it still generate
itself, and in Pieces is: the world breath is a
motion of real establishment. And the confron¬
tations, within the organism of their emotional
time, are the exactitude of the world insofar as
it can be accurate.12
The attempt is not to conform with the world of
appearances, but to discover the well-rounded heart of
reality, to be authentic to the Inner "One" behind all
appearances:
There is but one Logos
Tho many images audition 13
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Liberated from the obligation to copy the real world,
the poem enlarges its boundaries, pretends to the domi¬
nant reality. There is a sense in which Duncan, in
earnest, and Dorn, not entirely in jest, attempt them¬
selves to get into the world of words, to make their
fictions "real". As a conceit this is poetry; believed,
it is magic, an attempt to recover a prelapsarian state
where word and world, idea and reality, man and God are
one. The exaltation of the world of the poem has its
dangers, for the poet, all-powerful in his imagination,
may become too complacent about the intractibility of
the everyday world he shares with the rest of us and
consequently forfeit our confidence in his vision.
Dorn's affectation of inhabiting the poem and of
placing its events on a level with those of his life so
that they are interconnected has its irritating conse¬
quences. The average reader is deprived of certain
material he needs to understand the poem. Public ref¬
erences are more acceptable. If all works of litera¬
ture indeed formed a vast realm in which particular poems
were unfenced regions and if we were all able to live
as unconfined inhabitants of the realm instead of as
restricted individuals in the physical world then we
would have no difficulty in making connections, picking
up references, making inferences from other sources.
With a great deal of effort we can uncover references
to publicly available works, and this sort of effort has
been made with, for instance, the poetry of Pound, Eliot
and Olson. But there is a quantity of private informa¬
tion and reference accessible only to Dorn's immediate
audience, his peers on both sides of the Atlantic with
whom he shared his life, his work and even his writing
while Gunslinger was in progress. For example, the inter¬
views in Contemporary Literature and Vort show that parts
of Gunslinger relate very closely to Bean News, a once-
off ephemeral newspaper written in conjunction with
Jeremy Prymfi&and others:
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The lead story in Bean News is "Sllab Outline Arrives".
This is all like Book III stuff, the deity of which
Bean is the messenger. And Bean is the editor of
Bean News. So suddenly what's the newspaper our
group reads as they're travelling...Bean News. In
that sense I'm interested in the experimental aspect
of a newspaper rising vertically off the pages of
the poem in a three-dimensional sense. So this has
"Sllab Outline Arrives, In a cloud of adobe dust
and chicken feathers...out of state eye-witness
account". BNS, Bean News Service, Beenville,
Colorado. I is in the meantime off at Notsuoh,
which is Houston spelled backward, at the conference
on mega-space and reporting what's happening there.
And the editorial quotes a signal which arrived too
late to print, which by the at time deals with the
arrival of Sllab in Beenville because all those vectors
have been bicked up. I mean that is what it means
to me. Anybody else can read it as a newspaper.
In the list on the editorial page it shows who
has contributed in one way or another. 111
But anyone cannot read this ephemeral publication, most
copies of which are lost. Yet from Dorn's interview it
would appear that certain sections of Book III could be
very much illumined by reference to the paper.
There is but one Sllab ahead
(don't look back
and Bean is his messenger 15
In the final version of the poem it is only here and in
a passage in Book IIII that we find any reference to
Sllab. It is like reading a serial with some of the
parts missing; we are prevented from understanding the
full significance of Sllab.
You mean that giant bronze bean
That's Sllab's messenger 16
A colossal monument which arrives as mysteriously as the
monolith in Kubrick's 2001, it is, despite appearances,
made out of rubber and, like a jukebox, is coin-operated
to broadcast its message:
The Fenomena is stark, energetic
full-of-shit & well defined -
altho there is much that I find sickening -
the excessive opulence & waste,
the blatant commercialization
on which the society is built,
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the selfish introspective approach
to world affairs, the hysterical
obsession with disease,
the puerile abhorrence of old age
& death - all these illnesses
are the manifestation of overdeveloped rites 17
In the poem we are not fairly provided with informa¬
tion about Sllab; preceding passages suggest that he is
one manifestation of Hughes - "Hecho on Texas/para El
Hughes Tool Co", but that it is Hughes as Deus Abscon-
ditus:
I meant to say Sllab
did a fantastik job
and furthermore, left it
right in the middle of the field
at half-time, remember,
then he took a plane to the Garage
and Drove the rest of the way 18
As a God-figure, his role in creating a society is equi¬
valent to that of the poet, while the message given him
seems to coincide with Dorn's own views. Yet we are not
adequately informed why there should be this resolution
with the Other, the Adversary and though we may deduce
it, we may not be persuaded. This is a recurring prob¬
lem in Books III and IIII where the poem takes off in
a number of different directions which do not proceed
from Books I and II, but from other activities in the
poet's life which most readers cannot know about.
Similar difficulties are caused by the use of pri¬
vate vocabularies, drug slang and so forth, in the poem.
Again, it is partly due to the poet's sense of an inner
circle to which he is speaking with such confidence that
he can afford to ignore the incomprehension of the mass;
but there is also a deliberate pursuit of obscurity, a
sort of neo-hermeticism which is cultivated for its own
sake. Perhaps this creation of secrets increases the
poet's sense of power over language, his feeling that
he can withold as well as communicate information, that
certain truths will only be granted to those who win
them. The poem thus imposes a quest on the reader, a
quest which not all (the lazy, the non-hip, the un¬
educated, the uninitiated) are equipped to fill. Some
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may feel, as I do, that thelanguage of the poem is ex¬
clusive to the point of arrogance and that this dimi¬
nishes its value.
On the other hand, the references to Parmendides,
Heidegger, Levi-Strauss etc. may make the poem more
difficult but seem entirely legitimate because they direct
us to work in the public domain. Dorn himself has more
than once denied that a detailed knowledge of the works
of any of them is essential for the reading of Gunslinger:
You see, I don't want the poem to be susceptible
or dependent on textural considerations which are
external to itself. Like it's not an academic
poem. I mean you might know what I or anyone
knows about Heidegger, or how much they've read.
I hope that's not detectable.19
However, understanding of the poem is enhanced if one
has some familiarity with the ideas of these writers
since they do provide the set and stage furnishings for
the poem on the intellectual level. For instance, it
helps to know that Parmenides' extant work is cast in
the form of a dream poem where the philosopher is carried
off in a horse-drawn chariot. The departure of the stage¬
coach at the end of the first book of Gunslinger is
strongly reminiscent of Parmenides' Proem:
The steeds that carry me took me as far as my heart
could desire, when once they had brought me and set
me on the renowned way of the goddess, who leads the
man who knows through every town. On the way I was
conveyed; for on it did the wise steeds convey me,
drawing my chariot, and maidens led the way. And
the axle blazing in the socket - for it was urged
round by well-turned wheels at each end - was making
the wheels in the nave sing, while the daughters of
the Sun, hastening to convey me into the light,
threw back the veils from off their faces and left
the abode of night.20
As important as these surface echoes is the reinforce¬
ment of the quest theme. Gunslinger and I enter upon
a quest, code-named "Hughes". We may suspect that their
goal is essentially that of Parmenides "the unshaken
heart of well-rounded truth". The notion of the quest
is one representation or metaphor of the lure of creati¬
vity, the attempt to articulate and order the Many into
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the One, while the pursuit or journey is the process,
the reality of the poem:
What makes Process and Reality heavy
is the & 21
The naming of Parmenides may be regarded as further
indication that the poem is founded on process philoso¬
phies and projective poetics for Parmenides, like
Heraclitus, Anaximander and other pre-Socratics, is
regarded by the process philosophers as an early master.
We have seen that contemporary process or projective
poetics derive very largely from an amalgam of Heidegger's
thought and Whitehead's Process and Reality, particularly
as mediated by Charles Olson. For Heidegger especially,
Parmenides was an important figure. Opinions as to
what Parmenides actually taught vary but he seems to
have regarded Being or Reality as the unknowable plenum,
while the multifarious world of appearances and change
is illusory and unreal:
Wherefore all these are more names which mortals
laid down believing them to be true - coming into
being and perishing, being and not being, change
of place and variation of bright colour.22
Dear lengthening Day
I have loved your apparencies since you created me 2 3
At least according to Heidegger, these early Greeks were:
'perpetually compelled to wrest Being from appearance
and preserve it against appearance... in the ceaseless
struggle between Being and Seeming they wrested Being
from the essent, bringing permanence and unconceal-
ment to the essent'. As against the later falling
apart of Being and Seeming with Plato, the great age
of Greece was a unique creative self-assertion amid
the confusion of the complex struggle between the
two powers of Being and Seeming. Seeming belongs to
Being itself as appearing and because of this the early
Greek thinkers, Parmenides in particular, devoted
their main effort to the task of rescuing Being from
Seeming by distinguishing it from the latter and from
non-Being - it is with this distinction that, as
Heidegger says, Western man's historical existence
begins. The inner unity of Being and appearance has
found concise expression in Heraclitus's saying
physis kryptesthai philei i.e. Being, as physis (coming
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out of hiddenness) in itself tends to self-
concealment to a relapse into that. Being and
Seeming are locked together, intrinsically, in
the unity of polemos, of perpetual war. Becoming
too, like seeing, is not sheer nothing and there¬
fore, though opposed to Being in the sense of
what stands out in permanent sameness, is yet
comprehended in Being in the larger sense.
The constant attempt to go beyond appearance results
in more becoming apparent, a becoming which incites
further attempts to transcend appearance. This is
process and in his description of man's part in it,
Heidegger comes close to Whitehead:
Being in the sense of physis or emergence into
unhiddenness, and poein are the same in the sense
of inherently belonging together; where unhidden¬
ness occurs and Being prevails, there occurs also,
as necessarily implied in it, apprehension. Further,
such apprehension, far from being a power exercised
by man as a subject, is itself possible to man
because he himself is part of Being (physis) and
so shares in the apprehending (noein) that is
intrinsic to Being. The Being of man himself is
determined by the inner unity and togetherness of
physis and noein. Apprehension, Heidegger says,
is here not a possibility belonging to man, with
his nature already defined; apprehension is rather
a happening, sharing in which man enters into history
as an essent, appears, that is, in the literal sense,
comes into being. Apprehension is not a mdde of
activity which man posses as an attribute; on the
contrary, man himself is a function of apprehension.25
We have acknowledged Dorn's claim that a detailed
knowledge of Heidegger is not necessary for a satisfac¬
tory reading of the poem. Nevertheless we must recog¬
nize that it is written within a framework of ideas heavily
influenced by Heidegger and Heidegger's disciples.
British insularity and inimicality of our native philo¬
sophical tradition to continental metaphysics have resulted
in an underestimation of Heidegger, "the secret king of
thought" and his influence. As George Steiner has pointed
out, his influence lies behind many of the key figures
in European and American philosophy, linguistics and
culture criticism, figures we are realizingr tardily,
we cannot afford to discount:
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The existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre is,
explicitly, a version and critique of the idiom
and propositions in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger's
explications of Heraclitus, Anaximander, Parmenides,
Plato and Aristotle have entered, though in a
bitterly contested guise, into the whole current
image of Greek thought and civilization. There is
now a Heideggerian linguistics or 'metaphysical
etymologizing and nominalism - again both highly
controversial and formative. The 'structuralist'
and 'hermeneutic' schools of textual interpreta¬
tion (where 'hermeneutic' signifies the understand¬
ing of understanding', the attempt to formalise
and describe from within the ways in which we inter¬
pret the meanings of meaning) draw copiously on
Heidegger, via Gadamer in Germany and Derrida in
France. Even more arrestingly, Heidegger's doc¬
trines on the nature of language and poetry have
marked literary theory in Germany,inFrance, in the
United States, where the current debate over the
nature of a literary text', over the dialectical
interactions between poet, reader and language are
thoroughly Heideggerian. Indeed they have had 6Ktir
impact on the actual practice of such poets as
ReneChar and Paul Celan. It is now beginning to
look as if Mallarme and Heidegger are the two seminal
figures in the current linguistic self-consciousness
or 'reflexivity' in literature and criticism.36
This passage delineates areas of thought and ideas which
we have already discovered in our discussion of Robert
Duncan and which we recognize again in the study of
Gunslinger. The Greeks, Structuralism, hermeneutics,
linguistic self-consciousness, interaction between poet,
reader and language; all these concerns are of acknow¬
ledged importance in Gunslinger, and indeed are under¬
lying preoccupations in each of the poems we are consi¬
dering.
It is in Dorn's prologues that we come closest to
direct statement of poetic belief and intent. These
passages have their own surreal logic, an amalgam of
associational thinking and philosophical enquiry, of
literary archaisms and ephemeral slang. Dorn himself
seems to see them as a device to increase the formal or
ritualistic aspects of the poem's performance:
The main reason is, a narrative is like an evening.
There's no way to start it out directly, you have
to build the fire and you sit around the fire. You
get everything ready, in fact, you know, you lay
things out.2 7
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Although they are not necessarily consistent with each
other, a closer consideration of the prologues may pro¬
vide a clearer understanding of the different directions
and developments in the action of the poem. There is
no prologue to the first book which reflects its origin
as the poem "An Idle Visitation" first published in
The North Atlantic Turbine (London, 1967). This in it¬
self is an indication of the poem's involvement in our
external, historical time which a formal symmetry would
disguise. The second book does have a prologue, perhaps
the least impenetrable of the three. Unlike the other
two it is not separated from the rest of its book by
a title or a typographic device and indeed there is a
suggestion that it may be delivered by Poet, a character
whom Dorn sometimes seems to inhabit inside the poem.
The poet starts the strings
as sleep inhabits the stage,
along the silver of a morning raga,
So this raga disperses
as the shimmering of its sense goes out 28
The theme of the prologue is the opposition of 'we'
and 'they' who are, at the same time, interchangeable.
This is picked up in the body of the poem as the opposi¬
tion between "we", (Gunslinger and the stage-coach
passengers) versus 'they' (Hughes/Robart and his crew).
Here, however, 'we' are those who 'wake', who 'see',
who are in tune with the universe, who 'live', 'celebrate',
'concur' and are 'collective':
Our company thus moves collectively
along the River Rio Grande 2 9
The primary opposition of 'we' and 'they' is obscured
by pronominal ambiguities and alternating perspectives.
Thus as the prologue opens the narrator, be he Dorn or
Poet, seems detached, describing the inhabitants of the
stage-coach favourably but from the outside:
This tapestry moves
as the morning lights up.
And they who are in it move
and love its moving 3 0
Although still 'they' at this point, this group
seem to be within the reach of the harmony of the universe
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which would make them 'we'. Their movement is synthe¬
sized with the movement of their environment they travel
because
To see
Is their desire 31
Perhaps they must be 'they' at this stage because they
are still searching, "moving/from sleep to Ideas" and
their quest does have the effect of estranging them from
the rest of humanity:
they wander estranged
through the lanes of the Tenders
of Objects 32
These disparaged creatures, later the dwellers of
Universe City, do not even warrant a 'they'. Immersed
in matter, they 'sleep', are 'blind', dominated by material
objects and 'separate events'. They dance 'wide eyed'
to a tune which they cannot recognize; they seek a 'plan'
but instead are ruled by a 'schedule'. However, both
groups remain 'they' as they fail to overcome the dual-
istic drift, the materialists plunged in the sleep of
matter, the idealists aroused and in pursuit of the
Idea. Only when they truly wake to the present live
moment can they become 'we'
All may wake who live
the combination is given 3 3
The transition to 'we' is effected through a transi¬
tion from history, diachronic events, "Time does not
consent", to myth and ritual which, according to Levi-
Strauss, lie outside historical time and perform a uni¬
fying function, "Only celebrations concur". Myth, re-
enacted in ritual such as epic recitation, dance, theatre,
the Christian Mass, reveals inner reality, the 'plan':
we concur To See
The Universe 3 **
In the belief of Levi-Strauss, myth, analyzed according
to structuralist principles, will reveal a non-rational
or concrete logic which is universal, the product of the
collective unconscious. We have access to this collective
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unconscious through dream, myth, fairy-tale and it is
hoped, through poetry. The travellers on the stage¬
coach are engaged on the same quest as, differently,
are the structural anthropologists.
Levi-Strauss's thought here dovetails with Heidegger-
ian teaching for, according to Heidegger, it is our own
sophistication, our outline which has disguised from us
the real nature of Being:
Our preparatory Interpretation of the fundamental
structure of Dasein with regard to the average
kind of Being which is closest to it (a kind of Being
in which it is therefore proximately historical as
well), will make manifest, however, not only that
Dasein is inclined to fall back upon its world
(the world in which it is) and to interpret itself
in terms of that world by its reflected light but
also that Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the
tradition of which it has more or less explictly
taken hold. This tradition keeps it from providing
its own guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing.
This holds true - and by no means least - for that
understanding which is rooted in Dasein's own most
Being, and for the possibility of developing it -
namely for ojtological understanding. When tradi¬
tion thus becomes master, it does so in such a way
that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible,
proximally and for the most part, that it rather
becomes concealed.3 5
It is the world which is too much with us, which encourages
us to lapse into being "Tenders of Objects" which removes
us from authentic existence, the reality of our own
Being.
This prologue proclaims the quest as the effort
to integrate fragmented consciousness at the individual
and universal levels and to achieve the understanding
of Reality, especially human reality, the "Human Thing".
The recitation is relinquished to poem's Poet whose
poem or raga is said to penetrate appearance to the inner
structure, the world-tree ("Ygdrasillic yoga") which
supports us. Only through this vision and understanding,
again a Heideggerian notion, can we project ourselves
into the future.
Oh quickbeamJ oh quake and sway into waking
With aspergill enter Into the future 3 6
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If we take the quickbeam to be at once Yggdrasil, the
world-ash, and the stage-coach, "quaking and swaying",
we perceive that the quest for self-understanding, for
the reality of "man-in-the-world" is at the same time
a possibility for and a blessing of the future. The
shaking leaves of Yggdrasil sprinkle holy water, like
an aspergill, on what is to come, the world- project.
In Heidegger's thought, self-understanding and the
creation of the future were to be achieved through lang¬
uage, through poetry:
We do not learn what man is by learned definition;
we learn it only when man contends with the essent,
striving to bring it into its being, i.e. into limit
and form, that is to say when he projects something
new (not yet present) when he creates original
poetry, when he builds poetically.37
This prologue together with our recollections of
Book I provide us with certain expectations. We know
that we are engaged on a spiritual quest which is also,
probably, a quest for Howard Hughes. We know that there
is a division between questers and those ordinary mor¬
tals who are blinded by everyday concerns. Already,
I's existence has been made precarious; as an indivi¬
dual, separated self or ego, he had been threatened by
Slinger and Horse. Now, in the second Book, in a hila¬
rious episode, "mind-blown" by consciousness-expanding
drugs, I dies. However, in his place, the coach has
picked up the hitch-hiker, Kool Everything, an unlike-
able character who is the consequence of I's death:
What keeps you beside the road?
Dispersal, friend
my Head has been misplaced.38
The simple destruction of the ego is not, therefore,
the answer. In fact, it turns out that I is not dead
but had gone ahead to Universe City. For full integra¬
tion of consciousness I must return to the team, an event
which does not take place until Book IIII by which time
circumstances have changed anyway.
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The central figure in Book II is Poet; the action
is the journey to Universe City which is punctuated by
his poems and undertaken largely in order that he may
deliver The Cycle Poet, as narrator, takes over the
role of "mortal I", while as Singer, he moves towards
Slinger, towards the "semi-dios". Poet's poems should
be poems within a poem but they seem at times to become
the outer poem, reminding us that we are within a uni¬
verse subject to the laws of linguistics not of physics.
We have already noticed that the prologue may in fact
be Poet's morning raga. His next two poems create the
morning and the time of the journey, for this is a
journey through words, not through space. "Cool Liquid
Comes" is an enabling poem, a prophecy, projecting the
future, a poem demanded by Slinger:
so that the roots of my soul
may be loosened and grow past
the hardness of the Future 3 9
and as such, a task almost beyond Poet's powers. In the
world of language, Poet has the undisputed power to in¬
voke, to call into being. Here, he prophesies the
journey:
Cool dry,
Shall come the results of inquiry
out of the larks throat
oh people of the coming stage 110
In this pun we read an aspiration towards some sort of
new synthesis, a new race, the familiar prophecy of the
new Adam who must emerge beyond the
temptation of survival
oh lusterless hope
of victory in opposites h1
But the Poet's major task, his masterpiece, is
The Cycle. The Literate Projector is a notion which
fades out of the book, but serves here to show that in
this poem actions become words, or that words are the
action. It is Kool Everything, the media man, who must
call the poet a "Literate Projector". The recitation
which introduces Robart and his crew is prescribed by
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Gunslinger for the inhabitants of Universe City. Its
purpose is to show them who they are, and as audience,
they take part in a kind of celebration and become "We":
0 Singer, we are assembled here
beneath the rafters of the tanner's shed
Turn the Great Cycle of the Enchanted Wallet
of Robart the Valfather of this race
turn the Cycle of Acquisition
inside Cobalt Heads of these
otherwise lumpish listeners make
their azures senses warm Make your norm
their own - deliver them
from their Vicious Isolation h2
However, this "we" exists only in relation to a new "they"
- Robart and his crew, a new schism which ought in its
turn to be resolved. In fact, it is not. The direction
of the poem changes in Books III and IIII and the poem,
although it stops, does not come to an end. There is
neither resolution nor showdown; the threat of Robart
recedes, Slinger decides to go home. The conclusion
of the poem which is the consequence of Slinger's depar¬
ture, seems as arbitrary as the end of a factory shift:
But now ninos it is time for me to go inside
1 must catch the timetrain k3
Time and the nature of time are a central concern.
In the poem Time is understood as our condition, events
are framed by the cycles of the sun and the moon. Again
this accords with Heidegger, for whom Being or Dasein -
our Being in the World - must be understood in terms
of time:
Time must be brought to light - and genuinely
conceived - as the horizon for all understanding
of Being and for any way of interpreting it.
In order for us to discern this, time needs to
be explicated primordially as the region for the
Understanding of Being, and in terms of tempora¬
lity as the Being of Dasein, which understands
Being.h4
Heidegger, unlike Bergson, does not reject our ordinary
conception of time and physical limit:
We shall thereby restoreto the ordinary conception
the autonomy which is its rightful due, as against
Bergson's thesis that the time one has in mind in
this conception is space k5
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This acknowledgement of the obduracy of time,
"Time does not consent", may seem to sacrifice the sub¬
jective power which lies in the notion of Bergsonian
real time. But such extreme relativity leads to solip¬
sism while the ordinary conception permits us to share
a common world in which we communicate and where we may
still hope to transcend time by way of such vehicles
as the poem itself.
Gunslinger presents us with at least three orders
of time with which we must come to terms. These are
the poet's time, presumably 1965-1975, the period of
composition; the poem's time, apparently two days and
two nights; and our own time, the time it takes to read
it, the time of our first reading and of all our subse¬
quent readings. Reading convention is to blank out our
own time and that of the poet and to concentrate on the
poem's internal or fictional time. The historical critic
might wish to investigate the poet's time, the circum¬
stances of composition, personal and political background
and so forth. This approach might provide a firmer
understanding of the poem's genesis and growth, but the
conventional critic will still tend to think in terms
of an ideal poem, a Platonic text which the vagaries
of time and space and the poet's frailties have preven¬
ted him from achieving. As for the time in which we
ourselves receive the poem, this has, until quite recently,
been almost ignored. One of the major differences, for
instance, between a book-length poem like Gunslinger
and a lyric is quite simply the time it takes to read
and hence the difference in our mode of reception. Un¬
like a lyric, a book-length poem cannot be grasped all
at once, structure and detail, except perhaps very rarely
in a flash of insight, or moment of vision where the
reader shares in the poet's privilege of creation. As
a rule, neither poet nor reader can be expected to take
in the entirety. Rather, the long poem becomes a region
to which we return and which is gradually more familiar.
All we can hope for is the enrichment of the particular
aspects of particular moments in our relationship with
the work.
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The poem itself acts as a communication, as a
bridge between the poem's time and our time. Gunslinger"
does not allow us to forget these different orders of
time, so that we are forced to recognize the poem as
alive, continuing through composition and interpreta¬
tion. We cannot ignore the process of composition for
several different version or "takes" of Gunslinger are
extant, from the earliest prototype, "An Idle Visitation"
to the completed volume of Books I to IIII which came
out in 1975. The early poem has all the appearance of
spontaneous inspiration:
I published it in this book (The North Atlantic
Turbine) and then later I saw that it was the
start. It was so open-ended that I recognized
it later as being there for me if I wanted it.
I mean I had left it there for myself which I
didn't recognize straight off. I didn't start
out with the intention of writing a big poem.
But I saw it as a structure that was built in
such a way that it could be extended. 1,6
Something between lyric and narrative its has the surrea¬
list atmosphere of dream, perhaps a dream following an
unhappy love affair. In it I is the poet himself, or
a persona of him. In Books I and II, published in 1970.
I is already detached, becomes the ego and is killed.
In this version the love affair is reduced in signifi¬
cance when the portentous lines
as when two persons meet
it is the grove of Gethseiriane
no matter where they are k7
are eliminated.
The revisions of 1970 and 1975 do not simply alter
the text; they follow from the text. For instance, in
"An Idle Visitation" we are told
If it is all you have
the footstep in the flat above, in a foreign land
or any shimmer the city
sends you
the prompt sounds
of a metropolitan nearness
he doesn't have to unroll the map of love
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In 1970, this becomes
he will unroll the map of love
so that the level of personal emotion is reduced. The
first version stated that certain experiences of love
and loneliness enable one to appreciate Slinger's
domain without a map. In the second, I's experience
has qualified him as an initiate who may see the map
Of love. In the 1975 version, the "map of love" has
become the "map of locations", but we heed the successive
texts to understand how the two may be synonymous.
Love is energy and any locus, location, moment in space-
time is a meeting of energies - love makes the world go
round.
connection meant is
Instant in extent a proposal of limit h8
So we move from the lyric of lost love to the new physics
of the discontinuous universe.
Between 1970 and 1975 Dorn made a number of changes
which do not seem to make any radical difference to the
poem, but which may reflect changes in political pers¬
pectives and personal circumstances as well as interven¬
ing historical events. The Spanish American influence
is much more marked in 1975. "Slingo" becomes "Senor"
(p.114), "Far, far out" becomes "Muy, muy insoportable"
(p. 156) "you dig" becomes the neo-colonial "Comprendo.
Bwana". This may have to do with, on the one hand, Dorn's
own time in New Mexico, and, on the other hand, the
political emergence of ethnic minorities in the U.S.A.
and elsewhere.
In his interview with Barry Alpert, Dorn discusses
the composition of the long poem, especially in rela¬
tion to Book IIII:
...Book IV is formed in my mind in its most monstrous
sense. I'm just waiting to repeal a lot of that...
the moment comes when the pressure is so great that
there is no possibility of losing it because the
pressure itself just dictates when it comes. In
other words its a poetic content like a mega-content.
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Not a simple content as in a domestic poem where
the idea, where the distance from the beginning
to the end of the idea is within your fingers.
This poem we're talking about is not just measur¬
able in that way. Long poems interest me also,
not just the narrative. I think actually I
learned a lot from how Charles (Olson) worked,
not that he ever told me that much about it, but
I mean just from the demonstration of it. I
learned the possibilities of holding it over a
long time, you know, years. Really, it's so
much your life, actually. You cast out ahead of
yourself all this, like in a fan or a radius, and
you go forward in it and then the account of that
is art, it can be art. That's the ambition. 14 9
This reveals both that Dorn felt that he had an
overall conception of the poem and that the execution
over time was bou/lj to differ from the initial plan.
The time lapse has its own effects on the internal time
of the poem, for events which occur in Book I seem in
retrospect from Book IIII to have altered. Moreover,
external time seems at least once to intrude into the
poem's time:
Lets hear about your tour, I
Lil requested,
since that cold sicksties night
in Blackturkey, New Mexico, remember
when you got that cubic mile of air
pumped into your head?
We'd like to hear how ameliorating
you thought any of that stuff was 5 0
This could refer to something outside the action of the
poem, but it could equally be a reference to I's initia¬
tory turn-on in Book I:
Here
he said, passing me the cigarette 51
which leads to his temporary death in Book II. At the
same time, the allusion may extend beyond I to the actual
experience of Dorn or some other person.
The time or time-space of the poem, its internal
history is exceedingly difficult to follow. Neverthe¬
less it is possible to extrapolate a sequence of events,
of a plot from the recurrences and fragmentations of
the poem.
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As we have seen, there is a basic opposition between
"we" and 'them", most clearly defined as Gunslinger and
the stage-coach passengers on the one side and Hughes/
Robart and his crew, on the other. They are both engaged
on journeys, either in pursuit of or in flight from each
other, but the stage-coach appears by day while the train
seems to go by night. The action of the poem apparently
covers two days and two nights, although there is every
indication that this period is arbitrary, unreal. It
is experienced through drugs, it takes place during an
Epactos - the period in of days by which the solar cycle
exceeds the lunar cycle and which in Mexico and Mayan
culture was particularly sacred, known as Waiting Days
when nothing was done, houses were cleared out, old
crockery smashed and the new year prepared for. These
two "unreal days"
The phone on the stagecoach wall then Rang
and the Horse picked it up
February 31st.' he said into the mouthpiece 52
contain condensed or implicit all previous and future
action. What takes place has happened before and will be
repeated. There is no confrontation; nothing is con¬
clusive .
In Book I, I meets Gunslinger in Mesilla which lies
in New Mexico, on the Rio Grande, close to the borders
of Mexico and Texas. I is also introduced to the Horse,
Singer/Poet and Lil. However, already events are re¬
peating themselves. The talking horse has passed through
Mesilla before, on that occasion with a Texan; he was
introduced to drugs by a wrangler from Wyoming, "THE
Word", and they left for Amarillo on a stage-coach. On
this occasion, Slinger whom we may consider as the Logos,
meets and again I is turned on and breaks into speech.
In the first episode there is conflict over a girl which
is transferred to the Horse; in the second I has a girl
in his background, but the centre of interest seems to
move from her to the Horse as the Horse changes from
a neurasthenic mare to a talking stallion. As Book I
closes they all set off in pursuit of Hughes who is in
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Boston or Las Vegas. Their journey is northwards along
the River Rio Grande, presumably on Interstate Highway
25. In Book II they pick up Kool Everything and I dies;
the company arrive in Truth or Consequences known as
Universe City where they set up a performance of The
Cycle on a machine called the Literate Projector.
While doing this they meet Dr. Flamboyant, a Ph.D. whose
presence suggests that Universe City is also University
City.
The screening of The Cycle is in fact the delivery
of a poem, a performance which mimics our own relation¬
ship with the work as a whole. The planes of reality
are further confused because events in The Cycle occur
as they are recited in the lives of the listeners, while
the events in the lives of listeners, Gunslinger and
the stage-coach company are incorporated into The Cycle.
Because the whole is a work of language word can create
events as well as recording and recalling them, a form
of magic poets have aspired to but which cannot be achieved
directly in the physical world, although one justifica¬
tion of poetry is its power to invent possibilities which
may be put into physical effect.
I am not alone in finding the events of The Cycle
baffling:
I really lost almost everybody on The Cycle.
That's why in a strange way, I felt it had
to have some illustrations and color and so
forth because the language is kind of un-
remittently obscure on top. But any careful
reader would have known that this is simply
what was going to happen all the time. Which
was that Robart left the hotel he was staying
in in Boston to go to Las Vegas... His exis¬
tence is an echo, in a strange way, it's an
echo of the psychological condition of the
United States of America. Therefore, the
interior is a negative quantity, its anti-
gravitational. It doesn't suddenly involve
astro-physics. It's like a black hole among us...53
Nevertheless, we can extract significant structural
features. Robart is one aspect of Hughes, though by the
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very fact of his appearance, not the whole of the Hughes
mystery, and therefore not the authentic Hughes, or
object of the quest. He leaves Boston with his hench¬
men, apparently by night, disguised as the cheese in
a cheeseburger. It is suggested that power and possess¬
ions are kept from the people despite the affectations
of democracy. The obscurity of the language and surrea¬
listic narrative disguises fairly direct political satire
in the tradition of Blake, Shelley and Byron:
In the dangerous disguise of Nobody
He ran up a flag of John Adams in drag 5k
Unlike Slinger, Robart is sealed from the outside world;
he does not experience actual phenomena, only data as
it is relayed by various electronic media. The sugges¬
tion is that this journey is also a drug trip:
34 Now the slow exotic periods of the wheels
Across the sections of track as the car
Goes over the accordion rails to the Main Line
The design of the Goddess herself
35 Is tacked to the board as the car tacs
To the Main Line, this is not about haulage
Tied up at the dock in ships, this is the Inventory
And then the Overhaul of the fucking mind 5 5
We are confused, because this seems, at least in part, to
be the mission of Gunslinger. Robart, though evil, or
apparently evil, seems to need the stage-coach party,
and it seems, conversely, to need him. If Robart's
carriage is negative, a black hole, it must need the
positive, i.e. the Stage-coach to feed it:
Find me a crack that ain't been surrendered in
Find me a crack from Way up ahead 5 6
Robart's car seems to represent the trap of unauthentic
Dasein, the trap of convention:
When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in
such a way that what it transmits is made so in¬
accessible, proximally and for the most part that
it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what
has come down to us and delivers it over to self-
evidence; it blocks access to those primordial
'sources' from which categories and concepts handed
down to us have been quite genuinely drawn 5 7
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50Each datum is caught I got em
And stored cold in a special future
• •• ••• ••• •••
52What has been run thus far
Is what has been run before
Its what can be seen from the floor
It wont make us lock up the store 5 8
Robart has a right-hand man, Al, code-named Rupert, who
may be just another form of Robart himself. Al may be
one of the living Atlantes, half-men, half-columns, who
service the chariot, or may himself have a favourite
whos name is Al
After his master 59
The Atlantes tend the high powered communication equip¬
ment through which they receive word of the stage¬
coach :
It9I think this is it Boss
The crack we been waiting for
The scanners have picked off
A telegram to Parmenides
50From a point on the arc
2 days minus 4 corners
We sure know where that's at Boss,
We can find it in the dark 6 0
This news returns us to Universe City at sunset and pre¬
cipitates the continuation of the journey
from the smell brought in by the winde
We have news of the Master Nark
who trailed us into your cycle 61
The inner and outer poems have fused:
Yet there is another, an Unknown
Who tracks us
Some one whose fame is his Name.62
This someone is the full mystery of Hughes, which the
various named emanations in the Car fail to equal. A
reversal has taken place, the trackers have become the
track, or perhaps each is the other's lure.
In Book III the stage-coach continues along a route
which be traced on the map. Route 25 does parallel the
railway track along the Rio Grande between Los Padillos
-379-
and Algodones through the lands of the Sandias Indians.
From here, however, the journey becomes more difficult
to trace, as Slinger may perhaps be warning us as well
as the Poet:
the poet interrupted, Slinger?
Do you foresee the Master Nark
Interpreting our route
Thats not possible to say
returned the Slinger swaying in the coach
He's so complicated he believes
the shortest distance between two states
is a straight line 6 3
Certainly, the next mentioned village, "Mexican Hat"
is in Utah, miles from the Rio Grande, on the other
side of Four Corners which itself lies on the inter¬
sections of the state lines of Colorado, New Mexico,
Arizona and Utah. Yet three or four pages later we
return to Madrid and Cerillos just outside Santa Fe.
When the stage-coach reaches Santa Fe they make a connec¬
tion or pick up some drugs, which are in other words,
or metaphorically, the Night Letter from the Secretary
to Parmenides. At the same time, Dr. Flamboyant rejoins
the crew through his Turning machine. Everything seems
prepared for confrontation in Book IIII.
As it opens we find ourselves travelling through
Colorado with Robart towards Four Corners. Apparently
he has two armies under his command, the Mogollons,
perhaps a native tribe from Mogollon, New Mexico, and
the Single Spacers. However, for some reason, the
Mogollons and the Single Spacers are set on each other,
Robart loses control and flees over the border. The
reader is totally confused about what has happened and
in the end it seems fairly unimportant or unreal.
Perhaps it is all part of The Cycle screened in Universe
City:
But that's no hoss
the Doctor said, look
at the screen 6 4
The physical events of Book III and IIII are less
important than what is happening to "Our Mind" during
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this drug-influenced quest after knowledge. In Book
III it is winter, the nadir of the poem when the lack
of the ego, or some sort of renewing organizing princi¬
ple is felt. The prologue acknowledges that the death
of the ego is not enough; new life involves conflict
and will:
the dissected earth includes the contrary
over which our heads are not pervasive







the maneuvers of a brilliant ghost
who returns with a longer stride
in his eye 6 5
It becomes necessary to acknowledge and accept the
negative. Consequently, the clear distinction between
the inhabitants of the stage-coach and those in the
Winged Car breaks down. I returns to the stage-coach
as Indica Jack, a consummation which even Slinger prays
for:
Oh Jack, the Slinger prayed
I want you to feel
and in your feeling move your bones
for the want now of your access
in this time so little beyond you
and which needs your moving nerve 5 6
But this Indica Jack who has "got his gnosis in a sack
on his back"57 is a much more problematic character
than the naive individual who perished in Book II. He
is the Secretary to Parmenides who delivers his message,
the Night Letter, via a
goggled bi-plane pilot
hung from a pure hemp line 6 8
but this night letter seems to link him to Sllab. Indeed
he may even be Bean, Sllab's messenger. So much is hinted
in this complicated piece of word-play put into the mouth
of the Pilot, where the verbal ambiguities reflect the
ambiguities of reality.
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And I have brought you the data
in this here night letta





the 'other' hand of reality
Is that the code?
No that's the imagery
The Code
is Sllab -
I'll take a stab the Slinger said
Who's that
There is but one Sllab ahead
(don't look back
and Bean is his messenger
We have reckoned that
the Slinger said
from the shape of your head 6 9
We must recognize here that reference is being made to
different types of drugs and their relative merits.
Throughout the poem the special language of the drug
culture acts as a barrier to the uninitiated reader.
In the first place, he may simply fail to understand
and secondly he is left unsure of how he should react
to the apparent mythologizing of drug use. However,
behind the drug imagery we recognize the recurrent
theme: the relation of the One to the Many and the error
of asserting the reality of either at the expense of
the other. Again, the resolution is discovered in
process, the oscillation between the primordial and the
ultimate, the discovery of the future in the past:
"There is but one Sllab ahead...and Bean (or Been) is
his messenger".
From what we know of Sllab he seems to be the same
as Hughes, the unnameable, the vanished God, the void
behind all physical and social phenomena. Confronted
again with the themes of Being and Nothingness we are
returned to our own time and forced to extrapolate events
and significant structure from the poem. In a work
which is so ambiguous and obscure, the reader is made
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to participate and made to be conscious of his parti¬
cipation in the creation of meaning. Each reading will
lead to an extended or variant interpretation of the
kaleidoscopic repeating elements in the poem. Thus the
process of the poem continues through its readership
and the possibilities for changing or enlarging under¬
standing come from the reader's own circumstances, his
time, his awareness, his knowledge. For instance, my
own interpretation of the poem was considerably altered
even by my first very limited reading in Heidegger's
philosophy. This is inevitable, even though many of
the Heideggerian implications or echoes which I have
identified may not have been intended by Dorn. The poem
is so open that the reader is tempted, even obliged,
to impose his own structure upon it, a structure which
yields temporary satisfaction, but which in the end the
poem resists, inciting the reader to furthe efforts.
This is what should happen if the reader is sufficiently
engaged, but there is a danger that the opposite may
happen, that the reader may be so baffled, so irritated
by the work that he rejects it. Dorn may have come close
to this, risking the good will even of those best-
disposed towards the work, very largely through the
fragmentation of Book IIII and the excess of private
reference discussed earlier.
In the end, as reader I can only offer my own inter¬
pretation, forced by the poem to acknowledge that my
construction is temporary and subjective, conditioned
by the current set of my ideas and knowledge, condi¬
tioned by my interaction with the text at this point
of my time.
Gunslinger reenacts traditional themes. At the
level of parody and at the same time quite seriously,
it is a quest for identity, for self-knowledge, a con¬
sideration of the problems of good and evil, of the
nature of time, of the nature of being. The characters
are not discriminated individuals but parts of the
psyche, at once the poet's psyche and the representative
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human psyche.70 They cannot therefore be wholly sepa¬
rated and their roles are often interchangeable. Even
the names are ambiguous: I/Poet, Slinger/Singer. These
characters cover the range of the human mind as it spans
from the animal to the divine. As in traditional epic
and myth the hero, half-god, "semi-dios" is accompanied
by a creature who is half-man, half-animal, at once lower
than man and through his innocence, his noble savagery, -
higher.
In the first group of characters Lil is included
presumably as the feminine component of the psyche. Her
part is perhaps the least satisfactory for too often
Dorn does not speak through her, but about her. Too
often she fails to rise above her stereotype:
I love Lil, but she gets to seem more like a
resident woman. It's true reflection of what's
actual - the woman in a man's world which is an
occasion you don't have to walk far to find.
I treat her with all the respect I have for her.
That is a problem actually.
This is an honest statement, and it is difficult to see
how Dorn could have done otherwise, since he can only
write from the state of his own mind. There are signs
in the increasing fragmentation of Book IIII that Lil
may be moving closer to the other characters; in fact,
at the end of the poem she seems to have a special
relationship with Slinger:
I have this incomparable feeling
and it keeps calling me home
a feeling of Wyoming
I'd like to get back
before they tear off the dome 7 2
This speech parallels Slinger's own farewell speech and
seems to refer back to an earlier version of the action,
when the Slinger figure was the wrangler from Wyoming
who first introduced the Horse to drugs. Yet her apart¬
ness from the male characters in the final version is,
if anything, increased, especially as all her speeches
are italicized. As "resident woman" Lil accommodates,
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with some degree of strain, all the female stereo¬
types; whore with the heart of gold, sweetheart, the
eternal feminine
Lil,
I didn't expect to see
here - we were in Smyrna
together, now called Izmir
when they burned the place
Down, we were
very young then 7 3
She may also have been Gladys (or Helen. 1970) in Egypt
(p.35, "I was with Gladys in Egypt"). Yet in the end
Lil's importance is peripheral.
The real action concerns the quest for the mystery,
code-named Hughes or Sllab. Originally this mystery is
conceived as the eternal One, the undivided reality behind
all appearances, the integrated God at the end of the
Ages. However, as the poem develops we encounter the
problem of evil. If the stage-coach passengers are seek¬
ing the One which is total self-knowledge and integra¬
tion of the psyche, where the ego has been overcome and
reduced to its proper importance as guide or director
of a totally aware consciousness, then the evil in the
world must be either assimilated or destroyed. At first,
it seems there will be a traditional confrontation between
Slinger and the forces of darkness in the Winged Car.
However, there are difficulties. Is Hughes/Sllab the
One, the plenum to be achieved, or the dragon of the
pit, Tiamator Grendel, to be fled or destroyed. To
reflect this difficulty, halfway through the poem the
hunters become the hunted; Slinger and Poet flee the
Master Nark. Yet Robart and Slinger are still headed
for the same destination, Four Corners, though it's not
apparent that they get there, unless the Hill of Beans
is at Four Corners and is not the sacred Apache Mescal
Mountain. On the other hand, geography becomes so scram¬
bled in the end of the poem that it could plausibly be
argued that it is both. But the gathering of all the
forces is never complete. There is no confrontation,
Robart red-shifts away, Slinger returns to his own planet.
-385-
An ending would betray reality, the reality which is
process. To achieve wholeness apart from the wholeness
of the moment would be to end time; "connection meant
is /Instant in extent a proposal of limit". Each moment
has its synthesis, greater or less, which is lost as it
happens. As the past becomes unreal it becomes avail¬
able, in Whitehead's language, for prehension in the
next actual event.
Everything is prehensible
For from that which is not
we fall off 7h
The unreal is the unrealised, the void is what we
do not know or have not acknowledged. As it is unknown,
it is evil and other. The easy, ignorant way is not to
know, to renounce the evil behind society, to turn away
or drop out. But to choose this path is to reject the
possibility of enlightenment or self-knowledge. If, for
instance, drugs are used as the path to spiritual know-*-
ledge, at the same time the user acknowledges the power
of the Man and implicates himself in the capitalist ss
system. In dialectic, synthesis proceeds from positive
and negative. In Gunslinger the evil of Hughes is to
some extent discovered and recognized; Slinger lights
up a Sullivan (p.180) which was Robart's attribute earlier
in the book; I, on his return, is no angel but behaves
with many of the characteristics of the Ugly American:
Just for today
I will not be afraid
and I will enjoy murdering
now that I can perform
all by myself, an act of oblivion 75
At one level he is acknowledging his own complicity in
American experience and the Vietnam war:
A 50 Caliber Derringer
sprung out of I's right sleeve
and drilled two test holes
in the manager's skull
Whaaa, Everything stammered
as the manager hung by a finger
from Everything's ear
It's OK I said, theres no Ban
on mobile weapons, remember?
Salt talks,
or as Dr. Johnson said:
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if Public war be allowed
to be consistent with morality
Private war must be equally so 76
We may not like the new I very much. For although
each synthesis is doomed to perish, to become unreal it
is still an achievement. The fact that the process is
endless, or as endless as Time, does not make it futile.
Acknowledgement of evil is a necessary step in over¬
coming it. Increase in what is known returns us imme¬
diately to what is unknown, but the reality of each
moment is enriched by the increase in knowledge. So
the poem has no conclusion, it gives us no answers, or
at least it gives us a number of different answers and
fresh answers with fresh questions on each rereading.
The poem fulfills the function of traditional epic and
myth. Combining and recombining the basic elements of
our experience, it instructs, entertains and unites us.
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In this study I have been concerned with the possibility
of a long poem in open form. I have discussed four long
poems which in their different ways move towards open form
and which may be interpreted in terms of a poetics of process.
The four poems selected are very different from each other
yet from these readings of them and from the consideration
of contemporary developments in criticism and poetic theory
certain conclusions emerge.
Each of these poems has pretensions towards epic. Each
has a public dimension, each is concerned with myth and
history, the traditional themes of epic. Yet none of them
uses the traditional epic structure of narrative. As poems
of open form their structure is internal and proceeds from
the generation of metaphor. Theories of metaphor and of
open or organic form go back far behind the Imagists, at
least to Coleridge. However, in the modern period the
recognition of the centrality of the image, the image which
is the product of metaphoric process, came from the Imagists.
For this reason, it seemed reasonable to begin the investi¬
gation of poetic theory with the origins of the Imagist
movement in the work of T.E. Hulme and, behind him, in the
writings of Henri Bergson.
It became clear that although the moment of Imagism
united a number of significant poets in the attempt to reform
and renew poetry, the ideas or doctrines which it embraced
were differently interpreted and gave rise to two very
different developments in poetry. These two.strands of
thought were already identified by T.E. Hulme in his distinct¬
ion between romanticism and classicism, monism and dualism.
As we have seen, Hulme declared himself as a classicist and
a duallist. But we also saw that the poem of open form, the
poem whose creative principle is the development of metaphor,
must be based on a unitive and dynamic metaphysics. If
metaphor within the poem is to be allowed to determine the
poem's course, then the poet must be moved by a conviction
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of the real significance and effectiveness of language.
Metaphor works by establishing connections between
different elements, in I.A. Richards's terminology, between
tenor and vehicle. But the metaphor itself is neither
tenor nor vehicle, but the connection between or product
of the two. It is a recorded recognition of sameness in
difference and as such attests to notions of pattern, order
and structure in the universe.
Ezra Pound, the Vorticists and later, the Objectivists
placed their faith in the congruence of mind and the
external world. For Pound, the image-vortex was a concen¬
tration of energy, a fusion of subjective and objective in
itself revelatory and at the same time a source of energy
from which further images and ideas might spring:
The image is not an idea. It is a radiant node or cluster,
it is what I can, and must perforce, call a VORTEX, from
which, and through which, and into which, ideas are con¬
stantly rushing. 1
We recognise the same concept in Olson's Projective
Verse:
ONE PERCEPTION MUST IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY LEAD TO A
FURTHER PERCEPTION 2
For these poets, from Pound through to Olson, the poem
has the same reality as every other form, including forms
of consciousness, in that it is an organisation or structure
of energy. As such it is capable of being influenced by the
world, of prehending its being from mind and matter, and it
is also capable of working on the world, of articulating
and communicating reality. In their belief in the funda¬
mental unity of mind and matter, these poets are, as Hulme
saw, humanists or at least inclined towards natural religion.
Eliot and the New Critics, on the other hand, adhered to
the religion or classicist position and a dualist metaphysics
which manifests itself in a dualistic theory of knowledge.
The term "Post-Modern" has an ugly, neologistic ring
about it, but it does serve to distinguish those writers
who belong to the line of development we have traced from
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Pound to Olson from the other, conventionally accepted
tradition of modernism, dominated by Eliot and the New
Critics. David Jones and Hugh MacDiarmid, the two earlier,
British poets discussed in this study, fall somewhere between
the two schools. Although influenced by the poetic theories
of their time, they were both eccentrics and this eccentricity
allowed their poetry to develop towards "proto" post¬
modernism and an anticipation of open form.
In the case of David Jones, his cosmology is unitive,
but theoretically at least, this unity is predicated on the
goodness of God, and is thus consistent both with Hulme's
doctrines and with Catholic theology. In fact, as we have
seen, the vision to emerge from The Anathemata is surely
heretical, for it is fundamentally humanist and celebrates
Man as the Artist. It is Man who creates God, or himself
as God, through his art and the central or informing idea
of the poem, for which even the crucifixion is a metaphor,
in the human act of creation.
MacDiarmid vehemently eschews religion and of course
he avows, in however perverse a form, Marxist dialectical
materialism. However, his poetry may be said to lie some¬
where between Whitman and Whitehead, like Whitman in his
desire to write it all down, like Whitehead in his oscillation
between the two Silences, the Silence of Chaos and the
Silence of the achieved Logos, the articulated plenum,
between the Category of the Primordial and the Category of
the Ultimate. But for MacDiarmid also, the place where
extremes do meet is in the language of the poem and it is
the poem which is the instrument of knowledge taking us
from the known into the unknown, forwarding evolution as it
increases the degree of organisation and raises consciousness.
We have seen that the notion of different kinds of
knowledge, scientific and poetic, is profoundly unsatis¬
factory. Yet we can understand the attractiveness of
positivist scientific method, or rational empiricism.
Knowledge as the product of reasoned conclusions drawn
from objective observations of the external world offers a
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possibility of stability and security absent since the
decline of religious belief. Even if the descriptive and
conceptualising language of science is abstract and at a
remove from reality, nevertheless it offers explanations
and has predictive force. Moreover, rational argument
and discussion in a world where irrationalism has led to
havoc and destruction may seem to be the only safeguard
of civilised life and values. The mode of rational enquiry
has created the modern world and from it man has gained
huge knowledge. To abandon it may seem a foolhardy enter¬
prise .
Nevertheless, the notion of scientific knowledge
which the epistemological dualists propound in their poetic
theories has itself been abandoned by contemporary scientists.
They, ironically, have moved much closer to the traditional
idea of poetry.
The uncertainty principle rigorously brings us to the
realisation that there is no "My Way" which is separate
from the world around us. It brings into question the
very existence of an "objective" reality, as does comple¬
mentarity and the concept of particles as correlations.
The tables have been turned. "The exact sciences" no
longer study an objective reality that runs its course
regardless of our interest in it or not, leaving us to
fare as best we can while it goes its predetermined way.
Science, at the level of subatomic events, is no longer
exact, the distinction between objective and subjective
has vanished, and the portals through which the universe
manifests itself are, as we once knew a long time ago,
those impotent, passive witnesses to its unfolding, the
"I"s, of which we, insignificant we, are examples. The
Cogs in the Machine have become the Creators of the Universe.
If the new physics has led us anywhere, it is back to our¬
selves which, of course, is the only place that we could
go. 3
As Olson recognised, Man is returned firmly to the
centre of the universe. He is, in Heidegger's terms,
Dasein, "Being-in-the World" and the world is his respon¬
sibility and care. The poet perceives and articulates
relations between things through metaphors which are at
once discoveries and creations. Thus the poem and the
scientific theory are fundamentally similar; they are
operations which structure and explain the world. However,
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these structures are neither permanent nor independent
but the product of the interaction of mind and matter.
Turning to Piaget, we discover, in his theory of genetic
epistemology that
There is no structure apart from construction, either
abstract or genetic ...
The idea of a formal system of abstract structures is thereby
transformed into that of the construction of a never completed
whole, the limits of formalisation constituting the grounds
for incompleteness, or, as we put it earlier, incomplete¬
ness being a necessary consequence of the fact that there
is no "terminal" or "absolute" form because any content
is form relative to some inferior content and any form
the content for some higher form. ^
The evolutionary aspect of this theory of incomplete¬
ness bears comparison with Whitehead's action of the lure
of creativity through which every completed event becomes
potential content for a new form or concrescence.
In the philosophy of evolutionary organism conscious¬
ness is conceived as a characteristic of higher organisms
which has reached its furthest development in man. At the
same time, consciousness must always be consciousness of
something; of necessity, it carries its world along with
it. Thus it does not even make sense to separate conscious¬
ness from the physical world or to argue whether structure
proceeds from the world or from mind. Structure is a
product of mind and the world. It is, in Aristotle's
words, 5 "the arrangement of the incidents".
The poem which articulates consciousness in language
is thus both historical event and the discovery of myth.
It has objective reality as do the relations and metaphors
contained within it. However, the degree of that reality,
the degree of the poem's truth lies not in its corres¬
pondence to some external and immutable absolute truth,
but in its capacity to satisfy, its adequacy to the present
moment. However, this criterion is not simply the criterion
of the poem but also of the scientific theory.
So when in Robert Duncan's poetry connections and
metaphors are established through puns and through the
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poet's allowing the sound of words to carry him on, these
relations are no less real nor less valid than those
established through visual or semantic images. Even in
Gunslinger where many of the connections and perceptions
may escape us, we cannot deny the poem's reality as a
product of consciousness. We may however find it adequate
in its capacity to satisfy our sense of our own present
reality.
When we considered the traditional function of epic
we saw it as concerned with myth and history. We saw it
as having a public and social significance as it rehersed
the history of its people in order to reinforce their myth.
Epic served to confirm a people in their activity and to
project the pattern of their future activity. The problem
with this reinforcement of myth may be compared with one
of the disadvantages of many theories of structuralism.
They assume an underlying, changing order, in the case of
epic, a static society. Such a view sits oddly with a
metaphysics of process, yet its attractions, particularly
in the poetry of Robert Duncan, are clear. However, Piaget's
notion of structure as evolutionary may again prove useful.
The poem attempts to articulate the structure of reality,
but that reality is the reality of the present, different
from, more than the past. Therefore, the structure which
the poet will discover or create will be different from
any other structure although it will draw on previous
structures. The intensity of satisfaction of the poem
will depend on its capacity to include or prehend and
organise previous structures or forms. Moreover, in the
degree to which it succeeds in articulating the present so
will it increase the possibility of the future.
It must be emphasised that this is not a claim that
mind is all-powerful, or that man can through hiswill
create whatever world he desires. That would be a reversion
to arrant idealism. The future is not predictable, or not
certainly predictable. We only have probabilities. But
what the poet can do is recognise the world, respond to it,
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be "equal to the real itself". As the world's consciousness,
man is responsible for the world. The completion of the
Mystical Body, the reunification of the Logos, may be the
creative lure for the poem and the world but the actual
union of word and world occurs only in the present moment.
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